Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Computational Theory of Mind" by Michael Rescorla
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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