Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Cognitive Disability and Moral Status" by David Wasserman, Adrienne Asch, Jeffrey Blustein and Daniel Putnam
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Carlson, L. and Kittay, E., 2009. “Introduction: Rethinking Philosophical Presumptions in Light of Cognitive Disability,” Metaphilosophy, 40: 307–330. (Scholar)
- Crary, A., 2007. “ Humans, Animals, Right and Wrong,” in Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond, A. Crary (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 381–404. (Scholar)
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- Diamond, C., 1978. “Eating Meat and Eating People,” Philosophy, 53: 465–479. (Scholar)
- DiSilvestro, R., 2010. Human Capacities and Moral Status, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
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- Dworkin, R., 1994. Life’s Dominion: An Argument about
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- Francis, L. and Norman, R., 1978. “Some Animals are More Equal than Others,” Philosophy, 53: 518. (Scholar)
- Gleeson, A., 2008. “Eating Meat and Reading Diamond,” Philosophical Papers, 37: 157–175. (Scholar)
- Goode, D.A., 1994. A World Without Words: The Social
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- Gunnarson, L., 2008. “Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 11: 305–326. (Scholar)
- Hacker-Wright, J., 2007. “Moral Status in Virtue Ethics,” Philosophy, 82: 449–473. (Scholar)
- Hanfling, O., 2001. “Thinking,” in Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, H. Glock (ed.), Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Harman, E., 2003. “The potentiality problem,” Philosophical Studies, 114(1–2): 173–198. (Scholar)
- Harris, J., 1985. The Value of Life, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Jaworska, A., 1999. “Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 28: 105–138. (Scholar)
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- Kagan, S., 2016. “What’s Wrong with Speciesism?
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- Kain, P., 2009. “Kant’s Defense of Human Moral
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- Kittay, E., 1999. Love’s Labor: Essays on Women,
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- –––, 2008. “Ideal Theory in Bioethics and the Exclusion of People with Severe Cognitive Disabilities,” in Naturalized Bioethics: Toward Responsible Knowing and Practice, H. Lindemann, M. Verkerk and M.U. Walker (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 218–237. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, C., 1996. The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kumar, R., 2008. “Permissible Killing and the Irrelevance of Being Human,” The Journal of Ethics, 12: 57–80. (Scholar)
- Liao. M., 2010. “The Basis of Human Moral Status,”
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 7: 159–179. (Scholar)
- McMahan, J., 1996. “Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25:3–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002. The Ethics of Killing, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005. “Our Fellow Creatures,” The Journal of Ethics, 9: 353–380. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007. “Infanticide,” Utilitas, 19: 131–159. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2009. “Radical Cognitive Limitation,” in Disability and Disadvantage, K. Brownlee and A. Cureton (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 240–259. (Scholar)
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- Mulhall, S., 2002. “Fearful Thoughts,” London
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- Mullin, A., 2011, “Children and the Argument from
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- Newson, A.J., 2007. “Personhood and Moral Status,” in
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- Nozick, R., 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
- Perring, C., 1997. “Degrees of Personhood,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 22: 173–197. (Scholar)
- Rawls, J., 1971. A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Roberts, A.J., 2016. “Pessimism About Motivating Modal Personism,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, published online 3 July 2016, doi: 10.1111/japp.12235 (Scholar)
- Rossi, J., 2010. “Is equal moral consideration really compatible with unequal moral status?” Kennedy Institute Ethics Journal, 20(3): 251–76. (Scholar)
- Savulescu, J., 2009. “The Human Prejudice and the Moral Status of Enhanced Beings: What Do We Owe the Gods?” in Human Enhancement, J. Savulescu and N. Bostrom (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 211–250. (Scholar)
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- Scanlon, T., 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
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- Silvers, A. 2012. “Moral status: what a bad idea!”
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1014–25. (Scholar)
- Silvers, A. and Francis, L., 2009. “Thinking about the good: reconfiguring liberal metaphysics (or not) for people with cognitive disabilities,” Metaphilosophy, 40: 475–498. (Scholar)
- Singer, P., 1993. Practical Ethics, 2nd ed.
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- Surovell, Jonathan, forthcoming. “But for the Grace of God: Abortion and Cognitive Disability, Luck and Moral Status” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, published online 29 September 2016, doi:10.1007/s10677-016-9755-0 (Scholar)
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- Tooley, M., 1983. Abortion and Infanticide, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
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- Warren, M.A., 1997. Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
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