Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Compatibilism" by Michael McKenna and D. Justin Coates

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Adams, Robert M., 1985. “Involuntary Sins,” Philosophical Review, 94: 3–31. (Scholar)
Arpaly, Nomy, 2006. Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
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Ayer, A. J., 1954. “Freedom and Necessity,” in his Philosophical Essays, New York: St. Martin’s Press: 3–20; reprinted in Watson (ed.), 1982, pp. 15–23. (Scholar)
–––, 1980. “Free-Will and Rationality,” in van Straaten (ed.) 1980. (Scholar)
Beaty, Michael, ed., 1990. Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
Bennett, Jonathan, 1980. “Accountability,” in van Straaten (ed.) 1980. (Scholar)
Berofsky, Bernard, 2012. Nature’s Challenge to Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues,” in Kane (ed.) 2002. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. Liberation from Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1987. Freedom from Necessity, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1966. Free Will and Determinism, New York: Harper & Row. (Scholar)
Björnsson, G. and K. Persson, 2012. “The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility,” Noûs, 46(2): 326–354. (Scholar)
Bok, Hilary, 1998. Freedom and Responsibility, Princeton: Princeton University Press (Scholar)
Bratman, Michael, 2007. Structures of Agency, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “Three Theories of Self-governance,” Philosophical Topics 32: 21–46. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. “A Desire of One’s Own,” Journal of Philosophy, 100 (5): 221–42. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997. “Responsibility and Planning,” Journal of Philosophy, 1 (1): 27–43. (Scholar)
Buss, Sarah, and Lee Overton, 2002. Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Campbell, Joseph, 1997. “A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative Possibilities,” Philosophical Studies, 88: 319–30. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick, 1964. “Human Freedom and the Self,” The Lindley Lectures, Copyright by the Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas; reprinted in Watson (ed.) 1982. (Scholar)
Clarke, Randolph, 2009. “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism,” Mind, 118 (470): 323–51. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2000 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2000/entries/incompatibilism-theories/>. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will,” Noûs, 27: 191–203. (Scholar)
Coates, D. Justin, 2018. “Hard Incompatibilism and the Participant Attitude,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49: 208–229. (Scholar)
Dennett, Daniel, 2003. Freedom Evolves, London: Penguin Books. (Scholar)
–––, 1984a. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1984b. “I Could Not Have Done Otherwise — So What?” The Journal of Philosophy, LXXXI (10): 553–67. (Scholar)
–––, 1981a. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1981b. “Conditions of Personhood,” in Dennett, 1981a, 267–86. (Scholar)
–––, 1981c. “On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want,” in Dennett 1981a, 286–99. (Scholar)
–––, 1973. “Mechanism and Responsibility,” in Lehrer, 1973; reprinted in Watson (ed.) 1982. (Scholar)
Dorr, Cian, 2016. “Against Counterfactual Miracles,” Philosophical Review 125: 241–286. (Scholar)
Eshleman, Andrew S., 2001. “Being is not Believing: Fischer and Ravizza on Taking Responsibility,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 479–90. (Scholar)
Fara, Michael, 2008. “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism,” Mind, 117 (468): 843–65. (Scholar)
Fingarette, Herbert, 1972. The Meaning of Criminal Insanity, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, 2012. “Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals”, Journal of Ethics, 16: 117–43. (Scholar)
–––, 2008. “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Vihvelin,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38 (3): 327–42. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. My Way, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. “Reasons Reactivity & Incompatibilist Intuitions,” Philosophical Explorations, 8 (2): 131–43. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “Responsibility and Manipulation,” Journal of Ethics, 8 (2): 145–77. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility,” Ethics, 110: 93–139. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
–––, 1987. “Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility,” in Schoeman (ed.) 1987, 81–106. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1986. Moral Responsibility, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. “Power Necessity,” Philosophical Topics, 14: 77–91. (Scholar)
–––, 1983. “Incompatibilism,” Philosophical Studies, 43: 127–37. (Scholar)
–––, 1982. “Responsibility and Control,” Journal of Philosophy, 79: 24–40. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, 2007. Four Views on Free Will, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza, 1998. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
––– (eds.), 1993. Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Frankfurt, Harry, 2002. “Reply to John Martin Fischer,” in Buss and Overton (eds.) 2002, 27–31. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. “Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,” in Fulda and Horstman (eds.), 1994; reprinted in Frankfurt, 1999. (Scholar)
–––, 1988. The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1987. “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in Schoeman (ed.) 1987; reprinted in Frankfurt, 1999. (Scholar)
–––, 1971. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 5–20; reprinted in Fischer (ed.), 1986; Frankfurt, 1987; and Watson (ed.), 1982. (Scholar)
–––, 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 66: 829–39; reprinted in Fischer (ed.) 1986 and Frankfurt 1987. (Scholar)
Fulda, H.F., and R.P. Horstmann (eds.), 1994. Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne: Stuttgart Hegel-Kongress 1993, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. (Scholar)
Gert, Bernard, and Tim Duggan, 1979. “Free Will as the Ability to Will,” Noûs, 13: 197–217; reprinted in Fischer (ed.) 1986. (Scholar)
Ginet, Carl, 2003. “Libertarianism,” in Loux and Zimmerman (eds.) 2003. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing,” Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 403–17. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1983. “In Defense of Incompatibilism,” Philosophical Studies, 44: 391–400. (Scholar)
–––, 1980. “The Conditional Analysis of Freedom,” in van Inwagen (ed.), 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1966. “Might We Have No Choice?” in Lehrer (ed.) 1966, 87–104. (Scholar)
Glover, Jonathan, 1970. Responsibility, New York: Humanities Press. (Scholar)
Graham, Peter A, 2008. “A Defense of Local Miracle Compatibilism,” Philosophical Studies, 140: 65–82. (Scholar)
Haji, Ishtiyaque, 2009. Incompatibilism’s Allure, Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility,” in Kane (ed.) 2002. (Scholar)
–––, 1998. Moral Appraisability, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Haji, Ishtiyaque, and Stefaan Cuypers, 2008. Moral Responsibility, Authenticity, and Normative Education, New York, NY: Routledge Press. (Scholar)
Hobart, R. E., 1934. “Free Will as Involving Indeterminism and Inconceivable Without It,” Mind, 43: 1–27. (Scholar)
Hobbes, Thomas, 1997. Leviathan, R.E. Flatman & D. Johnston (eds.), New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Scholar)
Honderich, Ted, 1988. A Theory of Determinism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1973. Essays on Freedom and Action, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Jeff Jordan (eds.), 1996. Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
Hume, David, 1975. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1978. A Treatise of Human Nature, P.H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Hunt, David P., 2000. “Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action,” Philosophical Studies, 97: 195–227. (Scholar)
Kane, Robert (ed.), 2002. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. The Significance of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kapitan, Tomis, 2002. “A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert Kane (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 127–57. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. “Autonomy and Manipulated Freedom.” Philosophical Perspectives, 14: 81–104. (Scholar)
Kennett, Jeanette, 2001. Agency and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lamb, James, 1977. “On a Proof of Incompatibilism,” Philosophical Review, 86: 20–35. (Scholar)
Lehrer, Keith (ed.), 1966. Freedom and Determinism, New York: Random House. (Scholar)
Lenman, James, 2006. “Compatibilism and Contractualism: The Possibility of Moral Responsibility.” Ethics 117: 7–31. (Scholar)
Levy, Neil and Michael McKenna, 2008. “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility,” Philosophy Compass, 43: 96–133. (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1981. “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” Theoria, 47: 113–21. (Scholar)
Loux, Michael and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), 2003. Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
MacIntyre, Alisdair, 1957. “Determinism,” Mind, 66: 28–41. (Scholar)
McKay, Thomas and David Johnson, 1996. “A Reconsideration of an Argument against Incompatibilism,” Philosophical Topics, 24: 113–22. (Scholar)
McKenna, Michael, 2013. “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms,” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol. 1, ed., David Shoemaker, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 151–83. (Scholar)
–––,2008. “Ultimacy & Sweet Jane,” in Trakakis and Cohen (eds.), 2008: 186–208. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. “Reasons Reactivity & Incompatibilist Intuitions,” Philosophical Explorations, 8 (2): 131–43. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents,” Philosophical Topics, 32: 169–82. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. “Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives,” in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, Widerker and McKenna (eds.) 2003. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Review of Hilary Bok’s, Freedom & Responsibility,” Ethics, 113 (1): 144–5. (Scholar)
–––, 2001a. “Critical notice of Ishtiyaque Haji’s, Moral Appraisability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 711–5. (Scholar)
–––, 2001b. “John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s Responsibility & Control,” Review. Journal of Philosophy, XCVIII (2): 93–100. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. “Assessing Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 8 (1): 89–114. (Scholar)
–––, 1998. “The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism,” Journal of Ethics, 2: 123–42. (Scholar)
–––, 1997. “Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 28: 71–85. (Scholar)
Mele, Alfred, 2006. Free Will and Luck, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. “Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 447–452. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. Autonomous Agents, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Mele, Alfred, and David Robb, 1998. “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases,” Philosophical Review, 107: 97–112. (Scholar)
Nahmias, Eddy, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner, 2006. “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 28–53. (Scholar)
Naylor, Margery Bedford, 1984. “Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” Philosophical Studies, 46: 249–58. (Scholar)
Neely, Wright, 1974. “Freedom and Desire,” Philosophical Review, 83: 32–54. (Scholar)
Nelkin, Dana Kay, 2011. Making Sense of Freedom and Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nichols, Shaun, 2006. “Folk Intuitions on Free Will,” Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6 (1&2): 57–86. (Scholar)
Nozick, Robert, 1981. Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
O’Connor, Timothy, 2002. “Free Will,”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2002/entries/freewill/>. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. Persons and Causes, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. “On the Transfer of Necessity,” Noûs, 27: 204–218. (Scholar)
Otsuka, Michael, 1998. “Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame,” Ethics, 108: 685–701. (Scholar)
Pendergraft, Garrett, 2011. “The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism,” Philosophical Studies, 156: 249–266. (Scholar)
Pereboom, Derk, 2001. Living Without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. “Determinism al Dente,” Noûs, 29: 21–45. (Scholar)
Perry, John, 2004. “Compatibilist Options,” Freedom and Determinism, eds. J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and D. Shier. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 231–254. (Scholar)
Pettit, Philip, 2001. A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pettit, Philip, and Michael Smith, 1996. “Freedom in Belief and Desire,” Journal of Philosophy, 93 (9): 429–49. (Scholar)
Roskies, Adina, and Shaun Nichols, 2008. “Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth,” Journal of Philosophy, 105 (7): 371–88. (Scholar)
Rowe, William, 1991. Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Russell, Paul, 2002a. “Critical Notice of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 32: 587–606. (Scholar)
–––, 2002b. “Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the New Compatibilism,” in Kane (ed.) 2002, 229–56. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. Freedom and Moral Sentiment, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. “Strawson’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility,” Ethics, 102: 287–302. (Scholar)
Sartorio, Carolina. 2016. Causation and Free Will, Oxford: Oxford Universit Press. (Scholar)
Saunders, John Turk, 1968. “The Temptation of Powerlessness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 5: 100–8. (Scholar)
Scanlon, T.M., 2008. Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame, Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Harvard Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Schlick, Moritz, 1939. “When is a Man Responsible?” in Problems of Ethics, David Rynin (trans.), 143–6; reprinted in Berofsky (ed.) 1966, 54–62. (Scholar)
Schoeman, Ferdinand (ed.), 1987. Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Shabo, Seth, 2012. “Where Love and Resentment Meet: Strawson’s Interpersonal Defense of Compatibilism,” The Philosophical Review, 121: 95–124. (Scholar)
Shoemaker, David, 2017. “Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, a Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame,” The Philosophical Review, 126: 481–527. (Scholar)
Slote, Michael, 1980. “Understanding Free Will,” Journal of Philosophy, 77: 136–51. (Scholar)
–––, 1985. “Review of Peter van Inwagen’s An Essay on Free Will,” Journal of Philosophy, 82: 327–30. (Scholar)
–––, 1982. “Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem,” Journal of Philosophy, 79: 5–24. (Scholar)
Smart, J.J.C., 1963. “Free Will, Praise, and Blame,” Mind, 70: 291–306. (Scholar)
Smith, Angela. 2005. “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics, 115: 236–71. (Scholar)
Smith, Michael, 2003. “Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion,” in Stroud and Tappolet (eds.), 2003: 17–38. (Scholar)
Strawson, Galen, 1986. Freedom and Belief, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Strawson, P. F., 1962. “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 48: 187–211. (Scholar)
Stroud, Sarah and Christine Tappolet, eds., 2003. Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Stump, Eleonore, 2002. “Control and Causal Determinism,” in Buss and Overton (eds.), 2002: 33–60. (Scholar)
–––, 1996a. “Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” in Howard-Snyder and Jordan 1996, 73–88. (Scholar)
–––, 1996b. “Persons: Identification and Freedom,” Philosophical Topics, 24: 183–214. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. “Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” in Beaty (ed.) 1990, 254–85; reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza (eds.) 1993, 237–62. (Scholar)
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–––, 1983. An Essay on Free Will, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1980. Time and Cause, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
–––, 1978. “Ability and Responsibility,” Philosophical Review, 87: 201–24. (Scholar)
–––, 1975. “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism,” Philosophical Studies, 27: 185–99. (Scholar)
van Straaten, Zak (ed.), 1980. Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Vargas, Manuel, 2008. “Moral Influence, Moral Responsibility,” in Trakakis and Cohen (eds.), 2008: 90–122. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. “The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies, 125: 399–429. (Scholar)
Velleman, J. David, 2000. The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. “What Happens When Someone Acts?” Mind, 101: 462–81. (Scholar)
Vihvelin, Kadri, 2013. Causes, Laws, & Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008. “Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and the Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38 (3): 343–72. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account,” Philosophical Topics, 32: 427–50. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30: 1–24. (Scholar)
Wallace, R. Jay, 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2001. “Reason and Responsibility,” Ethics, 111: 374–94. (Scholar)
–––, 1987. “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” in Schoeman (ed.) 1987, 256–86; reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza (eds.) 1993. (Scholar)
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–––, 1975. “Free Agency,” Journal of Philosophy, 72: 205–20; reprinted in Watson (ed.) 1982. (Scholar)
Widerker, David, 1987. “On an Argument for Incompatibilism,” Analysis, 47: 37–41. (Scholar)
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Widerker, David, and Michael McKenna (eds.), 2003. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 1980. “Asymmetrical Freedom,” Journal of Philosophy, 77: 157–66. (Scholar)
Wyma, Keith, 1997. “Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 57–70. (Scholar)
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Zimmerman, Michael J., 1988. An Essay on Moral Responsibility, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)

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