The abbreviations CDE-1 and CDE-2 refer to Steup & Sosa 2005 and Steup, Turri, & Sosa 2013, respectively. For more information, see the listings for these two works in the alphabetical list of references below.

• Adler, Jonathan Eric, 2002, Belief’s Own Ethics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
• Albritton, Rogers, 2011, “On a Form of Skeptical Argument from Possibility”, Philosophical Issues, 21: 1–24. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00195.x (Scholar)
• Alston, William P., 1971 [1989], “Varieties of Privileged Access”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 8(3): 223–241. Reprinted in Alston 1989: 249–285. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985 [1989], “Concepts of Epistemic Justification”:, Monist, 68(1): 57–89. Reprinted in Alston 1989: 81–114. doi:10.5840/monist198568116 (Scholar)
• –––, 1988 [1989], “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification”, Philosophical Perspectives, 2: 257–299. Reprinted in Alston 1989: 115–152. doi:10.2307/2214077 (Scholar)
• –––, 1989, Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1991, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, The Reliability of Sense Perception, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “Perceptual Knowledge”, in Greco and Sosa 1999: 221–242. doi:10.1002/9781405164863.ch10">10.1002/9781405164863.ch10 (Scholar)
• Anderson, Elizabeth, 2004, “Uses of Value Judgments in Science: A General Argument, with Lessons from a Case Study of Feminist Research on Divorce”, Hypatia, 19(1): 1–24. doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2004.tb01266.x (Scholar)
• Armstrong, D. M., 1973, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511570827 (Scholar)
• Axtell, Guy (ed.), 2000, Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory), Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
• Audi, Robert, 1993, The Structure of Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1997, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “Moral Knowledge and Ethical Pluralism”, in Greco and Sosa 1999: 271–302. doi:10.1002/9781405164863.ch12 (Scholar)
• –––, 2000, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9781139164528 (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Audi, Robert and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 1997, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, (Point/Counterpoint), Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. (Scholar)
• Austin, J.L., 1946, “Symposium: Other Minds II”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 20: 148–187; reprinted as “Other Minds 1” in his Philosophical Papers, J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (eds.), third edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, 76–116. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/20.1.122 doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0004 (Scholar)
• –––, 1962, Sense and Sensibilia, G. J. Warnock (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Ayer, Alfred J., 1940, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, New York: Macmillan. (Scholar)
• –––, 1956, The Problem of Knowledge, London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
• Basu, Rima, 2018, “Can Beliefs Wrong?”:, Philosophical Topics, 46(1): 1–17. doi:10.5840/philtopics20184611 (Scholar)
• –––, 2019, “What We Epistemically Owe to Each Other”, Philosophical Studies, 176(4): 915–931. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1219-z (Scholar)
• Bengson, John, 2015, “The Intellectual Given”, Mind, 124(495): 707–760. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv029 (Scholar)
• Bengson, John and Marc A. Moffett, 2011, Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Berker, Selim, 2008, “Luminosity Regained”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 8: article 2. [Berker 2008 available online] (Scholar)
• –––, 2013, “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions”, Philosophical Review, 122(3): 337–393. doi:10.1215/00318108-2087645 (Scholar)
• Blome-Tillmann, Michael, 2014, Knowledge and Presuppositions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Boër, Stephen and William Lycan, 1975, “Knowing Who”, Philosophical Studies, 28(5): 299–344. doi:10.1007/bf00381575 (Scholar)
• Boghossian, Paul A., 2001, “How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?”, Philosophical Studies, 106(1/2): 1–40. doi:10.1023/a:1013141719930 (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “Blind Reasoning”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 77: 225–248. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00110 (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287185.001.0001 (Scholar)
• –––, 2008, “Epistemic Rules”:, Journal of Philosophy, 105(9): 472–500. doi:10.5840/jphil2008105929 (Scholar)
• –––, 2014, “What Is Inference?”, Philosophical Studies, 169(1): 1–18. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9903-x (Scholar)
• Boghossian, Paul and Christopher Peacocke (eds.), 2000, New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199241279.001.0001 (Scholar)
• BonJour, Laurence, 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998, In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625176 (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism”, in Greco and Sosa 1999: 117–142. doi:10.1002/9781405164863.ch4 (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, “Towards a Defense of Empirical Foundationalism”, in DePaul 2001: 21–38. (Scholar)
• –––, 2002, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
• BonJour, Laurence and Michael Devitt, 2005 [2013], “Is There a Priori Knowledge?”, CDE-1: 98–121 (chapter 4); second edition in CDE-2: 177–201 (chapter 8). Includes replies by each to the other:
  • BonJour, Laurence, “In Defense of the a Priori”, CDE-1: 98–104; CDE-2: 177–184. (Scholar)
  • Devitt, Michael, “There is no a Priori”, CDE-1: 105–115; CDE-2: 185–194. (Scholar)
• BonJour, Laurence and Ernest Sosa, 2003, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Bordo, Susan, 1990, The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture, Albany, NY: SUNY Press. (Scholar)
• Boyle, Matthew, 2009, “Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78(1): 133–164. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00235.x (Scholar)
• Brady, Michael and Duncan Pritchard, 2003, Moral and Epistemic Virtues, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Brady, Michael S. and Miranda Fricker (eds.), 2016, The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759645.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Brewer, Bill, 1999, Perception and Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199250456.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Brewer, Bill and Alex Byrne, 2005, “Does Perceptual Experience Have Conceptual Content?”, CDE-1: 217–250 (chapter 8). Includes:
  • Brewer, Bill, “Perceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content”, CDE-1: 217–230. (Scholar)
  • Byrne, Alex, “Perception and Conceptual Content”, CDE-1: 231–250. (Scholar)
• Brogaard, Berit, 2009, “The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism, or, How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth”, in Epistemic Value, Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 284–306. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0014 (Scholar)
• Brown, Jessica, 2008a, “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning”, Noûs, 42(2): 167–189. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x (Scholar)
• –––, 2008b, “The Knowledge Norm for Assertion”, Philosophical Issues, 18: 89–103. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00139.x (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Knowledge and Assertion”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(3): 549–566. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00369.x (Scholar)
• –––, 2018, Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801771.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Buchanan, Ray and Dogramaci, Sinan, forthcoming, “Beliefs about Probability”, Journal of Philosophy. [Author preprint of Buchanan & Dogramaci forthcoming available online] (Scholar)
• Burge, Tyler, 1993, “Content Preservation”, The Philosophical Review, 102(4): 457–488. doi:10.2307/2185680 (Scholar)
• Casullo, Albert, 2003, A Priori Justification, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Chisholm, Roderick M., 1966 [1977/1989], Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Second edition 1977. Third edition 1989. (Scholar)
• –––, 1982, The Foundations of Knowing, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
• Chrisman, Matthew, 2008, “Ought to Believe”, Journal of Philosophy, 105(7): 346–370. doi:10.5840/jphil2008105736 (Scholar)
• –––, 2012, “The Normative Evaluation of Belief and The Aspectual Classification of Belief and Knowledge Attributions”:, Journal of Philosophy, 109(10): 588–612. doi:10.5840/jphil20121091029 (Scholar)
• Chudnoff, Elijah, 2013, Intuition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199683000.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Clarke, Thompson, 1972, “The Legacy of Skepticism”, The Journal of Philosophy, 69(20): 754–769. doi:10.2307/2024672 (Scholar)
• Cohen, Stewart, 1988, “How to Be a Fallibilist”, Philosophical Perspectives, 2: 91–123. doi:10.2307/2214070 (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons”, Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 57–89. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.3 (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, “Contextualism Defended: Comments on Richard Feldman’s ‘Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions’”, Philosophical Studies, 103(1): 87–98. doi:10.1023/a:1010345123470 (Scholar)
• –––, 2002, “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 309–329. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00204.x (Scholar)
• –––, 2013, “Contextualism Defended”, in Steup, Sosa, and Turri 2013: 56–62. (Scholar)
• Comesaña, Juan, 2005a, “Unsafe Knowledge”, Synthese, 146(3): 395–404. doi:10.1007/s11229-004-6213-7 (Scholar)
• –––, 2005b, “We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now”, Philosophical Perspectives, 19: 59–76. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00053.x (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, “A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem”, Philosophical Studies, 129(1): 27–47. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-3020-z (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Evidentialist Reliabilism”, Noûs, 44(4): 571–600. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00748.x (Scholar)
• Comesaña, Juan and Holly Kantin, 2010, “Is Evidence Knowledge?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(2): 447–454. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00323.x (Scholar)
• Comesaña, Juan and Matthew McGrath, 2016, “Perceptual Reasons”, Philosophical Studies, 173(4): 991–1006. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0542-x (Scholar)
• Conee, Earl, 1988, “The Basic Nature of Epistemic Justification”:, Monist, 71(3): 389–404. doi:10.5840/monist198871327 (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, “The Truth Connection”, in Conee and Feldman 2004: 242–258. (Scholar)
• –––, 2013, “Contextualism Contested”, in Steup, Sosa, and Turri 2013: 47–56. (Scholar)
• Conee, Earl and Richard Feldman, 1998 [2004], “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism”, Philosophical Studies, 89(1): 1–29. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman 2004: 135–165. doi:10.1023/A:1004243308503 (Scholar)
• Conee, Earl and Richard Feldman, 2001 [2004], “Internalism Defended”, in Kornblith 2001: 231–60. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman 2004: 53–82. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001 (Scholar)
• –––, 2008, “Evidence”, in Q. Smith 2008: chapter 4. (Scholar)
• Craig, Edward, 1990, Knowledge and the State of Nature : An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198238797.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Dancy, Jonathan, 1985, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• David, Marian, 2001, “Truth and the Epistemic Goal”, in Steup 2001a: 151–169. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Donald, 1986, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Ernest LePore (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 307–319. (Scholar)
• DePaul, Michael R. (ed.), 2001, Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory), Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
• DeRose, Keith, 1991, “Epistemic Possibilities”, The Philosophical Review, 100(4): 581–605. doi:10.2307/2185175 (Scholar)
• –––, 1992, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52(4): 913–929. doi:10.2307/2107917 (Scholar)
• –––, 1995, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”, The Philosophical Review, 104(1): 1–52. doi:10.2307/2186011 (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense”, in Greco and Sosa 1999: 187–205. doi:10.1002/9781405164863.ch8 (Scholar)
• –––, 2002, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context”, The Philosophical Review, 111(2): 167–203. doi:10.2307/3182618 (Scholar)
• –––, 2005, “Direct Warrant Realism”, in God and the Ethics of Belief, Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 150–172. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511499166.008 [DeRose 2005 draft available online] (Scholar)
• –––, 2009, The Case for Contextualism, (Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.001.0001 (Scholar)
• DeRose, Keith and Ted A. Warfield, 1999, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Devitt, Michael, 2014, “We Don’t Learn about the World by Examining Concepts”, in Neta (ed.) 2014: 23–33. (Scholar)
• Dodd, Dylan and Elia Zardini (eds.), 2014, Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Dogramaci, Sinan, 2012, “Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94(3): 513–530. (Scholar)
• –––, 2015, “Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning”, Noûs, 49(4): 776–799. (Scholar)
• Dotson, Kristie, 2014, “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression”, Social Epistemology, 28(2): 115–138. doi:10.1080/02691728.2013.782585 (Scholar)
• Dretske, Fred I., 1970, “Epistemic Operators”, The Journal of Philosophy, 67(24): 1007–1023. doi:10.2307/2024710 (Scholar)
• –––, 1971, “Conclusive Reasons”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49(1): 1–22. doi:10.1080/00048407112341001 (Scholar)
• –––, 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
• Dretske, Fred and John Hawthorne, 2005 [2013], “Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment?”, in CDE-1: 13–46 (chapter 1). Second edition in CDE-2: 27–59 (chapter 2). Includes:
  • Dretske, Fred, “The Case Against Closure”, CDE-1: 13–26; CDE-2: 27–40. (Scholar)
  • Hawthorne, John, “The Case for Closure”, CDE-1: 26–43; CDE-2: 40–56. (Scholar)
• Easwaran, Kenny, 2017, “The Tripartite Role of Belief: Evidence, Truth, and Action”, Res Philosophica, 94(2): 189–206. doi: (Scholar)
• Egan, Andy, John Hawthorne, and Brian Weatherson, 2005, “Epistemic Modals in Context”, in Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 131–170. (Scholar)
• Elga, Adam, 2000, “Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem”, Analysis, 60(2): 143–147. doi:10.1093/analys/60.2.143 (Scholar)
• –––, 2007, “Reflection and Disagreement”, Noûs, 41(3): 478–502. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 10: article 5. [Elga 2010 available online] (Scholar)
• Elgin, Catherine Z., 1996, Considered Judgment, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Elgin, Catherine Z. and James Van Cleve, 2005 [2013], “Can Beliefs Be Justified through Coherence Alone?”, in CDE-1: 156–180 (chapter 6); second edition in CDE-2: 244– 273 (chapter 10). Includes and replies by both to each other (CDE-2 only):
  • Elgin Catherine, Z., “Non-Foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability”, CDE-1: 156–167; CDE-2: 244–255. (Scholar)
  • Van Cleve, James, “Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism”, CDE-1: 168–180; CDE-2: 255–267. (Scholar)
• Engel, Mylan, 1992, “Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 30(2): 59–75. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb01715.x (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, “What’s Wrong with Contextualism, and a Noncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox”, Erkenntnis, 61(2–3): 203–231. doi:10.1007/s10670-004-9278-2 (Scholar)
• Fantl, Jeremy and Matthew McGrath, 2009, Knowledge in an Uncertain World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Feldman, Fred, 1986, A Cartesian Introduction to Philosophy, New York: McGraw Hill. (Scholar)
• Feldman, Richard, 1988, “Epistemic Obligations”, Philosophical Perspectives, 2: 235–256. doi:10.2307/2214076 (Scholar)
• –––, 1999a, “Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology”, in Greco and Sosa 1999: 170–186. doi:10.1002/9781405164863.ch7 (Scholar)
• –––, 1999b, “Contextualism and Skepticism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 91–114. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.4 (Scholar)
• –––, 2001a, “Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation”, in Steup 2001a: 77–92. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001b, “Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions”, Philosophical Studies, 103(1): 61–85. doi:10.1023/a:1010393022562 (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, Epistemology, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
• Feldman, Richard and Earl Conee, 1985, “Evidentialism”, Philosophical Studies, 48(1): 15–34. doi:10.1007/bf00372404 (Scholar)
• Firth, Roderick, 1978 [1998], “The Schneck Lectures, Lecture 1: Epistemic Utility”, in Firth 1998: 317–333. First delivered as a lecture at the University of Arizona, 1978. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998, In Defense of Radical Empiricism: Essays and Lectures, John Troyer (ed.), Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
• Fraser, Rachel Elizabeth, 2016, “Risk, Doubt, and Transmission”, Philosophical Studies, 173(10): 2803–2821. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0638-y (Scholar)
• Friedman, Jane, 2013a, “Suspended Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, 162(2): 165–181. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y (Scholar)
• –––, 2013, “Question-Directed Attitudes”, Philosophical Perspectives, 27: 145–174. doi:10.1111/phpe.12026 (Scholar)
• –––, 2017, “Why Suspend Judging?”, Noûs, 51(2): 302–326. doi:10.1111/nous.12137 (Scholar)
• –––, 2018, “Junk Beliefs and Interest-Driven Epistemology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97(3): 568–583. doi:10.1111/phpr.12381 (Scholar)
• –––, 2019, “Inquiry and Belief”, Noûs, 53(2): 296–315. doi:10.1111/nous.12222 (Scholar)
• Foley, Richard, 1987, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Fricker, Elizabeth, 1994, “Against Gullibility”, in Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 125–161. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2_8 (Scholar)
• Fricker, Miranda, 2007, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Fumerton, Richard A., 1995, Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory), Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, “Classical Foundationalism”, in DePaul 2001: 3–20. (Scholar)
• Gardiner, Georgi, 2022, “Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention”, in Social Virtue Epistemology Epistemology, Mark Alfano, Colin Klein, and Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), London: Routledge, 48–72. (Scholar)
• Gettier, Edmund L., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23(6): 121–123. doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121 (Scholar)
• Gendler, Tamar Szabó and John Hawthorne, 2005, “The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies”, Philosophical Studies, 124(3): 331–352. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-7779-8 (Scholar)
• Gertler, Brie, 2011, Self-Knowledge, (New Problems of Philosophy), New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Gibbard, Allan, 2008, “Rational Credence and the Value of Truth”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Volume 2), Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 143–64. (Scholar)
• Ginet, Carl, 1975, Knowledge, Perception and Memory, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-9451-1 (Scholar)
• –––, 1980, “Knowing Less by Knowing More”, Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 5: 151–162. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00402.x (Scholar)
• Goldberg, Sanford C., 2015, “What Is the Subject-Matter of the Theory of Epistemic Justification?”, in Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology, David K. Henderson and John Greco (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 204–223. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.003.0009 (Scholar)
• Goldman, Alvin I., 1976, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”, The Journal of Philosophy, 73(20): 771–791. doi:10.2307/2025679 (Scholar)
• –––, 1979, “What Is Justified Belief?”, in Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, George Sotiros Pappas (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 1–23. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1 (Scholar)
• –––, 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology”, in Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 271–295. doi:10.2307/1522948 (Scholar)
• –––, 1999a, “Internalism Exposed”:, Journal of Philosophy, 96(6): 271–293. doi:10.2307/2564679 (Scholar)
• –––, 1999b, Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001 (Scholar)
• Greco, John, 1993, “Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23(3): 413–432. doi:10.1080/00455091.1993.10717329 (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “Agent Reliabilism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 273–296. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.13 (Scholar)
• –––, 2000, Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511527418 (Scholar)
• Greco, John and Richard Feldman, 2005 [2013], “Is Justification Internal?”, in CDE-1: 257–284 (chapter 9); second edition in CDE-2: 324–362 (chapter 13). Includes:
  • Greco, John, “Justification is Not Internal”, CDE-1: 257–270; CDE-2: 325–337. (Scholar)
  • Feldman, Richard, “Justification is Internal”, CDE-1: 270–284; CDE-2: 337–362. (Scholar)
• Greco, John and Ernest Sosa (eds.), 1999, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Oxford, UK: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781405164863 (Scholar)
• Gupta, Anil, 2019, Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Haack, Susan, 1993, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, “‘The Ethics of Belief’ Reconsidered”, in Steup 2001a: 21–33. (Scholar)
• Harman, Gilbert, 1973, Thought, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
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