Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism" by Richard Pettigrew
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- Ahlstrom-Vij, K. & J. Dunn (eds.), 2018, Epistemic Consequentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Berker, S., 2013a, “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions”, Philosophical Review, 122(3): 337–393. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013b, “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism”, Philosophical Issues (Supp. Noûs), 23(1): 363–387. (Scholar)
- Briggs, R. A. & R. Pettigrew, forthcoming, “An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization”, Noûs. doi:10.1111/nous.12258 (Scholar)
- BonJour, L., 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Caie, M., 2013, “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence”, Philosophical Review, 122(4): 527–575. (Scholar)
- Carr, J., 2015, “Epistemic Expansions”, Res Philosophica, 92(2): 217–236. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(3): 511–534. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, “A Modesty Proposal”, Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02301-x (Scholar)
- de Finetti, B., 1974, Theory of Probability Vol. 1, New York: Wiley. (Scholar)
- Dorst, K., 2017, “Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy”, Mind, 128(509): 175–211. (Scholar)
- Dunn, J., 2018, “Accuracy, Verisimilitude, and Scoring Rules”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97(1): 151–166. (Scholar)
- Easwaran, K., 2013, “Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection”, Philosophy of Science, 80(1): 119–142. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Dr Truthlove, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities”, Noûs, 50(4): 816–853 (Scholar)
- Easwaran, K. & B. Fitelson, 2012, “An ‘evidentialist’ worry about Joyce’s argument for Probabilism”, Dialectica, 66(3): 425–433. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 5, 61–96. (Scholar)
- Fraassen, B.C. van, 1983, “Calibration: Frequency Justification for Personal Probability”, in R.S. Cohen & L. Laudan (eds.), Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A.I., 2002, Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Greaves, H., 2013, “Epistemic Decision Theory”, Mind, 122(488): 915–952. (Scholar)
- Greaves, H. & D. Wallace, 2006, “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility”, Mind, 115(459): 607–632. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1973, Thought, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Hájek, A., 2008, “Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(4): 793–819. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Fifteen Arguments against Hypothetical Frequentism”, Erkenntnis, 70: 211–235. (Scholar)
- Horowitz, S., 2014, “Immoderately rational”, Philosophical Studies, 167: 41–56. (Scholar)
- Huttegger, S.M., 2013, “In Defense of Reflection”, Philosophy of Science, 80(3): 413–433. (Scholar)
- Jaffray, J-Y., 1989, “Coherent bets under partially resolving uncertainty and belief functions”, Theory and Decision, 26: 90–105. (Scholar)
- Jeffrey, R., 1965, The Logic of Decision, New York: McGraw-Hill. (Scholar)
- Jeffrey, R., 1983, The Logic of Decision (2nd). Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Jenkins, C.S., 2007, “Entitlement and Rationality”, Synthese, 157: 25–45. (Scholar)
- Joyce, J.M., 1998, “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Philosophy of Science, 65(4): 575–603. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief”, in F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief, Springer. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “The True Consequences of Epistemic Consequentialism”, in Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn 2018. (Scholar)
- Kelley, M., 2019, Accuracy Dominance on Infinite Opinion Sets, MA Thesis, UC Berkeley. [Online version available here] (Scholar)
- Konek, J., 2016, “Probabilistic Knowledge and Cognitive Ability”, Philosophical Review, 125(4): 509–587. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, “IP Scoring Rules: Foundations and Applications”, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, 103: 256–264. (Scholar)
- Konek, J. & B.A. Levinstein, 2019, “The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory”, Mind, 128(509): 69–107. (Scholar)
- Lam, B., 2013, “Calibrated Probabilities and the Epistemology of Disagreement”, Synthese, 190(6): 1079–1098. (Scholar)
- Lange, M., 1999, “Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization”, The Journal of Philosophy, 96(6): 294–324. (Scholar)
- Leitgeb, H. & R. Pettigrew, 2010a, “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy”, Philosophy of Science, 77: 201–235. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010b, “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy”, Philosophy of Science, 77: 236–272. (Scholar)
- Levinstein, B.A., 2012, “Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating”, Philosophy of Science, 79(3): 413–424. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “With All Due Respect: The Macro-Epistemology of Disagreement”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 15(3): 1–20. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “An Objection of Varying Importance to Epistemic Utility Theory”, Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1157-9 (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1980, “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance”, in R.C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability (Vol. II). Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- Maher, P., 1993, Betting on Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism”, Philosophy of Science, 69(1): 73–81. (Scholar)
- Mayo-Wilson, C. & G. Wheeler, 2016, “Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1): 55–78. (Scholar)
- –––, ms., “Epistemic Decision Theory’s Reckoning”. Unpublished manuscript. [Online version available here] (Scholar)
- Meacham, C. J. G., 2018, “Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms”, in Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn 2018. (Scholar)
- Moss, S., 2011, “Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise”, Mind, 120(480): 1053–1069. (Scholar)
- Oddie, G., 2019, “What Accuracy Could Not Be”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 70(2): 551–580. (Scholar)
- Paris, J. B., 2001, “A Note on the Dutch Book Method”, Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and their Applications Ithaca, NY: Shaker. (Scholar)
- Pettigrew, R., 2010, “Modelling uncertainty”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 80. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013a, “A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle”, Episteme, 10(1): 19–35. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013b, “Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credence”, Philosophy Compass, 8(10): 897–908. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014a, “Accuracy and Evidence”, Dialectica. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014b, “Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018a, “Making Things Right: the true consequences of decision theory in epistemology”, in Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn 2018. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018b, “The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X”, Noûs, 52(2): 336–372. (Scholar)
- Predd, J., et al., 2009, “Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules”, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55(10): 4786–4792. (Scholar)
- Rosenkrantz, R.D., 1981, Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press. (Scholar)
- Schoenfield, M., 2016, “Conditionalization does not (in general) Maximize Expected Accuracy”, Mind, 126(504): 1155–1187 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences”, Noûs, 51(4): 667–685. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, “Accuracy and Verisimilitude: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. doi:10.1093/bjps/axz032 (Scholar)
- Seidenfeld, T., 1985, “Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules”, Philosophy of Science, 52(2): 274–294. (Scholar)
- Seidenfeld, T., M.J. Schervish, & J.B. Kadane, 2012, “Forecasting with imprecise probabilities”, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 53: 1248–1261. (Scholar)
- Shimony, A., 1988, “An Adamite Derivation of the Calculus of Probability”, in J. Fetzer (ed.), 1988, Probability and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
- Walsh, S., ms., “Probabilism in Infinite Dimensions”. Unpublished manuscript. (Scholar)
- White, R., 2009, “Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 3: 161–186. (Scholar)
- Williams, J. R. G., 2012a, “Gradational accuracy and nonclassical semantics”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 5(4):513–537. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012b, “Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and accuracy domination”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41(5):811–840. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Rational Illogicality”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(1): 127–141. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 2000, Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
