Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Consciousness" by Robert Van Gulick

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Akins, K. 1993. “A bat without qualities?” In M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds. Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell.
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Anderson, J. 1983. The Architecture of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D. 1968. A Materialist Theory of Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D. 1981. “What is consciousness?” In The Nature of Mind. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Baars, B. 1988. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Balog, K. 1999. “Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.” Philosophical Review, 108: 497–528. (Scholar)
Bayne, T. 2010. The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bayne, T. and Montague, M. (eds.) 2012. Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Block, N. 1980a. “Troubles with Functionalism,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, Ned Block,ed., Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 268–305. (Scholar)
Block, N. 1980b. “Are absent qualia impossible?” Philosophical Review, 89/2: 257–74. (Scholar)
Block, N. 1990. “Inverted Earth,” Philosophical Perspectives, 4, J. Tomberlin, ed., Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company. (Scholar)
Block, N. 1995. “On a confusion about the function of consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–47. (Scholar)
Block, N. 1994. “What is Dennett's theory a theory of?” Philosophical Topics, 22/1–2: 23–40. (Scholar)
Block, N. 1996. “Mental paint and mental latex.” In E. Villanueva, ed. Perception. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. (Scholar)
Block, N. and Stalnaker, R. 1999. “Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap.” Philosophical Review, 108/1: 1–46. (Scholar)
Block, N. 2007. Consciousness, Accessibility and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30: 481–548 (Scholar)
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Carruthers, P. 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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Chalmers, D. 1995. “Facing up to the problem of consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2: 200–19. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D. 2002. “Does conceivability entail possibility?” In T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne eds. Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D. 2003. “The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.” In A. Jokic and Q. Smith eds. Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D. and Jackson, F. 2001. “Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation”. Philosophical Review, 110/3: 315–60. (Scholar)
Churchland, P. M. 1985. “Reduction, qualia, and direct introspection of brain states”. Journal of Philosophy, 82: 8–28. (Scholar)
Churchland, P. M. 1995. The Engine of Reason and Seat of the Soul. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Churchland, P. S. 1981. “On the alleged backwards referral of experiences and its relevance to the mind body problem”. Philosophy of Science, 48: 165–81. (Scholar)
Churchland, P. S. 1983. “Consciousness: the transmutation of a concept”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 80–95. (Scholar)
Churchland, P. S. 1996. “The hornswoggle problem”. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3: 402–8. (Scholar)
Clark, A. 1993. Sensory Qualities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Clark, G. and Riel-Salvatore, J. 2001. “Grave markers, middle and early upper paleolithic burials”. Current Anthropology, 42/4: 481–90. (Scholar)
Cleeremans, A., ed. 2003. The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration and Dissociation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Crick, F. and Koch, C. 1990. “Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness”. Seminars in Neuroscience, 2: 263–75. (Scholar)
Crick, F. H. 1994. The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York: Scribners. (Scholar)
Davies, M. and Humphreys, G. 1993. Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Damasio, A. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt. (Scholar)
Dehaene, S. and Naccache, L. 2000. Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition 79:1–37. (Scholar)
Dennett, D. C. 1978. Brainstorms. Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Dennett, D. C. 1984. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Having. Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Dennett, D. C. 1990. “Quining qualia”. In Mind and Cognition, W. Lycan, ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 519–548. (Scholar)
Dennett, D. C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. (Scholar)
Dennett, D. C. 1992. “The self as the center of narrative gravity”. In F. Kessel, P. Cole, and D. L. Johnson, eds. Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. (Scholar)
Dennett, D. C. 2003. Freedom Evolves. New York: Viking. (Scholar)
Dennett, D. C. and Kinsbourne, M. 1992. “Time and the observer: the where and when of consciousness in the brain”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15: 187–247. (Scholar)
Descartes, R. 1644/1911. The Principles of Philosophy. Translated by E. Haldane and G. Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Dretske, F. 1993. “Conscious experience.” Mind, 102: 263–283. (Scholar)
Dretske, F. 1994. “Differences that make no difference”. Philosophical Topics, 22/1–2: 41–58. (Scholar)
Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, Bradford Books. (Scholar)
Eccles, J. and Popper, K. 1977. The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Berlin: Springer (Scholar)
Edelman, G. 1989. The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
Farah, M. 1990. Visual Agnosia. Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Flanagan, O. 1992. Consciousness Reconsidered. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Flohr, H. 1995. “An information processing theory of anesthesia”. Neuropsychologia, 33/9: 1169–80. (Scholar)
Flohr, H., Glade, U. and Motzko, D. 1998. “The role of the NMDA synapse in general anesthesia”. Toxicology Letters, 100–101: 23–29. (Scholar)
Fodor, J. 1974. “Special sciences”. Synthese,28: 77–115. (Scholar)
Fodor, J. 1983. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Foster, J. 1989. “A defense of dualism”. In J. Smythies and J. Beloff, eds. The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.
Foster J. 1996. The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Gallistel, C. 1990. The Organization of Learning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Gardiner, H. 1985. The Mind's New Science. New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
Gazzaniga, M. 1988. Mind Matters: How Mind and Brain Interact to Create our Conscious Lives. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. (Scholar)
Gazzaniga, M. 2011. Who's In Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain, New York: Harper Collins. (Scholar)
Gennaro, R. 1995. Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. (Scholar)
Gennaro, R., ed. 2004. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. (Scholar)
Gennaro, R. 2012. The Consciousness Paradox. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Gray, J. 1995. “The contents of consciousness: a neuropsychological conjecture”. Behavior and Brain Sciences, 18/4: 659–722. (Scholar)
Hameroff, S. 1998. “Quantum computation in brain microtubules? The Penrose-Hameroff ‘Orch OR’ model of consciousness”. Philosophical Transactions Royal Society London, A 356: 1869–96. (Scholar)
Hardin, C. 1986. Color for Philosophers. Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
Hardin, C. 1992. “Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors”. In A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds. Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter. (Scholar)
Harman, G. 1990. “The intrinsic quality of experience”. In J. Tomberlin, ed. Philosophical Perspectives, 4. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing. (Scholar)
Hartshorne, C. 1978. “Panpsychism: mind as sole reality”. Ultimate Reality and Meaning,1: 115–29. (Scholar)
Hasker, W. 1999. The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Heidegger, M. 1927/1962. Being and Time (Sein und Zeit). Translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. New York: Harper and Row. (Scholar)
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Hill, C. 1991. Sensations:A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Hill, C. 1997. “Imaginability, conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem”. Philosophical Studies, 87: 61–85. (Scholar)
Hill, C. and McLaughlin, B. 1998. “There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers' philosophy”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59/2: 445–54. (Scholar)
Horgan, T. 1984. “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia.” Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 147–83. (Scholar)
Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. 2002. “The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality”. In D. J. Chalmers , ed., Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hume, D. 1739/1888. A Treatise of Human Nature. ed. L Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Humphreys, N. 1982. Consciousness Regained. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Humphreys, N. 1992. A History of the Mind. London: Chatto and Windus. (Scholar)
Husserl, E. 1913/1931. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Ideen au einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie). Translated by W. Boyce Gibson. New York: MacMillan. (Scholar)
Husserl, E. 1929/1960. Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated by Dorian Cairns. The Hague: M. Nijhoff. (Scholar)
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Hurley, S. 1998. Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Jackson, F. 1982. “Epiphenomenal qualia”. Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
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