Linked bibliography for the SEP article "A Priori Justification and Knowledge" by Bruce Russell

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Audi, Robert, 1997, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.001.0001 (Scholar)
Bealer, George, 1987, “The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 289–365. doi:10.2307/2214149 (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “The Incoherence of Empiricism”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 66: 99–137. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/66.1.99 (Scholar)
–––, 1996a, “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy” and “A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa”, Philosophical Studies, 81)2–3): 121–142 and 163–174, respectively; Bealer’s essay is reprinted in 2008, Epistemology: An Anthology, 2^nd edition, Ernest Sosa, et al. (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 612–624. doi:10.1007/bf00372777 doi:10.1007/BF00372780 (Scholar)
–––, 1996b, “On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 1–34. doi:10.2307/2216234 (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 201–239. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “The A Priori”, in Greco and Sosa 1999: 243–270. (Scholar)
Beebe, James R., 2011, “A Priori Skepticism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83(3): 583–602. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00488.x (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Experimental Epistemology”, in Cullison 2012: 248–269 (Ch. 13). (Scholar)
Boghossian, Paul, 2001, “Inference and Insight”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(3): 633–640. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00130.x (Scholar)
–––, forthcominga, “Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction Between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge? A Reply to Williamson”, in Boghossian and Williamson forthcoming. (Scholar)
–––, forthcomingb, “Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori”, in Boghossian and Williamson forthcoming.
Boghossian, Paul and Christopher Peacocke (eds.), 2000, New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199241279.001.0001 (Scholar)
Boghossian, Paul and Timothy Williamson, forthcoming, Debating the A Priori, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
BonJour, Laurence, 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625176 (Scholar)
–––, 2001a, “Précis of In Defense of Pure Reason” and “Replies”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(3): 625–631, 673–698. Part of a Book Symposium on BonJour’s In Defense of Pure Reason. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00129.x doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00135.x (Scholar)
–––, 2001b, “Review of Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry” (DePaul and Ramsey 1998), The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52(1): 151–158. doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.151 (Scholar)
–––, 2005a, “In Defense of the A Priori”, in Steup and Sosa 2005: 98–105. (Scholar)
–––, 2005b, “Reply to Devitt”, in Steup and Sosa 2005: 115–118. (Scholar)
–––, 2005c, “Last Rejoinder”, in Steup and Sosa 2005: 120–121. (Scholar)
Butchvarov, Panyot, 1970, The Concept of Knowledge, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Scholar)
Cappelen, Herman, 2012, Philosophy Without Intuitions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Casullo, Albert, 2001, “Experience and A Priori Justification”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(3): 665–671. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00134.x (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “A Priori Knowledge”, in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul Moser (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 95–143. This is a condensed version of Casullo 2003. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, A Priori Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195115058.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Analyzing a Priori Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, 142(1): 77–90. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9302-5 (Scholar)
–––, 2012a, Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification, New York: Oxford University Press. This is a collection of Casullo’s previously published essays, plus four unpublished essays and an annotated bibliography on a priori knowledge. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777860.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2012b, “Intuitions, Thought Experiments, and the A Priori”, in Casullo 2012a: 233–250. (Scholar)
–––, 2012c, “Articulating the A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction”, in Casullo 2012a: 289–327. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Articulating the A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 248–271 (Ch. 11). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0012">10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0012 (Scholar)
Casullo, Albert and Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), 2013, The A Priori in Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001 (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick, 1989, Theory of Knowledge, 3^rd edition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc. (Scholar)
Christensen, David and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), 2013, The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001 (Scholar)
Chudnoff, Elijah, 2011a, “What Intuitions Are Like”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(3): 625–654. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00463.x (Scholar)
–––, 2011b, “The Nature of Intuitive Justification”, Philosophical Studies, 153(2): 313–333. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9495-2 (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Intuitive Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, 162(2): 359–378. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9770-x (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, Intuition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199683000.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Intuition in Mathematics”, in Rational Intuition, Lisa M. Osbeck and Barbara S. Held (eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 174–191. doi:10.1017/cbo9781139136419.010 (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Is Intuition Based On Understanding?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(1): 42–67. doi:10.1111/phpr.12001 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Intuition, Presentational Phenomenology, and Awareness of Abstract Objects: Replies to Manning and Witmer”, Florida Philosophical Review, 16(1): 117–127. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “The Reality of the Intuitive”, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 60(4): 371–385. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2016.1220640 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Intuition in Gettier”, in Classical Philosophical Arguments: The Gettier Problem, Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, “In Search of Intuition”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, first online: 5 November 2019. doi:10.1080/00048402.2019.1658121 (Scholar)
Cullison, Andrew (ed.), 2012, The Continuum Companion to Epistemology, London: Continuum Press. (Scholar)
Cummins, Robert, 1998, “Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 113–127. (Scholar)
DePaul, Michael and William Ramsey (eds.), 1998, Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (Scholar)
Devitt, Michael, 2006a, “There is No a Priori”, in Steup and Sosa 2005: 105–115. (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, “Reply to BonJour”, in Steup and Sosa 2005: 118–120. (Scholar)
Donnellan, Keith S., 1977, “The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators”, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume II: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Morris, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 12–27. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1977.tb00025.x (Scholar)
Evans, Gareth, 1979, “Reference and Contingency”:, Monist, 62(2): 161–189. doi:10.5840/monist197962220 (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard, 1999, “Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology”, in Greco and Sosa 1999: 170–186. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Epistemology, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement”, in Hetherington 2006: 216–236. (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard and Ted A. Warfield (eds.), 2010, Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001 (Scholar)
Field, Hartry, 2000, “Aprioricity as an Evaluative Notion”, in Boghossian and Peacocke 2000: 117–149. doi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0006 (Scholar)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó, 2000, Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Empiricism, Rationalism and the Limits of Justification”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(3): 641–648. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00131.x (Scholar)
Gettier, Edmund L., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23(6): 121–123. doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121 (Scholar)
Goldberg, Sanford C., 2009, “Reliabilism in Philosophy”, Philosophical Studies, 142(1): 105–117. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9300-7 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement”, in Machuca 2013: 277–294. (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin I., 2007, “Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74(1): 1–26. doi:10.1163/9789401204651_002 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, in his Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 280–316 (Ch. 11). (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 11–44 (Ch. 1). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0002 (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin and Joel Pust, 1998, “Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 179–197. (Scholar)
Greco, John and Ernest Sosa (eds.), 1999, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert, 1994 [1999], “Doubts About Conceptual Analysis”, in Philosophy in Mind, Michaelis Michael and John O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 43–48. Reprinted in Harman 1999a: 138–143. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-1008-2_4 (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. A collection of Harman’s earlier essays; chpts. 6 and 7 especially relevant to the issue of a priori knowledge. doi:10.1093/0198238029.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “General Foundations versus Rational Insight”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(3): 657–663. Discussion of Lawrence BonJour’s In Defense of Pure Reason (1998). doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00133.x (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “The Future of the A Priori”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 28(supplement): 23–34. doi:10.5840/jpr_2003_1 (Scholar)
Hauser, Marc, 2006, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong, New York: Harper Collins. Some of the ideas in this book may have been anticipated by John Mikhail (2011), though published after Hauser’s book; see Mikhail entry below. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2013, “A Priority and Externalism”, in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, Sanford Goldberg (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 201–218. (Scholar)
Hetherington, Stephen (ed.), 2006, Epistemology Futures, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Huston, Mark, 2003, Intuition: A Discussion of Recent Philosophical Views, Ph.D dissertation, Wayne State University. (Scholar)
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins, “Experimental Philosophy and Apriority”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 45–66 (Ch. 2). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0003 (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198250614.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Representation, Scepticism, and the A Priori”, in Boghossian and Peacock 2000: 320–332. doi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0013 (Scholar)
Jenkins, Carrie S., 2007, “Entitlement and Rationality”, Synthese, 157(1): 25–45. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-0012-2 (Scholar)
–––, 2008a, Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, “A Priori Knowledge: Debates and Developments”, Philosophy Compass, 3(3): 436–450. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00136.x (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, “Apriorism About Modality: Reply to Scott Sturgeon”, in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffman (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 310–317. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Concepts, Experience and Modal Knowledge”, Philosophical Perspectives, 24: 255–279. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00193.x (Scholar)
–––, 2012a, “A Priori Knowledge: The Conceptual Approach”, in Cullison 2012: 180–198. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Naturalistic Challenges to the A Priori”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 274–290 (Ch. 12). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0013 (Scholar)
Kahneman, Daniel, 2011, Thinking, Fast and Slow, London, Penguin Books. (Scholar)
Kant, Immanuel, 1787 [1965], Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith (transl.), New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965. (Scholar)
Kitcher, Philip, 1983, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195035410.001.0001 (Scholar)
Kornblith, Hilary, 1998, “The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry: An Account with No Unnatural Ingredients”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 129–141. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “In Defense of Naturalized Epistemology”, in Greco and Sosa 1999: 158–169. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “The Impurity of Reason”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81(1): 67–89. doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00095 (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Précis of Knowledge and Its Place in Nature” and “Replies to Alvin Goldman, Martin Kusch and William Talbott”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71(2): 399–402 and 427–441. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00456.x doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00460.x (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Intuitions and Epistemology”, in Hetherington 2006: 10–25. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Review: Timothy Williamson’s The Philosophy of Philosophy”, Analysis, 69(1): 109–116. doi:10.1093/analys/ann039 (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Belief in the Face of Controversy”, in Feldman and Warfield 2010: 29–52. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?” in Machuca 2013: 260–276 (Ch. 13). (Scholar)
Kripke, Saul, 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in Semantics of Natural Language, Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 253–355. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 (Scholar)
Lehrer, Keith, 1986, “The Coherence Theory of Knowledge”:, Philosophical Topics, 14(1): 5–25. doi:10.5840/philtopics198614112 (Scholar)
–––, 1990, Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, CO: West View Press, Inc. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Proper Function versus Systematic Coherence”, in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., pp. 25–45. (Scholar)
Lycan, William G., 1996, “Bealer on the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, 81(2–3): 143–150. doi:10.1007/bf00372778 (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “On the Gettier Problem problem”, in Hetherington 2006: 148–168. (Scholar)
Machuca, Diego E. (ed.), 2013, Disagreement and Skepticism, Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis. doi:10.4324/9780203073346 (Scholar)
Malmgren, Anna-Sara, 2011, “Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements”, Mind, 120(478): 263–327. doi:10.1093/mind/fzr039 (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Review of Herman Cappelen’s Philosophy Without Intuitions (Cappelen 2012)”, Notre Dame Philosophical Review, 2013.04.27. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “A Priori Testimony Revisited”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 158–185 (Ch. 7). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0008 (Scholar)
McKinsey, Michael, 1987, “Apriorism in the Philosophy of Language”, Philosophical Studies, 52(1): 1–32. doi:10.1007/bf00354156 (Scholar)
Mikhail, John, 2011, Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511780578 (Scholar)
Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, On What Matters (Volume 2), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Peacocke, Christopher, 2000, “Explaining the A Priori: The Programme of Moderate Rationalism”, in Boghossian and Peacocke 2000: 255–285. doi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0011 (Scholar)
Philosophical Studies, 1998, 92(1–2), guest editor, John O’Leary-Hawthorne. This entire issue is devoted to the topic of a priori knowledge. (Scholar)
Plantinga, Alvin, 2011, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812097.001.0001 (Scholar)
Putnam, Hilary, 1983, “ ‘Two Dogmas’ Revisited”, in Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, vol. 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quine, Willard Van Orman, 1963, From A Logical Point of View, New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbook. (Scholar)
Railton, Peter, 2017a, “Two Sides of the Meta-Ethical Mountain”, in Singer 2017: 35–59. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.003.0002 (Scholar)
–––, 2017b, “Railton’s Commentary”, in Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Vol. III, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 113–127. (Scholar)
Rey, Georges, 2001, “Digging Deeper for the A Priori”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(3): 649–656. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00132.x (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “A Naturalistic A Priori”, Philosophical Studies, 92(1/2): 25–43. doi:10.1023/a:1017155400164 (Scholar)
Russell, Bruce, 2010, “Intuition in Epistemology”, in A Companion to Epistemology, 2^nd edition, Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup (eds.), Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 464–68. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Rock Bottom: Coherentism’s Soft Spot”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50(1): 94–111. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00085.x (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Moral Intuitionism”, in the International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hugh LaFollette (ed.), New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2017 “A Defense of Moral Intuitionism”, in Singer 2017: 231–258. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.003.0011 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Philosophical intuition: just what is ‘a priori’ justification?” Aeon, 2 March 2018. URL = <https://aeon.co/ideas/philosophical-intuition-just-what-is-a-priori-justification> (Scholar)
Russell, Gillian, 2008, Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001 (Scholar)
Schwitzgebel, Eric and Fiery Cushman, 2012, “Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers”, Mind & Language, 27(2): 135–153. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01438.x (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Philosophers’ Biased Judgments Persist despite Training, Expertise and Reflection”, Cognition, 141: 127–137. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015 (Scholar)
Singer, Peter (ed.), 2017, Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.001.0001 (Scholar)
Sosa, Ernest, 1996, “Rational Intuition: Bealer on Its Nature and Epistemic Status”, Philosophical Studies, 81(2–3): 151–162. doi:10.1007/bf00372779 (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Minimal Intuition”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 257–269. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Intuitions and Foundations: The Relevance of Moore and Wittgenstein”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 186–200 (Ch. 8). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0009 (Scholar)
Sosa, Ernest and Enrique Villanueva (eds.), 2004, Epistemology: Philosophical Issues, Volume 14, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. (Scholar)
Steup, Matthias and Ernest Sosa (eds.), 2005, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (Scholar)
Steup, Matthias, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (eds.), 2014, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology,2^nd edition, Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell. (Scholar)
Stratton-Lake, Philip (ed.), 2002, Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
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Thurow, Joshua C., 2013, “The Implicit Conception and Intuition Theory of the A Priori, With Implications for Experimental Philosophy”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 67–91 (Ch. 3). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0004 (Scholar)
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–––, 2018, “Experimental Epistomology and ’Gettier Cases’ ”, in S. Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 199–217. (Scholar)
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–––, 2017, “Analytic–Synthetic and A Priori–A Posteriori History”, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 231–248. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.24 (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Normative Externalism”, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2006, “What’s Epistemology For? The Case for Neopragmatism in Normative Metaepistemology” in Hetherington 2006: 26–47. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “The Prospects for an Experimentalist Rationalism or Why It’s OK if the A Priori is only 99.44 Percent Empirically Pure”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 92–108 (Ch. 4). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0005 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Intuitions”, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 282–308. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.25 (Scholar)
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–––, 2005, “Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105(1): 1–23. doi:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x (Scholar)
–––, 2007a, “Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74(1): 89–123. doi:10.1163/9789401204651_006 (Scholar)
–––, 2007b, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “How Deep is the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 291–312 (Ch. 13). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0014 (Scholar)
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Wykstra, Stephanie, 2018, “Out of the Armchair”, Aeon, 1 May 2018. URL = <https://aeon.co/essays/beyond-the-armchair-must-philosophy-become-experimental> (Scholar)

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