Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract" by Fred D’Agostino, Gerald Gaus and John Thrasher

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Ackerman, Bruce, 1980. Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (especially §66). (Scholar)
Alexander, Jason and Brian Skyrms, 1999. “Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?” The Journal of Philosophy, 96(11): 588–598. (Scholar)
Alexander, Jason, 2007. The Structural Evolution of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Berlin, Isaiah, 1958. Two Concepts of Liberty, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Bicchieri, Cristina, 2016. Norms in the Wild, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Binmore, Ken, 1998. Game Theory and the Social Contract Vol. 2: Just Playing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. Natural Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Braithwaite R.B., 1955. Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Brennan, Geoffrey and James Buchanan, 2000 [1985]. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy (The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 10), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc.
Broome, John, 1995. Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
Bruner, Justin, 2020. “Bargaining and the Dynamics of Divisional Norms,” Synthese, 197: 407–425. (Scholar)
Buchanan, James, 1965. “Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy,” in The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 307–322. (Scholar)
–––, 2000 [1975]. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 7), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc.
Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock, 1965 [1962]. The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Cartwright, Nancy and Robin Le Poidevin, 1991. “Fables and Models,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 65: 55–82. (Scholar)
Coleman, Jules, 1985. “Market Contractarianism and the Unanimity Rule,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 2(2): 69–114. (Scholar)
D’Agostino, Fred, 1996. Free Public Reason: Making It Up As We Go Along, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. Incommensurability and Commensuration: The Common Denominator, Burlington, VT: Ashgate. (Scholar)
Darwall, Stephen, 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Dworkin, Ronald, 1975. “The Original Position” in Reading Rawls, Norman Daniels (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 16–53. (Scholar)
––– 1981. “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 10(4): 283–345. (Scholar)
Freeman, Samuel, 2007a. Justice and the Social Contract, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007b. “The Burdens of Justification: Constructivism, Contractualism and Publicity,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 6 (February): 5–44. (Scholar)
Gaus, Gerald, 1990. Value and Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011a. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b. “Between Diversity and Choice: The General Will in a Diverse Society,” Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice, 3(2): 70–95. (Scholar)
–––, 2016. The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Gaus, Gerald and John Thrasher, 2015. “Rational Choice and the Original Position: The (Many) Models of Rawls and Harsanyi,” in The Original Position, Timothy Hinton (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39–58. (Scholar)
–––, 2021. Philosophy, Politics, and Economics: An Introduction, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Gauthier, David, 1986. Morals by Agreement, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991. “Why Contractarianism?” in Contractarianism and Rational Choice, Peter Vallentyne (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15–30 (Scholar)
–––, 1993. “Uniting Separate Persons,” in Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract: Themes from Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier and Robert Sugden (eds.), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 176–192. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. “Are We Moral Debtors?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(1): 162–168. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. “Twenty-Five On,” Ethics, 123(4): 601–624. (Scholar)
Habermas, Jürgen, 1985. The Theory of Communicative Action (Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society), Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Boston: Beacon Press. (Scholar)
Hamilton, Alexander, 2001 [1788]. “Federalist No. 1,” in The Federalist (Gideon Edition), George W. Carey and James McClellan (eds.), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, pp. 1–5.
Hampton, Jean, 1986. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Hardin, Russell, 2003. Indeterminacy and Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert, 1975. “Moral relativism defended,” The Philosophical Review, 84(1): 3–22. (Scholar)
Harsanyi, John, 1977. Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour and Scientific Explanation, Boston: Reidel. (Scholar)
–––, 1982. “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior,” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39–62. (Scholar)
Harsanyi, John and Reinhard Selten, 1988. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Heath, Joseph, 2004. “Dworkin’s Auction,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 3(1): 313–335. (Scholar)
Hobbes, Thomas, 2012 [1651]. Leviathan (3 volumes), Noel Malcolm, (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith, 2000. “The Impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games,” Experimental Economics, 3(1): 5–9. (Scholar)
Hume, David, 1985 [1741]. “Of the Independency of Parliament,” in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, Eugene Miller (ed.), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, pp. 42–46.
–––, 1985 [1748]. “Of the Original Contract,” in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, Eugene Miller (ed.), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, pp. 465–487.
Kalai, Ehud and Meir Smorodinsky, 1975. “Other Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 43(3): 513–518. (Scholar)
Kant, Immanuel, 1999 [1797]. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, second edition, John Ladd (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett.
Kavka, Gregory S., 1984. “The Reconciliation Project,” in Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, David Copp and David Zimmerman (eds.), Totawa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, pp. 297–319. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, (Scholar)
Klosko, George, 2000. Democratic Procedures and Liberal Consensus, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kogelmann, Brian, 2015. “Modeling the Individual for Constitutional Choice,” Constitutional Political Economy, 26: 455–474. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. “Aggregating Out of Indeterminacy: Social Choice Theory to the Rescue,” Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, 16(2): 210–232. (Scholar)
Kogelmann, Brian and Stephen Stich, 2016. “When Public Reason Fails Us: Convergence Discourse as Blood Oath,” American Political Science Review, 110(3): 717–730. (Scholar)
Lessnoff, Michael, 1986. Social Contract, London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
Lister, Andrew, 2010. “Public Justification and the Limits of State Action,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 9(2): 151–175. (Scholar)
Locke, John, 1960 [1689]. The Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 283–446.
Luce, Robert D. and Howard Raiffa, 1957. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, New York: Wiley. (Scholar)
Mack, Eric, 2007. “Scanlon as a Natural Rights Theorist,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 6 (February): 45–73. (Scholar)
Maynard Smith, John, 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Moehler, Michael, 2010. “The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice,” Utilitas, 22: 447–473. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. “The Scope of Instrumental Morality,” Philosophical Studies, 167(2): 431–451. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. Minimal Morality: A Two-Level Contractarian Theory, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Mueller, Dennis C., 2005. Public Choice III, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Muldoon, Ryan, 2017. Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World: Beyond Tolerance, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2017a. “Exploring Tradeoffs in Accommodating Moral Diversity,” Philosophical Studies, 174(7): 1871–1883. (Scholar)
Narveson, Jan. 1988. The Libertarian Idea, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. (Scholar)
Nash, John, 1950. “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 18(2): 155–162. (Scholar)
Nozick, Robert, 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
Reiman, Jeffrey, 1990. Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
Raiffa, Howard, 1953. “Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two-person Games,” Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28: 361–387. (Scholar)
Rawls, John, 1999 [1958]. “Justice as Fairness,” Philosophical Review, 67(2): 164–194; reprinted in John Rawls, Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 1995. “Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy, 92(3): 132–180. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Samuel Freeman (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 50(1): 90–109. (Scholar)
–––, 2012. Economic Fables, Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. (Scholar)
Scanlon, Thomas, 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. Being Realistic About Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Schelling, Thomas C., 1959. “For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 41(3): 213–224. (Scholar)
–––, 1960. The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Sen, Amartya, 1997. “Maximization and the Act of Choice,” Econometrica, 65(4): 745–779. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. The Idea of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Skyrms, Brian, 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. The Evolution of the Social Contract, Second Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Smith, Michael. The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell.
Smith, Vernon L., 1977. “The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social Choice,” Journal of Political Economy, 85(6): 1125–1139. (Scholar)
–––, 1982. “Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science,” The American Economic Review, 72(5): 923–955. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. “Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics,” The American Economic Review, 93(3): 465–508. (Scholar)
Southwood, Nicholas, 2010. Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2019. “Contractualism for Us As We Are,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(3): 529–547. (Scholar)
Stark, Cynthia, 2000. “Hypothetical Consent and Justification,” The Journal of Philosophy, 97(6): 313–334. (Scholar)
Sugden, Robert, 1986. The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. “Contractarianism and Norms,” Ethics, 100(4): 768–786. (Scholar)
–––, 1991. “Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy,” The Economics Journal, 101(407): 751–785. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. The Community of Advantage: A Behavioural Economist’s Defence of the Market, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Suikkanen, Jussi, 2014. “Contractualism and the Conditional Fallacy,” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, 4: 113–37. (Scholar)
Thoma, Johanna, 2015. “Bargaining and the Impartiality of the Social Contract,” Philosophical Studies, 172(12): 3335–3355. (Scholar)
Thrasher, John, 2013. “Reconciling Justice and Pleasure in Epicurean Contractarianism,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16(2): 423–436. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. “Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice,” Philosophical Studies, 167(3): 683–699. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. “Adam Smith and The Social Contract,” The Adam Smith Review, 68: 195–216. (Scholar)
–––, 2019. “Constructivism, Representation, and Stability: Path-Dependence in Public Reason Theories of Justice,” Synthese, 196(1): 429–450. (Scholar)
–––, 2020. “Agreeing to Disagree: Diversity, Political Contractualism, and the Open Society,” The Journal of Politics, 82(3): 1142–1155. (Scholar)
Thrasher, John and Kevin Vallier, 2015. “The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity and Stability,” The European Journal of Philosophy, 23(4): 933–954. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. “Political Stability in the Open Society,” American Journal of Political Science, 62(2): 398–409. (Scholar)
Tomasi, John, 2012. Free Market Fairness, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Vanderschraaf, Peter, 2005. “Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 28(4): 325–358. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. Strategic Justice: Convention and Problems of Balancing Divergent Interests, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Weisberg, Michael, 2007a. “Who is a Modeler?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58(2): 207–233. (Scholar)
–––, 2007b. “Three Kinds of Idealization,” The Journal of Philosophy, 104(12): 639–659. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Weisberg, Michael and Ryan Muldoon, 2009. “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor,” Philosophy of Science, 76(2): 225–252. (Scholar)

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