Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Epistemic Closure" by Steven Luper

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Alston, W., 1993, The Reliability of Sense Perception, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D., 1973, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Audi, R., 1995, “Deductive Closure, Defeasibility and Scepticism: A Reply to Feldman.” Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 494–499. (Scholar)
Becker, K., 2009, Epistemology Modalized, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Black, M., 1949, “The Justification of Induction,” Language and Philosophy, Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Black, T., and Murphy, P., 2007, “In Defense of Sensitivity”, Synthese, 154(1): 53–71. (Scholar)
Bogdan, R.J., 1985, “Cognition and Epistemic Closure,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 22: 55–63. (Scholar)
BonJour, L., 1987, “Nozick, Externalism, and Skepticism,” in Luper 1987a, 297–313. (Scholar)
Brueckner, A., 1985a, “Losing Track of the Sceptic,” Analysis, 45: 103–104. (Scholar)
–––, 1985b, “Skepticism and Epistemic Closure,” Philosophical Topics, 13: 89–117. (Scholar)
–––, 1985c, “Transmission for Knowledge Not Established,” Philosophical Quarterly, 35: 193–196. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Roush on Knowledge: Tracking Redux?,” in K. Becker and T. Black (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Cohen, S., 1987, “Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards,” Synthese, 73: 3–26. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “How to be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 91–123. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons,” Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 57–89. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65.2: 309–329. (Scholar)
Davies, M., 1998, “Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant,” in Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 321–361. (Scholar)
DeRose, K., 1995, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” Philosophical Review, 104: 1–52. (Scholar)
Dretske, F., 1969, Seeing and Knowing, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1970, “Epistemic Operators,” Journal of Philosophy, 67: 1007–1023. (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “Conclusive Reasons,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49: 1–22. (Scholar)
–––, 1972, “Contrastive Statements,” Philosophical Review, 81: 411–430. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Skepticism: What Perception Teaches,” in Luper 2003b, pp. 105–118. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment?” in Steup 2005. (Scholar)
Feldman, R., 1995, “In Defense of Closure,” Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 487–494. (Scholar)
Firth, R., 1978, “Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?” in Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Values and Morals, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. (Scholar)
Fumerton, R., 1995, Metaepistemology, and Skepticism, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
Goldman, A., 1976, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, 73: 771–791. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “What is Justified Belief?,” in Justification and Knowledge, G.S. Pappas (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
Goodman, N., 1955, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (4th ed.), Harvard University Press, 1983. (Scholar)
Hales, S., 1995, Epistemic Closure Principles, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 33: 185–201. (Scholar)
Harman, G. and Sherman, B., 2004, “Knowledge, Assumptions, Lotteries,” Philosophical Issues, 14: 492–500. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, J., 2004, Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “The Case for Closure,” in Steup 2005. (Scholar)
Jaeger, C. 2004, “Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretske’s Theory of Knowledge,” Erkenntnis, 61: 187–201. (Scholar)
Klein, P., 1981, Certainty: A Refutation of Skepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails,” Philosophical Topics, 23: 213–236. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues, 14(1): 165–184. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 2011, “Nozick on Knowledge,” in Philosophical Troubles (Collected Papers, Volume 1), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kyburg, H., 1961, Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1973, Counterfactuals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8: 339–359. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 549–567. (Scholar)
Luper, S., 1984, “The Epistemic Predicament: Knowledge, Nozickian Tracking, and Skepticism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62: 26–50. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1987a, The, Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 1987b, “The Possibility of Skepticism,” in Luper 1987a. (Scholar)
–––, 1987c, “The Causal Indicator Analysis of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47: 563–587. (Scholar)
–––, 2003a, “Indiscernability Skepticism,” in S. Luper 2003b, pp. 183–202. (Scholar)
–––, (ed.) 2003b, The Skeptics, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, Limited. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Epistemic Relativism,” Philosophical Issues, 14, a supplement to Noûs, 2004, 271–295. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Dretske on Knowledge Closure,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84(3): 379–394. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “False Negatives,” in K. Becker and T. Black (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Moore, G. E., 1959, “Proof of an External World,” and “Certainty,” in Philosophical Papers, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. (Scholar)
Murphy, P., 2005, “Closure Failures for Safety,” Philosophia, 33: 331–334. (Scholar)
Nozick, R., 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Papineau, D., 1992, “Reliabilism, Induction, and Scepticism,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 42: 1–20. (Scholar)
Pritchard, D., 2007, “Anti-Luck Epistemology,” Synthese, 158: 227–298. (Scholar)
Ramsey, F. P., 1931, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Roush, S., 2005, Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence and Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sextus Empiricus, 1933a, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, R.G. Bury (trans), London: W. Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library. (Scholar)
Shatz, D., 1987, “Nozick’s Conception of Skepticism,” in The Possibility of Knowledge, S. Luper (ed.), Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
Sosa, E., 1999, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 141–152. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Neither Contextualism Nor Skepticism,” in The Skeptics, S. Luper (ed.), Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, Limited, pp. 165–182. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge Volume I, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Stalnaker, R., 1968, “A Theory of Conditionals,” American Philosophical Quarterly (Monograph No. 2), 98–112. (Scholar)
Steup, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.), 2005, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Stine, G.C., 1971, “Dretske on Knowing the Logical Consequences,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 296–299. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure,” Philosophical Studies, 29: 249–261. (Scholar)
Van Cleve, J., 1979, “Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle,” Philosophical Review, 88: 55–91. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Is Knowledge Easy—or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Alternative to Skepticism,” in S. Luper 2003b, pp. 45–60. (Scholar)
Vogel, J., 1990, “Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?” in Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, M. Roth and G. Ross (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Reliabilism Leveled,” Journal of Philosophy, 97: 602–623. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Speaking of Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues, 14: 501–509. (Scholar)
Williamson, T., 2000, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wittgenstein, L., 1969, On Certainty, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), New York: Harper and Row, Inc. (Scholar)
Wright, C., 1985, “Facts and Certainty,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 71: 429–472. (Scholar)

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