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• –––, 2009, Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II: Reflective Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.001.0001 (Scholar)
• –––, 2015, “Virtue epistemology: Character versus competence”, in Alfano 2015: 62–74. (Scholar)
• –––, 2021, Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What it Explains, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Stanley, Jason, 2005, Knowledge and practical interests, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Sterelny, Kim, 2010, “Minds: Extended or scaffolded?” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4): 465–481. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9174-y (Scholar)
• Stocker, Michael, 2010, “Intellectual and other nonstandard emotions”, in Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Thagard, Paul R., 2002, “The passionate scientist: Emotion in scientific cognition”, In P. Carruthers, S. Stich, and M. Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Turri, John, 2011, “Manifest failure: the Gettier problem solved”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 11(8): 1–11. (Scholar)
• –––, 2013, “Bi-level virtue epistemology”, in Virtuous thoughts: the philosophy of Ernest Sosa, John Turri (ed.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 147–164. (Scholar)
• –––, 2015a, “From virtue epistemology to abilism: theoretical and empirical developments”, in Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel, and William Fleeson (eds.), Character: new directions from philosophy, psychology, and theology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 315–330. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190204600.003.0015 (Scholar)
• –––, 2015b, “Understanding and the Norm of Explanation”, Philosophia, 43(4), 1171–1175. doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9655-x (Scholar)
• –––, 2015c, “Unreliable knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90(3): 529–545. doi:10.1111/phpr.12064 (Scholar)
• –––, 2016a, “A new paradigm for epistemology: from reliabilism to abilism”, Ergo, 3(8), 189–231. doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.008
• –––, 2016b, “Epistemic contextualism: An idle hypothesis”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(1): 141–156. doi:10.1080/00048402.2016.1153684 (Scholar)
• –––, 2016c, “Knowledge and assertion in ‘Gettier’ cases”, Philosophical Psychology, 29(5): 759–775. doi:10.1080/09515089.2016.1154140 (Scholar)
• –––, 2016d, “Vision, knowledge, and assertion”, Consciousness and Cognition, 41(C): 41–49. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2016.01.004 (Scholar)
• –––, 2017, “Epistemic situationism and cognitive ability”, in Fairweather & Alfano 2017: 158–167. doi:DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199688234.003.0009 (Scholar)
• Turri, John, Wesley Buckwalter, & Peter Blouw, 2014, “Knowledge and luck”, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22(2): 378–390. (Scholar)
• Washington, N., 2016, “I don’t want to change your mind: A reply to Sherman”, Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 5(3): 10–14.
• Watson, James D., 1969, The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA, New York: New American Library. (Scholar)
• Watson, Lani, 2015, “What is inquisitiveness?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 52(3): 273–88. (Scholar)
• Whitcomb, Dennis, 2010, “Curiosity was framed”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(3): 664–687. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00394.x (Scholar)
• Whitcomb, Dennis, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-Snyder, 2015, “Intellectual humility: Owning our limitations”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94(3): 509–539. doi:10.1111/phpr.12228 (Scholar)
• Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, 1996, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “What is Knowledge?” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, John Greco and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, “Recovering Understanding”, in Steup 2001: 236–252. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good”, Metaphilosophy, 34(1–2): 12–28. doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00257 (Scholar)
• –––, 2009, On Epistemology, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. (Scholar)

Collections

• Alfano, Mark (ed.), 2015, Current Controversies in Virtue Theory, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Alfano, Mark, Klein, Colin, and de Ridder, Jeroen. (2022). Social Virtue Epistemology, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Axtell, Guy (ed.), 2000, Knowledge, Belief and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
• Brady, Michael S. and Duncan H. Pritchard (eds.), 2003, Moral and Epistemic Virtues, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
• DePaul, Michael and Linda Zagzebski (eds.), 2003, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Fairweather Abrol (ed.), 2014, Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Cham: Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3 (Scholar)
• Fairweather, Abrol and Mark Alfano (eds.), 2017, Epistemic Situationism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688234.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Fairweather, Abrol and Owen Flanagan (eds.), 2014, Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Fairweather, Abrol and Linda Zagzebski (eds.), 2001, Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Greco, John (ed.), 2004, Ernest Sosa and his Critics, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (ed.), 1996, Warrant in Contemporary Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
• Steup, Matthias (ed.), 2001, Knowledge, Truth and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility and Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195128923.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Villanueva, Enrique (ed.), 1994, Truth and Rationality, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. (Scholar)

Dedicated Journal Issues

• Metaphilosophy, 34(1–2), (2003)
• Metaphilosophy, 41(1–2), (2010)
• The Monist, 99(2), (2016).
• Noûs, 27(1), (1993).
• Philosophical Issues, 5 (1994).
• Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60(1), (2000).
• Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(2), (2003).
• Philosophical Papers, 37(3), (2008).
• Philosophical Studies, 78 (1995).
• Philosophical Studies, 130(1), (2006).
• Philosophical Studies, 143(3), (2009).
• Philosophical Studies, 143(4), (2009).
• Teorema, 27(1), (2009) (in Spanish). (Scholar)

Other Important Works

• Axtell, Guy, 1998, “The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in the Reunification of Epistemology”, The Monist, 81(3): 488–508. doi:10.5840/monist199881325 (Scholar)
• BonJour, Laurence and Ernest Sosa, 2003, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Carter, Joseph Adam, 2009, “Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety’s (Recent) Discontents”,, Philosophia 38(3): 517–532. doi:10.1007/s11406-009-9219-z (Scholar)
• Code, Lorraine, 1984, “Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45(1): 29–50. doi:10.2307/2107325 (Scholar)
• Driver, Julia, 1989, “The Virtues of Ignorance”, Journal of Philosophy, 86(7): 373–84. doi: 10.2307/2027146 (Scholar)
• Greco, John, 1994, “Virtue Epistemology and the Relevant Sense of ‘Relevant Possibility’”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 32(1): 61–77. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1994.tb00703.x (Scholar)
• Grimm, S.R., 2001, “Ernest Sosa, Knowledge and Understanding” Philosophical Studies, 106(3): 171–191. doi:10.1023/a:1013354326246 (Scholar)
• Haddock, Adrian, Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), 2009, Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Henderson, David K., 1994, “Epistemic Competence”, Philosophical Papers, 23(3): 139–167. doi:10.1080/05568649409506420 (Scholar)
• –––, 2008, “Testimonial Belief and Epistemic Competence”, Noûs, 42(2): 190–221. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00678.x (Scholar)
• Henderson, David and Terry Horgan, 2009, “Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions”, in Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf, and Karsten Stüber, (eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, Berlin: DeGruyter, pp. 296–319. (Scholar)
• Hibbs, Thomas S., 2001, “Aquinas, Virtue and Recent Epistemology”, Review of Metaphysics, 52(3): 573–594. (Scholar)
• Hookway, Christopher, 1993, “Mimicking Foundationalism: on Sentiment and Self-control”, European Journal of Philosophy, 1(2): 155–173. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.1993.tb00030.x (Scholar)
• –––, 1994, “Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2(2): 211–227. doi:10.1080/09672559408570791 (Scholar)
• Kelp, Christoph, 2009, “Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17(4): 583–587. doi:10.1080/09672550903164426 (Scholar)
• –––, 2009, “Knowledge and Safety”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 34: 21–31. doi:10.5840/jpr_2009_1 (Scholar)
• –––, 2009, “Pritchard on Knowledge, Safety and Cognitive Achievements”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 34: 51–53. doi:10.5840/jpr_2009_6 (Scholar)
• Lepock, Christopher, 2011, “Unifying the Intellectual Virtues”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83(1): 106–128. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00425.x (Scholar)
• Kvanvig, J., 2011, “Virtue Epistemology”, in the Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Duncan Pritchard and Sven Bernecker (eds.), London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Montmarquet, James A., 1987, “Epistemic Virtue”, Mind, 96(384): 482–497. doi:10.1093/mind/xcvi.384.482 (Scholar)
• Napier, Stephen E., 2008, Virtue Epistemology: Motivation and Knowledge, New York: Continuum Press. (Scholar)
• Pritchard, Duncan, 2003, “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck”, Metaphilosophy, 34(1–2): 106–30. doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00263 (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, What is This Thing Called Knowledge?, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• –––, 2009, Knowledge, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis”, Synthese, 175(S1): 133–151. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9738-y (Scholar)
• Sosa, Ernest, 1985, “The Coherence of Virtue and the Virtue of Coherence: Justification in Epistemology”, Synthese, 64(1): 3–28. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, “Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology”, Noûs, 27(1): 51–65. doi:10.2307/2215895 (Scholar)
• –––, 1997, “How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic: A Lesson form Descartes”, Philosophical Studies, 85(2–3): 229–249. doi:10.1023/a:1004254711671 (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore”, Noûs (Philosophical Perspectives), 33(S13): 141–55. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.7 (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “Beyond Internal Foundations to External Virtues”, in Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Taliaferro, Charles, 2001, “The Virtues of Embodiment”, Philosophy, 76(1): 111–125. doi:10.1017/s0031819101000079 (Scholar)
• Vaesen, Krist, 2011, “Knowledge Without Credit, Exhibit 4: Extended Cognition”, Synthese, 181(3): 515–529. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9744-0 (Scholar)
• Wood, W. Jay, 1998, Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous, Grand Rapids, MI: Intervarsity Press. (Scholar)
• Zagzebski, Linda, 1997, “Virtue in Ethics and Epistemology”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 71(Supplement): 1–17. doi: 10.5840/acpaproc19977110 (Scholar)
• –––, 2005, “Virtue Epistemology” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)