Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Narrow Mental Content" by Curtis Brown

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Bach, Kent, 1987, Thought and Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Content: Wide and Narrow,”Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Version 1.0), London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Bailey, Andrew and Bradley Richards, 2014, “Horgan and Tienson on phenomenology and intentionality,” Philosophical Studies 167: 313–326. (Scholar)
Bayne, Tim and Michelle Montague (eds.), 2011, Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Block, Ned, 1986, “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10: 615–678. Reprinted in Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield, eds., Mental Representation: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “What Narrow Content is Not,” In Loewer and Rey (eds.) 1991. (Scholar)
Block, Ned, and Stalnaker, Robert, 1999, “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap,” Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46. (Scholar)
Boghossian, Paul, 1989, “Content and self-knowledge,” Philosophical Topics, 17: 5–26. (Scholar)
Braddon-Mitchell, David, and Jackson, Frank, 1996, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Brown, Curtis, 1992, “Direct and Indirect Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 289–316. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Belief States and Narrow Content,” Mind and Language, 8: 343–67. (Scholar)
Burge, Tyler, 1979, “Individualism and the Mental,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 73–121; reprinted in Burge 2007. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Individualism and Psychology,” Philosophical Review, 95: 3–45; reprinted in Burge 2007. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Individualism and Self-Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, 85: 649–65. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Individuation and Causation in Psychology,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 70: 303–322; reprinted in Burge 2007. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Phenomenality and Reference: Reply to Loar,” in Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays, Volume 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Origins of Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Byrne, Alex, 2021, “Comment on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, Narrow Content,” Philosophical Studies, 178: 3017–3026. (Scholar)
Chalmers, David J., 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “The Components of Content,” in D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “The Nature of Narrow Content,” Philosophical Issues, 13: 46–66. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics,” in Garcia-Carpintero and Macia (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “The Representational Character of Experience,” in D. Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Review of Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne, Narrow Content,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, published 01 December 2018 [Chalmers 2018 available online]. (Scholar)
Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers, 1998, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis, 58: 7–19. (Scholar)
Crane, Tim, 1991, “All the Difference in the World,” Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 1–25. (Scholar)
Dennett, Daniel, 1982, “Beyond Belief,” in Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982; reprinted in D. Dennett, The Intentional Stance, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987. (Scholar)
Egan, Frances, 1991, “Must Psychology Be Individualistic?” Philosophical Review, 100: 179–203. (Scholar)
Fodor, Jerry, 1987, Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991a, “A Modal Argument for Narrow Content,” Journal of Philosophy, 88: 5–26. (Scholar)
–––, 1991b, “Replies,” in Loewer and Rey (eds.) 1991. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Frances, Bryan, 2016, “The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 53: 123–138. (Scholar)
Gaukroger, Cressida, 2017, “Why Broad Content Can’t Influence Behavior,” Synthese, 194: 3005–3020. (Scholar)
Glüer, Kathrin and Åsa Wikforss, 2009, “Against Content Normativity,” Mind, 118: 31–70. (Scholar)
Hattiangadi, Anandi, 2019, “In Defence of Narrow Content,”, Analysis, 79 (3): 539–550. (Scholar)
Horgan, Terence, and John Tienson, 2002, “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality,” in D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Horgan, Terence, John Tienson, and George Graham, 2004, “Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat,” in Richard Schanz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank, 1996, “Mental Causation,” Mind, 105:: 377–413. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Representation and Narrow Belief,” Philosophical Issues, 13: 99–112. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Narrow Content and Representation, or Twin Earth Revisited,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 77 (2): 55–70. (Scholar)
Jerzak, Ethan, 2021, “Review of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’ sNarrow Content,” The Philosophical Review, 130 (3): 475–480. (Scholar)
Kriegel, Uriah, 2008, “Real Narrow Content,” Mind and Language, 23: 305–328. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program,” in Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kripke, Saul, 1979, “A Puzzle About Belief,” in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 239–283. (Scholar)
Lepore, Ernest, and Barry Loewer, 1986, “Solipsist Semantics,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10: 595–614. (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1979, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,” Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543; reprinted in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Reduction of Mind,” in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Loar, Brian, 1988, “Social Content and Psychological Content,” in R. Grimm and D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought, Tucson: University of Arizona Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content,” in Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Loewer, Barry and Georges Rey (eds.), 1991, Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Ludlow, Peter and Norah Martin (eds.), 1998, Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Lycan, William G., 2008, “Phenomenal Intentionalities,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 233–252. (Scholar)
McDermott, Michael, 1986, “Narrow Content,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 277–288. (Scholar)
McGinn, Colin, 1977, “Charity, Interpretation, and Belief,” Journal of Philosophy, 74: 521–535. (Scholar)
Mendola, Joseph, 2008, Anti-Externalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nagel, Thomas, 1974, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review, 4: 435–450. (Scholar)
Nuccetelli, Susana (ed.), 2003, New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Putnam, Hilary, 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in Keith Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volumes VII), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975; reprinted in H. Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality (Philosophical Papers, Volume 2), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. (Scholar)
Recanati, Francois, 1994, “How Narrow is Narrow Content?” Dialectica, 48: 209–229. (Scholar)
Sawyer, Sarah, 2007, “There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content,” in Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Schroeter, Laura, 2004, “The Rationalist Foundations of Chalmers’s 2D Semantics,” Philosophical Studies, 118: 227–255. (Scholar)
Segal, Gabriel, 1989, “Seeing What Is Not There,” Philosophical Review, 98: 189–214. (Scholar)
Segal, Gabriel, 2000, A Slim Book about Narrow Content, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Ignorance of Meaning,” in A. Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Soames, Scott, 2005, Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Speaks, Jeff, 2021, “Galacticism, Thought-Relativism, Quasi-Internalism,” Philosophical Studies, 178: 3037–3047. (Scholar)
Stalnaker, Robert C., 1990, “Narrow Content,” In C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind, Stanford: CSLI Publications; reprinted in Stalnaker 1999. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “On What’s in the Head,” Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 287–316; reprinted in Stalnaker 1999. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Context and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Assertion Revisited,” in Garcia-Carpintero and Macia (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Stich, Stephen P., 1991, “Narrow Content Meets Fat Syntax,” in Loewer and Rey (eds.) 1991. (Scholar)
Taylor, Kenneth A., 1989, “Narrow Content Functionalism and the Mind-Body Problem,” Noûs, 23: 355–372. (Scholar)
Walker, Valerie, 1990, “In Defense of a Different Taxonomy: A Reply to Owens,” Philosophical Review, 99: 425–431. (Scholar)
Werner, Preston J., 2015, “Character (alone) doesn’t count: phenomenal character and narrow intentional content,” American Philosophical Quarterly 52: 261–271. (Scholar)
White, Stephen, 1982, “Partial Character and the Language of Thought,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63: 347–365. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Narrow Content and Narrow Interpretation,” in S. White, The Unity of the Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. (Scholar)
Williams, Meredith, 1990, “Social Norms and Narrow Content,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15: 425–462. (Scholar)
Wilson, Robert A., 1995, Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of Mind, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani, and John Hawthorne, 2018, Narrow Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2021a, “Reply to Byrne,” Philosophical Studies, 178: 3049–3054. (Scholar)
–––, 2021b, “Reply to Speaks,” Philosophical Studies, 178: 3061–3065. (Scholar)

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