Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Teleological Theories of Mental Content" by Peter Schulte and Karen Neander

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Abrams, M., 2005, “Teleosemantics Without Natural Selection”, Biology & Philosophy, 20: 97–116. (Scholar)
Agar, N., 1993, “What do Frogs Really Believe?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71: 1–12. (Scholar)
Allen, C., Bekoff, M. & Lauder, G. (eds.), 1998, Nature’s Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology, Cambridge, Mass: Bradford, MIT. (Scholar)
Ariew, A., Cummins, R., & Perlman, M., (eds.), 2002, Functions: New Readings in the Philosophy of Biology and Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Artiga, M., 2013, “Reliable Misrepresentation and Teleosemantics”, Disputatio 5(37): 265–281. (Scholar)
––– 2014, “The Modal Theory of Functions Is Not about Functions”, Philosophy of Science 81: 580–591. (Scholar)
––– 2015, “Millikan and Her Critics” (book review), Mind, 124: 679–683. (Scholar)
––– 2016a, “Liberal Representationalism: A Deflationist Defense”, dialectica, 70(3): 407–430. (Scholar)
––– 2016b, “Teleosemantic Modeling of Cognitive Representations”, Biology & Philosophy, 31: 483–505. (Scholar)
––– 2020, “Beyond Black Dots and Nutritious Things: A Solution to the Indeterminacy Problem”, Mind & Language, DOI: 10.1111/mila.12284 (Scholar)
––– 2021, “Strong Liberal Representationalism”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09720-z (Scholar)
Ayala, F., 1970, “Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology”, Philosophy of Science, 37: 1–15. (Scholar)
Bauer, M., 2017, “Ahistorical Teleosemantics: An Alternative to Nanay”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 55(2): 158–176. (Scholar)
Bedau, M., 1991, “Can Biological Teleology be Naturalized?”, Journal of Philosophy, 88: 647–55. (Scholar)
Bergman, K., 2021, “Should the Teleosemanticist Be Afraid of Semantic Indeterminacy?”, Mind & Language, DOI: 10.1111/mila.12395 (Scholar)
Blackburn, S., 2005, “Success Semantics”, in H. Lillehammer & D.H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey’s Legacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 22–36. (Scholar)
Block, N., 1986, “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology”, in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Mind (Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Volume 10), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. (Scholar)
Boorse, C., 1976, “Wright on Functions”, The Philosophical Review, 85: 70–86. (Scholar)
––– 2002, “A Rebuttal on Functions”, in A. Ariew, R. Cummins and M. Perlman (eds.) in Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 63–112. (Scholar)
Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F., 1997, “The Teleological Theory of Content”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 474–89. (Scholar)
––– 2002, “A Pyrrhic Victory for Teleonomy”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80(3): 372–377. (Scholar)
Brentano, F., 1874/1924, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Leipzig: Meiner. (Scholar)
Buller, D., 1998, “Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical Survey”, Biology & Philosophy, 13: 505–527. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1999, Function, Selection and Design, New York: State University of New York Press. (Scholar)
Burge, T., 1979, “Individualism and the Mental”, in P. French, T. Uehling Jr. and H. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Volume 2), Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
––– 1986, “Individualism and Psychology”, Philosophical Review, 95: 3–45. (Scholar)
––– 2010, Origins of Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Butlin, P., 2020a, “Representation and the Active Consumer”, Synthese, 197: 4533–4550. (Scholar)
––– 2020b, “Directive Content”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, DOI: 10.1111/papq.12328 (Scholar)
Cao, R., 2012, “A Teleosemantic Approach to Information in the Brain”, Biology & Philosophy, 27: 49–71. (Scholar)
Carey, S., 2009, The Origin of Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Craver, C., 2001, “Role Functions, Mechanism and Hierarchy,” in Philosophy of Science, 68: 31–55. (Scholar)
Cummins, R., 1975, “Functional Analysis”, in Journal of Philosophy, 72: 741–765. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
––– 1987, “Knowing One’s Own Mind”, in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60: 441–58. (Scholar)
Davies, P. S., 2001, Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of Functions, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Dennett, D., 1987, The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
––– 1995, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York: Simon & Schuster. (Scholar)
De Souza Filho, S., 2018, Naturalising Intentionality: A Teleological Approach, Dissertation, King’s College London (UK). (Scholar)
Devitt, M., 1996, Coming to our Senses; A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Dretske, F., 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
––– 1986, “Misrepresentation”, in Radu Bogdan (ed) Belief: Form, Content and Function, New York: Oxford: 17–36. (Scholar)
––– 1988, Explaining Behavior, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press. (Scholar)
––– 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Egan, F., 2020, “Content is Pragmatic: Comments on Nicholas Shea’s Representation in Cognitive Science”, Mind & Language, 35: 368–376. (Scholar)
Enç, B., 1994, “Review: David Papineau [1993], Philosophical Naturalism”, British Journal for the Philosgophy of Science, 45(4): 1070–1077. (Scholar)
––– 2002, “Indeterminacy of Function Attributions”, in A. Ariew, R. Cummins, and M. Perlman (eds.) 2002. (Scholar)
Fodor, J. A., 1981, “The Current Status of the Innateness Controversy”, in Fodor, J., Representations, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
––– 1987, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books. (Scholar)
––– 1990(a), “Psychosemantics, or: Where do truth conditions come from?” in W. Lycan (ed) Mind and Cognition, a Reader, 1990, Oxford: Basil Blackwell: 312–337. (Scholar)
––– 1990(b), “A Theory of Content”, in A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Book. (Scholar)
––– 1990(c), “Information and Representation” in P. Hanson (ed.) Information, Language and Cognition, Vancounver: University of British Columbia Press. (Scholar)
Ganson, T., 2018, “Sensory Malfunctions, Limitations, and Trade-Offs”, Synthese, 195: 1705–1713. (Scholar)
––– 2020, “A Role for Representations in Inflexible Behavior”, Biology & Philosophy, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-020-09756-0 (Scholar)
––– 2021a, “An Alternative to the Causal Theory of Perception”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(4): 683–695. (Scholar)
––– 2021b, “Representation in Cognitive Science, by Nicholas Shea”, Mind, 130: 281–290. (Scholar)
Garson, J., 2011, “Selected Effects and Causal Role Functions in the Brain: The Case for an Etiological Approach to Neuroscience,”Biology & Philosophy, 26: 547–565. (Scholar)
––– 2016, A Critical Overview of Biological Functions, Springer. (Scholar)
––– 2019a, What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
––– 2019b, “Do Constancy Mechanisms Save Distal Content?”, The Philosophical Quarterly 69(275): 409–417. (Scholar)
––– 2019c, “There Are No Ahistorical Theories of Function”, Philosophy of Science 86: 1146–1156. (Scholar)
Godfrey-Smith, P., 1989, “Misinformation”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19 (4): 533–550. (Scholar)
––– 1994, “A Modern History Theory of Functions”, Noûs, 28 (3): 344–362. (Scholar)
––– 2013, “Signals, Icons, and Beliefs”, in J. Kingsbury, D. Ryder and K. Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 41–58. (Scholar)
Graham, P., 2014, “The Function of Perception”, in A. Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Springer, 13–31. (Scholar)
Green, E.J., 2017, “Psychosemantics and The Rich/Thin Debate”, Philosophical Perspectives, 31: 153–186. (Scholar)
Grice, P., 1957, “Meaning”, in The Philosophical Review, 66: 377–388. (Scholar)
Griffiths, P., 1993, “Functional Analysis and Proper Functions”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44: 409–422. (Scholar)
Griffiths, P. & Goode, P. E., 1995, “The Misuse of Sober’s Selection for/Selection of Distinction”, in Biology and Philosophy, 10: 99–107. (Scholar)
Hall, R., 1990, “Does Representational Content Arise from Biological Function?”, in Philosophy of Science Association, 1: 193–199. (Scholar)
Heil, J. and Mele, A. (eds.), 1993, Mental Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hofmann, F. and Schulte, P., 2014, “The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation?”, Acta Analytica, 29: 267–284. (Scholar)
Hundertmark, F., 2018, Mind and Function: Teleosemantics Beyond Selected Effects. Dissertation, Bielefeld University (Germany). (Scholar)
––– 2021, “Explaining How to Perceive the New: Causal-Informational Teleosemantics and Productive Response Functions”, Synthese, 198: 5335–5350. (Scholar)
Jacob, P., 1997, What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
––– 2000, “Can Selection Explain Content?”, in The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 9, 91–102. (Scholar)
––– 2001, “Is Meaning Intrinsically Normative?”, in Proceedings, Meeting of the German Analytical Philosophy (GAP), Allermagne: Bielefeld. (Scholar)
Kracauer, J., 2022, “Representation in Cognitive Science by Nicholas Shea: But Is It Thinking? The Philosophy of Representation Meets Systems Neuroscience”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 92: 267–269 (Scholar)
Leahy, B., 2016, “Simplicity and Elegance in Millikan’s Account of Productivity: Reply to Martínez”, Philosophical Psychology, 29(4): 503–516. (Scholar)
Lewens, T., 2004, Organisms and Artifacts, Design in Nature and Elsewhere, Cambridge, MA: MIT. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1980, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (Volume 1), N. Block (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 216–222. (Scholar)
Loewer, B., 1987, “From Information to Intentionality” in Synthese, 70: 287–317. (Scholar)
Maley, C. & Piccinini, G. (2017), “A Unified Mechanistic Account of Teleological Functions for Psychology and Neuroscience”, in D. Kaplan (ed.), Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 236–256. (Scholar)
Martínez, M., 2011, “Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10: 67–90. (Scholar)
––– 2013a, “Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy”, dialectica, 67(4): 427–453. (Scholar)
––– 2013b, “Teleosemantics and Productivity”, Philosophical Psychology, 26(1): 47–68. (Scholar)
Matthen, M., 1988, “Biological Functions and Perceptual Content”, The Journal of Philosophy, 85(1): 5–27. (Scholar)
McLaughlin, B., (ed.), 1991, Dretske and his Critics, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Mendelovici, A., 2013, “Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation”, Philosophical Studies, 165: 421–443. (Scholar)
Millikan, R., 1984, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
––– 1989a, “In Defense of Proper Functions”, Philosophy of Science, 56 (2): 288–302. (Scholar)
––– 1989b, “Biosemantics”, Journal of Philosophy, 86: 281–97. (Scholar)
––– 1991, “Speaking Up for Darwin” in Loewer, B. & Rey, G. (eds.) (1991) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his critics, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 151–165. (Scholar)
––– 1993, “Compare and Contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on Teleosemantics”, in R. Millikan, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 123–133. (Scholar)
––– 1995, “Pushmi-Pullyu Representations”, Philosophical Perspectives, 9: 185–200. (Scholar)
––– 1996, “On Swampkinds”, in Mind and Language, 11 (1): 70–130. (Scholar)
––– 2000, On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay about Substance Concepts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
––– 2004, Varieties of Meaning, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. (Scholar)
––– 2009, “Biosemantics”, in B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, & S. Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 394–406. (Scholar)
––– 2013a, “Reply to Neander”, in Kingsbury, D. Ryder and K. Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 37–40. (Scholar)
––– 2013b, “Reply to Shea”, in Kingsbury, D. Ryder and K. Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 81–86. (Scholar)
––– 2017, Beyond Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
––– 2020, “Neuroscience and Teleosemantics”, Synthese, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02893-9 (Scholar)
Nanay, B., 2010, “A Modal Theory of Content,” in Journal of Philosophy, 107: 412–431. (Scholar)
––– 2013, “Success Semantics: The Sequel”, Philosophical Studies, 165: 151–165. (Scholar)
––– 2014, “Teleosemantics Without Etiology”, Philosophy of Science, 81: 798–810. (Scholar)
Neander, K., 1991, “Functions as Selected Effects”, in Philosophy of Science, 58: 168–184. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Malfunctioning and Misrepresenting”, in Philosophical Studies, 79: 109–141. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Swampman Meets Swampcow”, in Mind and Language, 11 (1): 70–130. (Scholar)
––– 2004, “Teleological Theories of Mental Content”, in E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/content-teleological/> (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Content for Cognitive Science”, in G. McDonald and D. Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 167–194. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Toward an Informational Teleosemantics”, in J. Kingsbury, D. Ryder and K. Williford (eds.) Millikan and Her Critics, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––A Mark of the Mental, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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––– 1987, Reality and Representation, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
––– 1993, Philosophical Naturalism Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
––– 1998, “Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 1–14. (Scholar)
––– 2001, “The Status of Teleosemantics, or How to Stop Worrying about Swampman”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 279–89. (Scholar)
––– 2016, “Teleosemantics”, in D. Livingstone-Smith (ed.), How Biology Shapes Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 95–120. (Scholar)
––– 2021, The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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Piccinini, G., 2020a, Neurocognitive Mechanisms, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
––– 2020b, “Nonnatural Mental Representation”, in J. Smortchkova, K. Dolega, & T. Schlicht (eds.), What Are Mental Representations?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 254–286. (Scholar)
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––– 2001, Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
––– 2014, “Teleosemantics Re-Examined: Content, Explanation and Norms”, Biology & Philosophy, 29: 587–596. (Scholar)
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––– 2021, “Nicholas Shea, Representation in Cognitive Science”, Philosophical Review, 130(1): 180–185. (Scholar)
Rupert, R., 2022, “Representation in Cognitive Science by Nicholas Shea: Content without Function”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 92: 260–263. (Scholar)
Schroeder, T., 2004, “New Norms for Teleosemantics”, in H. Clapin, P. Staines and P. Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, Elsevier, 91–106. (Scholar)
Schulte, P., 2012, “How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan’s Teleosemantics to the Test,” Philosophia, 40: 483–496. (Scholar)
––– 2015, “Perceptual Representations: A Teleosemantic Answer to the Breadth-of-Application Problem”, Biology & Philosophy, 30: 119–136. (Scholar)
––– 2018, “Perceiving the World Outside: How to Solve the Distality Problem for Informational Teleosemantics”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 68: 349–369. (Scholar)
––– 2019a, “Challenging Liberal Representationalism: A Reply to Artiga”, dialectica, 73: 331–348. (Scholar)
––– 2019b, “Naturalizing the Content of Desire”, Philosophical Studies 176: 161–174. (Scholar)
––– 2020, “Why Mental Content Is Not Like Water: Reconsidering the Reductive Claims of Teleosemantics”, Synthese, 197: 2271–2290. (Scholar)
––– 2021, “The Nature of Perceptual Constancies”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103: 3–20. (Scholar)
––– 2022, “Constancy Mechanisms and Distal Content: A Reply to Garson”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 72: 229–237. (Scholar)
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––– 2007, “Consumers Need Information: supplementing teleosemantics with an input condition” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (2): 404–435. (Scholar)
––– 2013, “Millikan’s Isomorphism Requirement” in J. Kingsbury, D. Ryder and K. Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
––– 2018, Representation in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
––– 2020, “Representation in Cognitive Science: Replies”, Mind & Language, 35: 402–412. (Scholar)
––– 2022, “Representation in Cognitive Science by Nicholas Shea: Reply by the Author”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 92: 270–273. (Scholar)
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––– 1976, Teleological Explanation, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Scholar)

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