Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Causal Approaches to Scientific Explanation" by Lauren Ross and James Woodward

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Andersen, Holly, 2014a, “A Field Guide to Mechanisms: Part I: A Field Guide to Mechanisms I”, Philosophy Compass, 9(4): 274–283. doi:10.1111/phc3.12119 (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “A Field Guide to Mechanisms: Part II: A Field Guide to Mechanisms II”, Philosophy Compass, 9(4): 284–293. doi:10.1111/phc3.12118 (Scholar)
Anscombe, G. E. M., 1971, Causality and Determination: An Inaugural Lecture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Causation, Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley (eds.), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 88–104. (Scholar)
Baker, Alan, 2005, “Are There Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?”, Mind, 114(454): 223–238. doi:10.1093/mind/fzi223 (Scholar)
Batterman, Robert W., 2000, “Multiple Realizability and Universality”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51(1): 115–145. doi:10.1093/bjps/51.1.115 (Scholar)
–––, 2002, The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence, (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195146476.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, “On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(1): 1–25. doi:10.1093/bjps/axp018 (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Reduction and Renormalization”, in Time, Chance, and Reduction, Gerhard Ernst and Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 159–179. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511770777.009 (Scholar)
–––, 2021, The Middle Way: A Non-Fundamental Approach to Many-Body Physics, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197568613.001.0001 (Scholar)
Batterman, Robert W. and Collin C. Rice, 2014, “Minimal Model Explanations”, Philosophy of Science, 81(3): 349–376. doi:10.1086/676677 (Scholar)
Baumgartner, Michael, 2010, “Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 40(3): 359–383. doi:10.1080/00455091.2010.10716727 (Scholar)
Bechtel, William and Robert C. Richardson, 1993 [2010], Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Second edition, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010. (Scholar)
Blanchard, Thomas, 2020, “Explanatory Abstraction and the Goldilocks Problem: Interventionism Gets Things Just Right”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(2): 633–663. doi:10.1093/bjps/axy030 (Scholar)
Briggs, Rachael, 2012, “Interventionist Counterfactuals”, Philosophical Studies, 160(1): 139–166. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9908-5 (Scholar)
Büchel, W., 1963 [1969], “Warum hat unser Raum gerade drei Dimensionen?”, Physik Journal, 19(12): 547–549. Translated and adapted as “Why Is Space Three-Dimensional?”, Ira. M. Freeman (trans./adapter), American Journal of Physics, 37(12): 1222–1224. doi:10.1002/phbl.19630191204 (de) doi:10.1119/1.1975283 (en) (Scholar)
Callender, Craig, 2005, “Answers in Search of a Question: ‘Proofs’ of the Tri-Dimensionality of Space”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 36(1): 113–136. doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2004.09.002 (Scholar)
Chirimuuta, M., 2014, “Minimal Models and Canonical Neural Computations: The Distinctness of Computational Explanation in Neuroscience”, Synthese, 191(2): 127–153. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0369-y (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Explanation in Computational Neuroscience: Causal and Non-Causal”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 69(3): 849–880. doi:10.1093/bjps/axw034 (Scholar)
Craver, Carl F., 2006, “When Mechanistic Models Explain”, Synthese, 153(3): 355–376. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9097-x (Scholar)
–––, 2007a, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299317.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2007b, “Constitutive Explanatory Relevance”:, Journal of Philosophical Research, 32: 3–20. doi:10.5840/jpr20073241 (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Physical Law and Mechanistic Explanation in the Hodgkin and Huxley Model of the Action Potential”, Philosophy of Science, 75(5): 1022–1033. doi:10.1086/594543 (Scholar)
Craver, Carl F., and Bechtel, William, 2007, “Top-down Causation Without Top-down Causes” Biology & Philosophy, 22: 547–563. doi:10.1007/s10539-006-9028-8 (Scholar)
Craver, Carl F. and David M. Kaplan, 2020, “Are More Details Better? On the Norms of Completeness for Mechanistic Explanations”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(1): 287–319. doi:10.1093/bjps/axy015 (Scholar)
Deutsch, David, 2011, The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations That Transform the World, New York: Viking. (Scholar)
Dupré, John, 2013, “Living Causes”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 87: 19–37. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00218.x (Scholar)
Ehrenfest, Paul, 1917, “In What Way Does It Become Manifest in the Fundamental Laws of Physics that Space Has Three Dimensions?”, KNAW, Proceedings, 20(2): 200–209. [Ehrenfest 1917 available online] (Scholar)
Euler, Leonhard, 1736 [1956], “Solutio problematis ad geometriam situs pertinentis”, Commentarii Academiae scientiarum imperialis Petropolitanae, 8: 128–140. Translated as “The Seven Bridges of Königsberg”, in The World of Mathematics: A Small Library of the Literature of Mathematics from Aʻh-Mosé the Scribe to Albert Einstein, 4 volumes, by James R. Newman, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1:573–580. (Scholar)
Fodor, Jerry A., 1981, Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Franklin-Hall, L. R., 2016, “High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist’s ‘Variables Problem’”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 67(2): 553–577. doi:10.1093/bjps/axu040 (Scholar)
Jansson, Lina, & Saatsi, Juha, 2017, “Explanatory abstractions”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 70(3): 817–844. doi:10.1093/bjps/axx016 (Scholar)
Glennan, Stuart S., 1996, “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation”, Erkenntnis, 44(1): 49–71. doi:10.1007/bf00172853 (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Capacities, Universality, and Singularity”, Philosophy of Science, 64(4): 605–626. doi:10.1086/392574 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, The New Mechanical Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779711.001.0001 (Scholar)
Glymour, Clark, 1980, “Explanations, Tests, Unity and Necessity”, Noûs, 14(1): 31–50. doi:10.2307/2214888 (Scholar)
Halina, Marta, 2018, “Mechanistic Explanation and Its Limits”, in The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari (eds.), New York: Routledge, 213–224. (Scholar)
Hall, Ned, 2012, “Comments on Michael Strevens’s Depth”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(2): 474–482. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00575.x (Scholar)
[EG2] Hitchcock, Christopher and James Woodward, 2003, “Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth”, Noûs, 37(2): 181–199. [For EG1, see Woodward & Hitchcock 2003.] doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00435 (Scholar)
Huneman, Philippe, 2010, “Topological Explanations and Robustness in Biological Sciences”, Synthese, 177(2): 213–245. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9842-z (Scholar)
Illari, Phyllis McKay and Jon Williamson, 2010, “Function and Organization: Comparing the Mechanisms of Protein Synthesis and Natural Selection”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 41(3): 279–291. doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2010.07.001 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “What Is a Mechanism? Thinking about Mechanisms across the Sciences”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2(1): 119–135. doi:10.1007/s13194-011-0038-2 (Scholar)
Kostić, Daniel, 2020, “General Theory of Topological Explanations and Explanatory Asymmetry”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375(1796): 20190321. doi:10.1098/rstb.2019.0321 (Scholar)
Kaplan, David Michael and Carl F. Craver, 2011, “The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective”, Philosophy of Science, 78(4): 601–627. doi:10.1086/661755 (Scholar)
Lange, Marc, 2013, “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64(3): 485–511. doi:10.1093/bjps/axs012 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, Because without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics, (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science), New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190269487.001.0001 (Scholar)
Levy, Arnon, 2014, “What Was Hodgkin and Huxley’s Achievement?”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 65(3): 469–492. doi:10.1093/bjps/axs043 (Scholar)
Levy, Arnon and William Bechtel, 2013, “Abstraction and the Organization of Mechanisms”, Philosophy of Science, 80(2): 241–261. doi:10.1086/670300 (Scholar)
Lyon, Aidan, 2012, “Mathematical Explanations Of Empirical Facts, And Mathematical Realism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(3): 559–578. doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.596216 (Scholar)
Lyon, Aidan and Mark Colyvan, 2008, “The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces”, Philosophia Mathematica, 16(2): 227–243. doi:10.1093/philmat/nkm025 (Scholar)
Machamer, Peter, 2004, “Activities and Causation: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Mechanisms”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 18(1): 27–39. doi:10.1080/02698590412331289242 (Scholar)
[MDC] Machamer, Peter, Lindley Darden, and Carl F. Craver, 2000, “Thinking about Mechanisms”, Philosophy of Science, 67(1): 1–25. doi:10.1086/392759 (Scholar)
Mackie, J. L., 1974, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation, (The Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy), Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198246420.001.0001 (Scholar)
Morgan, Stephen L. and Christopher Winship, 2014, Counterfactuals and Causal Inference: Methods and Principles for Social Research, second edition, (Analytical Methods for Social Research), New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9781107587991 (Scholar)
Ney, Alyssa, 2009, “Physical Causation and Difference-Making”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60(4): 737–764. doi:10.1093/bjps/axp037 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Microphysical Causation and the Case for Physicalism”, Analytic Philosophy, 57(2): 141–164. doi:10.1111/phib.12082 (Scholar)
Pearl, Judea, 2000 [2009], Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Second edition 2009. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511803161 (Scholar)
Piccinini, Gualtiero, 2006, “Computational Explanation in Neuroscience”, Synthese, 153(3): 343–353. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9096-y (Scholar)
Piccinini, Gualtiero and Carl Craver, 2011, “Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches”, Synthese, 183(3): 283–311. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9898-4 (Scholar)
Potochnik, Angela, 2011, “Explanation and Understanding: An Alternative to Strevens’ Depth”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 1(1): 29–38. doi:10.1007/s13194-010-0002-6 (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Causal patterns and adequate explanations”, Philosophical Studies, 172: 1163–1182. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0342-8 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, Idealization and the Aims of Science, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Pincock, Christopher, 2007, “A Role for Mathematics in the Physical Sciences”, Noûs, 41(2): 253–275. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00646.x (Scholar)
–––, 2012, Mathematics and Scientific Representation, (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199757107.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “Concrete Scale Models, Essential Idealization, and Causal Explanation”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 73(2): 299–323. doi:10.1093/bjps/axz019 (Scholar)
Rathkopf, Charles, 2018, “Network Representation and Complex Systems”, Synthese, 195(1): 55–78. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0726-0 (Scholar)
Rescorla, Michael, 2014, “The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(1): 173–208. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00619.x (Scholar)
Reutlinger, Alexander, 2014, “Why Is There Universal Macrobehavior? Renormalization Group Explanation as Noncausal Explanation”, Philosophy of Science, 81(5): 1157–1170. doi:10.1086/677887 (Scholar)
Reutlinger, Alexander and Andersen, Holly, 2016, “Abstract versus Causal Explanations?”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 30(2): 129–146. doi:10.1080/02698595.2016.1265867 (Scholar)
Reutlinger, Alexander and Saatsi, Juha (eds.), 2018, Explanation beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198777946.001.0001 (Scholar)
Rice, Collin, 2021, Leveraging Distortions: Explanation, Idealization, and Universality in Science, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
Ross, Lauren N., 2015, “Dynamical Models and Explanation in Neuroscience”, Philosophy of Science, 82(1): 32–54. doi:10.1086/679038 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Causal Selection and the Pathway Concept”, Philosophy of Science, 85(4): 551–572. doi:10.1086/699022 (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective”, Philosophy of Science, 87(4): 640–662. doi:10.1086/709732 (Scholar)
–––, 2021a, “Causal Concepts in Biology: How Pathways Differ from Mechanisms and Why It Matters”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(1): 131–158. doi:10.1093/bjps/axy078 (Scholar)
–––, 2021b, “Distinguishing Topological and Causal Explanation”, Synthese, 198(10): 9803–9820. doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02685-1 (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, “Cascade versus Mechanism: The Diversity of Causal Structure in Science”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, first online: 5 December 2022. doi:10.1086/723623 (Scholar)
Ross, Lauren N. and James F. Woodward, 2022, “Irreversible (One-Hit) and Reversible (Sustaining) Causation”, Philosophy of Science, 89(5): 889–898. doi:10.1017/psa.2022.70 (Scholar)
Salmon, Wesley C., 1971a, “Statistical Explanation”, in Salmon 1971b: 29–87. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1971b, Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Silberstein, Michael and Anthony Chemero, 2013, “Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences”, Philosophy of Science, 80(5): 958–970. doi:10.1086/674533 (Scholar)
Skow, Bradford, 2014, “Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)?”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 65(3): 445–467. doi:10.1093/bjps/axs047 (Scholar)
Strevens, Michael, 2008, Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified: Causally”, Noûs, 38(1): 154–176. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Causality Reunified”, Erkenntnis, 78(S2): 299–320. doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9514-8 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “The Mathematical Route to Causal Understanding”, in Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018: 117–140 (ch. 5). (Scholar)
Sober, Elliott, 1983, “Equilibrium Explanation”, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 43(2): 201–10. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “The Multiple Realizability Argument against Reductionism”, Philosophy of Science, 66(4): 542–564. doi:10.1086/392754 (Scholar)
Waters, C. Kenneth, 1990, “Why the Anti-Reductionist Consensus Won’t Survive the Case of Classical Mendelian Genetics”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1990(1): 125–139. doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1990.1.192698 (Scholar)
Weslake, Brad, 2010, “Explanatory Depth”, Philosophy of Science, 77(2): 273–294. doi:10.1086/651316 (Scholar)
Wigner, Eugene Paul, 1967, Symmetries and Reflections: Scientific Essays of Eugene P. Wigner, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. (Scholar)
Woodward, James, 2002, “What Is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account”, Philosophy of Science, 69(S3): S366–S377. doi:10.1086/341859 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Sensitive and Insensitive Causation”, The Philosophical Review, 115(1): 1–50. doi:10.1215/00318108-2005-001. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation”, Biology & Philosophy, 25(3): 287–318. doi:10.1007/s10539-010-9200-z (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Mechanistic Explanation: Its Scope and Limits”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 87: 39–65. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00219.x (Scholar)
–––, 2017a, “Explanation in Neurobiology: An Interventionist Perspective”, in Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science, David M. Kaplan (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch. 5. (Scholar)
–––, 2017b, “Interventionism and the Missing Metaphysics: A Dialogue”, in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: New Essays, Matthew Slater and Zanja Yudell (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 193–228. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199363209.003.0010 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Some Varieties of Non-Causal Explanation”, in Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018: 117–140. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “Causal Complexity, Conditional Independence, and Downward Causation”, Philosophy of Science, 87(5): 857–867. doi:10.1086/710631 (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Explanatory Autonomy: The Role of Proportionality, Stability, and Conditional Irrelevance”, Synthese, 198(1): 237–265. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01998-6 (Scholar)
[EG1] Woodward, James and Christopher Hitchcock, 2003, “Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account”, Noûs, 37(1): 1–24. [For EG2, see Hitchcock & Woodward 2003.] doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00426 (Scholar)

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