Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Causal Theories of Mental Content" by Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa

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Adams, F., 1979, “A Goal-State Theory of Function Attribution,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9: 493–518. (Scholar)
–––, 2003a, “Thoughts and their Contents: Naturalized Semantics,” in S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 143–171. (Scholar)
–––, 2003b, “The Informational Turn in Philosophy,” Minds and Machines, 13: 471–501. (Scholar)
Adams, F. and Aizawa, K., 1992, “‘X’ Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style,” Minds and Machines, 2: 175–183.
–––, 1994a, “Fodorian Semantics,” in S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds.), Mental Representations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 223–242. (Scholar)
–––, 1994b, “‘X’ Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics,” Minds and Machines, 4: 215–231.
Adams, F., Drebushenko, D., Fuller, G., and Stecker, R., 1990, “Narrow Content: Fodor’s Folly,” Mind & Language, 5: 213–229. (Scholar)
Adams, F. and Dietrich, L., 2004, “What’s in a(n Empty) Name?,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85: 125–148. (Scholar)
Adams, F. and Enc, B., 1988, “Not Quite by Accident,” Dialogue, 27: 287–297. (Scholar)
Adams, F. and Stecker, R., 1994, “Vacuous Singular Terms,” Mind & Language, 71: 1–12. (Scholar)
Agar, N., 1993. “ What do frogs really believe?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 9: 387–401. (Scholar)
Aizawa, K., 1994, “Lloyd’s Dialectical Theory of Representation,” Mind & Language, 9: 1–24. (Scholar)
Antony, L. and Levine, J., 1991, “The Nomic and the Robust,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 1–16. (Scholar)
Artiga, M., & Sebastián, M. A., 2020, “Informational Theories of Content and Mental Representation,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 11: 613–27. (Scholar)
Baker, L., 1989, “On a Causal Theory of Content,” Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 165–186. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Has Content Been Naturalized?,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 17–32. (Scholar)
Bar-On, D., 1995, “‘Meaning’ Reconstructed: Grice and the Naturalizing of Semantics,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 76: 83–116. (Scholar)
Boghossian, P., 1991, “Naturalizing Content,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 65–86. (Scholar)
Bridges, J., 2006, “Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro’s Fallacy?,” Noûs, 40: 522–547. (Scholar)
Brooks, R., 1991, “Intelligence without Representation,”Artificial Intelligence, 47: 139–159. (Scholar)
Buras, T., 2009, “An Argument against Causal Theories of Mental Content,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 46: 117–129. (Scholar)
Cain, M. J., 2009, “Fodor’s Attempt to Naturalize Mental Content,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 520–526. (Scholar)
Chemero, A., 2009, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
Cummins, R., 1989, Meaning and Mental Representation, Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “The LOT of the Causal Theory of Mental Content,” Journal of Philosophy, 94: 535–542. (Scholar)
Dennett, D., 1987, “Review of J. Fodor’s Psychosemantics,” Journal of Philosophy, 85: 384–389. (Scholar)
Dretske, F., 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, “Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6: 55–63. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Misrepresentation,” in R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 17–36. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Enç, B., 1982, “Intentional States of Mechanical Devices,” Mind, 91: 161–182. (Scholar)
Enç, B. and Adams, F., 1998, “Functions and Goal-Directedness,” in C. Allen, M. Bekoff and G. Lauder (eds.), Nature’s Purposes, Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford, pp. 371–394. (Scholar)
Fodor, J., 1984, “Semantics, Wisconsin Style,” Synthese, 59: 231–250. (Reprinted in Fodor, 1990a). (Scholar)
–––, 1987, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford. (Scholar)
–––, 1990a, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1990b, “Information and Representation,” in P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language, and Cognition, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, pp. 175–190. (Scholar)
–––, 1990c, “Psychosemantics or Where do Truth Conditions come from?,” in W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 312–337. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Replies,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 255–319. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, The Elm and the Expert, Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford. (Scholar)
–––, 1998a, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998b, In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford Press. (Scholar)
Gibson, M., 1996, “Asymmetric Dependencies, Ideal Conditions, and Meaning,” Philosophical Psychology, 9: 235–259. (Scholar)
Godfrey-Smith, P., 1989, “Misinformation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19: 533–550. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Indication and Adaptation,” Synthese, 92: 283–312. (Scholar)
Grice, H., 1957, “Meaning,” The Philosophical Review, 66: 377–88. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Haugeland, J., 1999, “Mind Embodied and Embedded,” in J. Haugeland (ed.), Having Thought, pp. 207–237. (Scholar)
Horgan, T., and Tienson, J., 2002, “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality,” in D. Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 520–933. (Scholar)
Johnson, M., 2007, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Jones, T., Mulaire, E., and Stich, S., 1991, “Staving off Catastrophe: A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor’s Psychosemantics,” Mind & Language, 6: 58–82. (Scholar)
Lloyd, D., 1987, “Mental Representation from the Bottom up,” Synthese, 70: 23–78. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Simple minds, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
Loar, B., 1991, “Can We Explain Intentionality?,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 119–135. (Scholar)
Loewer, B., 1987, “From Information to Intentionality,” Synthese, 70: 287–317. (Scholar)
Maloney, C., 1990, “Mental Representation,” Philosophy of Science, 57: 445–458. (Scholar)
Maloney, J., 1994, “Content: Covariation, Control and Contingency,” Synthese, 100: 241–290. (Scholar)
Manfredi, P. and Summerfield, D., 1992, “Robustness without Asymmetry: A Flaw in Fodor’s Theory of Content,” Philosophical Studies, 66: 261–283. (Scholar)
McLaughlin, B. P., 1991, “Belief individuation and Dretske on naturalizing content,” in B. P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 157–79. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “The Skewed View From Here: Normal Geometrical Misperception,” Philosophical Topics, 44: 231–99. (Scholar)
Mendelovici, A., 2013, “Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation,” Philosophical Studies, 165: 421–443. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Why tracking theories should allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation,” Disputatio, 8: 57–92. (Scholar)
Millikan, R., 1984, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Biosemantics,” Journal of Philosophy, 86: 281–97. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “What Has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?,” in D. M. Walsh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 105–125. (Scholar)
Neander, K., 1995, “Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning,” Philosophical Studies, 79: 109–141. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Dretske’s Innate Modesty,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 258–274. (Scholar)
Papineau, D., 1984, “Representation and Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, 51: 550–72. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 1–14. (Scholar)
Pineda, D., 1998, “Information and Content,” Philosophical Issues, 9: 381–387. (Scholar)
Possin, K., 1988, “Sticky Problems with Stampe on Representations,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66: 75–82. (Scholar)
Price, C., 1998, “Determinate functions,” Noûs, 32: 54–75. (Scholar)
Rupert, R., 1999, “The Best Test Theory of Extension: First Principle(s),” Mind & Language, 14: 321–355. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Coining Terms in the Language of Thought: Innateness, Emergence, and the Lot of Cummins’s Argument against the Causal Theory of Mental Content,” Journal of Philosophy, 98: 499–530. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Causal Theories of Mental Content,” Philosophy Compass, 3: 353–80. (Scholar)
Ryder, D., 2004, “SINBAD Neurosemantics: A Theory of Mental Representation,” Mind & Language, 19: 211–240. (Scholar)
Schulte, P., 2012, “How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan’s Teleosemantics to the Test,” Philosophia, 40: 483–96. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Perceptual Representations: A Teleosemantic Answer to the Breadth-of-Application Problem,” Biology & Philosophy, 30: 119–36. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Perceiving the world outside: How to solve the distality problem for informational teleosemantics,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 68: 349–69. (Scholar)
Skyrms, B., 2008, “Signals,” Philosophy of Science, 75: 489–500. (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information, Oxford: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “The flow of information in signaling games,” Philosophical Studies, 147: 155–65. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Learning to signal with probe and adjust,” Episteme, 9: 139–50. (Scholar)
Stampe, D., 1975, “Show and Tell,” in B. Freed, A. Marras, and P. Maynard (eds.), Forms of Representation, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 221–245. (Scholar)
–––, 1977, “Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation,” in P. French, H. K. Wettstein, and T. E. Uehling (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 42–63. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Verification and a Causal Account of Meaning,” Synthese, 69: 107–137. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Content, Context, and Explanation,” in E. Villanueva, Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 134–152. (Scholar)
Stegmann, U. E., 2005, “John Maynard Smith’s notion of animal signals,” Biology and Philosophy, 20: 1011–25. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “A consumer-based teleosemantics for animal signals,” Philosophy of Science, 76: 864–75.
Sterelny, K., 1990, The Representational Theory of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Stich, S., 1983, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
Sturdee, D., 1997, “The Semantic Shuffle: Shifting Emphasis in Dretske’s Account of Representational Content,” Erkenntnis, 47: 89–103. (Scholar)
Tye, M., 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Usher, M., 2001, “A Statistical Referential Theory of Content: Using Information Theory to Account for Misrepresentation,” Mind and Language, 16: 311–334. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Comment on Ryder’s SINBAD Neurosemantics: Is Teleofunction Isomorphism the Way to Understand Representations?,” Mind and Language, 19: 241–248. (Scholar)
Van Gelder, T. 1995, “What Might Cognition Be, If not Computation?,” The Journal of Philosophy, 91: 345–381. (Scholar)
Wallis, C., 1994, “Representation and the Imperfect Ideal,” Philosophy of Science, 61: 407–428. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Asymmetrical Dependence, Representation, and Cognitive Science,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 33: 373–401. (Scholar)
Warfield, T., 1994, “Fodorian Semantics: A Reply to Adams and Aizawa,” Minds and Machines, 4: 205–214. (Scholar)
Wright, L., 1973, “Functions,” Philosophical Review, 82: 139–168. (Scholar)

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