Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Anomalous Monism" by Steven Yalowitz

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Allison, H., 1983, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Anscombe, G. E. M., 1971, Causality and Determination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Antony, M., 2003, “Davidson’s Argument for Monism”, Synthese, 135: 1–12. (Scholar)
Bishop, J., 1989, Natural Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Block, N., 1980, “Troubles with Functionalism”, in Block, N., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Boghossian, P., 1989, “Content and Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Topics, 17: 5–26. (Scholar)
Burge, T., 1979, “Individualism and the Mental”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 73–121. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice”, in Heil and Mele 1993. (Scholar)
Campbell, N., 1998, “Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism”, Dialectica, 52(1): 23–39. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Mental Causation and the Philosophy of Mind, New York: Broadview Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Explanatory Epiphenomenalism”, Philosophical Quarterly, 55(220): 437–451. (Scholar)
Cartwright, N., 1983, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Child, W., 1992, “Anomalism, Uncodifiability and Psychophysical Relations”, The Philosophical Review, 102(2): 215–245. (Scholar)
Crane, T., 1995, “The Mental Causation Debate”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary, LXIX: 211–236. (Scholar)
Cussins, A., 1992, “The Limitations of Pluralism”, in Charles, D. and Lennon, K. (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 1963, “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, in Davidson 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1967, “Causal Relations”, in Davidson 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1969, “The Individuation of Events”, in Davidson 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1970, “Mental Events”, in Davidson 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “Agency”, in Davidson 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1973a, “The Material Mind”, in Davidson 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1973b, “Freedom to Act”, in Davidson 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1974a, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, in Davidson 1984. (Scholar)
–––, 1974b, “Psychology as Philosophy”, in Davidson 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1974c, “Reply to Solomon”, in Davidson 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1977, “Reality without Reference”, in Davidson 1984. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “The Inscrutability of Reference”, in Davidson 1984. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “Paradoxes of Rationality”, in Philosophical Essays on Freud, R. Wollheim and J. Hopkins (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1985a, “Rational Animals”, in LePore and McLaughlin. (Scholar)
–––, 1985b, “Reply to Quine on Events”, in LePore and McLaughlin. (Scholar)
–––, 1987a, “Knowing One’s Own Mind”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60: 441–58. (Scholar)
–––, 1987b, “Problems in the Explanation of Action” in Metaphysics and Morality, P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J. Norman (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “The Conditions of Thought” in J.Brandl and W. Gombocz (eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson, Grazer Philosophischen Studien, 36: 193–200. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “The Structure and Content of Truth”, The Journal of Philosophy, 87(6): 279–328. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Three Varieties of Knowledge”, in A.J. Ayer: Memorial Essays, A.P Griffiths (ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Thinking Causes”, in Heil and Mele. (Scholar)
–––, 1995a, “Laws and Cause”, Dialectica, 49: 2–4: 263–279. (Scholar)
–––, 1995b, “Could there be a Science of Rationality?”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3: 1–16. (Scholar)
–––, 1999a, “Reply to Quine”, in Hahn 1999. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b, “Reply to Bruce Vermazen”, in Hahn 1999. (Scholar)
–––, 1999c, “Spinoza’s Causal Theory of the Affects”, in Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, Y. Yovel (ed.), New York: Little Room Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999d, “Reply to Jennifer Hornsby”, in Hahn 1999. (Scholar)
Della Rocca, M., 1991, “Causation and Spinoza’s Claim of Identity”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 8: 265–276. (Scholar)
de Caro, M., 2020, ”Davidson and Putnam on the Antinomy of Free Will“, forthcoming in Chakraborty, S. and Conant, J. (eds.), Engaging Putnam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, URL= https://www.academia.edu/40534172/Davidson_and_Putnam_on_Free_Will . (Scholar)
de Pinedo, M., 2006, “Anomalous Monism: Oscillating between Dogmas”, Synthese, 148: 79–97. (Scholar)
Ducasse, C.J., 1926, “On the Nature and Observability of the Causal Relation”, Journal of Philosophy, 23: 57–68. (Scholar)
Fischer, J., 1986, “Van Inwagen on Free Will”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 36(143): 252–260. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Fischer, J., and Ravizza, M., 1994, “Responsibility and History”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XIX: 430–451. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Responsibility and Control, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Fodor, J., 1974, “Special sciences and the disunity of science as a working hypothesis”, Synthese, 28: 77–115. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Making Mind Matter More”, Philosophical Topics, 17: 59–80. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanations”, Mind, 100: 19–34. (Scholar)
Frankfurt, H., 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, in Frankfurt 1998 (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, in Frankfurt 1998. (Scholar)
–––, 1975, “Three Concepts of Free Action”, in Frankfurt 1998 (Scholar)
–––, 1987, “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, in Frankfurt 1998 (Scholar)
–––, 1998, The Importance of What We Care About, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Some Thoughts Concerning PAP”, in Widerker, D. and McKenna, M. (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, Burlington: Ashgate. (Scholar)
Gibbons, J., 2006, “Mental Causation without Downward Causation”, Philosophical Review, 115(1): 79–103. (Scholar)
Ginet, C., 1995, “Reasons Explanations of Action”, in Agents, Causes and Events, T. O’Connor (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Glannon, W., 1997, “Semicompatibilism and Anomalous Monism”, Philosophical Papers, 26(3): 211–231. (Scholar)
Goodman, N., 1983, Fact, Forecast and Fiction, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Grandy, R., 1973, “Reference, Meaning and Belief”, Journal of Philosophy, 70(14): 439–52. (Scholar)
Hahn, L.E. (ed.), 1999, The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Chicago: Open Court Press. (Scholar)
Hancock, N., 2001, “Anomalous Monism and Physical Closure”, Journal of Philosophical Research, XXVI: 175–85. (Scholar)
Heil, J. and Mele, A.(eds.), 1993, Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Honderich, T., 1982, “The Argument for Anomalous Monism”, Analysis, 42: 59–64. (Scholar)
Horgan, T., 1989, “Mental Quasation”, Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 47–76. (Scholar)
Horgan, T. and M. Tye, 1985, “Against the Token Identity Theory”, in LePore and McLaughlin 1985. (Scholar)
Hornsby, J., 1981, “Which Physical Events are Mental Events?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81: 73–92. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “Physicalism, Events, and Part-Whole Relations”, in LePore and McLaughlin 1985. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Agency and Causal Explanation”, in Heil and Mele 1993. (Scholar)
Hudson, H., 1994, Kant’s Compatibilism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Kant’s Third Antinomy and Anomalous Monism”, in Pasternack, L. (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals in Focus, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Hume, D., 1748 [1993], An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. (Scholar)
Jarrett, C., 1991, “Spinoza’s Denial of Mind-Body Interaction and the Explanation of Human Action”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29(4): 465–485. (Scholar)
Johnson, M., 1985, “Why Having a Mind Matters”, in LePore and McLaughlin 1985. (Scholar)
Kant, I., 1781/1786 [1996], Critique of Pure Reason, Guyer, P. and Wood, A., (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Kim, J., 1985, “Psychophysical Laws”, in LePore and McLaughlin 1985. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 63: 31–47. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52 (1): 1–26. (Scholar)
–––, 1993a, “Can Supervenience and ‘Non-Strict Laws’ Save Anomalous Monism?”, in Heil and Mele 1993. (Scholar)
–––, 1993b, Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem of Mental Causation”, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology, Oxford: Blackwell Press. (Scholar)
Latham, N., 1999, “Kim and Davidson on Psychophysical Laws”, Synthese, 118: 121–143. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Substance Physicalism”, in Loewer and Gillett (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “What is Token-Physicalism?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 84: 270–290. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Are Fundamental Laws Necessary or Contingent?”, in Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science, J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke and M. Slater (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT. (Scholar)
Leder, D., 1985, “Troubles with Token Identity”, Philosophical Studies, 47: 79–94. (Scholar)
LePore, E., and Loewer, B., 1987, “Mind Matters”, Journal of Philosophy, 84: 630–642. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “More on Making Mind Matter”, Philosophical Topics, 17: 175–191. (Scholar)
LePore, E. and McLaughlin, B, (eds.), 1985, Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, New York: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1966, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy, 63(2): 17–25. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?”, Theoria, 47: 113–121. (Scholar)
Loar, B., 1981, Mind and Meaning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Macdonald, C. and G., 1986, “Mental Causes and Explanation of Action”, Philosophical Quarterly, 36(143): 145–158. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “How to be Psychologically Relevant”, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation (Vol. 1), Oxford: Blackwell: 60–77. (Scholar)
McDowell, J., 1979, “Virtue and Reason”, The Monist 62: 331–350. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “Functionalism and Anomalous Monism”, in LePore and McLaughlin 1985. (Scholar)
McLaughlin, B., 1985, “Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental”, in Lepore and McLaughlin: 331–68. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical”, Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 109–135. (Scholar)
Meerbote, R., 1984, “Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of Human Actions”, in W. Harper and R. Meerbote (eds.), Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Mumford, S., 2009, “Laws and Dispositions”, in The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, R. le Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonigal and R. Cameron (eds.), London: Routledge, 471–9. (Scholar)
Nagel, T., 1974, “What is it like to be a bat?”, Philosophical Review, 83: 435–456. (Scholar)
Nelkin, D., 2000, “Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(10): 564–576. (Scholar)
Pereboom, D., 1995, “Determinism al Dente”, Noûs, 29(1): 21–45. (Scholar)
Quine, W.V., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Schiffer, S., 1991, “Ceteris Paribus Laws”, Mind, 100: 1–17. (Scholar)
Shea, N., 2003, “Does Externalism entail the Anomalism of the Mental?”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211): 201–213. (Scholar)
Smith, M., 2003, “Rational Capacities or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion”, in Stroud, S. and Tappolet, C. (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Rationality, New York: Oxford (Scholar)
Solomon, R., 1974, “Comment on Davidson” in Brown, Stuart (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology, London: MacMillan. (Scholar)
Spinoza, B., 1985 [1677], Ethics, in The Collected Writings of Spinoza (Vol. I), E. Curley (trans.), Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Stoutland, F., 1970, “The Logical Connection Argument”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph No. 4, 117–29. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, “The Causation of Behavior”, in Essays on Wittgenstein in Honor of G.H. von Wright, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 28(1–3): 286–325. (Scholar)
van Inwagen, P., 1984, An Essay on Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
von Wright, G.H., 1971, Explanation and Understanding, Cornell: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Watson, G., 1975, “Free Action”, in Watson 2004. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism”, in Watson 2004. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Agency and Answerability, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Widerker, D., 1995, “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities”, Philosophical Review, 104(2): 247–261. (Scholar)
Wilson, G., 1985, “Davidson on Intentional Action”, in LePore and McLaughlin 1985. (Scholar)
Yalowitz, S., 1997, “Rationality and the Argument for Anomalous Monism”, Philosophical Studies, 87(3): 235–58. (Scholar)
–––, 1998a, “Causation in the Argument for Anomalous Monism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28(2): 183–226. (Scholar)
–––, 1998b, “Semantic Determinants and Psychology as a Science”, Erkenntnis, 49: 57–91. (Scholar)

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