Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Representational Theories of Consciousness" by William Lycan
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Alston, W., 1999. ‘Back to the Theory of Appearing’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Epistemology: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 13., Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Alter, T., and S. Walter (eds.), 2007. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Anscombe, G.E.M., 1965. ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’, in R.J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy: Second Series, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D.M., 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981. ‘What is Consciousness?’, in The Nature of Mind, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Ball, D., 2009. ‘There Are No Phenomenal Concepts’, Mind, 118: 935-62. (Scholar)
- Block, N.J., 1990. ‘Inverted Earth’, in Tomberlin (1990). Reprinted in Lycan (1999). (Scholar)
- –––, 1995. ‘On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227-47. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996. ‘Mental Paint and Mental Latex’, in Villanueva (1996). (Scholar)
- –––, 2010. ‘Attention and Mental Paint’, in E. Sosa and E. Villanueva (eds.), Philosophical Issues, 20: Philosophy of Mind, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Brewer, B, 2006. ‘Perception and Content’, European Journal of Philosophy, 14: 165-81. (Scholar)
- Burge, T., 1988. ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy, 85: 649-53. (Scholar)
- Byrne, A., 2001. ‘Intentionalism Defended’, Philosophical Review, 110: 199-239. (Scholar)
- Byrne, A., and D.R. Hilbert, 1997. ‘Colors and Reflectances’, in Byrne and Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, vol. 1: The Philosophy of Color, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Butchvarov, P., 1980. ‘Adverbial Theories of Consciousness’, in P. French, T.E. Uehing and H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. V: Studies in Epistemology, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- Campbell, J., 2002. Reference and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Carrasco, M., 2006. ‘Covert Attention Increases Contrast Sensitivity: Psychophysical, Neurophysiological and Neuroimaging Studies’, in S. Martinez-Conde, et al. (eds.), Progress in Brain Research, Vol. 154: Visual Perception, Part 1, Amsterdam: Elsevier. (Scholar)
- Carruthers, P., 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D.J., 1996. The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003. ‘Consciousness and Its Place in Nature’, in S.P. Stich and F. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, (Oxford: Blackwell). (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. ‘The Representational Character of Experience’, in B. Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007. ‘Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap’, in Alter and Walter (2007). (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R., 1957. Perceiving, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P.M., 1985. ‘Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States’, Journal of Philosophy 82: 8-28. (Scholar)
- Clark, A., 2000. A Theory of Sentience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Crane, T., 2001. Elements of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003. ‘The Intentional Structure of Consciousness’, in Smith and Jokic (2003). (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1987. ‘Knowing One’s Own Mind’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 60, No. 3. (Scholar)
- Davies, M., and G. Humphreys (eds.), 1993. Consciousness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D.C., 1991. Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown and Co. (Scholar)
- Dretske, F., 1986. ‘Misrepresentation’, in R.J. Bogdan (ed.), Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993. ‘Conscious Experience’, Mind, 102: 263-83. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995. Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996. ‘Phenomenal Externalism’, in Villanueva 1996). (Scholar)
- –––, 2003. ‘How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie?’, in B. Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access and First Person Authority, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. (Scholar)
- Fish, W., 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J.A., 1975. The Language of Thought, New York: Crowell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987. Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Gennaro, R., 1995. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, (Philadelphia: John Benjamins. (Scholar)
- Goodman, N., 1951. The Structure of Appearance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Gray, R., 2003. ‘Tye’s Representationalism: Feeling the Heat?’, Philosophical Studies, 115: 245-56. (Scholar)
- Hall, E.W., 1961. Our Knowledge of Fact and Value, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1990. ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, in Tomberlin (1990). Reprinted in Lycan (1999). (Scholar)
- Heil, J., 1988. ‘Privileged Access’, Mind, 47: 238-51. Reprinted in Lycan (1999). (Scholar)
- Hintikka, K.J.J., 1969. ‘On the Logic of Perception’, in N.S. Care and R.H. Grimm (eds.), Perception and Personal Identity, Cleveland, OH: Case Western Reserve University Press. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T., 1984. ‘Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 147-52. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000. ‘Narrow Content and the Phenomenology of Intentionality’, Presidential Address to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New York City (June, 2000). (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1977. Perception, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982. ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127-36. Reprinted in Lycan (1999). (Scholar)
- Kim, J., 1995. ‘Mental Causation: What, Me Worry?’, in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues, 6: Content, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing. (Scholar)
- Kind, A., 2003. ‘What’s So Transparent about Transparency?’, Philosophical Studies, 115: 225-44. (Scholar)
- Kraut, R., 1982. ‘Sensory States and Sensory Objects’, Noûs, 16: 277-95. (Scholar)
- Kriegel, U., 2002a. ‘PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness’, Philosophical Psychology, 15: 55-64. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002b. ‘Phenomenal Content’, Erkenntnis, 57: 175-98. (Scholar)
- Leeds, S., 1993. ‘Qualia, Awareness, Sellars’, Noûs, 27: 303-30. (Scholar)
- Levine, J., 2001. Purple Haze, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003. ‘Experience and Representationi, in Smith and Jokic (2003). (Scholar)
- –––, 2007. ‘What is a Phenomenal Concept?,’ in Alter and Walter (2007). (Scholar)
- –––, 2010. ‘Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap’. (Scholar)
- Lewis, C.I., 1929. Mind and the World Order, New York: C. Scribners Sons. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1983. ‘Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation’, Philosophical Review, 92: 3-32. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997. ‘Naming the Colours’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325-42. (Scholar)
- Lloyd, D., 1991. ‘Leaping to Conclusions: Connectionism, Consciousness, and the Computational Mind’, in T. Horgan and J. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- Loar, B., 1990. ‘Phenomenal States’, in Tomberlin (1990). (Scholar)
- –––, 2003. ‘Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia’, in Smith and Jokic (2003). (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G., 1987. Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990. ‘What is the Subjectivity of the Mental?’, in Tomberlin (1990). (Scholar)
- –––, 1996. Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998. ‘In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia’ (Replies to Neander, Rey and Tye), in Tomberlin (1998). (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 1999. Mind and Cognition, Second Edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001. ‘The Case for Phenomenal Externalism’, in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), Metaphysics (Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 15), Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003. ‘Perspectivalism and the Knowledge Argument’, in Smith and Jokic (2003). (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming. ‘Block and the Representation Theory of Sensory Qualities’, in a Festschrift for Ned Block, A. Pautz and D. Stoljar (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Macpherson, F., 2006. ‘Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience’, Noûs, 40: 82-117. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1974. ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’, Philosophical Review, 82: 435-56. (Scholar)
- Nanay, B., 2010. ‘Attention and Perceptual Content’, Analysis, 70: 263-70. (Scholar)
- Neander, K., 1998. ‘The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness’, in Tomberlin (1998). (Scholar)
- Nelkin, N., 1989. ‘Unconscious Sensations’, Philosophical Psychology, 2: 129-41. (Scholar)
- Nickel, B., 2007. ‘Against Intentionalism’, Philosophical Studies, 136: 279-304. (Scholar)
- Noë, A., 2004. Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005. ‘Real Presence’, Philosophical Topics, 33: 235-64. (Scholar)
- Papineau, D., 2002. Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007. ‘Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts’, in Alter and Walter (2007). (Scholar)
- Pautz, A., 2007. ‘Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence’, in J. Hawthorne (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 21, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010. ‘Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content?’, in B. Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming. ‘The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists’, in R. Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, C., 1983. Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008. ‘Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 62: 7-24. (Scholar)
- Perry, J., 2001. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Pitcher, G., 1970. ‘Pain Perception’, Philosopical Review, 79: 368-93. (Scholar)
- Prinz, J., 2007. ‘Mental Pointing’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14: 184-211. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H., 1975. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII: Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- Rey, G., 1983. ‘A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness’, in Davidson, R., G.E. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol. 3. New York: Plenum Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991. ‘Sensations in a Language of Thought’, in Villanueva (1991). (Scholar)
- –––, 1998. ‘A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience’, in Tomberlin (1998). (Scholar)
- Rosenthal, D.M., 1991. ‘The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality’, in Villanueva (1991). (Scholar)
- –––, 1993. ‘Thinking that One Thinks’, in Davies and Humphreys (1993). (Scholar)
- Schellenberg, S., 2008. ‘The Situation-Dependency of Perception’, Journal of Philosophy, 105: 55-85. (Scholar)
- Searle, J.R., 1990. ‘Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13: 585-642. (Scholar)
- Sellars, W., 1956. ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1967. Science and Metaphysics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1991. ‘Qualia and Consciousness’, Mind, 100: 507-24. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994. ‘Phenomenal Character’, Noûs, 28: 21-38. (Scholar)
- Siewert, C., 1998. The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Smart, J.J.C., 1959. ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, Philosophical Review, 68: 141-156. (Scholar)
- Smith, Q., and A. Jokic (eds.), 2003. Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Speaks, J., 2010. ‘Attention and Intentionalism’, Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 325-42. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, R., 1996. ‘On a Defense of the Hegemony of Representation’, in Villanueva (1996). (Scholar)
- Stoljar, D., 2005. ‘Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts’, Mind and Language, 20: 469-94. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, S., 2000. Matters of Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Thau, M., 2002. Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Tomberlin, J.E. (ed.), 1990. Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 1998. Language, Mind, and Ontology (Philosophical Perspectives: Vol. 12), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing. (Scholar)
- Travis, C., 2004. ‘The Silence of the Senses’, Mind, 113: 57-94. (Scholar)
- Tye, M., 1986. ‘The Subjectivity of Experience’, Mind, 95: 1-17. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992. ‘Visual Qualia and Visual Content’, in T. Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994. Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum’, Noûs, 28: 159-83. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998. ‘Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism’, in Tomberlin (1998). (Scholar)
- –––, 2002. ‘Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience’, Noûs, 36: 137-51. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003a. ‘Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism?’, in Smith and Jokic (2003). (Scholar)
- –––, 2003b. Consciousness and Persons, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003c. ‘A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts’, in A. O’Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009. Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Van Gulick, R., 1985. ‘Physicalism and the Subjectivity of the Mental’, Philosophical Topics, 13: 51-70. (Scholar)
- Villanueva, E. (ed.), 1991. Philosophical Issues, 1: Consciousness, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 1996. Philosophical Issues, 7: Perception, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing. (Scholar)
- Wager, A., 1999. ‘The Extra Qualia Problem: Synaesthesia and Representationism’, Philosophical Psychology, 12: 263-81. (Scholar)
- White, S., 1987. ‘What Is It Like to Be a Homunculus?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 68: 148-74. (Scholar)
