Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Decision Theory" by Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson
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- Gärdenfors, Peter and Nils-Eric Sahlin, 1982, “Unreliability Probabilities, Risk Taking, and Decision Making”, reprinted in P. Gärdenfors and N.-E. Sahlin (eds.), 1988, Decision, Probability and Utility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 313–334. (Scholar)
- Gaifman, Haim and Yang Liu, 2018, “A Simpler and more Realistic Subjective Decision Theory”, Synthese, 195: 4205–4241. (Scholar)
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- Gustafsson, Johan E., 2010, “A Money-Pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences”, Dialectica, 64: 251–257. (Scholar)
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- Hájek, Alan and Philip Pettit, 2004, “Desire Beyond Belief”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 77–92. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1999, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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- Kadane, Joseph B., Mark J. Schervish, and Teddy Seidenfeld, 2008,
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