Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Dualism" by Howard Robinson
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- Aquinas, St Thomas, 1912, Summa Theologica, London: Washbourne. (Scholar)
- Aristotle, De Anima, Bk III, D.W. Hamlyn (trans.),
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968; reprinted 1993.
- Armstrong, D. M., 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, ch. 2. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, Universals and Scientific Realism (2 vols), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Averill, E. W. and Keating, B., 1981, ‘Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics?’, Mind, 90: 102–7. (Scholar)
- Ayer, A. J., 1963, ‘The concept of a person’, in
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Hypothesis, London: Continuum, pp. 73–93. (Scholar)
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- Broad, C. D., 1925, The Mind and its Place in Nature, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Collins, C., 1997, ‘Searle on consciousness and dualism’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 5: 15–33. (Scholar)
- Collins, R., 2011, ‘Energy of the soul’, in Baker 2011: 123–133. (Scholar)
- Crane, T., 2003, ‘Mental substances’, in A. O’Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 229–251. (Scholar)
- Cucu, A. C., 2018, ‘Turning the table on physicalism: the energy conservation objection against substance dualism is a two-edged sword’, Philosophical Explorations. (Scholar)
- Cucu, A. C. and Pitts, J. B., 2019, ‘How a dualist should (not) respond to the objection from energy conservation’, in Mind and Matter, vol. 17: 95–121. (Scholar)
- Dainton, B., 2008, The Phenomenal Self, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1971, ‘Mental events’, in L. Foster and J. W.
Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, London: Duckworth, pp. 207–224. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D., 1984, ‘Cognitive wheels: the frame problem of AI’, in C. Hookway (ed.), Minds, Machines and Evolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 129–152. (Scholar)
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psychology’, in The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, pp. 43–68. (Scholar)
- Descartes, R., 1641: ‘Meditation VI’,
in Meditations on the First Philosophy, J. Cottingham
(trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 57–72. (Scholar)
- Ducasse, C., 1961, ‘In defence of dualism’, in S. Hook
(ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York: Collier, pp. 85–9. (Scholar)
- Eccles, J., 1980, The Human Psyche, New York: Springer. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, ‘Brain and mind: two or one?’ In C. Blakemore and S. Green fields (eds.), Mindwaves, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 293–306. (Scholar)
- Efron, A., 1992, ‘Residual asymmetric dualism: a theory of mind-body relations’, Journal of Mind and Behaviour, 13: 113–36. (Scholar)
- Feigl, H., 1958, ‘The “mental” and the
“physical”’, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell,
(eds.), Concepts, Theories and the Mind-Body Problem
(Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 2),
Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, pp. 370–497. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J., 1974, ‘Special sciences and the disunity of science as
a working hypothesis’, Synthese, 28: 77–115. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, The Mind Does Not Work That Way, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Foster, J., 1968, ‘Psycho-physical causal relations’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 5: 64–70. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, ‘A defence of dualism’,
in J. Smythies and J. Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism,
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, pp. 59–80.
- –––, 1991, The Immaterial Self, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Fumerton, R., 2013, Knowledge, Thought and the Case for Dualism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Green, C., 2003, The Lost Cause, Oxford: Oxford Forum. (Scholar)
- Hamlyn, D. W., 1978, ‘Aristotle’s Cartesianism’,
Paedia, Special Aristotle Issue: 8–15. (Scholar)
- Hart, W. D., 1988, Engines of the Soul, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, ‘Dualism’, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 265–7. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J., 2007, ‘Cartesian dualism’, in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons Human and Divine, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 87–98. (Scholar)
- Heil, J., 1998, Philosophy of Mind, London and New York: Routledge, (especially ch. 2 (‘Descartes’s legacy’)). (Scholar)
- Herbert, R. T., 1998, ‘Dualism/materialism’, Philosophical Quarterly, 48: 159–75. (Scholar)
- Himma, K. E., 2005, ‘When a problem for all is a problem for none: substance dualism, physicalism and the mind-body problem’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 42: 81–92. (Scholar)
- Hodgson, D., 1988, The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice
in a Quantum World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Honderich, T., 1981, ‘Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems’, Inquiry, 24: 277–303. (Scholar)
- Hume, D., 1739, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk I, Pt IV, sect. VI, and Appendix, D.F. Norton and M.J. Norton (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. (Scholar)
- Huxley, T. H., 1893, ‘On the hypothesis that animals are
automata’, in Collected Essays (Volume 1), London:
Macmillan, pp. 199–250. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1982, ‘Epiphenomenal qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
- James, W., 1890, Principles of Psychology, London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Kenny, Anthony, 1989, The Metaphysics of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Kim, J., 2003, ‘Lonely souls: causality and substance
dualism’, in T. O’Connor and D. Robb (eds.), Philosophy of
Mind:contemporary readings, London: Routledge, pp. 65–78.. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Lahav, R. and Shanks, N., 1982, ‘How to be a scientifically
respectable “property dualist”’, Journal of Mind and
Behaviour, 13: 211–32. (Scholar)
- Larmer, R., 1986, ‘Mind-body interactionism and the conservation of energy’, International Philosophical Quarterly, 26: 277–85. (Scholar)
- Latham, N., 2000, ‘Chalmers on the addition of consciousness to the physical world’, Philosophical Studies, 98: 67–93. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J., 1992, ‘The problem of psychophysical causation’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 263–76. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, ‘The causal autonomy of the mental’, Mind, 102: 629–44. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, Subjects of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, ‘Non-Cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation’, Erkenntnis, 65 (1): 5–23. (Scholar)
- McGinn, C., 1993, ‘Consciousness and cosmology: hyperdualism ventilated’, in M. Davies and G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 136–168. (Scholar)
- Madell, G., 1981, The Identity of the Self, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Scholar)
- Mills, E., 1996, ‘Interaction and overdetermination’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 33: 105–15. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, ‘Interactionism and physicality’, Ratio, 10: 169–83. (Scholar)
- Nussbaum, M. C., 1984, ‘Aristotelian dualism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2: 197–207. (Scholar)
- Nussbaum, M. C. and A. O. Rorty, 1992, Essays on Aristotle’s
De Anima, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. and J. K. McDonough, 1998, ‘Numbers, minds and bodies: a fresh look at mind-body dualism’, Philosophical Perspectives, 12: 349–71. (Scholar)
- Oderberg, D. S., 2005, ‘Hylemorphic dualism’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 22: 70–99. (Scholar)
- Parfit, D., 1971, ‘Personal identity’, Philosophical Review, 80: 3–27. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Penelhum, T., 1970, Survival and Disembodies Existence, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Penfield, W., 1975, The Mystery of the Mind, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Penrose, R., 1990, The Emperor’s New Mind, Oxford: Oxford
University Press. (Scholar)
- Pietroski, P. M., 1994, ‘Mental causation for dualists’, Mind and Language, 9: 336–66. (Scholar)
- Pitts, J. B., 2019, ‘Conservation laws and the philosophy of mind: opening the black box, finding a mirror’, Philosophia, 48: 673–707. (Scholar)
- Plato, Phaedo, in J. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete
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- Popper, K. R., 1953, ‘Language and the mind-body problem: a restatement of interactionism’, in Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy; reprinted in Conjectures and Refutations, New York: Basic Books, 1962. (Scholar)
- –––., 1955, ‘A note on the mind-body
problem’, Analysis, 15: 131–5.
- Popper, K. and Eccles, J., 1977, The Self and its Brain, New York: Springer. (Scholar)
- Reid, T., 1785, ‘Of Memory’, in Essays on
the Intellectual Powers of Man, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1969, pp. 211–253. (Scholar)
- Richardson, R. C., 1982, ‘The ‘scandal’ of
Cartesian dualism’, Mind, 91: 20–37. (Scholar)
- Robinson, H., 1982, Matter and Sense, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, ‘Aristotelian dualism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1: 123–44. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, ‘Dualism’, in S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 85–101. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, ‘The self and time’, in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons, Human and Divine, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55–83. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘Benacerraf’s problem,
abstract objects and intellect’, in Z. Novak and A. Simony
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- –––, 2016, From Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance: Resurrecting the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Rosenburg, J. F., 1988, ‘On not knowing who or what one is: reflections on the intelligibility of dualism’, Topoi, 7: 57–63. (Scholar)
- Rozemond, M., 2002, Descartes’s Dualism, Cambridge,
MA : Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Ryle, G., 1949, The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson, esp. ch. 1. (Scholar)
- Searle, J., 1980, ‘Minds, brains and programs’, Behavioural and Brain Science, vol 3, pp. 417–457. (This version includes many peer responses. The article itself has been republished many times.) (Scholar)
- Sellars, W., 1954, ‘A note on Popper’s argument for
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- Sherrington, C. S., 1942, Man on his Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1984, Identity, Cause, and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Smook, R., 1988, ‘Egoicity and Twins’, Dialogue, 27: 277–86. (Scholar)
- Smythies, J. R. and J. Beloff (eds.), 1989, The Case for Dualism, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. (Scholar)
- Sprigge, T. L. S., 1993, James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality, Chicago: Open Court. (Scholar)
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- Stapp, H. P., 1993, Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, Berlin: Springer-Verlag. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P. F., 1959, Individuals, London: Methuen. (Scholar)
- Sussman, A., 1981, ‘Reflections on the chances for a scientific dualism’, Journal of Philosophy, 78: 95–118. (Scholar)
- Swinburne, R., 1986, The Evolution of the Soul, Oxford: Clarendon Press; revised edition, 1997. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, ‘From mental/physical identity
to substance dualism’, in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman
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Press, pp. 142–65. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, Mind, Brain and Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, ‘What makes me, me? A
defense of substance dualism’, in A. Lavazzo and H. Robinson
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- Taliaferro, C., 1996, Consciousness and the Mind of God, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Vendler, Z., 1972, Res Cogitans, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, The Matter of Minds, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- von Rooijen, K., 1987, ‘Interactionism and evolution: a
critique of Popper’, British Journal for the Philosophy of
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- von Wright, G. H., 1994, ‘On mind and matter’, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 171: 101–10. (Scholar)
- Watson, J. B., 1913, ‘Psychology as the behaviourist views it’, Psychological Review, 20: 158–77. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, D. W., 2004, ‘Should a Christian be a mind-body
dualist?’, in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of
Religion, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 341–352. (Scholar)