Primary Literature

• 1966a, “An Argument for the Identity Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25. (Scholar)
• 1966b, “Percepts and Color Mosaics in Visual Experience,” Philosophical Review, 75: 357–368. (Scholar)
• 1966 (with Jane S. Richardson), “Scriven on Human Unpredictability,” Philosophical Studies, 17: 69–74. (Scholar)
• 1968, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. (Scholar)
• 1968 (with Wilfrid Hodges), “Finitude and Infinitude in the Atomic Calculus of Individuals,” Noûs, 2: 405–410. (Scholar)
• 1969a, Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• 1969b, “Lucas against Mechanism,” Philosophy, 44: 231–233. (Scholar)
• 1969c, “Policing the Aufbau,” Philosophical Studies, 20: 13–17. (Scholar)
• 1969d, Review of Capitan and Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion, Journal of Philosophy, 66: 22–27.
• 1970a, “Anselm and Actuality,” Noûs, 4: 175–188. (Scholar)
• 1970b, “General Semantics,” Synthese, 22: 18–67. (Scholar)
• 1970c, “How to Define Theoretical Terms,” Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. (Scholar)
• 1970d, “Nominalistic Set Theory,” Noûs, 4: 225–240. (Scholar)
• 1970 (with Stephanie R. Lewis), “Holes,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 48: 206–212. (Scholar)
• 1971a, “Analog and Digital,” Noûs, 5: 321–327. (Scholar)
• 1971b, “Completeness and Decidability of Three Logics of Counterfactual Conditionals,” Theoria, 37: 74–85. (Scholar)
• 1971c, “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. (Scholar)
• 1971d, “Immodest Inductive Methods,” Philosophy of Science, 38: 54–63. (Scholar)
• 1972a, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–258. (Scholar)
• 1972b, “Utilitarianism and Truthfulness,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 17–19. (Scholar)
• 1973a, Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973, Reprinted with revisions, 1986. (Scholar)
• 1973b, “Causation,” Journal of Philosophy, 70: 556–567. (Scholar)
• 1973c, “Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2: 418–446. (Scholar)
• 1973d, “Lingue e lingua,” Versus, 4: 2–21. (Scholar)
• 1974a, “Tensions,” in Milton K. Munitz and Peter K. Unger (eds.), Semantics and Philosophy, New York: New York University Press, pp. 49–61. (Scholar)
• 1974b, “Intensional Logics Without Iterative Axioms,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 3: 457–466. (Scholar)
• 1974c, “Radical Interpretation,” Synthese, 23: 331–344. (Scholar)
• 1974d, “Semantic Analyses for Dyadic Deontic Logic,” in Sören Stenlund (ed.), Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis: Essays Dedicated to Stig Kanger on His Fiftieth Birthday, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1–14. (Scholar)
• 1974e, “Spielman and Lewis on Inductive Immodesty,” Philosophy of Science, 41: 84–85. (Scholar)
• 1975a, “Adverbs of Quantification,” in Edward L. Keenan (ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–15. (Scholar)
• 1975b, “Languages and Language,” in Keith Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume VII, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 3–35. (Scholar)
• 1975 (with Stephanie R. Lewis), Review of Olson and Paul, Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia, Theoria, 41: 39–60.
• 1976a, “Convention: Reply to Jamieson,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 6: 113–120. (Scholar)
• 1976b, “Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities,” Philosophical Review, 85: 297–315. (Scholar)
• 1976c, “Survival and Identity,” in Amélie O. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 17–40. (Scholar)
• 1976d, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 13: 145–152. (Scholar)
• 1977a, “Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics: A Rejoinder,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 6: 359–363. (Scholar)
• 1978a, “Reply to McMichael,” Analysis, 38: 85–86. (Scholar)
• 1978b, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 37–46. (Scholar)
• 1979a, “A Problem about Permission,” in E. Saarinen et al. (eds.), Essays in Honour of Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 163–175. (Scholar)
• 1979b, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,” Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. (Scholar)
• 1979c, “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,” Noûs, 13: 455–476. (Scholar)
• 1979d, “Lucas Against Mechanism II,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9: 373–376. (Scholar)
• 1979e, “Prisoners’ Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8: 235–240. (Scholar)
• 1979f, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8: 339–359. (Scholar)
• 1980a, “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” in Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 263–293. (Scholar)
• 1980b, “Index, Context, and Content,” in Stig Kanger and Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 79–100. (Scholar)
• 1980c, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain,” in Ned Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 216–32. (Scholar)
• 1980d, “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58: 239–249. (Scholar)
• 1981a, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?,” Theoria, 47: 113–121. (Scholar)
• 1981b, “Causal Decision Theory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59: 5–30. (Scholar)
• 1981c, “Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics for Counterfactuals,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 10: 217–234. (Scholar)
• 1981d, “What Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59: 283–289. (Scholar)
• 1981e, “Why Ain’cha Rich?,” Noûs, 15: 377–380. (Scholar)
• 1982a, “‘Whether’ Report,” in Tom Pauli (ed.), 320311: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Lennart Åqvist on his Fiftieth Birthday, Uppsala: University of Uppsala Press, pp. 194–206. (Scholar)
• 1982b, “Censored Vision,” Written under the name “Bruce LeCatt,”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60: 158–162. (Scholar)
• 1982c, “Logic for Equivocators,” Noûs, 16: 431–441. (Scholar)
• 1983a, Philosophical Papers, Volume I, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• 1983b, “Extrinsic Properties,” Philosophical Studies, 44: 197–200. (Scholar)
• 1983c, “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation,” Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. (Scholar)
• 1983d, “Levi Against U-Maximization,” Journal of Philosophy, 80: 531-534. (Scholar)
• 1983e, “New Work For a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. (Scholar)
• 1984a, “Devil’s Bargains and the Real World,” in Douglas MacLean (ed.), The Security Gamble: Deterrence in the Nuclear Age, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld, pp. 141–154. (Scholar)
• 1984b, “Putnam’s Paradox,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62: 221–236. (Scholar)
• 1986a, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
• 1986b, Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• 1986c, “A Comment on Armstrong and Forrest,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 92–93. (Scholar)
• 1986d, “Against Structural Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. (Scholar)
• 1986e, “Buy Like a MADman, Use Like a NUT” QQ 6: 5–8.
• 1986f, “Causal Explanation” in Lewis 1986b, pp. 214–240. (Scholar)
• 1986g, “Events” in Lewis 1986b, pp. 241–269. (Scholar)
• 1986h, “Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities II,” Philosophical Review, 95: 581–589. (Scholar)
• 1987, “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance,” Proceedings of the Russellian Society, University of Sydney, 12: 81–97. (Scholar)
• 1988a, “Ayer’s First Empiricist Criterion of Meaning: Why Does it Fail?,” Analysis, 48: 1–3. (Scholar)
• 1988b, “Desire as Belief,” Mind, 97: 323–332. (Scholar)
• 1988c, “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe,” Analysis, 48: 65–72. (Scholar)
• 1988d, “Relevant Implication,” Theoria, 54: 162–174. (Scholar)
• 1988e, “Statements Partly About Observation,” Philosophical Papers, 17: 1–31. (Scholar)
• 1988f, “The Trap’s Dilemma,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66: 220–223. (Scholar)
• 1988g, “Vague identity: Evans misunderstood,” Analysis, 48: 128–130. (Scholar)
• 1988h, “What Experience Teaches,” Proceedings of the Russellian Society, University of Sydney, 13: 29–57. (Scholar)
• 1989a, “Academic Appointments: Why Ignore the Advantage of Being Right?,” in Ormond Papers, Ormond College, University of Melbourne. Reprinted in Lewis 2000a, pp. 187–200. (Scholar)
• 1989b, “Dispositional Theories of Value,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63: 113–137. (Scholar)
• 1989c, “Finite Counterforce,” in Henry Shue (ed.), Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 51–114. (Scholar)
• 1989d, “Mill and Milquetoast,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67: 152–171. (Scholar)
• 1989e, Review of John Bigelow, The Reality of Numbers, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67: 487–489.
• 1990, “Noneism or Allism?,” Mind, 99: 23–31. (Scholar)
• 1991, Parts of Classes, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
• 1992a, “Meaning Without Use: Reply to Hawthorne,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 106–110. (Scholar)
• 1992b, Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224.
• 1993a, “Counterpart Theory, Quantified Modal Logic, and Extra Argument Places,” Analysis, 53: 69–71. (Scholar)
• 1993b, “Evil for Freedom’s Sake?,” Philosophical Papers, 22: 149–172. (Scholar)
• 1993c, “Many, But Almost One,” in Keith Campbell, John Bacon, and Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 23–38. (Scholar)
• 1993d, “Mathematics is Megethology,” Philosophia Mathematica, 3: 3–23. (Scholar)
• 1994a, “Humean Supervenience Debugged,” Mind, 103: 473–490. (Scholar)
• 1994b, “Reduction of Mind,” in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 412–431. (Scholar)
• 1995a, “Ern Malley’s Namesake,” Quadrant, 39: 14–15. (Scholar)
• 1995b, “Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73: 140–144. (Scholar)
• 1996a, “Desire as Belief II,” Mind, 105: 303–313. (Scholar)
• 1996b, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 549–567. (Scholar)
• 1996c, “Maudlin and Modal Mystery,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 683–684. (Scholar)
• 1996d, “Illusory Innocence?” review of Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die, Eureka Street, 6, No. 10 December 1996: 35–36. (Scholar)
• 1996 (with Stephanie R. Lewis), Review of R. Casati and A. Varzi, Holes, Philosophical Review, 105: 77–79.
• 1997a, “Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?,” Philosophical Papers, 26: 203–209. (Scholar)
• 1997b, “Finkish Dispositions,” Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 143–58. (Scholar)
• 1998a, Papers in Philosophical Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• 1997c, “Naming the Colours,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. (Scholar)
• 1998b, “A World of Truthmakers?” review of D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, published under an incorrect title in Times Literary Supplement, 4950, 13 February 1998: 30. (Scholar)
• 1998 (with Rae Langton), “Defining ‘Intrinsic’,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 333–345. (Scholar)
• 1999a, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• 1999b, “Why Conditionalize?,” Written in 1972 as a course handout, but not published until 1999 in Lewis 1999a.
• 1999c, “Zimmerman and the Spinning Sphere,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 209–212. (Scholar)
• 2000a, Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• 2000b, “Causation as Influence” abridged version, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. (Scholar)
• 2001a, “Forget About the ‘Correspondence Theory of Truth’,” Analysis, 61: 275–280. (Scholar)
• 2001b, “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381–398. (Scholar)
• 2001c, “Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga,” Analysis, 61: 171–176. (Scholar)
• 2001d, “Truthmaking and Difference-Making,” Noûs, 35: 602-615. (Scholar)
• 2001 (with Rae Langton), “Marshall and Parsons on ‘Intrinsic’” Rae Langton, co-author, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 353–355. (Scholar)
• 2002a, “Tensing the Copula,” Mind, 111: 1–14. (Scholar)
• 2002b, “Tharp’s Third Theorem,” Analysis, 62: 95–97. (Scholar)
• 2003a, “Rights to Rights,” Theoria, 69: 160–165. (Scholar)
• 2003b, “Things qua Truthmakers,” in Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, London: Routledge, pp. 25–38. (Scholar)
• 2003 (with Gideon Rosen), “Postscript to ‘Things qua Truthmakers’: Negative Existentials,”, in Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, London: Routledge, pp. 39–42. (Scholar)
• 2004a, “Causation as Influence” unabridged version, in John Collins, Ned Hall, and L.A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 75–106. (Scholar)
• 2004b, “How Many Lives has Schrödinger’s Cat?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 3–22. (Scholar)
• 2004c, “Tensed Quantifiers,” in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–14. (Scholar)
• 2004d, “Void and Object,” in John Collins, Ned Hall, and L.A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 277–290. (Scholar)
• 2004e, “Letters to Priest and Beall,” in Graham Priest, J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 176–177. (Scholar)
• 2005, “Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism” in Mark Calderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 314–321. (Scholar)
• 2007, “Divine Evil” in Louise Anthony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 231–242. (Scholar)
• 2009, “Ramseyan Humility” in David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 203–222. (Scholar)
• 2015a, “Counterparts of States of Affairs” in Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis, New York: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 15-17. (Scholar)
• 2015b, “Reply to Dana Scott, “Is There Life on Other Possible Worlds”” in Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis, New York: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 18-21. (Scholar)
• 2020a, Philosophical Letters of David K. Lewis, volume 1: Causation, Modality, Ontology, edited by Helen Beebee and A. R. J. Fisher, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• 2020b, Philosophical Letters of David K. Lewis, volume 2: Mind, Language, Epistemology, edited by Helen Beebee and A. R. J. Fisher, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cited Secondary Literature

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• Armstrong, D. M., 1978, Universals and Scientific Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Bennett, Jonathan, 1984, “Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction” Philosophical Review, 93: 57–91. (Scholar)
• Bennett, Jonathan, 2003, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Braddon-Mitchell, David and Robert Nola, 1997, “Ramsification and Glymour’s Counterexample” Analysis, 57: 167–169. (Scholar)
• Cohen, Stewart, 1986, “Knowledge and Context”, The Journal of Philosophy, 83: 574–583. (Scholar)
• Davies, Martin, 1981, Meaning, Quantification, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical Logic, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Elga, Adam, 2000, “Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Analysis 60: 143–147. (Scholar)
• DeRose, Keith, 1995, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”, The Philosophical Review, 104(1), 1–52. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, “Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69: 383–396. (Scholar)
• Egan, Andy, 2007, “Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion,” Philosophical Studies, 133: 1–22. (Scholar)
• Fine, Kit, 1975, “Critical Notice of Counterfactuals,” Mind, 84: 451–458. (Scholar)
• Forrest, Peter, 1982, “Occam’s Razor and Possible Worlds” Monist, 65: 456–464. (Scholar)
• ––– and D. M. Armstrong, 1984, “An Argument Against David Lewis’ Theory of Possible Worlds,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62: 164–8. (Scholar)
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• Goodman, Nelson, 1955, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Hall, Ned, 1994, “Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance”, Mind 103: 505–518. (Scholar)
• Hawthorne, John, 1990, “A Note on Languages and Language,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68: 116–118. (Scholar)
• Hájek, Alan, 2008, “David Lewis,” in The New Dictionary of Scientific Biography, ed. Noretta Koertke, New York: Scribners. (Scholar)
• Jackson, Frank, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Janssen-Lauret, Frederique and Fraser MacBride, 2020, “Lewis’s Global Descriptivism and Reference Magnetism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98: 192–198. (Scholar)
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• Schaffer, Jonathan, “Trumping Preemption,” Journal of Philosophy, 97: 165–181. (Scholar)
• Schelling, Thomas, 1960, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Schwarz, Wolfgang, 2009, David Lewis: Metaphysik und Analyse, Paderborn: Mentis-Verlag. (Scholar)
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