Primary Texts

• Annambhaṭṭa. Tarka-saṃgraha, Tr. Gopinath Bhattacharya. 1976. Tarkasaṃgraha-dīpikā on Tarkasaṃgraha by Annambhaṭṭa. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers. (Scholar)
• Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya, chapter 1. Tr. Joseph Ouseparampil. Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya Kāṇḍa 1. 2005. Pune: Indian Institute of Indology.
• Dharmakīrti. Nyāya-bindu. Tr. Alex Wayman. In A Millennium of Buddhist Logic, vol. 1, ed. Alex Wayman. 1999. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. (Scholar)
• –––. Pramāṇa-vārttika (with the commentary of Manorathanandin). Ed. Dvarikadas Sastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.
• –––. Pramāṇa-viniścaya, perception chapter. Tr. (from the Tibetan) Tillmann Vetter. 1966. Sitzungsberichte der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften 250, Band 3. Vienna: Bohlaus. (Scholar)
• –––. Vāda-nyāya. Tr. Pradeep P. Gokhale. 1993. Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti: The Logic of Debate. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. (Scholar)
• Dharmarāja Adhvarin. Vedānta-paribhāṣā. Tr. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri. 1971. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre. (Scholar)
• Dignāga. Pramāṇa-samuccaya, perception chapter. Tr. Masaaki Hattori. 1968. Dignāga on Perception. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Gaṅgeśa. Tattva-cintā-maṇi, the perception chapter. Tr. S. Phillips and N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. 2004. Epistemology of Perception. New York: American Institute for Buddhist Studies. Tattva-cintā-maṇi, the inference chapter (translated in part, piecemeal, by several scholars). Sanskrit text: ed. Kamakhyanath Tarkavagish. 1884–1901 (reprint 1991). 2 vols. Calcutta: The Asiatic Society. Tattva-cintā-maṇi, the anology chapter. Tr. S. Phillips (forthcoming).Tattva-cintā-maṇi, the testimony chapter. Tr. V.P. Bhatta. 2005. 2 vols. Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers. (Scholar)
• Gautama. Nyāya-sūtra, (with commentaries by Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, and Vācaspati Miśra). Nyāyadarśanam, ed. A.M. Tarkatirtha, Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha, and H.K. Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18. 1936–1944. Reprint, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985. Tr. (with commentaries by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara) Ganganatha Jha. 1912–1919. 4 vols. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. (Scholar)
• Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Nyāya-mañjarī. Tr. J.V. Bhattacharyya. 1978. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. (Scholar)
• Jayarāśi. Tattvopaplavasiṃha. Tr. Eli Franco. 1987. Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: A Study of Jayarāśi’s Scepticism. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. (Scholar)
• Kumārila. Śloka-vārttika, commentary on the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, the perception chapter. Tr. John Taber. 2005. A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: The “Determination of Perception” Chapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s Ślokavārttika. London: Routledge. Other chapters: tr. Ganganatha Jha. Ślokavārtika. 1900, 1908. Reprint, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. (Scholar)
• Mādhava. Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha. Tr. E.B. Cowell and A.E. Gough. 1906. The Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha: Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy by Mādhava Āchārya. Reprint, Delhi: Cosmo Publications. (Scholar)
• Nāgārjuna. Vigraha-vyāvartinī. Tr. Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya. 1978. The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. (Scholar)
• Śaṅkara. Brahma-sūtra Commentary. Tr. Georg Thibaut. Dover.
• Śrīharṣa. Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya. Tr. Ganganatha Jha. 1986 (reprint). Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya of Śrīharṣa. Delhi: Sri Satguru.
• Udayana. Nyāya-kusumāñjalī. Ed. Mahaprabhulal Goswami. 1972. Mithila Institite Ancient Texts Series 23. Darbhanga: Mithila Research Institute. (Scholar)

Secondary Literature

• Bagchi, Sitansusekhar, 1953. Inductive Reasoning: A Study of tarka and Its Role in Indian Logic, Calcutta: Munishchandra Sinha. (Scholar)
• Bhatt, Govardhan P., 1989. The Basic Ways of Knowing, 2nd ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. (Scholar)
• Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban, 1987. Doubt, Belief and Knowledge, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. (Scholar)
• Burge, T., 2005. “Disjunctivism and perceptual psychology,” Philosophical Topics, 33(1): 1–78. (Scholar)
• Burge, T., 2011. “Disjunctivism again,” Philosophical Explorations, 13(3): 43–80. (Scholar)
• Chadha, M., 2006. “Yet Another Attempt to Salvage Pristine Perceptions,” Philosophy East and West, 56(2): 333–342. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004. “Perceiving Particulars-as-such is Incoherent: A Reply to Mark Siderits,” Philosophy East and West, 54(3): 382–389. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001. “Perceptual Cognition: A Nyāya- Kantian Approach,” Philosophy East and West, 51(2): 197–209. (Scholar)
• Chakrabarti, Arindamm, 1994. “Telling as Letting Know,” in A. Chakrabarti and B.K. Matilal (eds.), 1994. (Scholar)
• –––, 2000. “Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating nirvikalpaka Perception from Nyāya,” Philosophy East and West, 50 (1): 1–8. (Scholar)
• –––, 2000. “Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvikalpaka Perception from Nyāya,” Philosophy East and West, 50(1): 1–8. (Scholar)
• Chakrabarti, Arindam and B. K. Matilal (eds.), 1994. Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• Chakrabarti, Kisor, 1995. Definition and Induction, Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999. Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyāya Dualist Tradition, Albany: State University of New York Press. (Scholar)
• Chaturvedi, A., 2020. “There is Something Wrong with Raw Perception, After All: Vyāsatīrtha’s Refutation of Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 48(1): 255–314. (Scholar)
• Das, N., 2021. “Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 49: 153–202. (Scholar)
• Dasti, M., & Phillips, S., 2010. “Pramāṇa are factive-a response to Jonardon Ganeri,” Philosophy East & West, 60(4): 535–540. (Scholar)
• Dasti, Matthew, 2012. “Parasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyāya Epistemology,” Philosophy East and West, 62(1): 1–15. (Scholar)
• Dreyfus, Georges B.J., 1997. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations, Albany: State University of New York Press. (Scholar)
• Ganeri, Jonardon, 1999. Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical India, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001a. Philosophy, in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• ––– (ed.), 2001b. Logic in India: A Reader, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010. “A study of Indian epistemology: questions of method–a reply to Matthew Dasti and Stephen H. Phillips,” Philosophy East & West, 60(4): 541–550. (Scholar)
• –––, 2011. The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450–1700, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• ––– (ed.), 2017. Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Gupta, Bina, 1998. The Disinterested Witness: A Fragment of Advaita Vedānta Phenomenology, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. (Scholar)
• Guha, Nirmalya, 2016. “On Arthāpatti,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 44: 757–776. (Scholar)
• Hamblin, C.L., 1970. Fallacies, London: Methuen. (Scholar)
• Hayes, Richard P., 1988. Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• Ingalls, Daniel H.H., 1951. Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Jha, Ganganatha, 1978 (reprint). The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
• Koons, Robert, 2013. “Defeasible Reasoning,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/reasoning-defeasible/>. (Scholar)
• Kumar, Shiv, 1980. Upamāna in Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers. (Scholar)
• Lindtner, Christian, 1986. Nāgārjuna, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
• Matilal, B.K., 1986. Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998. The Character of Logic in India, Jonardon Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari (eds.), Albany: State University of New York Press. (Scholar)
• Matilal, B.K. and R.D. Evans (eds.), 1986. Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• McDowell, J., 1996. Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2011, “Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism,” Philosophical Explorations, 13(3): 243–255. (Scholar)
• –––, 2013. “Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism,” Philosophical Explorations, 16(3): 259–279. (Scholar)
• Mohanty, J.N., 1992. Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought, Oxford: Clarenden. (Scholar)
• –––, 1994. “Is There an Irreducible Mode of Word-Generated Knowledge?” in A. Chakrabarti and B.K. Matilal (eds.) 1994. (Scholar)
• –––, 2000. Classical Indian Philosophy, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
• Oetke, Claus, 1996. “Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Non-Monotonic Reasoning,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 24: 447–539. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004. “The Role of the Example in Ancient Indian Logic,” in The Role of the Example (dṛṣṭānta) in Classical Indian Logic, Shoryu Katsura and Ernst Steinkellner (eds.), Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien. (Scholar)
• Perrett, Roy W., 2016. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Phillips, Stephen H., 1995. Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of “New Logic”, Chicago: Open Court. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001. “There’s Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception,” Philosophy East and West, 51(1): 104–13.
• –––, 2012. Epistemology in Classical India: The Knowledge Sources of the Nyāya School, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004. “Perceiving Particulars Blindly: Remarks on a Nyāya-Buddhist Debate,” Philosophy East and West, 54(3): 389–403. (Scholar)
• Potter, Karl H., 1984. “Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 12(4): 307–328. (Scholar)
• ––– (ed.), 1983+. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, 12 vols., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas. (Scholar)
• Prasad, Rajendra, 2002. Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Inference, New Delhi: Oxford. (Scholar)
• Raja, K. Kunjunni, 1969. Indian Theories of Meaning, 2nd edition, Madras: Adyar. (Scholar)
• Ram-Prasad, Chakravarthi, 2002. Advaita Metaphysics and Epistemology, London: Routledge Curzon. (Scholar)
• Rao, Srinivasa, 1998. Perceptual Error: The Indian Theories, Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press. (Scholar)
• Ruegg, David Seyfort, “Does the Madhyamika Have a Thesis and Philosophical Position,” in Matilal and Evans (eds.) 1986. (Scholar)
• Saha, Sukharanjan, 1991. Meaning, Truth and Predication: A Reconstruction of Nyāya Semantics, Calcutta: Jadavpur University and K.P. Bagchi and Company. (Scholar)
• –––, 2000. Epistemology in Pracīna and Navya Nyāya (Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy), Kolkata: Jadavpur University. (Scholar)
• Schayer, Stanislaw, 1933. “Studies in Indian Logic,” In Ganeri 2001b. (Scholar)
• Shaw, J. L., 2016. “Knowledge, Doubt, and Belief: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective,” in J. L. Shaw (ed.), The Collected Writings of Jaysankar Lal Shaw: Indian Analytic and Anglophone Philosophy, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 121–150. (Scholar)
• Siderits, Mark, 1991. Indian Philosophy of Language, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004. “Perceiving Particulars: A Buddhist Defense,” Philosophy East and West, 54(3): 367–382. (Scholar)
• Solomon, Ester, 1976. Indian Dialectics, 2 volumes. Ahmedabad: Gujarat Vidya Sabha. (Scholar)
• Staal, J.F., 1973. “The Concept of Pakṣa in Indian Logic,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2 (2): 156–167; reprinted in Ganeri 2001b. (Scholar)
• Steinkellner, Ernst, 1991. “On the Interpretation of the svabhāvahetu, in Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya,” in Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, E. Steinkellner (ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, 1989, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. (Scholar)
• Taber, John, 2004. “Is Indian Logic Nonmonotonic?” Philosophy East and West, 54 (2): 143–70. (Scholar)
• Tillemans, Tom J.F., 1999. Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and his Tibetan Successors, Boston: Wisdom Publications. (Scholar)
• Tuske, Joerg (ed.), 2017. Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics, London: Bloomsbury Academic. (Scholar)
• Vaidya, Anand, 2022. “Elements of Knowledge-First in Gaṅgeśa,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 7: 336–364. (Scholar)
• –––, 2020. “Multi-Factor Causal Disjunctivism: A Nyāya-Informed Account,” Sophia, 60(4): 917–40. (Scholar)
• –––, 2013. “Nyāya Perceptual Theory: Disjunctivism or Anti-Individualism?” Philosophy East and West, 63(4): 562–85. (Scholar)
• Westerhoff, Jan, 2010. Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī: Translation and Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Williamson, T., 2000. Knowledge and its Limits, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)