Two extensive bibliographies are available on line under entries for epiphenomenalism in (1) the PhilPapers’s bibliography (Other Internet Resources) and (2) The Philosopher’s Index. (The latter restricts entry to subscribers.) The following list contains all items referred to in the foregoing article, and a few other sources that offer particularly helpful discussions.

• Antony, L., 2010, “Realization Theory and the Philosophy of Mind: Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization”, Philosophical Studies, 148: 89–99. (Scholar)
• Audi, P., 2012, “Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(3): 654–674. (Scholar)
• Bailey, A., 2006, “Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36: 481–509. (Scholar)
• Baltimore, J. A., 2010, “Defending the Piggyback Principle Against Shapiro and Sober’s Empirical Approach”, Synthese, 175(2): 151–168. (Scholar)
• Baumeister, R. F., Lau, S., Maranges, H. M. and Clark, C. J., 2018, “On the Necessity of Consciousness for Sophisticated Human Action”, Frontiers in Psychology, 9: 1925. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01925 (Scholar)
• Baumgartner, M., 2010, “Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 40(3): 359–384. (Scholar)
• Beebee, H., 2017, “Epiphenomenalism for Functionalists”, in H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosoophy of Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Benecke, E. C., 1901, “On the Aspect Theory of the Relation of Mind to Body”, Aristotelian Society Proceedings (New Series), 1: 18–44. (Scholar)
• Bieri, P., 1992, “Trying Out Epiphenomenalism”, Erkenntnis, 36: 283–309. (Scholar)
• Bradley, M., 2011, “The Causal Efficacy of Qualia”, The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(11–12): 32–44. (Scholar)
• Carington, W., 1949, Matter, Mind, and Meaning, New Haven: Yale University Press. [H. H. Price edited this work, and wrote an introduction and notes for it.] (Scholar)
• Caston, V., 1997, “Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern”, The Philosophical Review, 106: 309–363. (Scholar)
• Chalmers, D. J., 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Clifford, W. K., 1874, “Body and Mind”, lecture originally given to the Sunday Lecture Society, Nov. 1, 1874. Published in The Fortnightly Review, 16 (December): 714–736; reprinted in L. Stephen & F. Pollock (eds.), Lectures and Essays of the late W. K. Clifford, London: Macmillan, 1879. (Scholar)
• Davidson, D., 1970, “Mental Events”, in Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, London: Duckworth. Reprinted, with other relevant papers, in D. Davidson, Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon, 1980. (Scholar)
• De Brigard, F., 2014, “In Defence of the Self-Stultification Objection”, The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 21(5–6): 120–130. (Scholar)
• Dennett, D. C., 1991a, “Real Patterns”, The Journal of Philosophy, 88: 27–51. (Scholar)
• –––, 1991b, Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown. (Scholar)
• Descartes, R., 1649, The Passions of the Soul, Part I, art. xxxiv. (Scholar)
• Fodor, J. A., 1989, “Making Mind Matter More”, Philosophical Topics, 17: 59–79. (Scholar)
• Haynes, J-D., 2013, “Beyond Libet”, in A. Clark, J. Kiverstein and T. Vierkant (eds.), Decomposing the Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Hodgson, S., 1870, The Theory of Practice, London: Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer. (Scholar)
• Honderich, T., 1982, “The Argument for Anomalous Monism”, Analysis, 42: 59–64. (Scholar)
• –––, 1983, “Anomalous Monism: Reply to Smith”, Analysis, 43: 147–149. (Scholar)
• –––, 1984, “Smith and the Champion of Mauve”, Analysis, 44: 86–89. (Scholar)
• Horowitz, A., 1999, “Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 421–434. (Scholar)
• Huxley, T. H., 1874, “On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History”, The Fortnightly Review 16 (New Series): 555–580. Reprinted in Method and Results: Essays by Thomas H. Huxley, New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1898. (Scholar)
• Hyslop, A., 1998, “Methodological Epiphenomenalism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 61–70. (Scholar)
• Jackson, F., 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
• James, W., 1879, “Are We Automata?” Mind, 4: 1–22. (Scholar)
• James, W., 1890, The Principles of Psychology, New York: H. Holt. (Scholar)
• Kim, J., 1993, Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2005, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Thoughts on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization”, Philosophical Studies, 148: 101–112. (Scholar)
• Kroedel, T., 2016, “Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem”, Nous, 49(2): 357–375. (Scholar)
• Lalor, B. J., 1997, “It Is What You Think: Intentional Potency and Anti-individualism”, Philosophical Psychology, 10: 165–178. (Scholar)
• LePore, E. & Loewer, B., 1987, “Mind Matters”, The Journal of Philosophy, 84: 630–642. (Scholar)
• Lewis, D., 1988, “What Experience Teaches”, Proceedings of the Russellian Society, J. Copley-Coltheart (ed.), University of Sydney. Reprinted in W. G. Lycan, (ed.), Mind and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. (Scholar)
• Libet, B., 1985, “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8: 529–566. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Linser, K and Goschke, T., 2007, “Unconscious modulation of the conscious experience of voluntary control”, Cognition, 104: 459–475. (Scholar)
• Lockwood, M., 1993, “The Grain Problem”, in H. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Lyons, J. C., 2006, “In Defense of Epiphenomenalism”, Philosophical Psychology, 19: 767–794. (Scholar)
• Maudsley, H., 1886, Body and Mind: An Inquiry into Their Connection and Mutual Influence, Specially in Reference to Mental Disorders, New York: D. Appleton and Co. (Scholar)
• McDougall, W., 1911, Body and Mind: A History and Defense of Animism, London: Methuen. (Scholar)
• Megill, J., 2007, “Naturalism, Physicalism and Epiphenomenalism”, Philosophical Psychology, 20(6): 681–686. (Scholar)
• Mele, A. R., 2014, Free: Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Melnyk, A., 2010, “Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization”, Philosophical Studies, 148: 113–123. (Scholar)
• Moore, D., 2012, “On Robinson’s Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection”, The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4: 627–641. (Scholar)
• –––, 2014, “The Epistemic Argument for Mental Causation”, The Philosophical Forum, 45(2): 149–168. (Scholar)
• Nagasawa, Y., 2010, “The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism”, Erkenntnis, 72: 37–56. (Scholar)
• Nahamias, E., 2008, “Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences”, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford. (Scholar)
• Nisbett, R. E. & Wilson, T. D., 1977a, “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes”, Psychological Review, 84: 231–259. (Scholar)
• –––, 1977b, “The halo effect: evidence for unconscious alteration of judgments”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35: 250–256. (Scholar)
• Pauen, M., 2006, “Feeling Causes”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13 (1–2): 129–152. (This combined issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies contains eight papers presenting a variety of positions regarding epiphenomenalism.) (Scholar)
• Pockett, S., Banks, W. P. & Gallagher, S. (eds.), 2006, Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
• Popper, K. & Eccles, J., 1977, The Self and Its Brain, New York: Springer-Verlag. (Scholar)
• Putnam, H., 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume VII), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in H. Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Robinson, D., 1993, “Epiphenomenalism, Laws and Properties”, Philosophical Studies, 69: 1–34. (Scholar)
• Robinson, W. S., 1982a, “Why I Am a Dualist”, in E. D. Klemke, A. D. Kline & R. Hollinger (eds.), Philosophy: The Basic Issues, New York: St. Martin’s Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1982b, “Causation, Sensations and Knowledge”, Mind, 91: 524–540. (Scholar)
• –––, 1997, “Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense”, Biology and Philosophy, 12: 51–71. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006a, “Knowing Epiphenomena”, The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13: 85–100. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006b, “What Is It Like to Like?”, Philosophical Psychology, 19: 743–765. (Scholar)
• –––, 2007, “Evolution and Epiphenomenalism”, The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14: 27–42. (Scholar)
• –––, 2012, “Phenomenal Realist Physicalism Implies Coherency of Epiphenomenalist Meaning”, The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19(3–4): 145–163. (Scholar)
• –––, 2013, “Experiencing is Not Observing: A Response to Dwayne Moore on Epiphenomenalism and Self-Stultification”, The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(2): 185–192. (Scholar)
• –––, 2018, “Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99: 100–117 (Scholar)
• –––, 2019, Epiphenomenal Mind: An Integrated Outlook on Sensations, Beliefs, and Pleasure, New York and London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Romanes, G. J., 1896, Mind and Motion, and Monism, London: Longmans, Green, and Co. [This book is an edition of material that first appeared in 1882 through 1886.] (Scholar)
• Russell, B., 1927, The Analysis of Matter, New York: Harcourt, Brace. (Scholar)
• Segal, G., 2009, “The Causal Inefficacy of Content”, Mind and Language, 24(1): 80–102. (Scholar)
• Shepherd, J., 2017, “Neuroscientific Threats to Free Will”, in K. Timpe, M. Griffith, and N. Levy (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will, London and New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Shoemaker, S., 2007, Physical Realization, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Reply to My Critics”, Philosophical Studies, 148: 125–132. (Scholar)
• Smith, P., 1982, “Bad News for Anomalous Monism?”, Analysis, 42: 220–224. (Scholar)
• –––, 1984, “Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism: A Reply to Honderich”, Analysis, 44: 83–86. (Scholar)
• Shapiro, L. A. and Sober, E., 2007, “Epiphenomenalism: The Do’s and the Don’ts”, in G. Wolters and P. Machamer (eds.), Thinking About Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. (Scholar)
• Soon, C., Brass, M., Heinze, H-J., and Haynes, J-D., 2008, “Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain”, Nature Neuroscience, 11: 543–545. (Scholar)
• Staudacher, A., 2006, “Epistemological Objections to Qualia-Epiphenomenalism”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(1–2): 153–175. (Scholar)
• Stich, S., 1983, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
• Swinburne, R., 2011, “Could anyone Justifiably Believe Epiphenomenalism?”, The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(3–4): 196–216. (Scholar)
• Taylor, R., 1963, Metaphysics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
• Van Rooijen, J., 1987, “Interactionism and Evolution: A Critique of Popper”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 38: 87–92. (Scholar)
• Walter, S., 2014, “Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will”, Synthese, 191(10): 2215–2238. (Scholar)
• Walton, M., 1989, “The Knowledge Argument Against the Knowledge Argument”, Analysis, 49: 158–160. (Scholar)
• Ward, J., 1902, “Psychology”, Encyclopedia Britannica, 10th edition, Volume 32. [Material quoted above appears in a section titled “Relation of Body and Mind: Psychophysical Parallelism” which did not appear in the 9th (1883) edition.] (Scholar)
• Wegner, D. M. and Wheatley, T., 1999, “Apparent mental causation: sources of the experience of will”, American Psychologist, 54: 480–492. (Scholar)
• –––, 2002, The Illusion of Conscious Will, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford. (Scholar)
• Woodward, J., 2015, “Interventionism and causal exclusion”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(2): 303–347. (Scholar)
• –––, 2017, “Intervening in the Exclusion Argument[Special-character]”, in H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Wundt, W., 1912, An Introduction to Psychology, translated from the second German edition by R. Pintner, London: George Allen. (Scholar)