Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Consciousness and Intentionality" by Charles Siewert

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Anscombe, G.E.M., 1965, “The Intentionality of Sensation: a Grammatical Feature”, in Analytical Philosophy, R.J. Butler (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Armstrong, David M., 1968, A Materialist Theory of Mind, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (Scholar)
Bayne, Tim, 2009, “Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content”, Philosophical Quarterly, 59(236): 385–404. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.631.x (Scholar)
Bayne, Tim and Elisabeth Pacherie, 2007, “Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Self-Awareness”, Synthese, 159(3): 475–491. doi: 10.1007/s11229-007-9239-9 (Scholar)
Bayne, Tim and Michelle Montague (eds.), 2011, Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Baars, Bernard J., 1997, In the Theatre of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bermúdez, José Luis, 1998, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Blattner, William, 2013, “Authenticity and Resoluteness”, in Wrathall 2013, pp. 320–337; doi: 10.1017/cco9781139047289.015">10.1017/cco9781139047289.015 (Scholar)
Block, Ned, 1990, “Inverted Earth”, in James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 4: Issue Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 53–79. doi: 10.2307/2214187 (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “A Confusion About a Function of Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–47. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness”, Cognition, 79 (1–2): 197–219. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Concepts of Consciousness”, in Chalmers 2002, pp. 206–218 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The Higher Order Approach to Consciousness is Defunct”, Analysis, 71(3): 419–431. doi: 10.1093/analys/anr037 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(12): 567–75. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.001 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Seeing-As in the Light of Vision Science”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(3): 560–572. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12135 (Scholar)
Block, Ned, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), 1997, The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Boyle, Matthew, 2009, “Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78(1): 133–164. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00235.x (Scholar)
Brandom, Robert B., 1994, Making it Explicit, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Brentano, Franz, [1874] 1973, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Antos C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAllister (trans.), Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, [1867] 1977, The Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect, Rolf George (trans.), Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
Brewer, Bill, 2005, “Perceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content”, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 217–230. (Scholar)
Brook, Andrew, 2006, “Kant: a Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness”, in Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (eds.) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Burge, Tyler, 1979, “Individualism and the Mental”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Volume 4), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00374.x (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Perception: Where the Mind Begins”, Neuropsychologia, 45: 3087–3091. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Origins of Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Byrne, Alex, 2001, “Intentionalism Defended”, Philosophical Review, 110(2): 199–240. doi: 10.1215/00318108-110-2-199 (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “What Phenomenal Consciousness is Like”, in Gennaro 2004, pp. 203–225. doi: 10.1075/aicr.56.12byr (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Experience and Content”, The Phillosophical Quarterly, 59(236): 429–451. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.614.x (Scholar)
Byrne, Alex and Siegel, Susanna, 2017, “Rich or Thin?”, in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, B. Nanay (ed.), Abingdon: Routledge. (Scholar)
Campbell, John, 2002, Reference and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Carruthers, Peter, 1989, “Brute Experience”, Journal of Philosophy, 86(5):258–269. doi: 10.2307/2027110 (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Phenomenal Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “HOP over FOR, HOT Theory”, in Gennaro 2004, pp. 115–135. doi: 10.1075/aicr.56.08car (Scholar)
–––, 2011, The Opacity of Mind: an Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, The Centered Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, David J., 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 2021, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick M., 1957, Perceiving: a Philosophical Study, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Chudnoff, Elijah, 2015, Cognitive Phenomenology, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (Scholar)
Clark, Andy, 1997, Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Clark, A. and David J. Chalmers, 1998, “The Extended Mind”, Analysis, 58: 10–23. doi: 10.1093/analys/58.1.7 (Scholar)
Connolly, Kevin, 2019, Perceptual Learning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Crane, Tim, 1991, “All the Difference in the World”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 41(162): 1–25. doi: 10.2307/2219783 (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “The Nonconceptual Contents of Experience”, in Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, The Objects of Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “A Short History of Philosophical Theories of Consciousness in the Twentieth Century”, in Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (The History of the Philosophy of Mind: Volume 6), Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (Scholar)
Crowell, Steven, 2013, Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Dainton, Barry, 2008, The Phenomenal Self, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1982, “Empirical Content”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 16–17: 471–489. (Scholar)
–––,1986 “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, in Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Davies, Martin, 1997, “Externalism and Experience”, in A. Clark, J. Ezquerro and Jesus M. Larrazabal (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness and Reasoning: Proceedings of Second International Colloquium on Cognitive Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 1–33. (Scholar)
Dennett, Daniel C., 1969, Content and Consciousness, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, “Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness”, in C. Wade Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume 9). (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “True Believers”, in Anthony Francis Heath (ed.) Scientific Explanation: Papers Based on Herbert Spencer Lectuers Given in the University of Oxford, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown and Co.. (Scholar)
Dretske, Fred, 1993, “Conscious Experience”, Mind, 102(406): 262–283. doi: 10.1093/mind/102.406.263 (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Dreyfus, Hubert L., 1991, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Drummond, John J., 1990, Husserlian Intentionality and Non-foundational Realism. Noema and Object, Kluwer. (Scholar)
Evans, Gareth, 1982, Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Erhard, Christopher, 2022, “Husserlian Intentionality”, in H. Jacobs (ed.), The Husserlian Mind, Abingdon: Routledge. (Scholar)
Farkas, Katalin, 2008, The Subject’s Point of View, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise”, The Monist, 91(2): 273–293. (Scholar)
Flanagan, Owen, 1992, Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Fodor, Jerry, 1987, Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “A Modal Argument for Narrow Content”, Journal of Philosophy, 88(1): 5–26. doi: 10.2307/2027084 (Scholar)
Føllesdal, Dagfinn, 1969, “Husserl’s Notion of Noema”, Journal of Philosophy, 66(20): 680–687. doi: 10.2307/2024451 (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Noema and Meaning in Husserl”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50: 263–271. doi: 10.2307/2108043 (Scholar)
Forrest, P., 2017, “Can Phenomenology Determine the Content of Thought?” Philosophical Studies, 174: 403–424. doi: 10.1007/s11098-016-0689-0 (Scholar)
Frankish, K., 2016, “Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23: 11–39. (Scholar)
Frege, Gottlob, [1892] 1952, “On Sense and Reference”, Max Black (trans.), in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Peter Geach and Max Black (eds.), Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (ed.), 2004, Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Philadelphia: John Benjamins. (Scholar)
Gertler, Brie, 2011, Self-Knowledge, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2012a, “Renewed Acquaintance”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012, p. 93. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0004 (Scholar)
–––, 2012b, “Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What is the Boundary of the Thinker?” Philosophical Perspectives, 26(1): 51–75, Philosophy of Mind. doi: 10.1111/phpe.12001 (Scholar)
Goff, P., 2017, Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert, 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, in Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 4: Issue Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind), James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 31–52. doi: 10.2307/2214186 (Scholar)
Heidegger, M., [1927] 1962, Being and Time, J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (trans.), Harper & Row. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, A. Hofstadter (trans.), Indiana University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, T. Kiesiel (trans.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (Scholar)
Hill, Christopher S., 2009, Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Hopp, Walter, 2011, Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Horgan, Terence and John Tienson, 2002, “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality”, in Chalmers 2002: 520–533. (Scholar)
Howell, Robert J., 2006, “Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72(1): 44–70. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00490.x (Scholar)
Husserl, Edmund, [1900] 1970, Logical Investigations, J. Findlay (trans.), Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, [1929] 1960, Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction to Phenomenology, D. Cairns (trans.), Martinus Nijhoff. (Scholar)
–––, [1911] 1965, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”, Q. Lauer (trans.), in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, New York: Harper and Row. (Scholar)
–––, [1939] 1973, Experience and Judgment, James Churchill and Karl Ameriks (trans.), Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Scholar)
–––, [1913] 1983, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, F. Kersten (trans.), Kluwer. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917), J. Brough (trans.), Dordrecht and Boston MA: Kluwer. (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank, 1977, Perception, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127): 127–138. doi: 10.2307/2960077 (Scholar)
Kaplan, David, 1979, “On the Logic of Demonstratives”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1): 81–98. doi: 10.1007/bf00258420 (Scholar)
Kaüfer, Stephan and Anthony Chemero, 2015, Phenomenology: an Introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press. (Scholar)
Keely, Brian L., 2009, “The Early History of the Quale and its Relation to the Senses”, in John Symons and Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp. 71–89. (Scholar)
Kelly, Sean D., 2001, “The Non-conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(3): 601–608. doi: 10.2307/2653538 (Scholar)
Kidd, C., 2019, “Re-examining Husserl’s Non-Conceptualism in the Logical Investigations”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 101(93): 407–444. (Scholar)
Kim, Jaegwon, 2011, Philosophy of Mind, third edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
Koksvik, Ole, 2015, “Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 52(4): 321–334. (Scholar)
Korsgaard, Christine M., 1989, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18(2): 101–132. [Korsgaard 1989 available online (Scholar)
Kriegel, Uriah, 2009, Subjective Consciousness: a Self-Representational Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Sources of Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 2013, Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 2014 Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, Varieties of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Brentano’s Philosophical System, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kripke, Saul A., 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel, pp. 253–355. doi: 10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 (Scholar)
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Lennon, Preston, forthcoming, “Aphantasia and Conscious Thought”, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, 3. (Scholar)
Levine, Joseph S., 2001, Purple Haze: the Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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Loar, Brian, 2003, “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content”, in Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Martin Han and Bjørn Ramberg (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 229–258. (Scholar)
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Ludwig, Kirk A., 1996a, “On Explaining Why Things Look the Way They Do”, in Perception, Elizabeth Akins (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195084627.003.0002 (Scholar)
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–––, 2004, “The Superiority of HOP to HOT”, in Gennaro 2004, pp. 93–113. doi: 10.1075/aicr.56.07lyc (Scholar)
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McDowell, John, 1994, Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2021, “Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory: A Multistage Account of Intentionality”, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2010 “Do Experiences Have Contents?” in Nanay 2010, pp. 333–368. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195386196.003.0012 (Scholar)
Siegel, Susanna and Nicholas Silins, 2015, “The Epistemology of Perception”, Matthen 2015: 781–811. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.040 (Scholar)
Siewert, Charles, 1998, The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Attention and Sensorimotor Intentionality”, in David Woodruff Smith and Amie L.Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 270–293. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0014 (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Saving Appearances: a Dilemma for Physicalists”, in Robert C. Koons and George Bealer (eds), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 67–87. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0003 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Phenomenal Thought”, in Bayne and Montague 2011, pp. 236–267. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0011 (Scholar)
–––, 2012a, “Respecting Appearances: A Phenomenological Approach to Consciousness”, in Dan Zahavi (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 48–69. (Scholar)
–––, 2012b, “On the Phenomenology of Introspection”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012, pp. 129–167 (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Intellectualism, Experience, and Motor Understanding”, in Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: the McDowell/Dreyfus Debate, Joseph Schear (ed.), Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp. 194–226. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness”, in Kriegel 2013, pp. 235–259. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Speaking Up for Consciousness”, in Kriegel 2014, pp. 199–221. (Scholar)
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