Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Doxastic Voluntarism" by Mark Boespflug and Elizabeth Jackson
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- Buckareff, Andrei A., 2004, “Acceptance and Deciding to Believe”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 29: 173–190. doi:10.5840/jpr_2004_17 (Scholar)
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- Coffman, E. J., 2022, “Involuntarism Impugned?”, Synthese, 200(5): article 362. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03849-x (Scholar)
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- Cusimano, Corey, Natalia Zorrilla, David Danks, and Tania
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- Descartes, Rene, 1641a, Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, Paris. Collected in AT VII. Translated as Meditations on First Philosophy in CSM II:1–61. (Scholar)
- –––, 1641b, “Third Set of Objections [by
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- Elder, Jamee, 2019, “Defending Stance Voluntarism”, Philosophical Studies, 176(11): 3019–3039. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1161-0 (Scholar)
- Enoch, David and Levi Spectre, forthcoming, “There is No Such Thing as Doxastic Wronging”, Philosophical Perspectives. (Scholar)
- Epictetus, The Discourses of Epictetus (Everyman
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- Fernandes, Alison, 2016, “Varieties of Epistemic Freedom”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(4): 736–751. doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1116015 (Scholar)
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- Flowerree, A. K., 2017, “Agency of Belief and Intention”, Synthese, 194(8): 2763–2784. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1138-5 (Scholar)
- Frankish, Keith, 2007, “Deciding to Believe Again”, Mind, 116(463): 523–548. doi:10.1093/mind/fzm523 (Scholar)
- Frederick, Danny, 2013, “Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 3(1): 24–44. doi:10.1163/221057012x627212 (Scholar)
- Fritz, James and Elizabeth Jackson, 2021, “Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment”, Synthese, 199(1–2): 1387–1408. doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02799-6 (Scholar)
- Gao, Jie, 2019, “Credal Pragmatism”, Philosophical Studies, 176(6): 1595–1617. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1081-z (Scholar)
- Gardiner, Georgi, 2018, “Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment”, in Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism (Synthese Library 398), Kevin McCain (ed.), Cham: Springer, 169–195. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_11 (Scholar)
- Gendler, Tamar Szabó, 2008, “Alief and Belief”, The Journal of Philosophy, 105(10): 634–663. doi:10.5840/jphil20081051025 (Scholar)
- Ginet, Carl, 2001, “Deciding to Believe”, in Steup 2001: 63–76 (ch. 4). doi:10.1093/0195128923.003.0005 (Scholar)
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- Hedden, Brian, 2015, “Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief”, Logos & Episteme, 6(4): 495–513. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20156437 (Scholar)
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- Helton, Grace, 2020, “If You Can’t Change What You Believe, You Don’t Believe It”, Noûs, 54(3): 501–526. doi:10.1111/nous.12265 (Scholar)
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