Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Arrow’s Theorem" by Michael Morreau

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

  • Arrow, K.J., 1950, “A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare”, Journal of Political Economy, 58: 328–346. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1951 [1963], Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley. 2nd ed., 1963. (Scholar)
  • Arrow, K.J. and H. Raynaud, 1986, Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Making, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Arrow, K.J., A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura (eds.), 1996, Social Choice Re-Examined, vol. 2, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan. (Scholar)
  • ––– (eds.), 2002, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 1, Amsterdam: North-Holland. (Scholar)
  • ––– (eds.), 2011, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland. (Scholar)
  • Balinski, M. and R. Laraki, 2007, “A Theory of Measuring, Electing, and Ranking”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), 104: 8720–8725. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2010, Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Barberà, S., 2010, “Strategy-Proof Social Choice”, in Arrow, Sen and Suzumura 2010: 731–831. (Scholar)
  • Bergson, A., 1938, “A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 52: 310–334. (Scholar)
  • Black, D., 1948, “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making”, Journal of Political Economy, 56: 23–34. (Scholar)
  • Blackorby, C., W. Bossert, and D. Donaldson, 2006, “Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism”, Social Choice and Welfare, 27: 279–287. (Scholar)
  • Borda, J.C. de, 1781, “Mémoire sur les Élections au Scrutin”, Histoire de l’Académie Royale de Sciences, Paris. In translation: Alfred de Grazia 1953, “Mathematical Derivation of an Election System”, Isis, 44 (1–2): 42–51. (Scholar)
  • Bordes, G. and N. Tideman, 1991, “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in the Theory of Voting”, Theory and Decision, 30: 163–186. (Scholar)
  • Buchanan, J., 1954, “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets”, Journal of Political Economy, 62: 114–123. (Scholar)
  • Campbell, D.E. and J.S. Kelly, 2002, “Impossibility Theorems in the Arrovian Framework”, in Arrow, Sen and Suzumura 2002: 35–94. (Scholar)
  • Condorcet, Marquis de, 1785, Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues àla pluralité des voix, Paris. (Scholar)
  • Cresto, E. and D. Tajer, forthcoming, “Confirmational Holism and Theory Choice: Arrow meets Duhem”, Mind, first online 30 January 2019. doi:10.1093/mind/fzy062 (Scholar)
  • Dodgson, C.L. (Lewis Carroll), 1884, The Principles of Parliamentary Representation, London: Harrison and Sons. (Scholar)
  • Elster, J. and Aa. Hylland (eds.), 1986, Foundations of Social Choice Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Estlund D., 1994, “Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem”, Theory and Decision, 36: 131–162. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2008, Democratic Authority: a Philosophical Framework, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Fleurbaey, M., 2007, “Social Choice and Just Institutions: new perspectives”, Economics and Philosophy, 23: 15–43. (Scholar)
  • Fleurbaey, M. and F. Maniquet, 2011, A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Fleurbaey, M. and P. Mongin, 2005, “The News of the Death of Welfare Economics is Greatly Exaggerated”, Social Choice and Welfare, 25: 381–418. (Scholar)
  • Franssen, M., 2005, “Arrow’s Theorem, Multi-criteria Decision Problems and Multi-Attribute Preferences in Engineering Design”, Research in Engineering Design, 16: 42–56. (Scholar)
  • Gaertner, W., 2001, Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2009, A Primer in Social Choice Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rev. ed. (Scholar)
  • Geanakoplos, J., 2005, “Three Brief Proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem”, Economic Theory, 26: 211–215. (Scholar)
  • Gibbard, A., 1969, “Social Choice and the Arrow Conditions”, unpublished manuscript. The main result is available in Gibbard 2014. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1973, “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result”, Econometrica, 41: 587–601. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2014, “Intransitive Social Indifference and the Arrow Dilemma”, Review of Economic Design, 18: 3–10. (Scholar)
  • Hansson, B., 1973, “The Independence Condition in the Theory of Social Choice”, Theory and Decision, 4: 25–49. (Scholar)
  • Hattiangadi, A., forthcoming, “Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, first online 21 February 2019. doi:10.1111/phpr.12578 (Scholar)
  • Hurley, S., 1985, “Supervenience and the Possibility of Coherence”, Mind, 94: 501–525. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1989, Natural Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Hylland, Aa., 1986, “The Purpose and Significance of Social Choice Theory: some general remarks and an application to the ‘Lady Chatterley problem’”, in Elster and Hylland 1986: 45–73. (Scholar)
  • Kelly, J.S., 1978, Arrow Impossibility Theorems, New York: Academic Press. (Scholar)
  • Kemp, M.C. and Y.K. Ng, 1976, “On the Existence of Social Welfare Functions, Social Orderings and Social Decision Functions”, Economica, 43: 59–66. (Scholar)
  • Kolm, Serge-Christophe 1996, “Rational Just Social Choice”, in Arrow, Sen and Suzumura 1996: 167–196. (Scholar)
  • Kornhauser, L. and L Sager 1986, “Unpacking the Court”, The Yale Law Journal, 96: 82–117. (Scholar)
  • Kroedel, T. and F. Huber, 2013, “Counterfactual Dependence and Arrow”, Noûs, 47: 453–466. [available online] (Scholar)
  • Landemore, H. 2012, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Le Breton, M. and J.A. Weymark, 2011, “Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains”, in Arrow, Sen and Suzumura 2011: 191–299. (Scholar)
  • Lewis, D. 1968, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, The Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1973a, Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973, Reprinted with revisions, 1986. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1973b, “Causation”, Journal of Philosophy, 70: 556–567 (Scholar)
  • –––, 1979, “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”, Noûs, 13: 455–476. (Scholar)
  • List, C., 2012, “The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: an Introductory Review”, Synthese, 187: 179–207. (Scholar)
  • List, C. and J. Dryzek, 2003, “Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation”, British Journal of Political Science, 33: 1–28. (Scholar)
  • List, C., R. C. Luskin, J. S. Fishkin, and I. McLean, 2013, “Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls”, Journal of Politics, 75: 80–95. (Scholar)
  • Little, I.M.D., 1952, “Social Choice and Individual Values”, Journal of Political Economy, 60: 422–432. (Scholar)
  • Mackie, G., 2003, Democracy Defended, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • May, K., 1954, “Intransitivity, Utility, and the Aggregation of Preference Patterns”, Econometrica, 22: 1–13. (Scholar)
  • McLean, I., 2003, “The Reasonableness of Independence: A Conversation from Condorcet and Borda to Arrow and Saari”, Nuffield College Working Paper 2003-W6, University of Oxford, [available online]. (Scholar)
  • Miller, D., 1992, “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice”, Political Studies, 40, 54–67. (Scholar)
  • Morreau, M., 2010, “It Simply Does Not Add Up: Trouble with Overall Similarity”, The Journal of Philosophy, 107: 469–490. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2014, “Mr. Fit, Mr. Simplicity and Mr. Scope: From Social Choice to Theory Choice”, Erkenntnis, 79: 1253–1268. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2015, “Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn Vindicated”, Mind, 124: 239–262. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2016, “Grading in Groups”, Economics & Philosophy, 32: 323–352. (Scholar)
  • Moulin, H., 1980, “On Strategy-Proofness and Single Peakedness”, Public Choice, 35: 437–455. (Scholar)
  • Murakami Y., 1968, Logic and Social Choice, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
  • Oddie, G., 2013, “The Content, Consequence and Likeness Approaches to Verisimilitude: Compatibility, Trivialization, and Underdetermination”, Synthese, 190: 1647–1687. (Scholar)
  • Okasha, S., 2011, “Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow”, Mind, 120: 83–115. (Scholar)
  • Page, S.E., 2007, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools and Societies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Parks, R.P., 1976, “An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: a Dictatorial Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function”, Review of Economic Studies, 43: 447–450. (Scholar)
  • Pattanaik. P.K., 2002, “Positional Rules of Collective Decision Making”, in Arrow, Sen and Suzumura 2002: 361–394. (Scholar)
  • Pazner, E., 1979, “Equity, Nonfeasible Alternatives and Social Choice: a Reconsideration of the Concept of Social Welfare”, in J.J. Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, Amsterdam: North Holland. (Scholar)
  • Peter, F., 2011, Democratic Legitimacy, New York, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
  • Plott, C. R. 1973, “Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice”, Econometrica, 41: 1075–1091. (Scholar)
  • Popper, K. R., 1963, Conjectures and Refutations, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
  • Ray, P., 1973, “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives”, Econometrica, 44: 987–991. (Scholar)
  • Riker, W.H., 1982, Liberalism against Populism, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. (Scholar)
  • Roberts, K.W.S., 1980, “Social Choice Theory: The Single- and Multi-Profile Approaches”, The Review of Economic Studies, 47: 441–450. (Scholar)
  • Samuelson, P., 1947, Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1967, “Arrow’s Mathematical Politics”, in S. Hook (ed.), Human Values and Economic Policy, New York: New York University Press: 41–52. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1977, “Reaffirming the Existence of ‘Reasonable’ Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions”, Economica, 44: 81–88. (Scholar)
  • Sattherthwaite, M., 1975, “Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions”, Journal of Economic Theory, 10: 187–217. (Scholar)
  • Schurz, G. and P. Weingartner, 2010, “Zwart and Franssen’s Impossibility Theorem holds for Possible-World-Accounts but not for Consequence-Accounts to Versimilitude”, Synthese, 172: 415–436. (Scholar)
  • Scott M.J. and E.K. Antonsson, 2000, “Arrow’s Theorem and Engineering Design Decision Making”, Research in Engineering Design, 11: 218–228. (Scholar)
  • Sen, A., 1969, “Quasi-transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions”, Review of Economic Studies, 36: 381–393. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1970, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco: Holden-Day. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1976, “Liberty, Unanimity and Rights”, Economica, 43: 217–245. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1977, “On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis”, Econometrica, 45: 1539–1572. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1979, “Utiliarianism and Welfarism”, The Journal of Philosophy, 76: 463–489. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1986, “Foundations of Social Choice Theory: An Epilogue”, in Elster and Hylland 1986: 213–248. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1999, “The Possibility of Social Choice”, American Economic Review, 89: 349–378. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2010, “The Informational Basis of Social Choice”, in Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura 2010: 29–46. (Scholar)
  • Stegenga, J. 2013, “An Impossibility Theorem for Amalgamating Evidence”, Synthese, 190: 2391–2411. (Scholar)
  • Weymark, J. A., 1984, “Arrow’s Theorem with Social Quasi-Orderings”, Public Choice, 42: 235–246. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2014, “An Introduction to Allan Gibbard’s Oligarchy Theorem Paper”, Review of Economic Design, 18: 1–2. (Scholar)
  • Zwart, S. D. and M. Franssen 2007, “An Impossibility Theorem for Verisimilitude”, Synthese, 158: 75–92. (Scholar)

Generated Sun Aug 9 06:42:05 2020