Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Ethics of Belief" by Andrew Chignell

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Adler, Jonathan, 2002, Belief's own ethics, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT. (Scholar)
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Ahlstrom-Vij, K., 2013, “In defense of veritistic value monism”, Pacific Philosophical Review, 94: 19–40. (Scholar)
Aiken, Scott F., 2008, “Evidentialism and James' argument from friendship”, Southwest Philosophy Review, 24: 173–180. (Scholar)
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Audi, Robert, 1991, “Faith, belief, and rationality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 5: 213–239. (Scholar)
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–––, 2003, “The epistemic authority of testimony and the ethics of belief”, in A. Dole and A. Chignell (eds.), God and the ethics of belief, New York: Cambridge, 175–201. (Scholar)
–––, 2008a, “Belief, faith, and acceptance”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 63: 87–102. (Scholar)
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Bolton, Martha Brandt, 2009, “Locke on rational virtue and moral law”, in D. Owen, G. Yaffe, and P. Hoffman (eds.), Early modern metaphysics: Essays in honor of Vere Chappell, pp. 253–272. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview. (Scholar)
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Bratman, Michael, 1992, “Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context”, Mind, 101: 1–15. (Scholar)
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Chignell, Andrew, 2007, “Belief in Kant”, Philosophical Review, 116: 323–360. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick M., 1956, “Epistemic statements and the ethics of belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 16: 447–460. (Scholar)
–––, 1957, Perceiving: A philosophical study, Ithaca, NY: Cornell. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Theory of knowledge, [3rd edition] Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Firth and the ethics of belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91: 119–128. (Scholar)
Christensen, David, 1994, “Conservatism in epistemology”, Noûs 28, 69–89. (Scholar)
Churchland, Paul M., 1981, “Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes”, Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67–90. (Scholar)
Clifford, W.K., 1877 [1999], “The ethics of belief”, in T. Madigan, (ed.), The ethics of belief and other essays, Amherst, MA: Prometheus, 70–96. (Scholar)
Cohen, L. J., 1992, An essay on belief and acceptance, (Oxford: Clarendon Press). (Scholar)
Conee, Earl, 1987, “Evident, but rationally unacceptable”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65: 316–326. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Heeding misleading evidence”, Philosophical Studies, 103: 99–120. (Scholar)
Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman, 2004, Evidentialism : Essays in epistemology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Côté-Bouchard, C., forthcoming, “Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?”, Philosophical Studies. (Scholar)
Dancy, Jonathan, 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
David, Marian, 2001, “Truth as the epistemic goal”, in M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, truth, and duty, New York: Oxford, 151–170. (Scholar)
Dellsén, Finnur, forthcoming, “Understanding without justification or belief”, Ratio, 29(3), doi: 10.1111/rati.12134 (Scholar)
DeRose, Keith, 2000, “Ought we to follow our evidence?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 697–706. (Scholar)
Descartes, René, 1641 [1996], Meditationes de prima philosophia, in C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds.), Oeuvres de Descartes, vol 7., Paris: Vrin. (Scholar)
–––, 1645 [1996], “Letter to Elizabeth of 15 Sept”, in C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds.), Oeuvres de Descartes, vol 4. Paris: Vrin. (Scholar)
Dole, Andrew, and Andrew Chignell (eds.), 2005, God and the ethics of belief, New York: Cambridge. (Scholar)
Dougherty, T. (ed.), 2011, Evidentialism and its discontents, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “The ethics of belief is ethics (period): reassigning responsibilism”, in Matheson & Vitz 2014, 146–168. (Scholar)
Engel, Pascal (ed.), 2000, Believing and accepting, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
Evans, C. Stephen, 1998, Faith beyond reason: A Kierkegaardian account, Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans. (Scholar)
Fairweather, Abrol, and Linda Zagzebski (eds.), 2001, Virtue epistemology : Essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard, 1988, “Epistemic obligations” Philosophical perspectives, 2: 235–256. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “The ethics of belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 667–695. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Epistemological duties”, in P. Moser (ed.), Oxford handbook of epistemology, New York: Oxford, 362–384. (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard, and Earl Conee, 1985, “Evidentialism”, Philosophical Studies, 48: 15–34. (Scholar)
Fodor, Jerry, 1975, The language of thought, New York: Crowell. (Scholar)
Firth, Roderick, 1959, “Chisholm and the ethics of belief”, Philosophical Review, 68: 493–506. (Scholar)
Foley, Richard, 1987, The theory of epistemic rationality. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard). (Scholar)
Gale, Richard M., 1980, “William James and the ethics of belief”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 17: 1–14. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “William James and the willfulness of belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 71–91. (Scholar)
Gardiner, G., 2012, “Understanding, integration, and epistemic value”, Acta Analytica, 27: 163–181. (Scholar)
Gibbons, John, 2013, The norm of belief, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
Ginet, Carl, 2001, “Deciding to believe”, in M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, truth and duty, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 63–76. (Scholar)
Ginsborg, Hannah, 2007, “Reasons for belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 286–318. (Scholar)
Goldberg, Sanford, 2009, “The knowledge account of assertion and the nature of testimonial knowledge”, in Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Greenough, Patrick, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), 2009, Williamson on knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Grimm S., 2012, “The value of understanding”, Philosophy Compass, 7: 103–117. (Scholar)
Haack, Susan, 1997, “The ethics of belief reconsidered”, in L. Hahn (ed.), The philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 129–144. (Scholar)
Hahn, L. (ed.), 1998, The philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, LaSalle, IL: Open Court. (Scholar)
Hájek, Alan, 2003, “Waging war on Pascal's wager”, Philosophical Review, 112: 27–56. (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert, 1986, Change in view: Principles of reasoning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, J., and T. Szabo Gender (eds.), 2005, Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Vol. 1), New York:Oxford. (Scholar)
Heil, John, 1983, “Believing what one ought”, Journal of Philosophy, 80: 752–65. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, “Doxastic incontinence”, Mind, 93: 56–70. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Doxastic agency”, Philosophical Studies, 43: 355–364. (Scholar)
Hieronymi, Pamela, 2006, “Controlling attitudes”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 87: 45–74. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Responsibility for believing”, Synthese, 161: 357–373. (Scholar)
Huemer, Michael, 2007a, “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism”, Philosophy and Phenomenal Research, 74: 30–55. (Scholar)
–––, 2007b, “Moore's and the norm of belief”, in Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New essays in epistemology and ethics, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Hunter, David, 1998, “Understanding and belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58(3): 559–580. (Scholar)
James, William, 1896 [1956], The Will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy, New York: Dover Publications, 1–31. (Scholar)
Jordan, Jeff, 2006, Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic arguments and belief in God, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Jordan, Jeff, and Daniel Howard Snyder (eds.), 1996, Faith, freedom and rationality, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
Kant, Immanuel, 1781/1787 [1902-], Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft), in Gesammelte Schriften, Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin/Walter de Gruyter.
Kasser, Jeff, and Nishi Shah, 2006, “The metaethics of belief: an expressivist reading of The will to believe”, Social Epistemology, 20: 1–17. (Scholar)
Kelly, Thomas, 2003, “Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66: 612–640. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “The epistemic significance of disagreement”, in J. Hawthorne and T. Szabo Gendler, (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Vol. 1), New York: Oxford, pp. 167–196. (Scholar)
Keller, Simon, 2004, “Friendship and belief”, Philosophical Papers, 33: 329–351. (Scholar)
Kierkegaard, Søren, 1846 [1992], Concluding Unscientific Postscript, H. Hong and E. Hong (trans. and eds.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Kolodny, Niko, 2005, “Why be rational?”, Mind, 114: 509–563. (Scholar)
Kornblith, Hilary, 1983, “Justified belief and epistemically responsible action”, Philosophical Review, 92: 33–48. (Scholar)
Kvanvig, J., 2003, The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, New York: Cambridge. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “The value of understanding”, in Pritchard, Haddock, and Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value, New York: Oxford University Press, 95–112. (Scholar)
Leon, Mark, 2002, “Responsible believers”, Monist, 85: 421–435. (Scholar)
Littlejohn, C. and Turri, J., 2014, Epistemic norms: assertion, action, and belief, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
Locke, John, 1690 [1975], An essay concerning human understanding, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Lycan, William, 1988, Judgment and justification, New York: Cambridge. (Scholar)
Madigan, T. (ed.), 1999, The ethics of belief and other essays, Amherst, MA: Prometheus. (Scholar)
Maher, Patrick, 1990, “Acceptance without belief”, Philosophy of science association, 1: 381–392. (Scholar)
Marušić, Berislav, 2015, Evidence and agency: norms of belief for promising and resolving, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
Matheson, J. and Vitz, R., 2014, The ethics of belief: individual and social, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
McCarthy, Gerald D. (ed.), 1986, The ethics of belief debate. Atlanta: Scholars Press. (Scholar)
McCormick, Miriam S., 2015, Believing against the evidence: Agency and the ethics of belief, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
McDowell, John, 1994, Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
McGrath, Matthew, 2007, “Memory and epistemic conservatism ”, Synthese, 157: 1–24. (Scholar)
Mele, Alfred R., 2001 Self-deception unmasked. Princeton, NJ: Princeton. (Scholar)
Meiland, Jack W., 1980, “What ought we to believe: Or the ethics of belief revisited”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 17: 15–24. (Scholar)
Moore, Joseph, 1994, “Review of L. J. Cohen, An essay on belief and acceptance”, Philosophical Review, 103: 705–709. (Scholar)
Moser P. (ed.), 2005, Oxford handbook of epistemology, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
Neta, Ram, 2004, “Perceptual evidence and the new dogmatism”, Philosophical Studies, 119: 199–214. (Scholar)
Nuccetelli, Susana, and Gary Seay (eds.), 2008, Themes from G. E. Moore: New essays in epistemology and ethics, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Owens, David, 2000, Reason without freedom: The problem of epistemic normativity, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Owens, David, and Gideon Yaffe, and Paul Hoffman (eds.), 2008, Early modern metaphysics: Essays in honor of Vere Chappell, Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview. (Scholar)
Pace, Michael, 2010, “The epistemic power of morally positive thinking: justification, moral encroachment, and James' ‘The will to believe’ ”, Noûs, forthcoming. (Scholar)
Papineau, David, 2001, “Evidentialism reconsidered”, Noûs, 35: 239–259. (Scholar)
Pascal, Blaise, 1670 [1995], Pensées, A. Kreilsheimer (trans. and ed.), New York: Penguin. (Scholar)
Perin, Casey, 2015, “Skepticism, suspension of judgment, and norms for belief”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 5: 107–125. (Scholar)
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Pritchard, Duncan, 2007, “Recent Work on Epistemic Value”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 85–110. (Scholar)
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–––, 2001, “Highlights of recent epistemology”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52: 95–124. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “What's wrong with Moore's argument?” Philosophical Issues, 14: 349–378. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Is there immediate justification? There is immediate justification”, in M. Steup (ed.), Contemporary debates in epistemology, Malden MA: Blackwell, 181–202. (Scholar)
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–––, 2009, “The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem”, Philosophical Studies, 145: 257–272. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Pragmatic reasons for belief”, in Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
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Shah, Nishi, 2002, “Clearing space for doxastic voluntarism”, The Monist, 85: 436–435. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “How truth governs belief”, Philosophical Review, 112: 447–482. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “A new argument for evidentialism”, Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 481–498.
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