Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Dispositions" by Sungho Choi and Michael Fara

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Handfield, T., 2005, ‘Armstrong and the Modal Inversion of Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 55: 452–461. (Scholar)
–––, 2008a, ‘Humean Dispositionalism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86: 113–126. (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, ‘Unfinkable Dispositions’, Synthese, 160: 297–308. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘The Metaphysics of Dispositions and Causes’, in T. Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–31. (Scholar)
Handfield, T. & Bird, A., 2008, ‘Dispositions, Rules, and Finks’, Philosophical Studies, 140: 285–98. (Scholar)
Harré, R., 1970, ‘Powers’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 21: 81–101. (Scholar)
Harré, R. & Madden, E.H., 1975, Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
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