Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Animalism" by Stephan Blatti
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- Árnadóttir, Steinvör Thöll, 2010,
“Functionalism and Thinking Animals”, Philosophical
Studies, 147(3): 347–354. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9287-0 (Scholar)
- Atherton, Margaret, 1983, “Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 8: 273–293. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1983.tb00470.x (Scholar)
- Ayers, Michael, 1991, Locke, 2 vols., London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1997, “Why Constitution Is Not Identity”, The Journal of Philosophy, 94(12): 599. doi:10.2307/2564596 (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “What Am I?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(1): 151–159. doi:10.2307/2653462 (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173124 (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “The Ontological Status of Persons”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 370–388. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00207.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487545 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Animalism vs.
Constitutionalism”, in Blatti and Snowdon (eds) 2016: 50–63.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0003 (Scholar)
- Bailey, Andrew M., 2016, “You Are an Animal”, Res Philosophica, 93(1): 205–218. doi:10.11612/resphil.2016.93.1.9 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Our Animal Interests”, Philosophical Studies, 174(9): 2315–2328. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0800-6 (Scholar)
- Belshaw, Christopher, 2011, “Animals, Identity and Persistence”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(3): 401–419. doi:10.1080/00048402.2010.497190 (Scholar)
- Blatti, Stephan, 2007, “Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases”, Philosophical Psychology, 20(5): 595–608. doi:10.1080/09515080701540867 (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “A New Argument for Animalism”, Analysis, 72(4): 685–690. doi:10.1093/analys/ans102 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Headhunters”, in Blatti
and Snowdon (eds.) 2016: 162–179.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0008 (Scholar)
- Blatti, Stephan and Paul F. Snowdon (eds.), 2016, Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Bolton, Martha Brand, 1994, “Locke on Identity: The Scheme
of Simple and Compounded Things”, in Individuation and
Identity in Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant, Kenneth
F. Barber and Jorge J. E. Gracia (eds.), Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press, 103–131. (Scholar)
- Campbell, Scott, 2001, “Neo-Lockeanism and Circularity”, Philosophia, 28(1–4): 477–489. doi:10.1007/bf02379796 (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(2): 339–358. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00621.x (Scholar)
- Campbell, Tim and Jeff McMahan, 2016, “Animalism and the
Varieties of Conjoined Twinning”, in Blatti and Snowdon (eds.)
2016: 229–252. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0011 (Scholar)
- Carruthers, Peter, 1986, Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Carter, William R, 1984, “Death and Bodily Transfiguration”, Mind, 93(371): 412–418. doi:10.1093/mind/xciii.371.412 (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “Our Bodies, Our Selves”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66(3): 308–319. doi:10.1080/00048408812343391 (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “How to Change Your Mind”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19(1): 1–14. doi:10.1080/00455091.1989.10716464 (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “Why Personal Identity Is Animal Identity”, Logos (University of Santa Clara), 11: 71–81. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Will I Be a Dead Person?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(1): 167–171. doi:10.2307/2653464 (Scholar)
- Chappell, Vere, 1989, “Locke and Relative Identity”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 6(1): 69–83. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, Roderick M., 1976, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, La Salle, IL: Open Court. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978 [1989], “Is There a Mind-Body
Problem?”, Philosophic Exchange, 9(1): 25–34.
Reprinted 1989, in On Metaphysics, Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 119–128.
[Chisholm 1978 available online] (Scholar)
- Daly, Chris and David Liggins, 2013, “Animalism and Deferentialism: Animalism and Deferentialism”, Dialectica, 67(4): 605–609. doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12047 (Scholar)
- DeGrazia, David, 2005, Human Identity and Bioethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614484 (Scholar)
- Descartes, René, 1984, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (trans./eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818998 (Scholar)
- Feldman, Fred, 1992, Confrontations with the Reaper: A
Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195089288.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Foster, John, 1991, The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Gendler, Tamar Szabó, 2002, “Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 52(206): 34–54. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00251 (Scholar)
- Gillett, Carl, 2013, “What You Are and the Evolution of Organs, Souls and Superorganisms: A Reply to Blatti”, Analysis, 73(2): 271–279. doi:10.1093/analys/ant005 (Scholar)
- Hacker, P. M. S., 2007, Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. doi:10.1002/9780470692165 (Scholar)
- Hershenov, David B., 2005a, “Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?”, Mind, 114(453): 31–59. doi:10.1093/mind/fzi031 (Scholar)
- –––, 2005b, “Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms”, Theoria, 71(1): 29–37. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2005.tb01003.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Shoemaker’s Problem of Too Many Thinkers”, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 80: 225–236. doi:10.5840/acpaproc20068017 (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity”:, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 82(3): 481–502. doi:10.5840/acpq200882332 (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons”, Dialogue, 48(2): 291–312. doi:10.1017/s001221730909026x (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Personal Identity”, in Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, Neil A. Manson and Robert W. Barnard (eds.), London: Continuum Publishing, pp. 198–222. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Four-Dimensional Animalism”, in Blatti and Snowdon (eds.) 2016: 208–226. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0010 (Scholar)
- Hume, David, 1738, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. (Scholar)
- Hudson, Hud, 2001, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “I Am Not an Animal!” in Persons: Human and Divine, Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 216–234. (Scholar)
- Johansson, Jens, 2007, “What Is Animalism?”, Ratio, 20(2): 194–205. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00357.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Animal Ethics”, in Blatti and Snowdon (eds.) 2016: 283–302. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0014 (Scholar)
- Johnston, Mark, 1987, “Human Beings”, The Journal of Philosophy, 84(2): 59–83. doi:10.2307/2026626 (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Constitution Is Not Identity”, Mind, 101(401): 89–106. doi:10.1093/mind/101.401.89 (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “‘Human Beings’
Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal”, in Oxford Studies in
Metaphysics, volume 3, Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 33–74. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, Surviving Death, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Remnant Persons”, in
Blatti and Snowdon (eds.) 2016: 89–127.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0005 (Scholar)
- Lewis, D. K., 1976 [1983], “Survival and Identity”, in
The Identities of Persons, A. O. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley:
University of California Press, pp. 17–40; reprinted in
Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983, pp. 55–77. (Scholar)
- Liao, S. Matthew, 2006, “The Organism View Defended”:, Monist, 89(3): 334–350. doi:10.5840/monist200689315 (Scholar)
- Locke, John, 1689 [1975], An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J., 1996, Subjects of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511598005 (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Identity, Constitution, and the Simplicity of the Self”, in Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons, Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 139–158. (Scholar)
- Luper, Steven, 2014, “Persimals”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 52 (Spindel Supplement): 140–162. doi:10.1111/sjp.12062 (Scholar)
- Mackie, David, 1999a, “Animalism versus Lockeanism: No Contest”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(196): 369–376. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00148 (Scholar)
- –––, 1999b, “Personal Identity and Dead People”, Philosophical Studies, 95(3): 219–242. doi:10.1023/a:1004239225105 (Scholar)
- Mackie, J. L., 1976, Problems from Locke, Oxford:
Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198750366.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Madden, Rory, 2016a, “Thinking Parts”, in Blatti and Snowdon (eds.) 2016: 180–207. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0009 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016b, “Human Persistence”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 16(17): 1–18. [Madden 2016b available online] (Scholar)
- Martin, Raymond and John Barresi (eds), 2003, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John, 1997, “Reductionism and the First Person”, in Reading Parfit, Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 230–250. (Scholar)
- McMahan, Jeff, 2002, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the
Margins of Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
doi:10.1093/0195079981.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Merricks, Trenton, 2001, Objects and Persons, Oxford:
Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199245363.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Miller, Kenneth, 1996, “Together Forever”,
Life, April: 44–56.
[Miller 1996 available online] (Scholar)
- Nichols, Shaun and Michael Bruno, 2010, “Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical Study”, Philosophical Psychology, 23(3): 293–312. doi:10.1080/09515089.2010.490939 (Scholar)
- Noonan, Harold W., 1998, “Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48(192): 302–318. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00102 (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 51(202): 83–90. doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00216.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Personal Pronoun Revisionism—Asking the Right Question”, Analysis, 72(2): 316–318. doi:10.1093/analys/ans037 (Scholar)
- –––, 1989 [2019], Personal Identity, London: Routledge, 3rd edition. (Scholar)
- Olson, Eric T., 1997, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195134230.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2002a, “Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’”, Philosophical Topics, 30(1): 189–207. doi:10.5840/philtopics20023016 (Scholar)
- –––, 2002b, “What Does Functionalism Tell Us about Personal Identity?”, Noûs, 36(4): 682–698. doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00407 (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “An Argument for Animalism”, in Martin and Barresi (eds.) 2003: 318–334. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Animalism and the Corpse Problem”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(2): 265–274. doi:10.1080/713659837 (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Replies”, Abstracta, 1 (special issue): 32–42. (See Other Internet Resources.) (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 52 (Spindel Supplement): 24–40. doi:10.1111/sjp.12073 (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “On Parfit’s View that We Are Not Human Beings”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 76: 39–56. doi:10.1017/s1358246115000107 (Scholar)
- Parfit, Derek, 1971, “Personal Identity”, Philosophical Review, 80(1): 3–27. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford:
Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019824908x.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 1995 [2003], “The Unimportance of
Identity”, in Identity, Henry Harris (ed.), Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 13–45; reprinted in Martin and
Barresi (eds.) 2003: 292–317. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Persons, Bodies, and Human
Beings”, in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics,
Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford:
Blackwell, pp. 177–208. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “We Are Not Human Beings”, Philosophy, 87(1): 5–28. in Blatti and Snowdon (eds.) 2016: 31–49. doi:10.1017/s0031819111000520 doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0002 (Scholar)
- Persson, Ingmar, 1999, “Our Identity and the Separability of Persons and Organisms”, Dialogue, 38(3): 519–534. doi:10.1017/s0012217300046874 (Scholar)
- Puccetti, Roland, 1973, “Brain Bisection and Personal Identity”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 24(4): 339–355. doi:10.1093/bjps/24.4.339 (Scholar)
- Reid, Mark D., 2016, “A Case in Which Two Persons Exist in
One Animal”, in Blatti and Snowdon (eds.) 2016: 253–265.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0012 (Scholar)
- Robinson, Denis, 2007, “Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival”, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 3, Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–32. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Constitution and the Debate
between Animalism and Psychological Views”, in Blatti and
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- Rovane, Carol, 1998, The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Sauchelli, Andrea, 2017a, Personal Identity and Applied Ethics: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction, London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315644288 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017b, “The Animal, the Corpse, and the Remnant-Person”, Philosophical Studies, 174(1): 205–218. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0677-4 (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Animalism, Abortion, and a Future Like Ours”, The Journal of Ethics, first online: 29 June 2019. doi:10.1007/s10892-019-09298-y (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, David, 2009, Personal Identity and Ethics, London: Broadview Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Personal Identity and
Ethics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2013 Edition), E. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/identity-ethics/>. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism”, in Blatti and Snowdon (eds.) 2016: 303–328. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0015 (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, Sydney, 1963, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Personal Identity: A Materialist Account”, in Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984: 67–132. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Self and Substance”, in Philosophical Perspectives, 11: Mind, Causation, and World, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 283–304. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Self, Body, and Coincidence”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 73: 287–306. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00059 (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Functionalism and Personal Identity—A Reply”, Noûs, 38(3): 525–533. doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00481.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Persons, Animals, and
Identity”, Synthese, 162(3): 313–324.
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- –––, 2011, “On What We Are”, in The Oxford Handbook to the Self, Shaun Gallagher (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 352–371. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.003.0016 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Thinking Animals Without
Animalism”, in Blatti and Snowdon (eds.) 2016: 128–142.
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- Shoemaker, Sydney and Richard Swinburne, 1984, Personal Identity, (Great Debates in Philosophy), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Snowdon, Paul F., 1990, “Persons, Animals, and Ourselves”, in The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Christopher Gill (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 83–107. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Personal Identity and Brain Transplants”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, David Cockburn (ed.), (proceedings of the conference on Human Beings, July 1990, Lampteter, Wales), 29: 109–126. doi:10.1017/s1358246100007499 (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Persons, Animals, and Bodies”, in The Body and the Self, José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel, and Naomi Eilan (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 71–86. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Persons and Personal
Identity”, in Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and
Value, Sabrina Lovibond and Stephen G. Williams (eds.), Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, pp. 33–48. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Objections to Animalism”, in On Human Persons, Klaus Petrus (ed.), Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, pp. 47–66. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, Persons, Animals, Ourselves, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719618.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Swinburne, Richard, 1984, “Personal Identity: the Dualist Theory”, in Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984: 1–66. (Scholar)
- Thiel, Udo, 1997, “‘Epistemologism’ and Early Modern Debates about Individuation and Identity”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 5(2): 353–372. doi:10.1080/09608789708570971 (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Personal Identity”, in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, volume 1, Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 868–912. doi:10.1017/chol9780521307635.028 (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume, Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Thomson, Judith Jarvix, 1987, “Ruminations on an Account of Personal Identity”, in On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright, Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 215–240. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “People and their
Bodies”, in Reading Parfit, Jonathan Dancy (ed.),
Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 202–229. (Scholar)
- Toner, Patrick, 2011, “Hylemorphic Animalism”, Philosophical Studies, 155(1): 65–81. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9522-3 (Scholar)
- Unger, Peter, 1979a, “Why There Are No People”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 177–222. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00377.x (Scholar)
- –––, 1979b, “I Do Not Exist”, in Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with His Replies to Them, G. F. Macdonald (ed.), London: Macmillan, 235–251. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-04862-5_10 (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, Identity, Consciousness, and Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, Peter, 1990, Material Beings, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity”, in Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Mind, Causation, and World, Oxford: Blackwell, 305–319. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, David, 1967, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, Sameness and Substance, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value”, in Persons and Personality, A. Peacocke and G. Gillett (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 56–74. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Sameness and Substance Renewed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612756 (Scholar)
- Wilkes, Kathleen V., 1988, Real People: Personal Identity
without Thought Experiments, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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- Williams, Bernard A. O., 1957, “Personal Identity and Individuation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57: 229–252. reprinted in Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 1–18. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/57.1.229 (Scholar)
- Winkler, Kenneth, 1991, “Locke on Personal Identity”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 29(2): 201–226. doi:10.1353/hph.1991.0041 (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1953, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Wollheim, Richard, 1984, The Thread of Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Yang, Eric, 2015, “Unrestricted Animalism and the Too Many Candidates Problem”, Philosophical Studies, 172(3): 635–652. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0323-y (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, Dean W., 2002, “The Constitution of Persons by Bodies: A Critique of Lynne Rudder Baker’s Theory of Material Constitution”, Philosophical Topics, 30(1): 295–338. doi:10.5840/philtopics200230111 (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Problems for Animalism”, Abstracta, 1 (special issue): 23–31. (See Other Internet Resources.) (Scholar)