Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Epistemic Utility Arguments for Epistemic Norms" by Richard Pettigrew

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Alchourrón, C.E., P. Gärdenfors, & D. Makinson, 1985, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50: 510–530. (Scholar)
Berker, S., 2013a, “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions”, Philosophical Review, 122(3): 337–393. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism”, Philosophical Issues (Supp. Noûs), 23(1): 363–387. (Scholar)
BonJour, L., 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Briggs, R. A. & R. Pettigrew, 2020, “An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization”, Noûs, 54(1): 162–181. (Scholar)
Brown, P. M., 1976, “Conditionalization and expected utility” Philosophy of Science, 43(3): 415–419. (Scholar)
Buchak, L., 2013, Risk and Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Caie, M., 2013, “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence”, Philosophical Review, 122(4): 527–575. (Scholar)
Campbell-Moore, C., 2015, “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence? A Reply to Michael Caie”, Philosophical Review 124(3): 393–406. (Scholar)
–––, & B. Salow 2020, “Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(3): 495–515. (Scholar)
–––, & B. Salow 2022, “Accurate Updating for the Risk–Sensitive”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 73(3): 751–776. (Scholar)
Carr, J., 2015, “Epistemic Expansions”, Res Philosophica, 92(2): 217–236. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(3): 511–534. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “A Modesty Proposal”, Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02301-x (Scholar)
Cox, R. T., 1946, “Probability, Frequency and Reasonable Expectation”, American Journal of Physics, 14: 1–13. (Scholar)
–––, 1961, The Algebra of Probable Inference, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Scholar)
D’Agostino, M. & C. Sinigaglia, 2010, “Epistemic Accuracy and Subjective Probability”, in M. Dorato & M. Suàrez (eds.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science, Springer. (Scholar)
Das, N., “The Value of Biased Information”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 74(1): 25–55. (Scholar)
de Finetti, B., 1937 [1980], “Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources”, in H. E. Kyburg & H. E. K. Smokler (eds.), Studies in Subjective Probability, Huntington, NY: Robert E. Kreiger Publishing Co., 1980 (Scholar)
–––, 1974, Theory of Probability Vol. 1, New York: Wiley. (Scholar)
Diaconis, P. & S. Zabell, 1982, “Updating Subjective Probability” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 77(380): 822–830. (Scholar)
Dorst, K., 2017, “Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy”, Mind, 128(509): 175–211. (Scholar)
Douven, I. & S. Wenmackers, 2017, “Inference to the Best Explanation versus Bayes???s Rule in a Social Setting”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(2): 535–570. (Scholar)
Dunn, J., 2018, “Accuracy, Verisimilitude, and Scoring Rules”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97(1): 151–166. (Scholar)
Easwaran, K., 2013, “Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection”, Philosophy of Science, 80(1): 119–142. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 5, 61–96. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Dr Truthlove, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities”, Noûs, 50(4): 816–853 (Scholar)
––– & B. Fitelson, 2012, “An ‘evidentialist’ worry about Joyce’s argument for Probabilism”, Dialectica, 66(3): 425–433. (Scholar)
Feldman, R., 2005, “Respecting the Evidence”, Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1): 95–119. (Scholar)
Fitelson, B. & K. Easwaran, 2015, “Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 5: 61–96. (Scholar)
Fitelson B. & D. McCarthy, 2014, “Toward an epistemic foundation for comparative confidence”, Presentation, University of Wisconsin-Madison. [Online version available here]. (Scholar)
Flores, C. & E. Woodard, forthcoming, “Epistemic Norms on Evidence–Gathering”, Philosophical Studies. (Scholar)
Foley, R., 1992, “The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 29(2): 111–121. (Scholar)
Fraassen, B.C. van, 1983, “Calibration: Frequency Justification for Personal Probability”, in R.S. Cohen & L. Laudan (eds.), Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
Gallow, J. D., 2019, “Learning and Value Change”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 19: 1–22. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Updating for Externalists”, Noûs, 55(3): 487–516. (Scholar)
Goldman, A.I., 1999, Knowledge in a Social World, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Good, I. J., 1967, “On the Principle of Total Evidence”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17(4):319–321. (Scholar)
Greaves, H., 2013, “Epistemic Decision Theory”, Mind, 122(488): 915–952. (Scholar)
Greaves, H. & D. Wallace, 2006, “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility”, Mind, 115(459): 607–632. (Scholar)
Hacking, I., 1967, “Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability”, Philosophy of Science, 34(4): 311–325. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1973, Thought, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Hájek, A., 2008, “Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(4): 793–819. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Fifteen Arguments against Hypothetical Frequentism”, Erkenntnis, 70: 211–235. (Scholar)
Hempel, C., 1962, “Deductive–Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation”, in H. Feigl and & G. Maxwell (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (vol. III), Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Horowitz, S., 2014, “Immoderately rational”, Philosophical Studies, 167: 41–56. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Accuracy and Educated Guesses” in T. Szabó Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume 6 Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “The Truth Problem for Permissivism”, Journal of Philosophy 116(5): 237–262. (Scholar)
Hughes, R. I. G. & B. C. van Fraassen, 1984, “Symmetry arguments in probability kinematics”, in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (Issue 2/Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers), pp. 851–869 doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1984.2.192543 (Scholar)
Hurwicz, L., 1952, “A criterion for decision making under uncertainty”, Cowles Commission Technical Report 355.
Huttegger, S.M., 2013, “In Defense of Reflection”, Philosophy of Science, 80(3): 413–433. (Scholar)
Ismael, J., 2008, “Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug”, Noûs, 42(2): 292–307. (Scholar)
Jaffray, J-Y., 1989, “Coherent bets under partially resolving uncertainty and belief functions”, Theory and Decision, 26: 90–105. (Scholar)
James, W., 1897, “The Will to Believe’, in The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, New York: Longmans Green. (Scholar)
Jeffrey, R., 1965, The Logic of Decision, New York: McGraw-Hill. (Scholar)
Jeffrey, R., 1983, The Logic of Decision (2^nd). Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Jenkins, C.S., 2007, “Entitlement and Rationality”, Synthese, 157: 25–45. (Scholar)
Joyce, J.M., 1998, “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Philosophy of Science, 65(4): 575–603. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief”, in F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief, Springer. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “The True Consequences of Epistemic Consequentialism”, in Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn 2018. (Scholar)
Kelley, M., 2019, Accuracy Dominance on Infinite Opinion Sets, MA Thesis, UC Berkeley. [Online version available here]. (Scholar)
Kelly, T., 2014, “Evidence Can Be Permissive”, in M. Steup, J. Turri, & E. Sosa (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
Kerbel, G., ms, “A New Approach to Scoring on the Educated Guessing Framework”, Unpublished manuscript. (Scholar)
Konek, J., 2016, “Probabilistic Knowledge and Cognitive Ability”, Philosophical Review, 125(4): 509–587. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “IP Scoring Rules: Foundations and Applications”, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, 103: 256–264. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “The Art of Learning” in T. Szabó Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume 7 Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Konek, J. & B.A. Levinstein, 2019, “The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory”, Mind, 128(509): 69–107. (Scholar)
Kopec, M., 2012, “We Ought to Agree: A Consequence of Repairing Goldman’s Group Scoring Rule”, Episteme, 9: 101–14. (Scholar)
Leitgeb, H., 2021, “A Structural Justification of Probabilism: From Partition Invariance to Subjective Probability”, Philosophy of Science, 88(2): 341–365. (Scholar)
Leitgeb, H. & R. Pettigrew, 2010a, “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy”, Philosophy of Science, 77: 201–235. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy”, Philosophy of Science, 77: 236–272. (Scholar)
Levinstein, B. A., 2012, “Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating”, Philosophy of Science, 79(3): 413–424. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “With All Due Respect: The Macro-Epistemology of Disagreement”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 15(3): 1–20. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “A Pragmatist’s Guide to Epistemic Utility”, Philosophy of Science 84(4): 613–638. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “An Objection of Varying Importance to Epistemic Utility Theory”, Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1157-9 (Scholar)
–––, 2023, “Accuracy, Deference, and Chance” Philosophical Review 132(1): 43–87. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1980, “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance”, in R.C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability (Vol. II). Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
Locke, J., 1689 [1975] An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch (ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Maher, P., 1993, Betting on Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism”, Philosophy of Science, 69(1): 73–81. (Scholar)
Mayo-Wilson, C. & G. Wheeler, 2016, “Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1): 55–78. (Scholar)
–––, ms., “Epistemic Decision Theory’s Reckoning”. Unpublished manuscript. [Online version available here]. (Scholar)
Meacham, C. J. G., 2018, “Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms”, in Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn 2018. (Scholar)
Moss, S., 2011, “Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise”, Mind, 120(480): 1053–1069. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Probabilistic Knowledge”, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Myrvold, W., 2012, “Epistemic values and the value of learning”, Synthese, 187: 547–568. (Scholar)
Nielsen, M., 2021, “Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization”, Philosophical Studies, 178(10): 3217–3236. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “On the Best Accuracy Arguments for Probabilism”, Philosophy of Science, 89(3): 621–630. (Scholar)
–––, 2023, “Accuracy and Probabilism in Infinite Domains” Mind, 132(526): 402–427. (Scholar)
Oddie, G., 1997, “Conditionalization, cogency, and cognitive value”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48(4): 533–541. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “What Accuracy Could Not Be”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 70(2): 551–580. (Scholar)
Paris, J. B., 1994, The Uncertain Reasoner’s Companion: A Mathematical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “A Note on the Dutch Book Method”, Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and their Applications Ithaca, NY: Shaker. (Scholar)
Pérez Carballo, A., 2018, “Good Questions”, in J. Dunn & K. Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pettigrew, R., 2010, “Modelling uncertainty”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 80. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle”, Episteme, 10(1): 19–35. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credence”, Philosophy Compass, 8(10): 897–908. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Accuracy and Evidence”, Dialectica. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Scholar)
–––, 2016a, Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2016b, “Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of ‘The Will to Believe’” Episteme 13(3): 253–268. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “On the Accuracy of Group Credences” in T. Szabó Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume 6 Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018a, “Making Things Right: the true consequences of decision theory in epistemology”, in Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn 2018. (Scholar)
–––, 2018b, “The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X”, Noûs, 52(2): 336–372. (Scholar)
–––, 2018c, “Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity”, Philosophy of Science, 89(1): 128–151. (Scholar)
–––, 2021a, “Logical ignorance and logical learning”, Synthese, 198(10): 9991–10020. (Scholar)
–––, 2021b, “On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation”, Synthese 199(5–6): 12407–12438. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2023, “Bayesian updating when what you learn might be false”, Erkenntnis 88(1): 309–324. (Scholar)
Predd, J., et al., 2009, “Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules”, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55(10): 4786–4792. (Scholar)
Quiggin, J., 1982, “A theory of anticipated utility”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3(4): 323–43.
Raidl, E. & W. Spohn, 2020, “An Accuracy Argument in Favor of Ranking Theory”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 49(2): 283–313. (Scholar)
Ramsey, F. P., 1926 [1931], “Truth and Probability”, in R. B. Braithwaite (ed.) The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. (Scholar)
Rescorla, M., 2022, “An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization”, Erkenntnis, 87(3): 1013–1041. (Scholar)
Rosenkrantz, R.D., 1981, Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press. (Scholar)
Rothschild, D., 2021, ‘Lockean Beliefs, Dutch Books, and Scoring Systems’, Erkenntnis, 88(5): 1979–1995. (Scholar)
Schervish, M. J., 1989, “A General Method for Comparing Probability Assessors“ The Annals of Statistics, 17(4): 1856–1879. (Scholar)
Schoenfield, M., 2014, “Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief”, Noûs, 48(2): 193–218. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Conditionalization does not (in general) Maximize Expected Accuracy”, Mind, 126(504): 1155–1187 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences”, Noûs, 51(4): 667–685. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Accuracy and Verisimilitude: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. doi:10.1093/bjps/axz032 (Scholar)
Seidenfeld, T., 1985, “Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules”, Philosophy of Science, 52(2): 274–294. (Scholar)
Seidenfeld, T., M.J. Schervish, & J.B. Kadane, 2012, “Forecasting with imprecise probabilities”, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 53: 1248–1261. (Scholar)
Shear, T. & B. Fitelson, 2019, “Two Approaches to Belief Revision” Erkenntnis 84(3): 487–518. (Scholar)
Spohn, W., 2012, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory & its Philosophical Applications, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Staffel, J. & G. de Bona, Forthcoming, “An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization”, Erkenntnis. (Scholar)
Sylvan, K., 2020, “An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism”, The Philosophical Review, 129(1): 1–51. (Scholar)
Talbot, B., 2022, I “Headaches for Epistemologists”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 104(2): 408–433. (Scholar)
van Fraassen, B. C., 1999, “Conditionalization, A New Argument For”, Topoi, 18(2): 93–96. (Scholar)
Vindrola, F. & V. Crupi, forthcoming, “Bayesians Too Should Follow Wason: A Comprehensive Accuracy–Based Analysis of the Selection Task”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. (Scholar)
Wald, A., 1945, “Statistical decision functions which minimize the maximum risk”, The Annals of Mathematics, 46(2): 265–280. (Scholar)
Walsh, S., ms., “Probabilism in Infinite Dimensions”. Unpublished manuscript. (Scholar)
White, R., 2009, “Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 3: 161–186. (Scholar)
Williams, J. R. G., 2012a, “Gradational accuracy and nonclassical semantics”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 5(4):513–537. (Scholar)
–––, 2012b, “Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and accuracy domination”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41(5):811–840. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Rational Illogicality”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(1): 127–141. (Scholar)
Williams, J. R. G. & R. Pettigrew, 2023, ‘Consequences of Calibration’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. (Scholar)
Williamson, T., 2000, Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wong, S.K.M., Yao, Y.Y., Bollmann, P., & Bürger, H.C., 1991, “Axiomatization of qualitative belief structure”, IEEE Transactions on System, Man, and Cybernetics, 21: 726–734. (Scholar)
Zollman, K. J. S., 2010, “The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity”, Erkenntnis 72(1): 17–35. (Scholar)

Generated Sun Sep 15 17:54:15 2024

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...