Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness" by Peter Carruthers and Rocco Gennaro

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Aquila, R., 1990. ‘Consciousness as higher-order thoughts: two objections,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 27: 81–87. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D., 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
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Baars, B., 1988. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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Bach-y-Rita, P., 1995. Non-Synaptic Diffusion Neurotransmission and Late Brain Reorganization, New York: Demos Press. (Scholar)
Bach-y-Rita, P. and Kercel, S., 2003. ‘Sensory substitution and the human-machine interface,’ Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7: 541–546. (Scholar)
Balog, K. 2009. ‘Phenomenal concepts,’ in B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, and S. Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Berger, J., 2014. ‘Consciousness is not a property of states: a reply to Wilberg,’ Philosophical Psychology, 27: 829–842. (Scholar)
Berger, J., 2017. ‘How things seem to higher-order thought theorists,’ Dialogue, 56: 503–526. (Scholar)
Block, N., 1986. ‘Advertisement for a semantics for psychology,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10: 615–678. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. ‘A confusion about a function of consciousness,’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–247.
–––, 2011. ‘The higher-order approach to consciousness is defunct,’ Analysis, 71, 419–431. (Scholar)
Block, N. and Stalnaker, R., 1999. ‘Conceptual analysis, dualism and the explanatory gap,’ Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46. (Scholar)
Brentano, F., 1874/1973. Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint, New York: Humanities. (Scholar)
Brown, R., 2015. ‘The HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness,’ Philosophical Studies, 172: 1783–1794. (Scholar)
Burge, T., 1996. ‘Our entitlement to self-knowledge,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96: 91–116. (Scholar)
Byrne, A., 1997. ‘Some like it HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts,’ Philosophical Studies, 86: 103–129. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. ‘What phenomenal consciousness is like,’ in R. Gennaro (ed.) 2004, pp. 203–226. (Scholar)
Byrne, R. and Whiten, A. (eds.), 1988. Machiavellian Intelligence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, (eds.), 1998. Machiavellian Intelligence II: Evaluations and extensions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Carruthers, P., 1989. ‘Brute experience,’ Journal of Philosophy, 86: 258–269. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. Language, Thought and Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. ‘Sympathy and subjectivity,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 465–482. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness: a naturalistic theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. Consciousness: essays from a higher-order perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008. ‘Meta-cognition in animals: a skeptical look,’ Mind and Language, 23: 58–89. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. ‘In defence of first-order representationalism,’ Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24: 74–87. (Scholar)
–––, 2019. Human and Animal Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Carruthers, P. and Veillet, B., 2007. ‘The phenomenal concept strategy,’ Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14 (9–10). (Scholar)
Caston, V., 2002. ‘Aristotle on consciousness,’ Mind, 111: 751–815. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1996. The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Cherniak, C., Mokhtarzada, Z., Rodriquez-Esteban, R., and Changizi, B., 2004. ‘Global optimization of cerebral cortex layout,’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101: 1081–1086. (Scholar)
Coleman, S., 2015. ‘Quotational higher-order thought theory,’ Philosophical Studies, 172: 2705–2733. (Scholar)
Dennett, D., 1978a. ‘Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness,’ in C. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Reprinted in Dennett 1978b.) (Scholar)
–––, 1978b. Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991. Consciousness Explained, London: Allen Lane. (Scholar)
Dere, E., Kart-Teke, E., Huston, J., and Silva, D., 2006. ‘The case for episodic memory in animals.’ Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 30: 1206–1224. (Scholar)
Dretske, F., 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. ‘Misrepresentation,’ in R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1988. Explaining Behavior, Cambridge, MA; MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. ‘Conscious experience,’ Mind, 102: 263–283. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Emery, N. and Clayton, N., 2001. ‘Effects of experience and social context on prospective caching strategies in scrub jays.’ Nature, 414: 443–446. (Scholar)
Flombaum, J. and Santos, L., 2005. ‘Rhesus monkeys attribute perceptions to others.’ Current Biology, 15: 447–452. (Scholar)
Fodor, J., 1987. Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Gennaro, R., 1996. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. ‘Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation,’ in R. Gennaro (ed.) 2004, pp. 45–66. (Scholar)
–––, (ed.) 2004, Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Philadelphia: John Benjamins. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. ‘The HOT theory of consciousness: between a rock and a hard place,’ Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12: 3–21. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. ‘Between pure self-referentialism and the (extrinsic) HOT theory of consciousness,’ in Kriegel and Williford (ed.) 2006. (Scholar)
–––, 2012. The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts, Cambridge, MA: MIT press. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 2015. Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT press. (Scholar)
Glover, S., 2004. ‘Separate visual representations in the planning and control of action,’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27: 3–24. (Scholar)
Goldman, A., 1993. ‘Consciousness, folk-psychology, and cognitive science,’ Consciousness and Cognition, 2: 364–382. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. ‘Can science know when you are conscious?’ Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (5): 3–22. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. Simulating Minds: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mind-reading, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Graziano, M., 2013. Consciousness and the social brain, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Güzeldere, G. 1995. ‘Is consciousness perception of what passes in one’s own mind?’ in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh; reprinted in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.) (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1990. ‘The intrinsic quality of experience,’ Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 31–52. (Scholar)
Hellie, B., 2007. ‘Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance,’ Philosophical Studies, 134: 289–324. (Scholar)
Hill, C., 2004. ‘Ouch! An essay on pain,’ in R. Gennaro (ed.) 2004, pp. 339–362. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. ‘Perceptual consciousness: how it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to the mind,’ in U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Hurley, S. and Nudds, M. (eds.), 2006. Rational Animals? New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jacob, P. and Jeannerod, M., 2003. Ways of Seeing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1982. ‘Epiphenomenal qualia,’ Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. ‘What Mary didn’t know,’ Journal of Philosophy, 83: 291–295. (Scholar)
Jamieson, D. and Bekoff, M., 1992. ‘Carruthers on non-conscious experience,’ Analysis, 52: 23–28. (Scholar)
Jehle, D. and Kriegel, U., 2006. ‘An argument against dispositional HOT theory,’ Philosophical Psychology, 19: 463–476. (Scholar)
Kirk, R., 1994. Raw Feeling, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kosslyn, S., 1994. Image and Brain, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Kozuch, B., 2014. ‘Prefrontal lesion evidence against higher-order theories of consciousness,’ Philosophical Studies, 167: 721–746. (Scholar)
Kriegel, U., 2003. ‘Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: two views and an argument,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33: 103–132. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. ‘The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness,’ in U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.) 2006. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. Subjective Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. ‘Brentano’s dual-framing theory of consciousness,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97: 79–98. (Scholar)
Kriegel, U. and Williford, K. (eds.), 2006. Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1972. ‘Naming and necessity’, in G. Harman and D. Davidson (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Revised version printed in book form by Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.) (Scholar)
Lau, H. and Brown, R., 2019. “The emperor’s new phenomenology? The empirical case for conscious experience without first-order representations”, in A. Pautz and D. Stoljar (eds.) Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 171–198. (Scholar)
Lau, H. and Passingham, R., 2006. ‘Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness,’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103: 18763–18768. (Scholar)
Lau, H. and Rosenthal, D., 2011. ‘Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness,’ Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15: 365–373. (Scholar)
Levine, J., 1983. ‘Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 354–361. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. Purple Haze, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. ‘Conscious awareness and (self-)representation,’. in U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.) 2006. (Scholar)
Locke, J., 1690. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (Many editions now available.) (Scholar)
Loewer, B. and Rey, G. (eds.), 1991. Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his critics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Lycan, W., 1987. Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2001a. ‘Have we neglected phenomenal consciousness?’ Psyche, 7. Available from the ASSC depository (Scholar)
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–––, 2004. ‘The superiority of HOP to HOT,’ in R. Gennaro (ed.) 2004, pp. 93–114. (Scholar)
McGinn, C., 1982. ‘The structure of content,’ in A. Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1989. Mental Content, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1991. The Problem of Consciousness, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Mehta, N., 2013. ‘Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?,’ Philosophical Studies, 164: 357–370. (Scholar)
Miguens, S., Preyer, G., and Morando, C., (eds.) 2016. Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, London: Routledge Publishers. (Scholar)
Millikan, R., 1984. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. ‘Thoughts without laws: cognitive science with content,’ Philosophical Review, 95: 47–80. (Scholar)
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Milner, D. and Goodale, M., 1995. The Visual Brain in Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 1986. The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Neander, K., 1998. ‘The division of phenomenal labor: a problem for representational theories of consciousness,’ in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Language, Mind, and Ontology, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Nelkin, N., 1996. Consciousness and the Origins of Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Odegaard, B., Knight, R., and Lau, H. 2017. “Should a few null fundings falsify prefrontal theories of conscious experience?” The Journal of Neuroscience, 37: 9593–9602. (Scholar)
Papineau, D., 1987. Reality and Representation, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
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Peacocke, C., 1986. Thoughts, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Phillips, B., 2014. ‘Indirect representation and the self-representational theory of consciousness,’ Philosophical Studies, 167: 273–290. (Scholar)
Picciuto, V., 2011. ‘Addressing higher-order misrepresentation with quotational thought,’ Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(3–4): 109–136. (Scholar)
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Rosenthal, D., 1986. ‘Two concepts of consciousness,’ Philosophical Studies, 49: 329–359. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. ‘Thinking that one thinks,’ in Davies and Humphreys (eds) 1993. (Scholar)
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