Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory" by Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy

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  • Aumann, R. & S. Hart, 1994, Handbook of game theory with economic applications (Vol. 2), Amsterdam: North Holland. (Scholar)
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  • van Benthem, J., P. Girard, & O. Roy, 2009, “Everything else being equal: A modal logic for Ceteris Paribus preferences”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 38: 83–125. (Scholar)
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  • –––, 2013, “A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals”, Games and Economic Behavior, 78: 31–43.
  • Brandenburger, A., 2003, “On the existence of a “complete” possibility structure”, in M. Basili, N. Dimitri, & I. Gilboa (Eds.), in Cognitive processes and economic behavior (pp. 30–34). Routledge. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2007, “A note on Kuhn’s theorem”, in J. van Benthem, D. Gabbay, & B. Loewe (Eds.), Interactive logic, proceedings of the 7th Augustus de Morgan workshop, London (pp. 71–88). Texts in Logic; Games, Amsterdam University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2010, “Origins of epistemic game theory”, in V. F. Hendricks & O. Roy (Eds.), Epistemic logic: Five questions (pp. 59–69). Automatic Press. (Scholar)
  • Brandenburger, A. & E. Dekel, 1987, “Rationalizability and correlated equilibria”, Econometrica, 55(6): 1391–1402. (Scholar)
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  • Brandenburger, A. & A. Friedenberg, 2008, “Intrinsic correlation in games”, Journal of Economic Theory, 141(1): 28–67. (Scholar)
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  • Brandenburger, A. & H. Keisler, 2006, “An impossibility theorem on beliefs in games”, Studia Logica, 84(2): 211–240. (Scholar)
  • Brandenburger, A., A. Friedenberg, & H.J. Keisler, 2008, “Admissibility in games”, Econometrica, 76(2): 307–352. (Scholar)
  • de Bruin, B., 2010, Explaining games : The epistemic programme in game theory, New York City: Springer. (Scholar)
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  • –––, 2014, “ Common reasoning in games: A Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality”, Economics and Philosophy, 30(03): 285–329. (Scholar)
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  • Fagin, R., J. Halpern, Y. Moses, & M. Vardi, 1995, Reasoning about knowledge, Cambridge: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
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  • Friedenberg, A. & M. Meier, 2009, “The context of a game”, in Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, pp. 134–135 [available online]. (Scholar)
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  • –––, 1997, “On ambiguities in the interpretation of game trees”, Games and Economic Behavior, 20(1): 66–96. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1999, “Set-theoretic completeness for epistemic and conditional logic”, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 26: 1–27. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2001a, “Alternative semantics for unawareness”, Game and Economic Behavior, 37: 321–339. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2001b, “Substantive rationality and backward induction”, Games and Economic Behavior, 37(2): 425–435. (Scholar)
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  • –––, 2010, “Lexiographic probability, conditional probability and nonstandard probability”, Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1): 155–179. (Scholar)
  • Halpern, J.Y. & R. Pass, 2009, “A logical characterization of iterated admissibility”, in A. Heifetz (Ed.), Proceedings of the twelfth conference on theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge (pp. 146–155).
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