Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Blame" by Neal Tognazzini and D. Justin Coates
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Arpaly, N., 2006, Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Arpaly, N. and T. Schroeder, 2014, In Praise of Desire, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Beade, G. A., forthcoming, “Who Can Blame Whom? Moral Standing to Blame and Punish Deprived Citizens”, Criminal Law and Philosophy. (Scholar)
- Beardsley, E., 1969, “A Plea For Deserts”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 6: 33–42. (Scholar)
- Bell, M., 2013a, “The Standing to Blame: A Critique”, in Coates & Tognazzini 2013: 263–281. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013b, Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bennett, C., 2013, “The Expressive Function of Blame”, in Coates & Tognazzini 2013: 66–83. (Scholar)
- Carbonell, V., forthcoming, “Social Constraints on Moral Address”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Scholar)
- Coates, D. Justin, 2016, “The Epistemic Norm of Blame,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19: 457–473. (Scholar)
- Coates, D. J. and N. A. Tognazzini, 2012, “The Nature and Ethics of Blame”, Philosophy Compass, 7: 197–207. (Scholar)
- ––– (eds.), 2013, Blame: Its Nature and Norms, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Cohen, G. A., 2006, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 58: 113–136. (Scholar)
- Duff, R. A., 1986, Trials and Punishments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Blame, Moral Standing and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial”, Ratio, 23: 123–140. (Scholar)
- Dworkin, G., 2000, “Morally Speaking”, in Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), Reasoning Practically, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 182–188. (Scholar)
- Fischer, J. M., 1994, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Fischer, J. M. and M. Ravizza, 1998, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Franklin, C. E., 2013, “Valuing Blame”, in Coates & Tognazzini 2013: 207–223. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fricker, M., 2016, “What is the Point of Blame? A Paradigm-Based Explanation”, Noûs, 50: 165–183. (Scholar)
- Friedman, M., 2013, “How to Blame People Responsibly”, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 47: 271–284. (Scholar)
- Fritz, K. G. and D. Miller, 2018, “Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99: 118–139. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, A., 1990, Wise Feelings, Apt Choices: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Ginet, C., 2000, “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility”, Nous, 34: 267–277. (Scholar)
- Haji, I., 1998, Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hart, H. L. A., 1968, Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Herstein, O. J., 2017, “Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons”, Philosophical Studies, 174: 3109–3132. (Scholar)
- Hieronymi, P., 2001, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62: 529–555. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “The Force and Fairness of Blame”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 115–148. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Sher’s Defense of Blame”, Philosophical Studies, 137: 19–30. (Scholar)
- Hornsby, J., 1995, “Disempowered Speech”, Philosophical Topics, 23: 127–147. (Scholar)
- Houston, B., 1992, “In Praise of Blame”, Hypatia, 7: 128–147. (Scholar)
- Kenner, L., 1967, “On Blaming”, Mind, 76: 238–249. (Scholar)
- King, M. forthcoming, “Skepticism about the Standing to Blame”, in D. Shoemaker, ed., Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol. 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Levy, N., 2011, Hard Luck, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Macnamara, C., 2011, “Holding Others Responsible”, Philosophical Studies, 152: 81–102. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90: 546–569. (Scholar)
- Mason, M., 2011, “Blame: Taking it Seriously”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83: 473–481. (Scholar)
- McGeer, V., 2013, “Civilizing Blame”, in Coates & Tognazzini 2013: 162–188. (Scholar)
- McKenna, M., 2012, Conversation and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Directed Blame and Conversation”, in Coates & Tognazzini 2013: 119–140. (Scholar)
- Mele, A., 2011, “Moral Responsibility for Actions: Epistemic and Freedom Conditions”, Philosophical Explorations, 13: 101–111. (Scholar)
- Menges, L., 2017, “The Emotion Account of Blame,” Philosophical Studies, 174: 257–273. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1998, “Concealment and Exposure”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27: 3–30. (Scholar)
- Nelkin, D., 2011, Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Nussbaum, M. C. 2001, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Pickard, H., 2013, “Irrational Blame”, Analysis 73: 613–626. (Scholar)
- Priest, M., 2016, “Blame After Forgiveness”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19: 619–633. (Scholar)
- Radzik, L., 2011, “On Minding Your Own Business: Differentiating Accountability Relations within the Moral Community”, Social Theory and Practice, 37: 574–598. (Scholar)
- Rettler, L., 2018, “In Defense of Doxastic Blame,” Synthese, 195: 2205–2226. (Scholar)
- Roadevin, C., 2018, “Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing”, Metaphilosophy, 49: 137–152. (Scholar)
- Robichaud, P. and J. W. Wieland. (eds.), 2017, Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Rosen, G., 2004, “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 295–313. (Scholar)
- Sabini, J. and M. Silver, 1982, Moralities of Everyday Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Scanlon, T. M., 1986, “The Significance of Choice”, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VIII, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Interpreting Blame”, in Coates & Tognazzini 2013: 84–99. (Scholar)
- Sher, G., 2006, In Praise of Blame, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Wrongdoing and Relationships: The Problem of the Stranger”, in Coates & Tognazzini 2013: 49–65. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, D., 2011, “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility”, Ethics, 121: 602–632. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, Responsibility from the Margins, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Response-Dependent Responsibility”, The Philosophical Review, 126: 481–527. (Scholar)
- Smart, J. J. C., 1961, “Free Will, Praise and Blame”, Mind, 70: 291–306. (Scholar)
- Smith, A. M., 2005, “Responsibility for Attitudes”, Ethics, 115: 236–271. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible”, The Journal of Ethics, 2: 465–484. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Character, Blameworthiness, and Blame: Comments on George Sher’s In Praise of Blame”, Philosophical Studies, 137: 31–39. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account”, Ethics, 122: 575–589. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Moral Blame and Moral Protest”, in Coates & Tognazzini 2013: 27–48. (Scholar)
- Solomon, R. C., 1993, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P. F., 1962, “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 48: 1–25, reprinted in Watson 2003. (Scholar)
- Szabados, B. and E. Soifer, 2004, Hypocrisy: Ethical Investigations, Broadview Press. (Scholar)
- Talbert, M., 2012, “Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest”, The Journal of Ethics, 16: 89–109. (Scholar)
- Todd, P., 2012, “Manipulation and Moral Standing: An Argument for Incompatibilism”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 12 (March) [Todd 2012 available online]. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming. “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame”, Nous. (Scholar)
- Tognazzini, N. A. 2015. “The Strains of Involvement,” in Clarke, McKenna, and Smith (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 19–44. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, P., 1983, An Essay on Free Will, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Vargas, Manuel, 2013. Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wallace, R. J., 1994, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 38: 307–341. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments”, in Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 348–372. (Scholar)
- Watson, G., 1987, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme”, in F. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 256–286. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Two Faces of Responsibility”, Philosophical Topics, 24(2): 227–248. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, Agency and Answerability, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “The Trouble with Psychopaths”, in Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 307–331. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013a, “Moral Agency”, in H, LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 3322–3333. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015. “A Moral Predicament in the Criminal Law”, Inquiry, 58: 168–188. (Scholar)
- Wertheimer, R., 1998, “Constraining Condemning”, Ethics, 108: 489–501. (Scholar)
- Wolf, S., 2011, “Blame, Italian Style”, in Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essay on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 332–347. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, M., 1988, An Essay on Moral Responsibility, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
