Linked bibliography for the SEP article "David Lewis" by Brian Weatherson

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Primary Literature

  • 1966a, “An Argument for the Identity Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25. (Scholar)
  • 1966b, “Percepts and Color Mosaics in Visual Experience,” Philosophical Review, 75: 357–368. (Scholar)
  • 1966 (with Jane S. Richardson), “Scriven on Human Unpredictability,” Philosophical Studies, 17: 69–74. (Scholar)
  • 1968, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. (Scholar)
  • 1968 (with Wilfrid Hodges), “Finitude and Infinitude in the Atomic Calculus of Individuals,” Noûs, 2: 405–410. (Scholar)
  • 1969a, Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • 1969b, “Lucas against Mechanism,” Philosophy, 44: 231–233. (Scholar)
  • 1969c, “Policing the Aufbau,” Philosophical Studies, 20: 13–17. (Scholar)
  • 1969d, Review of Capitan and Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion, Journal of Philosophy, 66: 22–27.
  • 1970a, “Anselm and Actuality,” Noûs, 4: 175–188. (Scholar)
  • 1970b, “General Semantics,” Synthese, 22: 18–67. (Scholar)
  • 1970c, “How to Define Theoretical Terms,” Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. (Scholar)
  • 1970d, “Nominalistic Set Theory,” Noûs, 4: 225–240. (Scholar)
  • 1970 (with Stephanie R. Lewis), “Holes,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 48: 206–212. (Scholar)
  • 1971a, “Analog and Digital,” Noûs, 5: 321–327. (Scholar)
  • 1971b, “Completeness and Decidability of Three Logics of Counterfactual Conditionals,” Theoria, 37: 74–85. (Scholar)
  • 1971c, “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. (Scholar)
  • 1971d, “Immodest Inductive Methods,” Philosophy of Science, 38: 54–63. (Scholar)
  • 1972a, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–258. (Scholar)
  • 1972b, “Utilitarianism and Truthfulness,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 17–19. (Scholar)
  • 1973a, Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973, Reprinted with revisions, 1986. (Scholar)
  • 1973b, “Causation,” Journal of Philosophy, 70: 556–567. (Scholar)
  • 1973c, “Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2: 418–446. (Scholar)
  • 1973d, “Lingue e lingua,” Versus, 4: 2–21. (Scholar)
  • 1974a, “Tensions,” in Milton K. Munitz and Peter K. Unger (eds.), Semantics and Philosophy, New York: New York University Press, pp. 49–61. (Scholar)
  • 1974b, “Intensional Logics Without Iterative Axioms,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 3: 457–466. (Scholar)
  • 1974c, “Radical Interpretation,” Synthese, 23: 331–344. (Scholar)
  • 1974d, “Semantic Analyses for Dyadic Deontic Logic,” in Sören Stenlund (ed.), Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis: Essays Dedicated to Stig Kanger on His Fiftieth Birthday, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1–14. (Scholar)
  • 1974e, “Spielman and Lewis on Inductive Immodesty,” Philosophy of Science, 41: 84–85. (Scholar)
  • 1975a, “Adverbs of Quantification,” in Edward L. Keenan (ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–15. (Scholar)
  • 1975b, “Languages and Language,” in Keith Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume VII, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 3–35. (Scholar)
  • 1975 (with Stephanie R. Lewis), Review of Olson and Paul, Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia, Theoria, 41: 39–60.
  • 1976a, “Convention: Reply to Jamieson,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 6: 113–120. (Scholar)
  • 1976b, “Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities,” Philosophical Review, 85: 297–315. (Scholar)
  • 1976c, “Survival and Identity,” in Amélie O. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 17–40. (Scholar)
  • 1976d, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 13: 145–152. (Scholar)
  • 1977a, “Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics: A Rejoinder,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 6: 359–363. (Scholar)
  • 1978a, “Reply to McMichael,” Analysis, 38: 85–86. (Scholar)
  • 1978b, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 37–46. (Scholar)
  • 1979a, “A Problem about Permission,” in E. Saarinen et al. (eds.), Essays in Honour of Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 163–175. (Scholar)
  • 1979b, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,” Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. (Scholar)
  • 1979c, “Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow,” Noûs, 13: 455–476. (Scholar)
  • 1979d, “Lucas Against Mechanism II,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9: 373–376. (Scholar)
  • 1979e, “Prisoners' Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8: 235–240. (Scholar)
  • 1979f, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8: 339–359. (Scholar)
  • 1980a, “A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance,” in Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 263–293. (Scholar)
  • 1980b, “Index, Context, and Content,” in Stig Kanger and Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 79–100. (Scholar)
  • 1980c, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain,” in Ned Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 216–32. (Scholar)
  • 1980d, “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58: 239–249. (Scholar)
  • 1981a, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?,” Theoria, 47: 113–121. (Scholar)
  • 1981b, “Causal Decision Theory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59: 5–30. (Scholar)
  • 1981c, “Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics for Counterfactuals,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 10: 217–234. (Scholar)
  • 1981d, “What Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59: 283–289. (Scholar)
  • 1981e, “Why Ain'cha Rich?,” Noûs, 15: 377–380. (Scholar)
  • 1982a, “‘Whether’ Report,” in Tom Pauli (ed.), 320311: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Lennart Åqvist on his Fiftieth Birthday, Uppsala: University of Uppsala Press, pp. 194–206. (Scholar)
  • 1982b, “Censored Vision,” Written under the name “Bruce LeCatt,”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60: 158–162. (Scholar)
  • 1982c, “Logic for Equivocators,” Noûs, 16: 431–441. (Scholar)
  • 1983a, Philosophical Papers, Volume I, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 1983b, “Extrinsic Properties,” Philosophical Studies, 44: 197–200. (Scholar)
  • 1983c, “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation,” Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. (Scholar)
  • 1983d, “Levi Against U-Maximization,” Journal of Philosophy, 80: 531-534. (Scholar)
  • 1983e, “New Work For a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. (Scholar)
  • 1984a, “Devil's Bargains and the Real World,” in Douglas MacLean (ed.), The Security Gamble: Deterrence in the Nuclear Age, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld, pp. 141–154. (Scholar)
  • 1984b, “Putnam's Paradox,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62: 221–236. (Scholar)
  • 1986a, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
  • 1986b, Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 1986c, “A Comment on Armstrong and Forrest,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 92–93. (Scholar)
  • 1986d, “Against Structural Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. (Scholar)
  • 1986e, “Buy Like a MADman, Use Like a NUT” QQ 6: 5–8.
  • 1986f, “Causal Explanation” in Lewis 1986b, pp. 214–240. (Scholar)
  • 1986g, “Events” in Lewis 1986b, pp. 241–269. (Scholar)
  • 1986h, “Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities II,” Philosophical Review, 95: 581–589. (Scholar)
  • 1987, “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance,” Proceedings of the Russellian Society, University of Sydney, 12: 81–97. (Scholar)
  • 1988a, “Ayer's First Empiricist Criterion of Meaning: Why Does it Fail?,” Analysis, 48: 1–3. (Scholar)
  • 1988b, “Desire as Belief,” Mind, 97: 323–332. (Scholar)
  • 1988c, “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe,” Analysis, 48: 65–72. (Scholar)
  • 1988d, “Relevant Implication,” Theoria, 54: 162–174. (Scholar)
  • 1988e, “Statements Partly About Observation,” Philosophical Papers, 17: 1–31. (Scholar)
  • 1988f, “The Trap's Dilemma,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66: 220–223. (Scholar)
  • 1988g, “Vague identity: Evans misunderstood,” Analysis, 48: 128–130. (Scholar)
  • 1988h, “What Experience Teaches,” Proceedings of the Russellian Society, University of Sydney, 13: 29–57. (Scholar)
  • 1989a, “Academic Appointments: Why Ignore the Advantage of Being Right?,” in Ormond Papers, Ormond College, University of Melbourne. Reprinted in Lewis 2000a, pp. 187–200. (Scholar)
  • 1989b, “Dispositional Theories of Value,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63: 113–137. (Scholar)
  • 1989c, “Finite Counterforce,” in Henry Shue (ed.), Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 51–114. (Scholar)
  • 1989d, “Mill and Milquetoast,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67: 152–171. (Scholar)
  • 1989e, Review of John Bigelow, The Reality of Numbers, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67: 487–489.
  • 1990, “Noneism or Allism?,” Mind, 99: 23–31. (Scholar)
  • 1991, Parts of Classes, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
  • 1992a, “Meaning Without Use: Reply to Hawthorne,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 106–110. (Scholar)
  • 1992b, Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224.
  • 1993a, “Counterpart Theory, Quantified Modal Logic, and Extra Argument Places,” Analysis, 53: 69–71. (Scholar)
  • 1993b, “Evil for Freedom's Sake?,” Philosophical Papers, 22: 149–172. (Scholar)
  • 1993c, “Many, But Almost One,” in Keith Campbell, John Bacon, and Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 23–38. (Scholar)
  • 1993d, “Mathematics is Megethology,” Philosophia Mathematica, 3: 3–23. (Scholar)
  • 1994a, “Humean Supervenience Debugged,” Mind, 103: 473–490. (Scholar)
  • 1994b, “Reduction of Mind,” in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 412–431. (Scholar)
  • 1995a, “Ern Malley's Namesake,” Quadrant, 39: 14–15. (Scholar)
  • 1995b, “Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73: 140–144. (Scholar)
  • 1996a, “Desire as Belief II,” Mind, 105: 303–313. (Scholar)
  • 1996b, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 549–567. (Scholar)
  • 1996c, “Maudlin and Modal Mystery,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 683–684. (Scholar)
  • 1996d, “Illusory Innocence?” review of Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die, Eureka Street, 6, No. 10 December 1996: 35–36. (Scholar)
  • 1996 (with Stephanie R. Lewis), Review of R. Casati and A. Varzi, Holes, Philosophical Review, 105: 77–79.
  • 1997a, “Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?,” Philosophical Papers, 26: 203–209. (Scholar)
  • 1997b, “Finkish Dispositions,” Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 143–58. (Scholar)
  • 1998a, Papers in Philosophical Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 1997c, “Naming the Colours,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. (Scholar)
  • 1998b, “A World of Truthmakers?” review of D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, published under an incorrect title in Times Literary Supplement, 4950, 13 February 1998: 30. (Scholar)
  • 1998 (with Rae Langton), “Defining ‘Intrinsic’,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 333–345. (Scholar)
  • 1999a, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 1999b, “Why Conditionalize?,” Written in 1972 as a course handout, but not published until 1999 in Lewis 1999a.
  • 1999c, “Zimmerman and the Spinning Sphere,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 209–212. (Scholar)
  • 2000a, Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 2000b, “Causation as Influence” abridged version, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. (Scholar)
  • 2001a, “Forget About the ‘Correspondence Theory of Truth’,” Analysis, 61: 275–280. (Scholar)
  • 2001b, “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381–398. (Scholar)
  • 2001c, “Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga,” Analysis, 61: 171–176. (Scholar)
  • 2001d, “Truthmaking and Difference-Making,” Noûs, 35: 602-615. (Scholar)
  • 2001 (with Rae Langton), “Marshall and Parsons on ‘Intrinsic’” Rae Langton, co-author, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 353–355. (Scholar)
  • 2002a, “Tensing the Copula,” Mind, 111: 1–14. (Scholar)
  • 2002b, “Tharp's Third Theorem,” Analysis, 62: 95–97. (Scholar)
  • 2003a, “Rights to Rights,” Theoria, 69: 160–165. (Scholar)
  • 2003b, “Things qua Truthmakers,” in Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, London: Routledge, pp. 25–38. (Scholar)
  • 2003 (with Gideon Rosen), “Postscript to ‘Things qua Truthmakers’: Negative Existentials,”, in Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, London: Routledge, pp. 39–42. (Scholar)
  • 2004a, “Causation as Influence” unabridged version, in John Collins, Ned Hall, and L.A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 75–106. (Scholar)
  • 2004b, “How Many Lives has Schrödinger's Cat?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 3–22. (Scholar)
  • 2004c, “Tensed Quantifiers,” in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–14. (Scholar)
  • 2004d, “Void and Object,” in John Collins, Ned Hall, and L.A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 277–290. (Scholar)
  • 2004e, “Letters to Priest and Beall,” in Graham Priest, J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 176–177. (Scholar)
  • 2005, “Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism” in Mark Calderon (ed.), Moral Fictionalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 314–321. (Scholar)
  • 2007, “Divine Evil” in Louise Anthony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 231–242. (Scholar)
  • 2009, “Ramseyan Humility” in David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 203–222. (Scholar)

Cited Secondary Literature

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