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Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Epistemic Self-Doubt" by Sherrilyn Roush
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Adler, Jonathan E., 1990, “Conservatism and Tacit Confirmation”, Mind, 99(396): 559–70. doi:10.1093/mind/xcix.396.559 (Scholar)
- Alston, William P., 1980, “Level Confusions in Epistemology”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 135–150. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00401.x (Scholar)
- Bergmann, Michael, 2005, “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 55(220): 419–436. doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00408.x (Scholar)
- Briggs, Rachael, 2009, “Distorted Reflection”, Philosophical Review, 118(1): 59–85. doi:10.1215/00318108-2008-029 (Scholar)
- Christensen, David, 1991, “Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs”, Philosophical Review, 100(2): 229–47. doi:10.2307/2185301 (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Conservatism in Epistemology”, Noûs, 28(1): 69–89. doi:10.2307/2215920 (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality”, Philosophical Review, 109(3): 349–71. doi:10.2307/2693694 (Scholar)
- –––, 2007a, “Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubts and Rational Ideals”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 2: 3–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007b, “Epistemic Self-Respect”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 107(1[3]): 319–337. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00224.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2010a, “Higher-Order Evidence”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(1): 185–215. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2010b, “Rational Reflection”, Philosophical Perspectives, 24: 121–140. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00187.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Disagreement, Question-begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 11(6): 1–22. [Christensen 2011 available online] (Scholar)
- Christensen, David and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), 2013, The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Coates, Allen, 2012, “Rational Epistemic Akrasia”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 49(2): 113–124. (Scholar)
- Cohen, Stewart, 2002, “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 309–39. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00204.x (Scholar)
- Conee, Earl, 1987, “Evident, but Rationally Unacceptable”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65(3): 316–326. doi:10.1080/00048408712342971 (Scholar)
- Dawid, A.P., 1982, “The Well-Calibrated Bayesian”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 77(379): 605–610. (Scholar)
- Egan, Andy and Adam Elga, 2005, “I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid”, Philosophical Perspectives, 19: 77–93. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00054.x (Scholar)
- Elga, Adam, 2007, “Reflection and Disagreement”, Noûs, 41(3): 478–502. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2013 “The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock and the New Rational Reflection Principle”, Philosophical Studies, 164(1): 127–139. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0091-0 (Scholar)
- Evnine, Simon J., 2008, Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Feldman, Richard, 2005 “Respecting the Evidence”, Philosophical Perspectives, 19: 95–119. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00055.x (Scholar)
- Foley, Richard, 1982, “Epistemic Conservatism”, Philosophical Studies, 43(2): 165–82. doi:10.1007/bf00372381 (Scholar)
- Gaifman, Haim, 1988, “A Theory of Higher-Order Probabilities”, in Causation, Chance and Credence: Proceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation, July 15-19, 1985, vol. 1, (The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 41), Brian Skyrms and William L. Harper (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 191–219. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2863-3_11 (Scholar)
- Gibbons, John, 2006, “Access Externalism”, Mind, 115(457): 19–39. doi:10.1093/mind/fzl019 (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert, 1973, “Evidence one does not Possess”, Ch. 9 of Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Horowitz, Sophie, 2014, “Epistemic Akrasia”, Noûs, 48(4): 718–744. doi:10.1111/nous.12026 (Scholar)
- Kelly, Thomas, 2005, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1: 167–196. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence”, in Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 111–174. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007 (Scholar)
- Koons, Robert C., 1992, Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625381 (Scholar)
- Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria, 2014, “Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2): 314–345. doi:10.1111/phpr.12090 (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 5: 145–179. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0005 (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1980, “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance”, in Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, University of California Press, pp. 83–132. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986: 84–132. (Scholar)
- Lycan, William G., 1977, “Evidence one does not Possess”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 55(2): 114–126. doi:10.1080/00048407712341141 (Scholar)
- Owens, David, 2002, “Epistemic Akrasia”, The Monist, 85(3): 381–397. (Scholar)
- Pollock, John L., 1989, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Richter, Reed, 1990, “Ideal Rationality and Hand-Waving”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68(2): 147–156. doi:10.1080/00048409012344171 (Scholar)
- Roush, Sherrilyn, 2009, “Second-Guessing: A Self-Help Manual”, Episteme, 6(3): 251–68. doi:10.3366/e1742360009000690 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, first online 4 February 2016. doi:10.1111/phpr.12274 (Scholar)
- Roush, Sherrilyn, Kelty Allen, and Ian Herbert, 2012, “Skepticism about Reasoning”, in New Waves in Philosophical Logic, Greg Restall and Jillian Russell (eds.), Hampshire, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 112–141. (Scholar)
- Seidenfeld, Teddy, 1985, “Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules”, Philosophy of Science, 52(2): 274–294. doi:10.1086/289244 (Scholar)
- Sklar, Lawrence, 1975, “Methodological Conservatism”, Philosophical Review, 84(3): 374–400. doi:10.2307/2184118 (Scholar)
- Skyrms, Brian, 1980, “Higher Order Degrees of Belief”, in Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F.P. Ramsey, D.H. Mellor (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 109–137. (Scholar)
- Sliwa, Paulina and Sophie Horowitz, 2015, “Respecting All the Evidence”, Philosophical Studies, 172(11): 2835–2858. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0446-9 (Scholar)
- Sobel, Jordan Howard, 1987, “Self-Doubts and Dutch Strategies”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65(1): 56–81. doi:10.1080/00048408712342771 (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, Sydney, 1994, “Moore’s paradox and Self-Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, 77(2–3): 211–28. doi:10.1007/bf00989570 (Scholar)
- Sorensen, Roy A. 1987, “Anti-Expertise, Instability, and Rational Choice”, Australian Journal of Philosophy, 65(3): 301–315. doi:10.1080/00048408712342961 (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, Blindspots. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Talbott, W.J., 1991, “Two Principles of Bayesian Epistemology”, Philosophical Studies, 62(2): 135–50. doi:10.1007/bf00419049 (Scholar)
- van Fraassen, Bas C., 1983, “Calibration: A Frequency Justification for Personal Probability”, Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honour of Adolf Grünbaum, (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 76), R.S. Cohen and L. Laudan (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 295–320. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-7055-7_15 (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Belief and the Will”, Journal of Philosophy, 81(5): 235–56. doi:10.2307/2026388 (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens”, Philosophical Studies, 77(1): 7–37. doi:10.1007/bf00996309 (Scholar)
- Vickers, John M., 2000 “I Believe It, But Soon I’ll Not Believe It Any More: Scepticism, Empiricism, and Reflection”, Synthese, 124(2): 155–74. doi:10.1023/a:1005213608394 (Scholar)
- Vogel, Jonathan, 2000, “Reliabilism Leveled”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(11): 602–623. doi:10.2307/2678454 (Scholar)
- Vranas, Peter B.M., 2004, “Have your cake and eat it too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(2): 368–382. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00399.x (Scholar)
- Weatherson, Brian, 2008 “Deontology and Descartes’ Demon”, Journal of Philosophy, 105(9): 540–569. doi:10.5840/jphil2008105932 (Scholar)
- Wedgwood, Ralph, 2011, “Justified Inference”, Synthese, 189(2): 1–23. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0012-8 (Scholar)
- White, Roger, 2009, “On treating oneself and others as thermometers”, Episteme, 6(3): 233–250. doi:10.3366/e1742360009000689 (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2011, “Improbable Knowing”, in Evidentialism and Its Discontents, Trent Doherty (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 147–164. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.003.0010 (Scholar)
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