Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Dynamic Choice" by Chrisoula Andreou

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Ainslie, George, 1999. “The Dangers of Willpower,” in Getting Hooked, Jon Elster and Ole-Jørgen Skog (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 65–92. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. Breakdown of Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Andreou, Chrisoula, 2005. “Incommensurable Alternatives and Rational Choice,” Ratio, 18(3): 249–61. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. “Going from Bad (or Not So Bad) to Worse: On Harmful Addictions and Habits,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 42(4): 323–31. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. “Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34(1): 95–108. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. “There Are Preferences and Then There Are Preferences” in Economics and the Mind, Barbara Montero and Mark D. White (eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 115–126. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. “Understanding Procrastination,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 37(2): 183–93. (Scholar)
–––, 2012. “Self-Defeating Self-Governance,” Philosophical Issues, 22: 20–34. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. “The Real Puzzle of the Self-Torturer: Uncovering a New Dimension of Instrumental Rationality,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45: 562–75 (Scholar)
Andreou, Chrisoula and Mark D. White (eds.), 2010. The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bratman, Michael, 1983. “Taking Plans Seriously,” Social Theory and Practice, 9: 271–87. (Scholar)
–––, 1987. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. “Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention,” in Faces of Intention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 58–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. “Temptation Revisited,” in Structures of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 257–282. (Scholar)
–––, 2012. “Time, Rationality, and Self-Governance,” Philosophical Issues, 22: 73–88. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. “Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint,” Inquiry, 57: 293–310. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. Planning, Time, and Self-Governance, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Broome, John, 2000. “Incommensurable Values,” in Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin, Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21–38. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. “Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?” in Practical Rationality and Preference, Christopher W. Morris and Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 98–120. (Scholar)
Chang, Ruth (ed.), 1997. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “The Possibility of Parity,” Ethics, 112: 659–88 (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, McKinsey, J. and Suppes, Patrick, 1955. “Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value,” Philosophy of Science, 22: 140–60. (Scholar)
Dougherty, Tom, 2011, “On Whether to Prefer Pain to Pass,” Ethics, 121: 521–37. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “A Deluxe Money Pump,” Thought, 3: 21–29. (Scholar)
Elster, Jon, 1984. Ulysses and the Sirens, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. Ulysses Unbound, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Elster, Jon and Ole-Jørgen Skog (eds.), 1999. Getting Hooked, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Ferrero, Luca, 2009. “What Good is a Diachronic Will?,” Philosophical Studies, 144: 403–30. (Scholar)
Gauthier, David, 1986. Morals by Agreement, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. “Assure and Threaten,” Ethics, 104(4): 690–716. (Scholar)
Greene, Preston and Meghan Sullivan, 2015. “Against Time Bias,” Ethics, 125: 947–70. (Scholar)
Holton, Richard, 1999. “Intention and Weakness of Will,” Journal of Philosophy, 96: 241–62. (Scholar)
Kavka, Gregory S., 1983. “The Toxin Puzzle,” Analysis, 43: 33–6. (Scholar)
Kirby, Kris N. and R. J. Herrnstein, 1995. “Preference Reversals Due to Myopic Discounting of Delayed Reward,” Psychological Science, 6: 83–89. (Scholar)
Loewenstein, George and Jon Elster (eds.), 1992. Choice Over Time, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. (Scholar)
Loewenstein, George, Daniel Read, and Roy Baumeister (eds.), 2003. Time and Decision, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. (Scholar)
MacIntosh, Duncan, 2010. “Intransitive Preferences, Vagueness, and the Structure of Procrastination” in The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination, Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 68–86. (Scholar)
Mele, Alfred, 2004. “Motivated Irrationality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 240–256. (Scholar)
McClennen, Edward, 1990. Rationality and Dynamic Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997. “Pragmatic Rationality and Rules,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26(3): 210–58. (Scholar)
Millar, Andrew and Douglas J. Navarick, 1984. “Self-Control and Choice in Humans: Effects of Video Game Playing as a Positive Reinforcer,” Learning and Motivation, 15: 203–218. (Scholar)
Nozick, Robert, 1993. The Nature of Rationality, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Parfit, Derek, 1984. Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Portmore, Douglas W., 2019. Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Quinn, Warren, 1993. “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer,” in Morality and Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 198–209. (Scholar)
Rabinowicz, Wlodek, 2000. “Money Pump with Foresight,” in M. J. Almeida (ed.), Imperceptible Harms and Benefits (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy: 8), Dordrecht, London: Kluwer Academic, pp. 123–154. (Scholar)
Ramsey, Frank P., 1926. “Truth and Probability,” in The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, R. B. Braithwaite (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1931, pp. 156–198. (Scholar)
Raz, Joseph, 1997. “Incommensurability and Agency,” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Ruth Chang (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 110–128. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Regan, Donald, 1997. “Value, Comparability, and Choice,” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Ruth Chang (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 129–150. (Scholar)
Schelling, Thomas C., 1960. The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Solnick, Jay V., Catherine H. Kannenberg, David A. Eckerman, and Marcus B. Waller. “An Experimental Analysis of Impulsivity and Impulse Control in Humans,” Learning and Motivation, 11: 61–77. (Scholar)
Stroud, Sarah, 2010. “Is Procrastination Weakness of Will?” in The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination, Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 51–67. (Scholar)
Tenenbaum, Sergio, forthcoming. Rational Powers in Action, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Tenenbaum, Sergio and Diana Raffman, 2012. “Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer,” Ethics, 123: 86–112. (Scholar)
Tversky, Amos, 1969. “Intransitivity of Preferences,” Psychological Review, 76: 31–48. (Scholar)
Velleman, David, 2000. “Deciding How to Decide,” in The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 221–243. (Scholar)

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