Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Collective Intentionality" by David P. Schweikard and Hans Bernhard Schmid

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Alonso, Facundo M., 2009, “Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations,” Ethics, 119(3): 444–75. (Scholar)
Bacharach, Michael, 2006, Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Baier, Annette, 1997, “Doing Things With Others: The Mental Commons,” in L. Alanen, S. Heinämaa, and T. Wallgren (eds.), Commonality and Particularity in Ethics, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 15–44. (Scholar)
Baltzer, Ulrich, 2002: “Joint Action of Large Groups”, in George Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Intentionality, Frankfurt am Main: Hänsel-Hohenhausen, pp. 1–18. (Scholar)
Barzagan-Forward, Saba and Deborah Tollefsen (eds.), 2020, The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Bratman, Michael, 1999, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Dynamics of Sociality,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXX: 1–15. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Collingwood, Robin George, 1947, The New Leviathan. Oxford, Clarendon. (Scholar)
Copp, David, 1979, “Collective Actions and Secondary Actions,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 16/3: 177–86. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, “Hobbes on Artificial Persons and Secondary Actions,” The Philosophical Review, 89/4: 579–606. (Scholar)
de Bruin, Boudewijn, 2009, “We and the Plural Subject,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 39: 235–59. (Scholar)
Durkheim, Emile. [1898] 1994. “On Social Facts,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, M. Martin and L. McIntyre (eds.), Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 433–40.
French, Peter, 1979, “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 16(3): 207–15. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
Gilbert, Margaret, 1989, On Social Facts, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon,” in Gilbert 1996, chapter 6, pp. 177–94 (Scholar)
–––, 1996, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation, Lanham/Boulder/New York/London: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory, Lanham/Boulder/New York/London: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, A Theory of Political Obligation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Shared intention and personal intentions,” Philosophical Studies, 144: 167–87. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gold, Natalie and Robert Sugden, 2007, “Collective intentions and team agency,” The Journal of Philosophy, 104(3): 109–37. (Scholar)
Hakli, Raul, Kaarlo Miller, and Raimo Tuomela, 2010, “Two Kinds of We-Reasoning,” Economics & Philosophy, 26: 291–320. (Scholar)
Heidegger, Martin. [1928/29] 1996. Einleitung in die Philosophie. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 27. Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann.
Hindriks, Frank, 2008a, “The Status Account of Corporate Agents,” in H.B. Schmid et al. (eds.), Concepts of Sharedness: Essays on Collective Intentionality, Heusenstamm: Ontos, pp. 119–44. (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, “The Freedom of Collective Agents,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 16(2): 165–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Corporate Responsibility and Judgment Aggregation,” Economics and Philosophy, 25: 161–77. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Institutions and Collective Intentionality,” in M. Jankovic and K. Ludwig (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, New York: Routledge, pp. 353–362. (Scholar)
Hollis, Martin, 1998, Trust Within Reason, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Ikäheimo, Heikki and Arto Laitinen (eds.), 2011, Recognition and Social Ontology, Leiden: Brill. (Scholar)
Kornhauser, Lewis A., 1992, “Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 8(3): 441–70. (Scholar)
Laitinen, Arto, 2014, “Against representations with two directions of fit,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13: 179–199. (Scholar)
List, Christian, 2012, “The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review,” Synthese, 187: 179–207. (Scholar)
List, Christian and Philip Pettit, 2011, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Mathiesen, Kay, 2006, “We’re All in This Together: Responsibility of Collective Agents and Their Members,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30(1): 240–55. (Scholar)
May, Larry, 1992, Sharing Responsibility, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
May, Larry and Stacey Hoffman (eds.), 1991, Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
May, Larry and Raimo Tuomela (eds.), 2007, Journal of Social Philosophy (Special Issue: Collective Responsibility), 38(3): 365–503. (Scholar)
Meijers, Anthonie W.M., 1994, Speech Acts, Communication and Collective Intentionality: Beyond Searle’s Individualism, Utrecht: de Jonge. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Can Collective Intentionality be Individualized?” In: American Journal of Economics and Sociology (Special Issue: John Searle’s Ideas about Social Reality), 62: 167–83. (Scholar)
Miller, Seumas, 2001, Social Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Collective Moral Responsibility: An Individualist Account,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 8: 176–93. (Scholar)
Miller, Seumas and Pekka Makela, 2005, “The Collectivist Approach to Collective Moral Responsibility,” Metaphilosophy 36(5): 634–51. (Scholar)
Moran, Dermot and Thomas Szanto (eds.), 2016, Phenomenology of Sociality: Discovering the ‘We’, New York and London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Nunberg, Geoffrey, 1993, “Indexicality and Deixis,” Linguistics and Philosophy, 16(1): 1–43. (Scholar)
Olen, Peter and Stephen P. Turner, 2015, “Durkheim, Sellars, and the Origins of Collective Intentionality,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 23(5): 954–975. (Scholar)
Petersson, Björn, 2007, “Collectivity and Circularity,” The Journal of Philosophy, 104(3): 138–56. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8(2): 199–201. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Collective Omissions and Responsibility,” Philosophical Papers, 37(2): 243–61. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Bratman, Searle, and Simplicity. A comment on Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together,” Journal of Social Ontology, 1(1): 27–37. (Scholar)
Pettit, Philip, 2001a, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001b, “Collective Intentions,” in N. Naffine, R.J. Owens and J.Williams (eds.), Intention in Law and Philosophy, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 241–54. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Collective Persons and Powers,” Legal Theory, 8: 443–70. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Groups with Minds of their Own,” in Schmitt (ed.) 2003, pp. 167–93 (Scholar)
–––, 2007a, “Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency,” Dialectica, 61(4): 495–519. (Scholar)
–––, 2007b, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Ethics, 117: 171–201. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “The reality of group agents,” in C. Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 67–91. (Scholar)
Pettit, Philip and David P. Schweikard, 2006, “Joint Actions and Group Agents,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 36(1): 18–39. (Scholar)
Quinton, Anthony, 1975, “Social Objects,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 75: 1–27. (Scholar)
Rovane, Carol, 1998, The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Salice, Alessandro and Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), 2016, The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
Scheler, Max, 1954 [1912], The Nature of Sympathy, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 1982 [1914], “Der Krieg als Gesamterlebnis,” In: Politisch-Pädagogische Schriften. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 4, Bern/München: Franke, p. 272–282. (Scholar)
Scheve, Christian von and Salmela, Mikko (eds.), 2014, Collective Emotion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Schmid, Hans Bernhard, 2003, “Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?” Philosophical Explorations 6(3): 201–217. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Wir-Intentionalität. Kritik des ontologischen Individualismus und Rekonstruktion der Gemeinschaft. Freiburg i.Br., Alber. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Plural Action: Essays in Philosophy and Social Science, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Shared Intentionality and the Origins of Human Communication,” in A. Salice (ed.), Intentionality, München, Philosophia, pp. 349–368. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Trying to Act Together,” in M. Schmitz, B. Kobow, and H.B. Schmid (eds.), The Background of Social Reality, Cham: Springer, pp. 37–56. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “The Subject of ‘We Intend’,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 17: 231–243. (Scholar)
Schmitz, Michael, 2017, “What is a Mode Account of Collective Intentionality?” in G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds.), Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with his Responses, Cham: Springer, pp. 37–70. (Scholar)
Schweikard, David P. 2011, Der Mythos des Singulären: Eine Untersuchung der Struktur kollektiven Handelns, Paderborn: mentis. (Scholar)
Searle, John, 1990, “Collective Intentions and Actions,” in P. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M.E. Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication, Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books, MIT Press (Scholar)
–––, 1995, The Construction of Social Reality, New York: The Free Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sellars, Wilfrid, 1968, Science and Metaphysics. Variations on Kantian Themes, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
–––, 1974, Essays in Philosophy and its History, Dordrecht, Reidl. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, “On Reasoning about Values,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 17(2): 81–101. (Scholar)
Smiley, Marion, 2018, “Collective Intentions and Collective Moral Responsibility,” in M. Jankovic and K. Ludwig (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, New York: Routledge, pp. 316–326. (Scholar)
Smith, Thomas H., 2011, “Playing One’s Part,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2: 213–44. (Scholar)
Stoutland, Frederick, 1997, “Why are Philosophers of Action so Anti-Social?” In L. Alanen, S. Heinämaa, and T. Wallgren (eds.), Commonality and Particularity in Ethics, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 45–74. (Scholar)
Sugden, Robert, 1993, “Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 10: 69–89. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Team Preferences,” Economics and Philosophy, 16: 175–204. (Scholar)
Tollefsen, Deborah, 2002a, “Organizations as True Believers,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 33(3): 395–401. (Scholar)
–––, 2002b, “Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32(1): 25–50. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Let’s Pretend. Children and Joint Action,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 35(1): 75–97. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, Groups as Agents, Cambridge: Polity Press. (Scholar)
Tomasello, Michael, 2009, The Origins of Human Communication, Cambridge/MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, A Natural History of Human Morality Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Tomasello, Michael and Hannes Racokzy, 2003, “What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality,” Mind & Language, 18(2): 121–147. (Scholar)
Tuomela, Raimo, 1991, “We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group Intentions;” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51(2): 249–77. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, The Importance of Us – A Study of Basic Social Notions, Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “The We-mode and the I-mode,” in F. Schmitt (Hrsg.), Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “We-Intentions revisited,” Philosophical Studies, 125: 327–69. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Tuomela, Raimo and Kaarlo Miller, 1988, “We-Intentions,” Philosophical Studies, 53: 367–89. (Scholar)
Turner, Stephen P., 1986, The Search for a Methodology of Social Science: Durkheim, Weber, and the Nineteenth-Century Problem of Cause, Probability, and Action, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
Velleman, J. David, 1997, “How to Share an Intention,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57: 29–51. (Scholar)
Walther, Gerda 1923, “Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften,” Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 6: 1–158. (Scholar)
Weber, Max, 1922, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Marianne Weber (ed.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. (Scholar)
Zaibert, Leo A., 2003, “Collective Intentions and Collective Intentionality,” in D.R. Koepsell and L.S. Moss (eds.), John Searle’s Ideas about Social Reality – Extensions, Criticisms and Reconstructions, Oxford: Blackwell (Scholar)

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