Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Chinese Room Argument" by David Cole

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Apple Inc., 2014, ‘IOS 7 Siri’, accessed 1/10/2014. (Scholar)
Baggini, J., 2009, ‘Painting the bigger picture’, The Philosopher’s Magazine, 8: 37–39. (Scholar)
Block, N., 1978, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, in C. W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Reprinted in many anthologies on philosophy of mind and psychology.) (Scholar)
–––, 1986, ‘Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Volume X), P.A. French, et al. (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 615–678. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, ‘Searle’s Arguments Against Cognitive Science’, in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002. (Scholar)
Boden, M., 1988, Computer Models of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; pp. 238–251 were excerpted and published as ‘Escaping from the Chinese Room’, in The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, ed M. A. Boden, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. (Scholar)
Cam, P., 1990, ‘Searle on Strong AI’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68: 103–8. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1992, ‘Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room’, in J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996a, “Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton’, Synthese 108: 309–33. (Scholar)
–––, 1996b, ‘Minds, machines, and mathematics’, Psyche, 2: 11–20. (Scholar)
Churchland, P., 1985, ‘Reductionism, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States’, The Journal of Philosophy, LXXXII: 8–28. (Scholar)
Churchland, P. and Churchland, P., 1990, ‘Could a machine think?’, Scientific American, 262(1): 32–37. (Scholar)
Clark, A., 1991, Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Cole, D., 1984, ‘Thought and Thought Experiments’, Philosophical Studies, 45: 431–44. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, ‘Functionalism and Inverted Spectra’, Synthese, 82: 202–222. (Scholar)
–––, 1991a, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity’, Synthese, 88: 399–417. (Scholar)
–––, 1991b, ‘Artificial Minds: Cam on Searle’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69: 329–33. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, ‘The Causal Powers of CPUs’, in E. Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons, New York: Academic Press (Scholar)
Cole, D. and Foelber, R., 1984, Contingent Materialism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65(1): 74–85. (Scholar)
Copeland, J., 2002, ‘The Chinese Room from a Logical Point of View’, in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002, 104–122. (Scholar)
Crane, Tim., 1996, The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation, London: Penguin. (Scholar)
Davis, Lawrence, 2001, ‘Functionalism, the Brain, and Personal Identity’, Philosophical Studies, 102(3): 259–279. (Scholar)
Dehaene, S., 2014, Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts, New York: Viking Penquin. (Scholar)
Dennett, D., 1978, ‘Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness’, in Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, ‘Where am I?’ in Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 310–323. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, ‘Fast Thinking’, in The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 324–337. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, ‘Consciousness in Humans and Robot Minds,’ in M. Ito, Y. Miyashita and E.T. Rolls (eds.), Cognition, computation, and consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 17–29. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, New York: W.W. Norton and Co. (Scholar)
Dneprov, A., 1961, ‘Игра’ (‘The Game’), Знание-сила (Knowledge is Power), 5: 39–42; for a link to the translation, see Mickevich 1961, Other Internet Resources.
Double, R., 1983, ‘Searle, Programs and Functionalism’, Nature and System, 5: 107–14. (Scholar)
Dretske, F. 1985, ‘Presidential Address’ (Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association), Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 59(1): 23–33. (Scholar)
Dreyfus, H. 1965, ‘Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence’, Boston, MA: Rand Corporation. (Scholar)
–––, 1972, What Computers Can’t Do, New York: Harper & Row. (Scholar)
Fodor, J., 1987, Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, ‘Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room’, in D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, A Theory of Content and other essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘Where is my Mind?’, London Review of Books, (31)3: 13–15. (Scholar)
Ford, J., 2010, ‘Helen Keller was never in a Chinese Room’, Minds and Machines, VOLUME: PAGES. (Scholar)
Gardiner, H., 1987, The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
Hanley, R., 1997, The Metaphysics of Star Trek, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
Harnad, S., 1989, ‘Minds, Machines and Searle’, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 1: 5–25. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, ‘Minds, Machines, and Searle2: What’s Right and Wrong about the Chinese Room Argument’, in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002, 294–307. (Scholar)
Haugeland, J., 2002, ‘Syntax, Semantics, Physics’, in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002, 379–392. (Scholar)
Hauser, L., 1997, ‘Searle’s Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument’, Minds and Machines, 7: 199–226. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, ‘Nixin’ Goes to China’, in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002, 123–143. (Scholar)
Hayes, P., Harnad, S., Perlis, D. & Block, N., 1992, ‘Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind’, Minds and Machines, 2(3): 217–238. (Scholar)
Hofstadter, D., 1981, ‘Reflections on Searle’, in Hofstadter and Dennett (eds.), The Mind’s I, New York: Basic Books, pp. 373–382. (Scholar)
Horgan, T., 2013, ‘Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality’, The Monist 96: 232–251. (Scholar)
Hudetz, A., 2012, ‘General Anesthesia and Human Brain Connectivity’, Brain Connect, 2(6): 291–302. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1986, ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXXIII: 291–5. (Scholar)
Kaernbach, C., 2005, ‘No Virtual Mind in the Chinese Room’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12(11): 31–42. (Scholar)
Kim, J., 2010, The Philosophy of Mind, (3rd edition), Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
Kurzweil, R., 2000, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence, New York: Penguin. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, ‘Locked in his Chinese Room’, in Richards 2002, 128–171. (Scholar)
Maloney, J., 1987, ‘The Right Stuff’, Synthese, 70: 349–72. (Scholar)
Maudlin, T., 1989, ‘Computation and Consciousness’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXXVI: 407–432. (Scholar)
Milkowski, M. 2017, ‘Why think that the brain is not a computer?’, APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, 16(2), 22–28. (Scholar)
Millikan, R., 1984, Language, Thought, and other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Moravec, H., 1999, Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nute, D., 2011, ‘A Logical Hole the Chinese Room Avoids’, Minds and Machines, 21: 431–3; this is a reply to Shaffer 2009. (Scholar)
Penrose, R., 2002, ‘Consciousness, Computation, and the Chinese Room’ in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002, 226–249. (Scholar)
Pinker, S., 1997, How the Mind Works, New York: Norton. (Scholar)
Preston, J. and M. Bishop (eds.), 2002, Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pylyshyn, Z., 1980, Reply to Searle,Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3. (Scholar)
Rapaport, W., 1984, ‘Searle’s Experiments with Thought’, Philosophy of Science, 53: 271–9. (Scholar)
––– 2006, ‘How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese Room’, Minds and Machines, 16(4): 381–436. (Scholar)
Rey, G., 1986, ‘What’s Really Going on in Searle’s “Chinese Room” ’, Philosophical Studies, 50: 169–85. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, ‘Searle’s Misunderstandings of Functionalism and Strong AI’, in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002, 201–225. (Scholar)
Richards, J. W. (ed.), 2002, Are We Spiritual Machines: Ray Kurzweil vs. the Critics of Strong AI, Seattle: Discovery Institute. (Scholar)
Rosenthal, D. (ed), 1991, The Nature of Mind, Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Schank, R., 2015, ‘Machines that Think are in the Movies’, in Brockman, J. (ed.), What to Think About Machines that Think, New York: Harper Collins (Scholar)
Schank, R. and Abelson, R., 1977, Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. (Scholar)
Schank, R. and P. Childers, 1985, The Cognitive Computer: On Language, Learning, and Artificial Intelligence, New York: Addison-Wesley. (Scholar)
Schweizer, P., 2012, ‘The Externalist Foundations of a Truly Total Turing Test’, Minds and Machines, 22: 191–212. (Scholar)
Searle, J., 1980, ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417–57 [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Minds, Brains and Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, ‘Artificial Intelligence and the Chinese Room: An Exchange’, New York Review of Books, 36: 2 (February 16, 1989). (Scholar)
–––, 1990a, ‘Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program?’, Scientific American, 262(1): 26–31. (Scholar)
–––, 1990b, ‘Presidential Address’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 64: 21–37. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, ‘Do We Understand Consciousness?’ (Interview with Walter Freeman), Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6: 5–6. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, ‘The Chinese Room’, in R.A. Wilson and F. Keil (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002a, ‘Twenty-one Years in the Chinese Room’, in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002, 51–69. (Scholar)
–––, 2002b, ‘The Problem of Consciousness’, in Consciousness and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 7–17. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Mind: a Brief Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘Why Dualism (and Materialism) Fail to Account for Consciousness’, in Richard E. Lee (ed.), Questioning Nineteenth Century Assumptions about Knowledge (III: Dualism), New York: SUNY Press. (Scholar)
Seligman, M., 2019, ‘The Evolving Treatment of Semantics in Machine Translation’, in M. Ji and M. Oakes (eds.), Advances in Empirical Translation Studies: Developing Translation Resources and Technologies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Shaffer, M., 2009, ‘A Logical Hole in the Chinese Room’, Minds and Machines, 19(2): 229–235. (Scholar)
Sharvy, R., 1983, ‘It Ain’t the Meat It’s the Motion’, Inquiry, 26: 125–134. (Scholar)
Simon, H. and Eisenstadt, S., 2002, ‘A Chinese Room that Understands’, in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 2002, 95–108. (Scholar)
Sloman, A. and Croucher, M., 1980, ‘How to turn an information processor into an understanding’, Brain and Behavioral Sciences, 3: 447–8. (Scholar)
Sprevak, M., 2007, ‘Chinese Rooms and Program Portability’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58(4): 755–776. (Scholar)
Stampe, Dennis, 1977, ‘Towards a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation’, in P. French, T. Uehling, H. Wettstein, (eds.) Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume 2), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 42–63. (Scholar)
Thagard, P., 1986, ‘The Emergence of Meaning: An Escape from Searle’s Chinese Room’, Behaviorism, 14: 139–46. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, ‘Thought Experiments Considered Harmful‘, Perspectives on Science, 21: 122–139. (Scholar)
Turing, A., 1948, ‘Intelligent Machinery: A Report’, London: National Physical Laboratory. (Scholar)
–––, 1950, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, Mind, 59: 433–460. (Scholar)
Weiss, T., 1990, ‘Closing the Chinese Room’, Ratio, 3: 165–81. (Scholar)
Ziemke, T., 2016, ‘The Body of Knowledge: on the role of the living body in grounding embodied cognition’, Biosystems, 148: 4–11. (Scholar)

Generated Sun Oct 6 13:32:26 2024

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