Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Causal Decision Theory" by Paul Weirich
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- Ahmed, Arif, 2012, “Push the Button”, Philosophy of Science, 79: 386–395. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample”, Philosophical Review, 122: 289–306. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014a, Evidence, Decision and Causality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014b, “Dicing with Death,” Analysis 74: 587–592. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 2018, Newcomb’s
Problem, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Armendt, Brad, 1986, “A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory”, Topoi, 5(1): 3–19. doi:10.1007/bf00137825 (Scholar)
- –––, 1988a, “Conditional Preference and Causal Expected Utility”, in William Harper and Brian Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, Vol. II, pp. 3–24, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988b, “Impartiality and Causal Decision Theory”, in Arthur Fine and Jarrett Leplin (eds.), PSA: Proceedings of Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (Volume I), pp. 326–336, East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, “Causal Decision Theory and Decision Instability,” Journal of Philosophy, 116: 263–277. (Scholar)
- Arntzenius, Frank, 2008, “No Regrets, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory”, Erkenntnis, 68(2): 277–297. doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9084-8 (Scholar)
- Bacon, Andrew, 2022, “Actual Value in Decision Theory”, Analysis, 82(4): 617–629. (Scholar)
- Bales, Adam, 2016, “The Pauper’s Problem: Chance, Foreknowledge and Causal Decision Theory”, Philosophical Studies, 173(6): 1497–1516. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0560-8 (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Richness and Rationality: Causal Decision Theory and the WAR Argument,” Synthese, 195: 259–267. (Scholar)
- –––, 2020, “Intentions and Instability: A Defense of Causal Decision Theory,” Philosophical Studies, 177: 793–804. (Scholar)
- Barnett, David, 2022, “Graded Ratifiability”, Journal of Philosophy, 119(2): 57–88. (Scholar)
- Borchert, Rhys and Jack Spencer, 2024, “Newcomb,
frustrated”, Analysis, 84(3): 449–456
doi:10.1093/analys/anad084 (Scholar)
- Cartwright, Nancy, 1979, “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies”, Noûs, 13(4): 419–437. doi:10.2307/2215337 (Scholar)
- Easwaran, Kenny, 2021, “A Classification of Newcomb Problems
and Decision Theories,” Synthese, 198
(Supplement 27): S6415–S6434. (Scholar)
- Eells, Ellery, 1981, “Causality, Utility, and Decision”, Synthese, 48(2): 295–329. doi:10.1007/bf01063891 (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, Rational Decision and Causality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984a, “Newcomb’s Many Solutions”, Theory and Decision, 16(1): 59–105. doi:10.1007/bf00141675 (Scholar)
- –––, 1984b, “Metatickles and the Dynamics of Deliberation”, Theory and Decision, 17(1): 71–95. doi:10.1007/bf00140057 (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Review: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, by James Joyce”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51(4): 893–900. doi:10.1093/bjps/51.4.893 (Scholar)
- Egan, Andy, 2007, “Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory”, Philosophical Review, 116(1): 93–114. 10.1215/00318108-2006-023 (Scholar)
- Elga, Adam, 2022, “Confessions of a Causal Decision Theorist”, Analysis, 82(2): 203–213. (Scholar)
- Fusco, Melissa, 2023, “Absolution of a Causal Decision
Theorist”, Noûs, first online 23 June 2023.
doi:10.1111/nous.12459 (Scholar)
- Gallow, J. Dimitri, 2020, “The Causal Decision
Theorist’s Guide to Managing the Improvement News”,
Journal of Philosophy, 117(3): 117–149. (Scholar)
- –––, 2024a, “Counterfactual Decision Theory is Causal Decision Theory,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 105: 115–156. (Scholar)
- –––, 2024b, “Decision and Foreknowledge”, Noûs, 58: 77–105. (Scholar)
- –––, 2024c, “The Sure Thing Principle Leads to Instability”, Philosophical Quarterly, first online 10 September 2024. doi:10.1093/pq/pqae114 (Scholar)
- Gibbard, Allan and William Harper, 1978 [1981],
“Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility”, in
Clifford Alan Hooker, James L. Leach, and Edward Francis McClennan
(eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory
(University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 13a),
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 125–162,
doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9789-9_5; reprinted in Harper, Stalnaker, and
Pearce 1981: 153–190. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_8 (Scholar)
- Hájek, Alan and Harris Nover, 2006, “Perplexing Expectations”, Mind, 115(459): 703–720. doi:10.1093/mind/fzl703 (Scholar)
- Hare, Caspar and Brian Hedden, 2016, “Self-Reinforcing and
Self-Frustrating Decisions,” Noûs, 50:
604–628. (Scholar)
- Harper, William, 1986, “Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory”, Erkenntnis, 24(1): 25–36. doi:10.1007/bf00183199 (Scholar)
- Harper, William, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce (eds.), 1981,Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time (University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 15), Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
- Hedden, Brian, 2012, “Options and the Subjective Ought,” Philosophical Studies, 158(2): 343–360. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9880-0 (Scholar)
- –––, 2023, “Counterfactual Decision Theory”, Mind, 132: 730–761. (Scholar)
- Hitchcock, Christopher Read, 1996, “Causal Decision Theory and Decision-Theoretic Causation”, Noûs, 30(4): 508–526. doi:10.2307/2216116 (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “What is the
‘Cause’ in Causal Decision
Theory?”, Erkenntnis, 78: 129–146. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Conditioning, Intervening, and Decision”, Synthese, 193(4): 1157–1176. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0710-8 (Scholar)
- Horgan, Terry, 1981 [1985], “Counterfactuals and
Newcomb’s Problem”, The Journal of Philosophy,
78(6): 331–356, doi:10.2307/2026128; reprinted in Richmond
Campbell and Lanning Sowden (eds.), 1985, Paradoxes of Rationality
and Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s
Problem, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, pp.
159–182. (Scholar)
- Horwich, Paul, 1987, Asymmetries in Time, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Huttegger, Simon, 2023, “Reconciling Evidential and Causal Decision Theory”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 23(20). doi:10.3998/phimp.931 (Scholar)
- Jeffrey, Richard C., 1981, “The Logic of Decision Defended”, Synthese, 48(3): 473–492. (Scholar)
- –––, [1965] 1983, The Logic of Decision, second edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [The 1990 paperback edition includes some revisions.] (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Joyce, James M., 1999, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision”, Philosophy of Science, 67: S1–S13. doi:10.1086/392804 (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One’s Own Actions”, Philosophical Studies, 110(1): 69–102. doi:10.1023/a:1019839429878 (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Are Newcomb Problems Really
Decisions?” Synthese, 156(3): 537–562.
doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9137-6 (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory”, Synthese, 187(1): 123–145. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0022-6 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Review of Evidence,
Decision and Causality, by Arif Ahmed”, Journal of
Philosophy, 113: 224–232. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Deliberation and Stability in
Newcomb Problems and Pseudo-Newcomb Problems,” in Arif Ahmed
(ed.), Newcomb’s Problem, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 138–159. (Scholar)
- Joyce, James and Allan Gibbard, 2016, “Causal Decision
Theory”, in Horacio Arlø-Costa, Vincent F. Hendricks, and
Johan van Benthem (eds.), Readings in Formal Epistemology,
Berlin: Springer, pp. 457–491. (Scholar)
- Kment, Boris, 2023, “Decision, Causality, and Predetermination”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 107(3): 638–670. doi:10.1111/phpr.12935 (Scholar)
- Krantz, David, R., Duncan Luce, Patrick Suppes, and Amos Tversky,
1971, The Foundations of Measurement (Volume 1: Additive
and Polynomial Representations), New York: Academic Press. (Scholar)
- Kusser, Anna and Wolfgang Spohn, 1992, “The Utility of Pleasure is a Pain for Decision Theory”, Journal of Philosophy, 89(1): 10–29. (Scholar)
- Lauro, Greg and Simon Huttegger, 2022, “Structural Stability
in Causal Decision Theory”, Erkenntnis, 87:
603–621. (Scholar)
- Levi, Isaac, 2000, “Review Essay on The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, by James Joyce”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(7): 387–402. doi:10.2307/2678411 (Scholar)
- Levinstein, Benjamin and Nate Soares, 2020, “Cheating Death in Damascus”, Journal of Philosophy, 117: 237–266. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1973, Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, “Probabilities of Conditionals
and Conditional Probabilities”, Philosophical Review,
85(3): 297–315. doi:10.2307/2184045 (Scholar)
- –––, 1979, “Prisoner’s Dilemma is a
Newcomb Problem”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8(3):
235–240. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, “Causal Decision Theory”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59(1): 5–30. doi:10.1080/00048408112340011 (Scholar)
- McNamara, Calum, 2023, “Causal Decision Theory, Context, and
Determinism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 109: 226–260. (Scholar)
- Meek, Christopher and Clark Glymour, 1994, “Conditioning and Intervening”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45(4): 1001–1021. doi:10.1093/bjps/45.4.1001 (Scholar)
- Nielsen, Michael, 2024, “Only CDT Values Knowledge”, Analysis, 84(1): 67–82. (Scholar)
- Nozick, Robert, 1969, “Newcomb’s Problem and Two
Principles of Choice”, in Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in
Honor of Carl G. Hempel, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp.
114–146. (Scholar)
- Papineau, David, 2001, “Evidentialism Reconsidered”, Noûs, 35(2): 239–259. (Scholar)
- Pearl, Judea, 2000, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; second edition, 2009. (Scholar)
- Pollock, John, 2006, Thinking about Acting: Logical Foundations for Rational Decision Making, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “A Resource-Bounded Agent Addresses the Newcomb Problem”, Synthese, 176(1): 57–82. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9484-1 (Scholar)
- Price, Huw, 1986, “Against Causal Decision Theory”, Synthese, 67(2): 195–212. doi:10.1007/bf00540068 (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Causation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence”, Philosophical Review, 121(4): 483–538. doi:10.1215/00318108-1630912 (Scholar)
- Richter, Reed, 1984, “Rationality Revisited”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62(4): 392–403. doi:10.1080/00048408412341601 (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Further Comments on Decision Instability”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(3): 345–349. doi:10.1080/00048408612342571 (Scholar)
- Sandgren, Alexander and Timothy Luke Williamson, 2021, “Determinism, Counterfactuals, and Decision”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(2): 286–302. (Scholar)
- Savage, Leonard, 1954, The Foundations of Statistics, New York: Wiley. (Scholar)
- Skyrms, Brian, 1980, Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, “Causal Decision Theory”, Journal of Philosophy, 79(11): 695–711. doi:10.2307/2026547 (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Sobel, Jordan Howard, 1994, Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Solomon, Toby Charles Penhallurick, 2021, “Causal Decision
Theory’s Predetermination Problem”, Synthese,
198: 5623–5654. (Scholar)
- Spencer, Jack, 2021, “An Argument Against Causal Decision Theory”, Analysis, 81(1): 52–61. (Scholar)
- –––, 2023, “Can It Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 101(1): 128–139. (Scholar)
- Spencer, Jack and Ian Wells, 2019, “Why Take Both Boxes?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99: 27–48. (Scholar)
- Spirtes, Peter, Clark Glymour, and Richard Scheines, 2000,
Causation, Prediction, and Search, second edition, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Spohn, Wolfgang, 2012, “Reversing 30 Years of Discussion: Why Causal Decision Theorists Should One-Box”, Synthese, 187(1): 95–122. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0023-5 (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert C., 1968, “A Theory of Conditionals”, in Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosphical Quarterly Monographs: Volume 2), Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112; reprinted in in Harper, Stalnaker, and Pearce 1981: 41–56. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_2 (Scholar)
- –––, 1972 [1981], “Letter to David
Lewis”, May 21; printed in Harper, Stalnaker, and Pearce 1981:
151–152. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_7 (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Game Theory and Decision
Theory (Causal and Evidential),” in Arif Ahmed (ed.),
Newcomb’s Problem, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 180–200. (Scholar)
- Titelbaum, Michael, 2022, The Fundamentals of Bayesian
Epistemology, Volume 1: Introducing Credences, and
Volume 2: Arguments, Challenges, Alternatives, Oxford: Oxford
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- Wedgwood, Ralph, 2013, “Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem”, Synthese, 190(14): 2643–2675. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9900-1 (Scholar)
- Weirich, Paul, 1980, “Conditional Utility and Its Place in Decision Theory”, Journal of Philosophy, 77(11): 702–715. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, “Decision Instability”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63(4): 465–472. doi:10.1080/00048408512342061 (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Decision Space: Multidimensional Utility Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, Realistic Decision Theory: Rules for Nonideal Agents in Nonideal Circumstances, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, Models of Decision-Making: Simplifying Choices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2007, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy Luke, 2021, “Causal Decision Theory Is
Safe from Psychopaths”, Erkenntnis, 86:
665–685. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy Luke and Alexander Sandgren, 2023, “Law-Abiding Causal Decision Theory”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 74(4): 899–920. (Scholar)