Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Epistemology in Latin America" by Diego Machuca

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Alchourrón, Carlos E., 1993, “Philosophical Foundations of Deontic Logic and the Logic of Defeasible Conditionals”, in J.-J. Meyer & R. J. Wieringa (eds.), Deontic Logic in Computer Science: Normative System Specifications, Chichester: Wiley and Sons, pp. 43–84. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Defeasible Logic: Demarcation and Affinities”, in Crocco, Fariñas del Cerro, & Herzig 1995: 67–102. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Detachment and Defeasibility in Deontic Logic”, Studia Logica, 57(1): 5–18. doi:10.1007/bf00370667 (Scholar)
Alchourrón, Carlos E., Peter Gärdenfors, & David Makinson, 1985, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50(2): 510–530. doi:10.2307/2274239 (Scholar)
Alchourrón, Carlos E. & David Makinson, 1982, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Contraction Functions and Their Associated Revision Functions”, Theoria, 48(1): 14–37. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1982.tb00480.x (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Safe Contraction”, Studia Logica, 44(4): 405–422. doi:10.1007/bf00370430 (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Maps between Some Different Kinds of Contraction Function: The Finite Case”, Studia Logica, 45(2): 187–198. doi:10.1007/bf00373274 (Scholar)
Alvarado, José Tomás & Agnaldo Portugal, forthcoming, Creative Research on the Existence and Nature of God: Contributions from Latin America, special issue of Religious Studies. (Scholar)
Arló-Costa, Horacio, 1990, “Conditionals and Monotonic Belief Revisions: The Success Postulate”, Studia Logica, 49(4): 557–566. doi:10.1007/bf00370165 (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Epistemic Conditionals, Snakes and Stars”, in Crocco, Fariñas del Cerro, & Herzig 1995: 193–239. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Racionalidad y teoría de la acción”, in Oscar Nudler & G. Klimovsky (eds.), La racionalidad y sus límites, Barcelona: Paidós, pp. 295–327. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated Systems”, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 96(1–3): 3–28. doi:10.1016/s0168-0072(98)00028-1 (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Bayesian Epistemology and Epistemic Conditionals: On the Status of the Export-Import Laws”, Journal of Philosophy, 98(11): 555–598. doi:10.2307/3649472 (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Rationally Choosing Beliefs: Some Open Questions”, Análisis Filosófico, 26(1): 93–114. (Scholar)
Arló-Costa, Horacio, John Collins, & Isaac Levi, 1995, “Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference”, Analysis, 55(1): 2–5. doi:10.2307/3328612 (Scholar)
Arló-Costa, Horacio & Eduardo Fermé, 2010, “Formal Epistemology and Logic”, in Nuccetelli, Schutte, & Bueno 2010: 482–495. (Scholar)
Arló-Costa, Horacio & Jeffrey Helzner, 2010, “Ambiguity Aversion: The Explanatory Power of Indeterminate Probabilities”, Synthese, 172(1): 37–55. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9475-2 (Scholar)
Arló-Costa, Horacio & Isaac Levi, 1996, “Two Notions of Epistemic Validity: Epistemic Models for Ramsey’s Conditionals”, Synthese, 109(2): 217–262. doi:10.1007/bf00413768 (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Contraction: On the Decision-Theoretical Origins of Minimal Change and Entrenchment”, Synthese, 152(1): 129–154. doi:10.1007/s11229-005-0351-4 (Scholar)
Arló-Costa, Horacio & Rohit Parikh, 2005, “Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 34(1): 97–119. doi:10.1007/s10992-004-5553-6 (Scholar)
Arló-Costa, Horacio & Arthur Paul Pedersen, 2012, “Belief and Probability: A General Theory of Probability Cores”, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 53(3): 293–315. doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2012.01.002 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Bounded Rationality: Models for Some Fast and Frugal Heuristics”, in Johan van Benthem, Amitabha Gupta, & Eric Pacuit (eds.), Games, Norms and Reasons: Logic at the Crossroads, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 1–21. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-0714-6_1 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Fast and Frugal Heuristics: Rationality and the Limits of Naturalism”, Synthese, 190(5): 831–850. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0188-6 (Scholar)
Arló-Costa, Horacio & Richmond H. Thomason, 2001, “Iterative Probability Kinematics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 30(5): 479–524. doi:10.1023/a:101227721 (Scholar)
Bueno, Otávio, 2005, “Davidson and Skepticism: How Not to Respond to the Skeptic”, Principia, 9: 1–18. [Bueno 2005 available online] (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Sosa on Skepticism”, Metaphilosophy, 40(2): 195–202. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01574.x (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Is the Pyrrhonist an Internalist?”, in Machuca 2011a: 179–192. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Disagreeing with the Pyrrhonist?”, in Machuca 2013a: 24–45. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Realism and Anti-Realism about Science: A Pyrrhonian Stance”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 5(2): 145–167. doi:10.1163/22105700-04031176 (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Neo-Pyrrhonism, Empiricism, and Scientific Activity”, Veritas, 66(1): 1–14. doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.42184 (Scholar)
Carnota, Raúl & Ricardo Rodríguez, 2010, “AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence”, in Erik J. Olsson & Sebastian Enqvist (eds.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 1–42. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8_1 (Scholar)
Chopra, S., R. Parikh, & R. Wassermann, 2001, “Approximate Belief Revision”, Logic Journal of the IGPL, 9(6): 755–768. doi:10.1093/jigpal/9.6.755 (Scholar)
Cohen, Stewart & Juan Comesaña, 2013a, “Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic”, Inquiry, 56(1): 15–29. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2013.775012 (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply”, Inquiry, 56(4): 400–415. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2013.816087 (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, “Rationality and Truth”, in Julien Dutant & F. Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Comesaña, Juan, 2005, “Unsafe Knowledge”, Synthese, 146(3): 393–402. doi:10.1007/s11229-004-6213-7 (Scholar)
–––, 2006a, “The Pyrrhonian Problematic”, in Donald M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2^nd edition, Detroit: Macmillan & Thompson-Gale, pp. 174–181. (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, “A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem”, Philosophical Studies, 129(1): 27–47. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-3020-z (Scholar)
–––, 2009a, “Escepticismo”, in D. Quesada (ed.), Cuestiones de Teoría del Conocimiento, Madrid: Tecnos. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, “What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 19(1): 1–20. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01326.x (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Evidentialist Reliabilism”, Noûs, 44(4): 571–600. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00748.x (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Can Contemporary Semantics Help the Pyrrhonian Get a Life?”, in Machuca 2011b: 217–240. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1991-0_12">10.1007/978-94-007-1991-0_12 (Scholar)
Comesaña, Juan & Matthew McGrath, 2014, “Having False Reasons”, in Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59–78. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.003.0004 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Perceptual Reasons”, Philosophical Studies, 173(4): 991–1006. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0542-x (Scholar)
Cresto, Eleonora, 1996a, “Naturalismo y escepticismo”, Revista de Filosofía y Teoría Política, 31–32: 439–447. (Scholar)
–––, 1996b, “Algunas estrategias naturalistas contra el escepticismo”, Revista de Filosofía (Argentina), 11: 21–33. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Escepticismo, verdad y confiabilidad”, Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 23(1): 93–125. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “A Model for Structural Changes of Belief”, Studia Logica, 88(3): 431–451. doi:10.1007/s11225-008-9112-y (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, “Epistemology”, in Nuccetelli, Schutte, & Bueno 2010: 468–481. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Belief and Contextual Acceptance”, Synthese, 177(1): 41–66. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9637-2 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Horacio Arló-Costa (1956–2011)”, Cuadernos de Filosofía, 57: 109–111. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency”, The Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41(6): 923–955. doi:10.1007/s10992-012-9225-7 (Scholar)
–––, 2015a, “El conocimiento grupal de agentes epistémicamente responsables”, Veritas, 60(3): 460–482. doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24269 (Scholar)
–––, 2015b, “Una teoría de la evidencia para el ámbito jurídico: probabilidades inciertas, decisiones y explicaciones”, in A. Páez (ed.), Hechos, evidencia y estándares de prueba. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica, Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, pp. 89–119. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “De la paradoja doctrinaria a la agregación de probabilidades: la aceptación de hipótesis en el ámbito jurídico”, in R. Villanueva, B. Marciani & P. Lastres (eds.), Ensayos sobre prueba, argumentación y justicia, Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, pp. 157–184. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Models and Modelling in Formal Epistemology: Some Thoughts on Probability Aggregation”, in H. Leitgeb, I. Niiniluoto, E. Sober & P. Seppälä (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Congress, London: College Publications, pp. 338–355. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Knowledge Attribution Revisited: A Deflationary Account”, Synthese, 195: 3737–3753. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1282-y (Scholar)
Crocco, G., Luis Fariñas del Cerro, & Andreas Herzig (eds.), 1995, Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science, (Studies in logic and computation, 5), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
de Almeida, Claudio, 2001, “What Moore’s Paradox Is About”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(1): 33–58. doi:10.2307/2653588 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons”, Acta Analytica, 22(4): 301–319. doi:10.1007/s12136-007-0013-x (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Racionalidade epistêmica e o Paradoxo de Moore”, Veritas, 54(2): 48–73. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Epistemic Closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility”, Synthese, 188(2): 197–215. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9923-7 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Stroud, Skepticism, and Knowledge-Claims”, Sképsis, 14: 40–56. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Knowledge, Benign Falsehoods, and the Gettier Problem”, in Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, & Peter D. Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 292–311. (Scholar)
de Almeida, Claudio & J.R. Fett, 2016, “Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(1): 152–169. doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1009127 (Scholar)
de Olaso, Ezequiel, 1974, “Objections inédites de Leibniz au principe sceptique de l’équipollence”, in Gerhard Funke (ed.), Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 52–59. (Scholar)
–––, 1977, “La crisis pirrónica de Hume”, Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 3(2): 131–143. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, “Otra vez sobre el escepticismo de Hume”, Manuscrito, 1(1): 65–82. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, “Praxis sans Théorie? La réfutation pragmatiste du pyrrhonisme selon un texte inédit de Leibniz”, Theoria cum Praxi: zum Verhältnis von Theorie und Praxis im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Akten des III. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, Band III: Logik, Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Metaphysik, Théologie (Studia Leibnitiana, Supplementa 21), Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, pp. 159–167. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, “La investigación y la verdad”, Manuscrito, 6(2): 45–62. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, “Leibniz y el escepticismo”, Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 10(3): 197–229. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Zetesis”, Manuscrito, 11(2): 7–32. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “El escepticismo y los límites de la caridad”, Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 18(2): 219–240. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Certeza y escepticismo”, in L. Villoro (ed.), El conocimiento (Enciclopedia Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Vol. 20), Madrid: Trotta, pp. 107–133. (Scholar)
Fermé, Eduardo L., 1998, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Contraction without Recovery”, Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 7(2): 127–137. doi:10.1023/a:1008241816078 (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Irrevocable Belief Revision and Epistemic Entrenchment”, Logic Journal of the IGPL, 8(5): 645–652. doi:10.1093/jigpal/8.5.645 (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Five Faces of Recovery”, in Mary-Anne Williams & Hans Rott (eds.), Frontiers in Belief Revision, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 247–259. doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9817-0_12 (Scholar)
Fermé, Eduardo L. & Sven Ove Hansson, 1999, “Selective Revision”, Studia Logica, 63(3): 331–342. doi:10.1023/a:1005294718935 (Scholar)
–––, (ed.), 2011, Special Issue on 25 Years of AGM Model, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 40(2). (Scholar)
Fermé, Eduardo, & Maurício D.L. Reis, 2013, “Epistemic Entrenchment-based Multiple Contractions”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 6(3): 460–487. doi:10.1017/s1755020313000105 (Scholar)
Fermé, Euardo, & Ricardo Rodríguez, 2006, “DFT and Belief Revision”, Análisis Filosófico, 26(2): 373–393. (Scholar)
Fogelin, Robert J., 1981, “Wittgenstein and Classical Scepticism”, International Philosophical Quarterly, 21(1): 3–15. doi:10.5840/ipq19812118 (Scholar)
Gabbay, Dov, Gabriella Pigozzi, & Odinaldo Rodrigues, 2006, “Belief Revision, Belief Merging and Voting”, in G. Bonanno, W. van der Hoek, & M. Wooldridge (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Games and Decision Theory (LOFT06), Liverpool: University of Liverpool Department of Computer Science, pp. 71–78. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Common Foundations for Belief Revision, Belief Merging and Voting”, in G. Bonanno, J. Delgrande, J. Lang, & H. Rott (eds.), Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents (Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07531), Dagstuhl: Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum für Informatik (IBFI). http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1217 (extended abstract) (Scholar)
Gabbay, Dov & Odinaldo Rodrigues, 1996, “Structured Databases: A Framework to Reason about Belief Change”, in A. Edalat, S. Jourdan, & G. McCusker (eds.), Advancing in Theory and Formal Methods of Computing, London: Imperial College Press, pp. 204–215. (Scholar)
Gabbay, Dov, Odinaldo Rodrigues, & Gabriella Pigozzi, 2009, “Connections between Belief Revision, Belief Merging and Social Choice”, Journal of Logic and Computation, 19(3): 445–446. doi:10.1093/logcom/exn013 (Scholar)
Gabbay, Dov, Odinaldo Rodrigues, & Alessandra Russo, 2008, “Belief Revision in Non-Classical Logics”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 1(3): 267–304. doi:10.1017/s1755020308080246 (Scholar)
Hansson, Sven Ove, 2011, “Logic of Belief Revision”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/logic-belief-revision/>. (Scholar)
Hansson, Sven Ove, & Renata Wassermann, 2002, “Local Change”, Studia Logica, 70(1): 49–76. doi:10.1023/a:1014654208944 (Scholar)
Holguín, Magdalena, 1997, Wittgenstein y el escepticismo, Cali: Editorial Universidad del Valle. (Scholar)
Hurtado, Guillermo, 1996, “El (supuesto) trilema del saber”, Crítica, 28(83): 131–136. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Por qué no soy falibilista”, Crítica, 32(96): 59–97. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “¿Saber sin verdad? Objeciones a un argumento de Villoro”, Crítica, 35(103): 121–134. (Scholar)
Katsuno, Hirofumi & Alberto O. Mendelzon, 1989, “A Unified View of Propositional Knowledge Base Updates”, in IJCAI’89 Proceedings of the 11th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., vol. 2, pp. 1413–1419. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Propositional Knowledge Base Revision and Minimal Change”, Artificial Intelligence, 52(3): 263–294. doi:10.1016/0004-3702(91)90069-v (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “On the Difference between Updating a knowledge Database and Revising It”, in Peter Gärdenfors (ed.), Belief Revision, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 182–203. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511526664.007 (Scholar)
Machuca, Diego E. (ed.), 2011a, New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism, Leiden: Brill. (Scholar)
–––, (ed.), 2011b, Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, Dordrecht: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1991-0 (Scholar)
–––, (ed.), 2013a, Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “A Neo-Pyrrhonian Approach to the Epistemology of Disagreement”, in Machuca 2013a: 66–89. (Scholar)
–––, 2015a, “Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 40: 23–39. doi:10.5840/jpr2015102631 (Scholar)
–––, 2015b, “Conciliationism and the Menace of Scepticism”, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 54(3): 469–488. doi:10.1017/s0012217315000347 (Scholar)
–––, 2017a, “A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing about Disagreement Argument”, Synthese, 194(5): 1663–1680. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-1012-x (Scholar)
–––, 2017b, “Disagreement-Based Skepticism”, Syndicate Philosophy, 1(1). (Scholar)
–––, 2022, Pyrrhonism Past and Present: Inquiry, Disagreement, Self-Knowledge, and Rationality, Cham: Springer. (Scholar)
Margutti Pinto, Paulo R., 1996, “Sobre a natureza da filosofia: Wittgenstein e o pirronismo”, Kriterion, 93: 164–183. (Scholar)
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–––, 2014, “Justificación y persuasión en Sobre la certeza”, in R. Mélendez, J. Morales, L. Murillo, & A. Pinzón (eds.), Imágenes de la mente en el mundo natural, Bogotá: Editorial Universidad Nacional de Colombia, pp. 107–131. (Scholar)
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–––, 1998, Belief, Personal, and Propositional Knowledge (Creer, saber, conocer), translated by D. Sosa and Douglas McDermid, Amsterdam & Atlanta: Rodopi. (Scholar)
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–––, 2012, “El principio de cierre lógico del conocimiento y el escepticismo”, Praxis Filosófica, 35: 97–110. (Scholar)

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