Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Assertion" by Peter Pagin and Neri Marsili

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  • Alston, William P., 2000, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
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  • Baghramian, Maria and J. Adam Carter, 2020, “Relativism”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/relativism/>
  • Begby, Endre, 2020, “The Knowledge Norm of Assertion in Dialectical Context”, Ratio, 33(4): 295–306. doi:10.1111/rati.12261
  • Bellucci, Francesco, 2019, “Peirce on Assertion and Other Speech Acts”, Semiotica, 2019(228): 29-54. https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0081 (Scholar)
  • Benton, Matthew A., 2011, “Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion”, Analysis, 71(4): 684–687. doi:10.1093/analys/anr085
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  • Black, Dylan, 2019, “A Non-Normative Account of Assertion”, Ratio, 32(1): 53–62. doi:10.1111/rati.12210
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  • Brandom, Robert, 1994, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Brock, Jarrett E, 1981,“An Introduction to Peirce’s Theory of Speech Acts”. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy 17(4): 319-26 (Scholar)
  • Brogaard, Berit, 2014, “Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm”. In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (2014), pp. 11-31.
  • Brogaard, Berit and Dimitria Electra Gatzia, 2017, “Introduction: Epistemic Modals”, Topoi, 36(1): 127–130. doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9374-3 (Scholar)
  • Brown, Jessica, 2008, “The Knowledge Norm for Assertion”, Philosophical Issues, 18: 89–103. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00139.x
  • –––, 2010, “Knowledge and Assertion”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(3): 549–566. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00369.x
  • –––, 2011, “Fallibilism and the Knowledge Norm for Assertion and Practical Reasoning”, in Brown and Cappelen 2011: 153–174.
  • –––, 2012, “Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1): 123–157. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00432.x
  • Brown, Jessica and Herman Cappelen (eds.), 2011, Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.001.0001 (Scholar)
  • Caffi, Claudia, 1999, “On Mitigation”, Journal of Pragmatics, 31(7): 881–909. doi:10.1016/S0378-2166(98)00098-8
  • Cappelen, Herman, 2011, “Against Assertion”, in Brown and Cappelen 2011: 21–47.
  • –––, 2020, “Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category”, in Goldberg 2020: 137–155. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.6
  • Carson, Thomas L., 2006, “The Definition of Lying”, Noûs, 40(2): 284–306. doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00610.x
  • Carter, J. Adam, 2017, “Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy”, Synthese, 194(5): 1463–1476. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5
  • Carter, J. Adam and Emma C. Gordon, 2011, “Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support”, Philosophia, 39(4): 615–635. doi:10.1007/s11406-011-9317-6
  • Carter, Sam. forthcoming. Degrees of Assertability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. doi:10.1111/phpr.12725 (Scholar)
  • Caso, Ramiro, 2014, “Assertion and Relative Truth”, Synthese, 191(6): 1309–1325. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0329-6
  • Coates, Jennifer, 1987, “Epistemic Modality and Spoken Discourse”, Transactions of the Philological Society, 85(1): 110–131. doi:10.1111/j.1467-968X.1987.tb00714.x
  • Coffman, E. J., 2014, “Lenient Accounts of Warranted Assertability”, in Littlejohn and Turri 2014: ch. 2, pp. 33–58.
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  • Davidson, Donald, 1979, “Moods and Performances”, in Meaning and Use, Avishai Margalit (ed.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 9–22. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-4104-4_2
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  • DeRose, Keith, 2002, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context”, The Philosophical Review, 111(2): 167–203. doi:10.1215/00318108-111-2-167
  • Dewey, John, 1938, Logic. The Theory of Inquiry, New York: Henry Holt Company.
  • Douven, Igor, 2006, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility”, The Philosophical Review, 115(4): 449–485. doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-010
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  • Dummett, Michael, 1976, “What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)”, in Truth and Meaning, Gareth Evans & John McDowell (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 63-137.
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  • Egan, Andy, 2012, “Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value: Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50(4): 557–582. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00136.x
  • Engel, Pascal, 2004, “Truth and the Aim of Belief”, in Laws and Models in Science, Donald Gillies (ed.), London: King’s College Publications, pp. 77-97.
  • –––, 2008, “In What Sense Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion?” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 77: 45–59. doi:10.1163/18756735-90000843
  • Evans, Gareth, 1985, “Does Tense Logic Rest on a Mistake?” in his Collected Papers, Antonia Phillips (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 341–363.
  • Fallis, Don, 2013, “Davidson Was Almost Right about Lying”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2): 337–353. doi:10.1080/00048402.2012.688980
  • Fantl, Jeremy and Matthew McGrath, 2009, Knowledge in an Uncertain World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001
  • Frege, Gottlob, 1879, Begriffsschrift, Eine Der Aritmetischen Nachgebildete Formelsprache Des Reinen Denkens, Halle: Louis Nebert; partial translation in Frege [TPW], pp. 1–21. Full translation in J van Heijenoort (ed.), Frege and Gödel. Two Fundamental Texts in Mathematical Logic, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970.
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  • –––, 1918a, “Der Gedanke: Eine logische Untersuchung”, Beiträge Zur Philosophie Des Deutschen Idealismus, 100: 58–77; English translation by P. T. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff as “Thoughts: A Logical Enquiry”, republished in Frege [TFR], 325–45.
  • –––, 1918b, “Die Verneinung. Eine logische Untersuchung”, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, I (1918–1919), pp. 143–157; translated by Peter T. Geach as “Negation”, in Frege [TPW]: 117–135.
  • –––, [TFR], The Frege Reader, Mike Beaney (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 1997.
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  • Fricker, Elizabeth, 2012, “Stating and Insinuating”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 86: 61–94. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00208.x
  • García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2004, “Assertion and the Semantics of Force-Markers”, in The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction, Claudia Bianchi (ed.), Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, pp. 133–166.
  • –––, 2008, “Relativism, Vagueness and What Is Said”, in Relative Truth, Manuel García-Carpintero and Max Kölbel (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 129–154. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.003.0006
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  • –––, 2016, “Indirect Assertion”, Polish Journal of Philosophy, 10(1): 13–49. doi:10.5840/pjphil20161012 (Scholar)
  • –––, 2019a, “Conventions and Constitutive Norms”, Journal of Social Ontology, 5(1): 35–52. doi:10.1515/jso-2019-0013
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  • –––, forthcoming, “How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00576-z (Scholar)
  • Gerken, Mikkel, 2012, “Discursive Justification and Skepticism”, Synthese, 189(2): 373–394. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0076-0 (Scholar)
  • –––, 2014, “Same, Same but Different: The Epistemic Norms of Assertion, Action and Practical Reasoning”, Philosophical Studies, 168(3): 725–744. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0156-0
  • –––, 2017, On Folk Epistemology: How We Think and Talk about Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198803454.001.0001
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  • Geurts, Bart, 2019, “Communication as Commitment Sharing: Speech Acts, Implicatures, Common Ground”, Theoretical Linguistics, 45(1–2): 1–30. doi:10.1515/tl-2019-0001
  • Glüer, Kathrin and Peter Pagin, 1998, “Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning”, Synthese, 117(2): 207–227. doi:10.1023/A:1005162503125
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  • Goldberg, Sanford C., 2015, Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732488.001.0001
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  • Graham, Peter J., 2020, “Assertions, Handicaps, and Social Norms”. Episteme, 17(3), 349-363. doi:10.1017/epi.2019.53 (Scholar)
  • Green, Mitchell S., 1999, “Illocutions, Implicata, and What a Conversation Requires”, Pragmatics & Cognition, 7(1): 65–91. doi:10.1075/pc.7.1.05gre
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  • –––, forthcoming-a, “The Norm of Assertion: A ‘Constitutive’ Rule?”, Inquiry. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2019.1667868
  • –––, forthcoming-b, “Lies, Common Ground and Performative Utterances”, Erkenntnis. doi: 10.1007/s10670-020-00368-4 (Scholar)
  • Marsili, Neri and Alex Wiegmann, 2021, “Should I Say That? An Experimental Investigation of the Norm of Assertion”, Cognition, 212: 104657. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104657
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  • McKenna, Robin, 2013, “Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm”, Logos & Episteme, 4(4): 457–464. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme2013446
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