Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Disagreement" by Bryan Frances and Jonathan Matheson

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Adams, Zed, 2013, “The Fragility of Moral Disagreement,” in Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge, pp. 131–49. (Scholar)
Anderson, Elizabeth, 2006, “The Epistemology of Democracy,” Episteme 3: 8–22. (Scholar)
Arsenault, Michael and Zachary C. Irving, 2012, “Aha! Trick Questions, Independence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3): 185–194. (Scholar)
Aumann, Robert J., 1976, “Agreeing to Disagree,” The Annals of Statistics 4: 1236–1239. (Scholar)
Baghramian, Maria, Carter, J. Adam, and Rowland, Richard (eds.), forthcoming, Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Ballantyne, Nathan, 2013a, “The Problem of Historical Variability,” in Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Counterfactual Philosophers,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2): 368–387. (Scholar)
, 2018, “Is Epistemica Permissivism Intuitive?” American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4): 365–378. (Scholar)
Ballantyne, Nathan, and E. J. Coffman, 2011, “Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality,” Philosophers Imprint 11 (18): 1–13. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Conciliationism and Uniqueness,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4): 657–670. (Scholar)
Barnett, Zach, 2019, “Philosophy without Belief,” Mind 128 (509): 109–138. (Scholar)
Barnett, Zach and Han Li, 2016, “Conciliationism and Merely Possible Disagreement,” Synthese 193 (9): 2973–2985. (Scholar)
Beebee, Helen, 2018, “Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy,” The Aristotelian Society CXVIII: 1–24. (Scholar)
Békefi, Bálint, 2023, “Self-Favoring Theories and the Bias Argument,” Logos and Episteme 14 (2): 199–213. (Scholar)
Benjamin, Sherman, 2015, “Questionable Peers and Spinelessness,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4): 425–444. (Scholar)
Benton, Matthew, 2021, “Disagreement and Religion,” in M. Benton and J. Kvanvig (eds.) Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–40. (Scholar)
Benton, Matthew and Kvanvig, Jonathan (eds.), 2021, Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bergmann, Michael, 2009, “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 6 (3): 336–353. (Scholar)
Bernáth, László and Tözsér, János, 2021, “The Biased Nature of Philosophical Beliefs in the Light of Peer Disagreement,” Metaphilosophy 52 (3–4): 363–378. (Scholar)
Besong, Brian, 2014, “Moral Intuitionism and Disagreement,” Synthese 191 (12): 2767–2789. (Scholar)
Blessenohl, Simon, 2015, “Self-Exempting Conciliationism is Arbitrary,” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29 (3): 1–22. (Scholar)
Bogardus, Tomas, 2009, “A Vindication of the Equal Weight View,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 6 (3): 324–335. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Foley’s Self-Trust and Religious Disagreement,” Logos and Episteme 4 (2): 217–226. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Disagreeing with the (Religious) Skeptic,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1): 5–17. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument,” Ethics 126 (3): 636–661. (Scholar)
Boyce, Kenneth and Allan Hazlett, 2014, “Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox,” Ratio 27 (3): 29–41. (Scholar)
Brauer, Ethan, 2023, “Disagreement, the Independence Thesis, and the Value of Repeated Reasoning,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104(3): 494–510. (Scholar)
Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando and Simion, Mona, 2021, “Disagreement and Epistemic Improvement,” Synthese 199 (5–6): 14641–14665. (Scholar)
Buchak, Lara, 2021, “A Faithful Response to Disagreement,” The Philosophical Review 130 (2): 191–226 (Scholar)
Bueno, Otávio, 2013, “Disagreeing with the Pyrrhonist?” in Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge, 131–49. (Scholar)
Carey, Brandon, 2011, “Possible Disagreements and Defeat,” Philosophical Studies 155 (3): 371–381. (Scholar)
Carey, Brandon and Jonathan Matheson, 2013, “How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View?” in Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge, pp. 131–49. (Scholar)
Carter, J. Adam, 2013, “Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision,” Erkenntnis 1 (S1): 1–18. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Group Peer Disagreement,” Ratio 27 (3): 11–28. (Scholar)
, 2018, “On behalf of controversial view agnosticism,” European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4): 1358–1370. (Scholar)
Choo, Frederick, 2021, “The Epistemic Significance of Religious Disagreements: Cases of Unconfirmed Superiority Disagreements,” Topoi 40 (5): 1139–1147. (Scholar)
Christensen, David, 2007, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 116: 187–218. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy,” Philosophy Compass 4 (5): 756–767. (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, “Higher-Order Evidence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 185–215. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Rational Reflection,” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 121–140. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism,” Philosophers Imprint 11 (6): 1–22. (Scholar)
–––, 2016a, “Disagreement, Drugs, Etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia,” Episteme 13 (4): 397–422. (Scholar)
–––, 2016b, “Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity,” Noûs 50 (3): 584–603. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Formulating Independence,” in M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13–34. (Scholar)
Christensen, David and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), 2013, The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Coady, David, 2006, “When experts disagree,”Episteme 3 (1–2): 68–79. (Scholar)
Coliva, Annalisa, and Doulas, Louis, forthcominga, “Philosophical (and Scientific) Progress: A Hinge Account,” in S. Goldberg and M. Walker (eds.) Attitude in Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, forthcomingb, “Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement,” in M. Baghramian, J.A. Carter, and R. Rowland (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Comesana, Juan, 2012, “Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 49 (3): 237–252. (Scholar)
Conee, Earl, 1987, “Evident, but Rationally Unacceptable,” Australian Journal of Philosophy 65: 316–326. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Peerage,” Episteme 6 (3): 313–323. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Rational Disagreement Defended,” in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Cruz, H. D. and Smedt, J. D., 2013, “The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice. The case of Homo Floresiensis,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (2): 169–177. (Scholar)
Dang, Haixin and Bright, Liam Kofi, 2021, “Scientific Conclusions need not be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors,” Synthese 199: 8187–8203. (Scholar)
de Ridder, Jeroen, 2021, “Deep Disagreement and Belief Polarization,” in E. Edenberg and M. Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press, 225–243. (Scholar)
De Cruz, Helen, 2017, “Religious Disagreement: An Empirical Study Among Academic Philosophers,” Episteme 14: 71–87. doi:10.1017/epi.2015.50 (Scholar)
De Cruz, Helen and Johan De Smedt, 2013, “The Value of Epistemic Disagreement in Scientific Practice. The Case of Homo Floresiensis,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44 (2): 169–177. (Scholar)
DePaul, Michael, 2013, “Agent Centeredness, Agent Neutrality, Disagreement, and Truth Conduciveness,” in Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Decker, Jason, 2012, “Disagreement, Evidence, and Agnosticism,” Synthese 187 (2): 753–783. (Scholar)
Dellsén, Finnur, 2018, “When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1): 142–156. doi:10.1080/00048402.2017.1298636 (Scholar)
Dellsén, Finnur, Lawler, Insa, and Norton, James, 2023, “Would Disagreement Undermine Progress?” Journal of Philosophy 120 (3): 139–172. (Scholar)
Dixon, Jonathan, forthcoming, “No Hope for Conciliationism,” Synthese. (Scholar)
Dogramaci, Sinan and Sophie Horowitz, 2016, “An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support,” Philosophical Issues 26 (1): 130–147. (Scholar)
Dougherty, Trent, 2013, “Dealing with Disagreement from the First-Person Perspective: A Probabilistic Proposal,” in D. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge, pp. 218–238. (Scholar)
Elga, Adam, 2007, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41: 478–502. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “How to Disagree About How to Disagree,” in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Elgin, Catherine, 2010, “Persistent Disagreement,” in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Reasonable disagreement,” in C.R. Johnson (ed.), Voicing Dissent. New York USA: Routledge, pp. 10–21. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “Disagreement in philosophy,” Synthese 200 (20): 1–16. (Scholar)
Enoch, David, 2010, “Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement,” Mind 119: 953–997. (Scholar)
Everett, Theodore J., 2015, “Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2): 273–286. (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard, 2003, “Plantinga on Exclusivism,” Faith and Philosophy 20: 85–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Having Evidence,” in Conee and Feldman (eds.), Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 219–242. (Scholar)
–––, 2005a, “Respecting the Evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives 19: 95–119. (Scholar)
, 2005b, “Deep Disagreement, Rational Resolution, and Critical Thinking,” Informal Logic 25 (1): 12–23. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” Episteme 6 (3): 294–312. (Scholar)
–––, 2006a, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement,” in Steve Hetherington (ed.), Epistemic Futures, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 216–236. (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in L. Antony (ed.), Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life, New York: Oxford University Press, 194–214. (Scholar)
–––, 2006c, “Clifford’s Principle and James’ Options,” Social Epistemology 20: 19–33. (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard, and Ted Warfield (eds.), 2010, Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Fleisher, Will, 2018, “Rational Endorsement,” Philosophical Studies 175 (10): 2649–2675. (Scholar)
, 2021a, “Endorsement and Assertion,”Noûs 55 (2): 363–384. (Scholar)
, 2021b, “How to Endorse Conciliationism,” Synthese 198 (10): 9913–9939.
Fogelin, Robert, 2005, “The Logic of Deep Disagreement,” Informal Logic 25 (1): 3–11. (Scholar)
Foley, Richard, 2001, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Frances, Bryan, 2005, “When a Skeptical Hypothesis is Live,” Noûs 39: 559–95. (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, “Disagreement,” in Duncan Pritchard and Sven Bernecker (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, New York: Routledge Press, pp. 68–74. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “The Reflective Epistemic Renegade,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81: 419–463. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Philosophical Renegades,” in Jennifer Lackey and David Christensen (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 121–166. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Disagreement, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Scepticism and Disagreement,” in Diego Machuca and Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, New York: Bloomsbury. (Scholar)
Fritz, James, 2018, “Conciliationism and Moral Spinelessness,” Episteme 15 (1): 101–118. (Scholar)
Fritz, James and McPherson, Tristram, 2019, “Moral Steadfastness and Meta-Ethics,” American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1): 43–56. (Scholar)
Fumerton, Richard, 2010, “You Can’t Trust a Philosopher,” in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gardiner, Georgi, 2014, “The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Disagreement,” Episteme 11 (1): 83–95. (Scholar)
Gausselin, Kevin, forthcoming, “Conciliationism and the Peer-Undermining Problem,” Synthese. (Scholar)
Gibbons, Adam, 2021, “Political Disagreement and Minimal Epistocracy,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (2). (Scholar)
Goldberg, Sanford, 2009, “Reliabilism in Philosophy,” Philosophical Studies 124: 105–17. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Inclusiveness in the Face of Anticipated Disagreement,” Synthese 190 (7): 1189–1207. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement,” in Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge, pp. 131–49. (Scholar)
Goldberg, Sanford and Walker, Mark (eds.), forthcoming, Attitudes in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin, 2001, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63: 85–110. (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin, 2010, “Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement,” in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gonzalez de Prado, Javier, 2020, “Disposessing Defeat,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2): 323–340. (Scholar)
Graves, Shawn, 2013, “The Self-Undermining Objection in the Epistemology of Disagreement,” Faith and Philosophy 30 (1): 93–106. (Scholar)
Greco, Daniel and Brian Hedden, 2016, “Uniqueness and Metaepistemology,” Journal of Philosophy 113 (8): 365–395. (Scholar)
Grundmann, Thomas, 2013, “Doubts about Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge from Disagreement,” in T. Henning and D. Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. New York: Routledge, pp. 72–98. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view,” Philosophical Issues 29 (1): 129–142. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism Cannot Escape the Problem of Self-Defeat,” Episteme 18 (2): 224–241. (Scholar)
Gutting, Gary, 1982, Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
Hales, Steven, 2014, “Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to Disagreements,” Philosophy 89 (1): 63–82. (Scholar)
Hardwig, John, 1985, “Epistemic Dependence,” Journal of Philosophy 82: 335–49. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 88: 693–708. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John and Amia Srinivasan, 2013, “Disagreement Without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts,” in David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 9–30. (Scholar)
Hazlett, Alan, 2012, “Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility,” Episteme 9: 205–23. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement,” Episteme 11 (1): 1–25. (Scholar)
Henderson, David, Terrance Horgan, Matjaz Potrc, and Hannah Tierney, 2017, “Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 94: 194–225. (Scholar)
Heesen, Remco and Pieter van der Kolk, 2016, “A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement,” Erkenntnis 81 (6): 1345–1368. (Scholar)
Hirvelä, Jaakko, 2017, “Is it Safe to Disagree?” Ratio 30 (3): 305–321. (Scholar)
Horowitz, Sophie, 2022, “Higher-Order Evidence,”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman(eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/higher-order-evidence/>. (Scholar)
Huemer, Michael, 2011, “Epistemological Egoism and Agent-Centered Norms,” in T. Dougherty (ed.) Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 17–33. (Scholar)
Jackson, Liz, 2021, “A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism,” Episteme 18 (2): 313–327. (Scholar)
Jehle, David and Brandon Fitelson, 2009, “What is the ‘Equal Weight View’?” Episteme 6: 280–293. (Scholar)
Johnson, Drew, 2022, “Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility,” Episteme 19 (3): 353–372. (Scholar)
Jones, Nicholas, 2012, “An Arrovian Impossibility Theorem for the Epistemology of Disagreement,” Logos and Episteme 3 (1): 97–115. (Scholar)
Kappel, Klemens, 2012, “The Problem of Deep Disagreement,”Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2): 7–25. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Higher-Order Evidence and Deep Disagreement,” Topoi 40: 1039–1050. (Scholar)
Kelly, Thomas, 2005, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence,” in R. Feldman and T. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 183–217. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Evidence Can be Permissive,” in M. Steup, J. Turri, and E. Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, New York: Blackwell, pp. 298–311. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment,” in David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 31–53. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Believers as Thermometers,” in J. Matheson and R. Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 301–314. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming a, “Bias and Disagreement,” in J. Lackey and A. McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming b, “Peer Disagreement, Steadfastness, and Conciliationism,” in M. Baghramian, J.A. Carter, and R. Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
King, Nathan, 2011, “Disagreement: What’s the Problem? Or A Good Peer is Hard to Find,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2): 249–272. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Disagreement: The Skeptical Arguments from Peerhood and Symmetry,” in Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge, 193–217. (Scholar)
Knocks, Aleks, 2022, “Conciliatory Views, Higher-Order Disagreements, and Defeasible Logic,” Synthese 200 (2). (Scholar)
–––, 2023, “Conciliatory Reasoning, Self-Defeat, and Abstract Argumentation,” The Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (3): 740–787. (Scholar)
Kopec, Matthew, 2015, “A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis,” Philosophia 43 (2): 403–409. (Scholar)
Kopec, Matthew and Michael G. Titelbaum, 2016, “The Uniqueness Thesis,” Philosophy Compass 11 (4): 189–200. (Scholar)
Kornblith, Hilary, 2010, “Belief in the Face of Controversy,” in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?” in Diego Machuca (ed.) Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge, pp. 131–49. (Scholar)
Lackey, Jennifer, 2010a, “What Should We Do When We Disagree?” in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “A Justificationalist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “What’s the Rational Response to Everyday Disagreements?” Philosophers’ Magazine 59: 101–6. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter,” in David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243–68. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously,” in Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 299–316. (Scholar)
Lam, Barry, 2011, “On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement,” Philosophical Review 120 (2): 207–245. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Calibrated Probabilities and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” Synthese 190 (6): 1079–1098. (Scholar)
Lammenranta, Markus, 2011, “Skepticism and Disagreement,” in Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, Dordrect: Springer, pp. 203–216. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “The Role of Disagreement in Pyrrhonian and Cartesian Skepticism,” in Diego Machuca (ed.), Skepticism and Disagreement, New York: Routledge, pp. 46–65. (Scholar)
Lampert, Fabio and John Biro, 2017, “What is Evidence of Evidence Evidence of?” Logos and Episteme 2: 195–206. (Scholar)
Lane, Melissa, 2014, “When the Experts are Uncertain: Scientific Knowledge and the Ethics of Democratic Judgment,” Episteme 11 (1): 97–118. (Scholar)
Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria, 2013, “Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation,” Noûs 47 (4): 767–794. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2): 314–345. (Scholar)
Lee, Matthew Brandon, 2013, “Conciliationism Without Uniqueness,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 88: 161–188. (Scholar)
Levinstein, Benjamin Anders, 2015, “With All Due Respect: The Macro-Epistemology of Disagreement,” Philosophers Imprint 15 (13): 1–20. (Scholar)
–––, 2017,“Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2): 1–29. (Scholar)
Levy, Neil, 2020, “The Surprising Truth about Disagreement,” Acta Analytica 36 (2): 137–157. (Scholar)
Licon, Jimmy Alfonso, 2013, “On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-Weight View,” Philosophia 41 (3): 809–823. (Scholar)
List, C. and Goodin, R., 2001, “Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem,” Journal of Political Philosophy 9: 277–306. (Scholar)
Littlejohn, Clayton, 2013, “Disagreement and Defeat,” in Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge, pp. 169–192. (Scholar)
Lord, Errol, 2014, “From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2): 365–377. (Scholar)
Lougheed, Kirk, 2019, The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement. New York: Springer. (Scholar)
–––, 2020a, “Religious Disagreement, Religious Experience, and the Evil God Hypothesis,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1): 173–190. (Scholar)
–––, 2020b, “The Epistemic Benefits of Worldview Disagreement,”Social Epistemology 35 (1), 85–98. (Scholar)
Lynch, Michael, 2016, “After the Spade Turns: Disagreement, First Principles and Epistemic Contractarianism,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2–3): 248–259. (Scholar)
MacFarlane, John, 2007, “Relativism and Disagreement,” Philosophical Studies132: 17–31. (Scholar)
Machuca, Diego, 2015, “Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement,” Journal of Philosophical Research 40: 23–39. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing about Disagreement Argument,” Synthese 194 (5): 1663–1680. (Scholar)
Machuca, Diego (ed.), 2013, Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Machuca, Diego, 2017, “A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing about Disagreement Argument,” Synthese 194 (5): 1663–1680. (Scholar)
Martini, Carlo, 2013, “A Puzzle About Belief Updating,” Synthese 190 (15): 3149–3160. (Scholar)
Matheson, Jonathan, 2009, “Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Philosophy 6 (3): 269–279. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The Case for Rational Uniqueness,” Logos & Episteme 2 (3): 359–73. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday,” in Jonathan Matheson and Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 315–330. (Scholar)
–––, 2015a, “Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief,” in James Collier (ed.), The Future of Social Epistemology: A Collective Vision, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 139–148. (Scholar)
–––, 2015b, “Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating?” Social Epistemology 29 (2): 145–159. (Scholar)
–––, 2015c, The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2): 120–141. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Deep Disagreement and Rational Resolution,” Topoi 40: 1025–1037. (Scholar)
Miller, Boaz, 2021, “When Is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate?”Philosophy of Science 88 (5): 918–928. (Scholar)
Moffett, Mark, 2007, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3): 352–367. (Scholar)
Mogensen, A. L., 2016, “Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4): 590–611. (Scholar)
Moon, Andrew, 2018, “Independence and New Ways to Remain Steadfast in the Face of Disagreement,” Episteme 15 (1): 65–79. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Circular and Question-Begging Responses to Religious Disagreement and Debunking Arguments,” Philosophical Studies 178 (3): 785–809. (Scholar)
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