Cited Works

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• Aronson, Jerrold L., 1971, “On the Grammar of Cause,” Synthese, 22: 414–430. (Scholar)
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• Barry, Christian, Matthew Lindauer, and Gerhard Øverland, 2014, “Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm: An Empirical Investigation,” in J. Knobe, T. Lombrozo, S. Nichols (eds.) Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Barry, Christian, and Gerhard Øverland, 2016, Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Bennett, Jonathan, 1967, “Acting and Refraining,” Analysis, 28: 30–31. (Scholar)
• –––, 1981, “Morality and Consequences,” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values: II, S. McMurrin (ed.), Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, “Negation and Abstention: Two Theories of Allowing,” Ethics, 104: 75–96. (Scholar)
• –––, 1995, The Act Itself, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Bradley, Ben and Michael Stocker, 2005, “‘Doing and Allowing’ and Doing and Allowing,” Ethics, 115: 799–808. (Scholar)
• Bronner, Ben, 2018, “Two Ways To Kill A Patient,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 43: 44–63. (Scholar)
• Callahan, Daniel, 1989, “Killing and Allowing to Die,” The Hastings Center Report, Volume 19 (January/February). The Hastings Center. (Scholar)
• Cushman, Fiery, Joshua Knobe, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, “Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments,” Cognition, 108 (2): 353–380. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Donald, 1980, “Agency,” in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 43–62. (Scholar)
• Dinello, Daniel, 1971, “On Killing and Letting Die,” Analysis, 31: 84–86. (Scholar)
• Donagan, Alan, 1977, The Theory of Morality, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
• Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza (eds.), 1992, Ethics Problems and Principles, Fort Worth: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. (Scholar)
• Fitzpatrick, William, 2009, “Thomson’s Turnabout on the Trolley,” Analysis, 69: 636–643. (Scholar)
• Foot, Philippa, 1972, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” Philosophical Review, 81: 305–316. (Scholar)
• –––, 1978, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect,” in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 19–33. (Scholar)
• –––, 1984, “Killing and Letting Die,” in Jay L. Garfield and Patricia Hennessey (eds.) Abortion: Moral and Legal Perspectives, Amherst: University of Amherst Press, reprinted in Steinbock and Norcross 1994, pp. 355–382. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985, “Morality, Action and Outcome,” in Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 23–38. (Scholar)
• Frankfurt, Harry, 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 65: 829–839. (Scholar)
• Frowe, Helen, 2007, “Killing John to Save Mary: A Defense of the Moral Distinction between Killing and Letting Die,” in J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke and H. Silverstein (eds.) Action, Ethics, and Responsibility, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Book Cambridge MA: MIT Press, pp. 47–66. (Scholar)
• Hall, Timothy, 2008, “Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 5: 50–76. (Scholar)
• Hanna, Jason, 2014, “Doing, Allowing, and the Moral Relevance of the Past,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 11 (4): 677–698. (Scholar)
• –––, 2015, “Enabling Harm, Doing Harm, and Undoing One’s Own Behavior,” Ethics, 126 (1): 68–90. (Scholar)
• Hanser, Matthew, 1999, “Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People from Being Saved,” Utilitas, 11 (3): 277–295. (Scholar)
• Haydar, Bashdar, 2002, “Consequentialism and the Doing-Allowing Distinction,” Utilitas 14 (1): 222–227. (Scholar)
• Horowitz, Tamara, 1998, “Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory,” Ethics, 108 (2): 367–385. (Scholar)
• Howard-Snyder, Frances, 2002, “Doing vs. Allowing Harm,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition) Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/doing-allowing> (Scholar)
• Isaacs, Tracy, 1995, “Moral Theory and Action Theory, Killing and Letting Die,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (4): 355–368. (Scholar)
• Kagan, Shelly, 1989, The Limits of Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1988, “The Additive Fallacy,” Ethics, 99: 5–31. (Scholar)
• Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, 1984, “Choices, Values, and Frames,” American Psychologist, 39 (4): 341–350. (Scholar)
• Kamm, Frances, 1996, Morality, Mortality, Volume II, Oxford Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2007, Intricate Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2020, “Parfit on the Irrelevance of Deontological Distinctions,” in Mark Timmons (ed.) Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 9–31. (Scholar)
• Lewis, David, 1986, “Causation,” in his Philosophical Papers (Volume 2), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 159–213. (Scholar)
• Mackie, John, 1974, The Cement of the Universe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Malm, Heidi, 1992, “In Defense of the Contrast Strategy,” in Fischer and Ravizza (eds.) 1992, pp. 272–277. (Scholar)
• McGrath, Sarah, 2003, “Causation and the Making/Allowing Distinction,” Philosophical Studies, 114: 81–106. (Scholar)
• McMahan, Jeff, 1993, “Killing, Letting Die and Withdrawing Aid,” Ethics, 103 (January): 250–279; reprinted in Steinbock and Norcross 1994, 383–419. (Scholar)
• Munthe, Christian, 1999, “The Morality of Interference,” Theoria, 65 (1): 55–69. (Scholar)
• Parfit, Derek, 2017, On What Matters (Volume Three), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Persson, Ingmar, 2013, From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Persson, Ingmar, and J. Savulescu, 2005, “McMahan on the Withdrawal of Life-Prolonging Aid”, Philosophical Books, 46 (1): 11–22. (Scholar)
• Purves, Duncan, 2011, “Still in Hot Water: Doing, Allowing, and Rachels’ Bathtub Case,” Southwest Philosophy Review, 27: 129–137. (Scholar)
• Quinn, Warren S., 1989, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Philosophical Review, 98 (3): 287–312; reprinted in Steinbock and Norcross 1994, pp. 355–382. (Scholar)
• Rachels, James, 1975, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” New England Journal of Medicine, 292: 78–86. (Scholar)
• Rickless, Samuel, 2011, “The Moral Status of Enabling Harm,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92 (1): 66–86. (Scholar)
• Schaffer, Jonathan, 2000, “Causation by Disconnection,” Philosophy of Science, 67 (2): 285–300. (Scholar)
• Scheffler, Samuel, 1982, The Rejection of Consequentialism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, “Doing and Allowing,” Ethics, 114 (2): 215–239. (Scholar)
• Singer, Peter, 1979, Practical Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 2008, “Framing Moral Intuitions,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology: the cognitive science of morality: intuition and diversity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 47–106. (Scholar)
• Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Ron Mallon, Tom McCoy, and Jay G. Hull, 2008, “Intentions, Temporal Order and Moral Judgments,” Mind and Language, 23 (1): 90–106. (Scholar)
• Smart, J.J.C, 1973, “An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics,” in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–74. (Scholar)
• Steinbock, Bonnie, and Alastair Norcross (eds.), 1994, Killing and Letting Die, 2nd edition, New York: Fordham University Press. (Scholar)
• Strudler, Alan and David Wasserman, 1995, “The First Dogma of Deontology: the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and the Notion of a Say,” Philosophical Studies, 80 (1): 51–67. (Scholar)
• Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1986, “Killing, Letting Die and the Trolley Problem,” in Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory, W. Parent (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 78–93. (Scholar)
• –––, 1990, The Realm of Rights, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2008, “Turning the Trolley,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 36 (4): 359–374. (Scholar)
• Tooley, Michael, 1972, “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2 (1): 37–65. (Scholar)
• Trammell, Richard, 1975, “Saving and Taking Life,” The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 131–137. (Scholar)
• Unger, Peter, 1996, Living High and Letting Die, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Vihvelin, Kadri, and Terrance Tomkow, 2006, “The Dif,” The Journal of Philosophy, 103 (4): 183–205. (Scholar)
• Williams, Bernard, 1973, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 75–150. (Scholar)
• Woollard, Fiona, 2008, “Doing and Allowing, Threats and Sequences,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89: 199–216. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Doing/Allowing and the Deliberative Requirement,” Ratio, 23 (June): 261–277. (Scholar)
• –––, 2013, “If this is My Body...: a Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94: 315–341. (Scholar)
• –––, 2015, Doing and Allowing Harm, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)

Further Reading

• Anscombe, Elizabeth, 1981, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in Ethics, Religion, and Politics (Collected Philosophical Papers: Volume III), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 26–42. (Scholar)
• Blair, Jacob, 2018, “Autonomy and the Moral Symmetry Principle: Reply to Frowe and Tooley,” Res Publica, 24 (4): 531–541. (Scholar)
• Casey, John, 1980, “Killing and Letting Die: A Reply to Bennett,” in Killing and Letting Die, 1st edition, B. Steinbock (ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 132–138. (Scholar)
• Chan, David K., 2010, “A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing” in J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke and H. Silverstein (eds.) Action, Ethics, and Responsibility, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford, pp. 25–45. (Scholar)
• Chandler, John, 1990, “Killing and Letting Die—Putting the Debate in Context,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68: 420–431. (Scholar)
• Chappell, Timothy, 2002, “Two Distinctions That Do Make a Difference: The Action/Omission Distinction and the Principle of Double Effect, ” Philosophy, 77 (2): 211–233. (Scholar)
• Clarke, Randolph, 2014, Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Conway, David, 1988, “Is Failing to Save Lives as Bad as Killing?” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 5: 109–112. (Scholar)
• Draper, Kai, 2005, “Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33 (3): 253–280. (Scholar)
• Feinberg, Joel, 1970, Doing and Deserving, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Glover, Jonathan, 1977, Causing Death and Saving Lives, London: Penguin. (Scholar)
• –––, 1975, “It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 49: 171–209. (Scholar)
• Howard-Snyder, Frances, 1994, “The Heart of Consequentialism,” Philosophical Studies, 76 (1): 107–129. (Scholar)
• Hurley, Paul, 2019, “Consequentialism and the New Doing-Allowing Distinction” in C. Seidel (ed.), Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 176–197. (Scholar)
• Kamm, Frances Myrna, 1989, “Harming Some to Save Others,” Philosophical Studies, 57: 227–260. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, Morality, Mortality, Volume I, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Lichtenberg, Judith, 1982, “The Moral Equivalence of Action and Omission,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, 8: 19–36. (Scholar)
• Liu, Xiaofei, 2012, “A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Utilitas, 24 (1): 63–81. (Scholar)
• MacAskill, William, and Andreas Mogensen, 2019, “The Paralysis Argument,” GPI Working Paper No. 6–2019, Global Priorities Institute. [MacAskill and Mogensen 2019 available online. (Scholar)
• McCarthy, David, 2000, “Harming and Allowing Harm,” Ethics, 110 (4): 749–779. (Scholar)
• McMahan, Jeff, 2002, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• McMahon, Christopher, 1991, “The Paradox of Deontology,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20: 350–377. (Scholar)
• Nagel, Thomas, 1986, The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Norcross, Alastair, 2003, “Killing and Letting Die,” in A Companion to Applied Ethics, R.G. Frey (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 451–463. (Scholar)
• Oddie, Graham, 1997, “Killing and Letting Die: Bare Differences and Clear Differences,” Philosophical Studies, 88 (3): 267–287. (Scholar)
• Rickless, Samuel, 1997, “The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Philosophical Review, 106 (4): 555–575. (Scholar)
• Russell, Bruce, 1980, “On the Relative Strictness of Negative and Positive Duties,” in Killing and Letting Die (1st edition), B. Steinbock (ed.), Englewood, Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 215–237. (Scholar)
• Sartorio, Carolina, 2008, “Moral Inertia,” Philosophical Studies, 140 (1): 117–133. (Scholar)
• Setiya, Kieran, 2018, “Must Consequentialists Kill?” Journal of Philosophy, 115 (2): 92–105. (Scholar)
• Sneddon, Andrew, 2020, “Scottish Dentistry and Broken Promises: Woollard on Presuppositions and Substantial Negative Facts,” Analysis, first online 13 October 2020. doi:10.1093/analys/anaa040 (Scholar)
• Trammell, Richard, 1978, “The Presumption Against Taking Life,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 3: 53–67. (Scholar)
• –––, 1979, “The Nonequivalency of Saving Life and Not Taking Life,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 4 (3): 251–262. (Scholar)
• Tooley, Michael, 1994, “An Irrelevant Consideration: Killing Versus Letting Die,” reprinted in Steinbock and Norcross (eds.) 1994, pp. 103–111. (Scholar)
• Walen, Alec, 1995, “Doing, Allowing and Disabling: Some principles governing deontological restrictions,” Philosophical Studies, 80 (2): 183–215. (Scholar)