Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Legal Concept of Evidence" by Hock Lai Ho

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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  • Abimbola, A., 2001, “Abductive Reasoning in Law: Taxonomy and Inference to the Best Explanation”, Cardozo Law Review, 22: 1683–1689. (Scholar)
  • Aitken, C., P. Roberts, and G. Jackson, 2010, Fundamentals of Probability and Statistical Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance for Judges, Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert Witnessess, London: Royal Statistical Society. [Aitken, Roberts, and Jackson 2010 available online] (Scholar)
  • Allen, R., 1986, “A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials”, Boston University Law Review, 66: 401–437. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1991, “The Nature of Juridical Proof”, Cardozo Law Review, 13: 373–422. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1992, “The Myth of Conditional Relevancy”, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 25: 871–884. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1994, “Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence”, Northwestern University Law Review, 88: 604–640. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2020, “Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited”, Quaestio Facti: International Journal on Evidential Reasoning, 2: 1–32. (Scholar)
  • Allen, R. and S. Jehl, 2003, “Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations”, Michigan State Law Review, 4: 893–944. (Scholar)
  • Allen, R. and B. Leiter, 2001, “Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence”, Virginia Law Review, 87: 1491–1550. (Scholar)
  • Allen, R. and M. Pardo, 2007a, “The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence”, Journal of Legal Studies, 36: 107–140. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2007b, “Probability, Explanation and Inference: a Reply”, International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 11: 307–317. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2019, “Relative Plausibility and its Critics”, International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 23: 5–59. (Scholar)
  • Allen, R. and P. Roberts (eds.), 2007, International Journal of Evidence and Proof (Special Issue on the Reference Class Problem), vol. 11, no.4. (Scholar)
  • Allen, R. and A. Stein, 2013, “Evidence, Probability and the Burden of Proof”, Arizona Law Review, 55: 557–602. (Scholar)
  • Amaya, A., 2008, “Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-finding”, Episteme, 5: 306–319. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2009, “Inference to the Best Explanation”, in Legal Evidence and Proof: Statistics, Stories and Logic, H. Kaptein, H. Prakken, and B. Verheij (eds.), Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 135–159. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2011, “Legal Justification by Optimal Coherence”, Ratio Juris, 24: 304–329. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2013, “Coherence, Evidence, and Legal Proof”, Legal Theory, 19: 1–43. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2015, The Tapestry of Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Coherence and its Role in Legal Argument, Oxford: Hart and Portland. (Scholar)
  • Anderson, T., D. Schum, and W. Twining, 2009, Analysis of Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition. (Scholar)
  • Ball, V., 1980, “The Myth of Conditional Relevancy”, Georgia Law Review, 14: 435–469. (Scholar)
  • Bartels, R., 1981, “Punishment and the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Modest Proposal”, Iowa Law Review, 66: 899–930. (Scholar)
  • Beltrán, J., 2006, “Legal Proof and Fact Finders’ Beliefs”, Legal Theory, 12: 293–314. (Scholar)
  • Bentham, J., 1825, A Treatise on Judicial Evidence, M. Dumont (ed.), London: Paget. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1827, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice, J. Mill (ed.), London: Hunt and Clarke. (Scholar)
  • Blackstone, W., 1770, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4, Dublin. (Scholar)
  • Blome-Tillmann, M., 2017, “‘More Likely Than Not’ – Knowledge First and the Role of Bare Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law”, in Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, J. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 278–292. (Scholar)
  • Buchak, L., 2014, “Belief, Credence, and Norms”, Philosophical Studies, 169: 285–311. (Scholar)
  • Callen, C., 1982, “Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law”, Indiana Law Journal, 57: 1–44. (Scholar)
  • Cheng, E., 2009, “A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem”, Columbia Law Review, 109: 2081–2105. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2013, “Reconceptualising the Burden of Proof”, Yale Law Journal, 122: 1254–1279. (Scholar)
  • Cohen, L., 1977, The Probable and the Provable, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1986, “The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof”, Boston University Law Review, 66: 635–649. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1991, “Should a Jury Say What It Believes or What It Accepts?”, Cardozo Law Review, 13: 465–483. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1992, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Colyvan, M., H. Regan, and S. Ferson, 2001, “Is it a Crime to Belong to a Reference Class?”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 9: 168–181. (Scholar)
  • Cullison, A., 1969, “Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-finding: A Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach”, Toledo Law Review, 1: 538–598. (Scholar)
  • Damaška, M., 1973, “Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 121: 506–589. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1975, “Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 123: 1083–1105. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1992, “Of Hearsay and Its Analogues”, Minnesota Law Review, 76: 425–458. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1994, “Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal Systems”, Chicago Kent Law Review, 70: 55–67. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1997, Evidence Law Adrift, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2006, “The Jury and the Law of Evidence: Real and Imagined Interconnections”, Law, Probability and Risk, 5: 255–265. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2019, Evaluation of Evidence: Pre-modern and Modern Approaches, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Davis, D. and W. Follette, 2002, “Rethinking the Probative Value of Evidence: Base Rates, Intuitive Profiling and the ‘Postdiction’ of Behavior”, Law and Human Behavior, 26: 133–158. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2003, “Toward an Empirical Approach to Evidentiary Ruling”, 27 Law and Human Behavior, 27: 661–684. (Scholar)
  • Dawid, P., W. Twining, and M. Vasilaki, 2011, Evidence, Inference and Enquiry, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy. (Scholar)
  • Duff, A., et al., 2007, The Trial on Trial (Volume 3: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial), Oxford: Hart. (Scholar)
  • Dworkin, R., 1981, “Principle, Policy, Procedure”, in Crime, Proof and Punishment, Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross, C. Tapper (ed.), London: Butterworths, pp. 193–225. (Scholar)
  • Eggleston, R., 1983, Evidence, Probability and Proof, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
  • Enoch, D., L. Spectre, and T. Fisher, 2012, “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 40(3): 197–224. (Scholar)
  • Enoch, D. and L. Spectre, 2019, “Sensitivity, Safety, and the Law: a Reply to Pardo”, Legal Theory, 25: 178–199. (Scholar)
  • Enoch, D. and T. Fisher, 2015, “Sense and ‘Sensitivity’: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence”, Stanford Law Review, 67: 557–611. (Scholar)
  • Finkelstein, M. and B. Levin, 2003, “On the Probative Value of Evidence from a Screening Search”, Jurimetrics, 43: 265–290. (Scholar)
  • Franklin, J., 2010, “Feature Selection Methods for Solving the Reference Class Problem: Comment on Edward K. Cheng, ‘A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem’”, Columbia Law Review Sidebar, 110: 12–23. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2011, “The Objective Bayesian Conceptualisation of Proof and Reference Class Problems”, Sydney Law Review, 33: 545–561. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2012, “Discussion Paper: How much of Commonsense and Legal Reasoning is Formalizable? A Review of Conceptual Obstacles”, Law, Probability and Risk, 11: 225–245. (Scholar)
  • Friedman, R., 1986, “A Close Look at Probative Value”, Boston University Law Review, 33: 733–759. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1994, “Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth”, Michigan Law Review, 93:439–484. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1997, “Dealing with Evidential Deficiency”, Cardozo Law Review, 18: 1961–1986. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2000, “A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds”, Stanford Law Review, 52:873–887. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2001, “‘E’ is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on Evidence”, Virginia Law Review, 87: 2029–2054.
  • Friedman, R. and R. Park, 2003, “Sometimes What Everybody Thinks They Know Is True”, Law and Human Behavior, 27: 629–644. (Scholar)
  • Gardiner, G., 2019a, “The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 47: 288–318. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2019b, “Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence”, in The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, in D. Coady and J. Chase (eds.), Oxford: Routledge. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2020, “Profiling and Proof: Are Statistics Safe?”, Philosophy, 95: 161–183. (Scholar)
  • –––, forthcoming, “Legal Evidence and Knowledge”, in M. Lasonen-Aarnio and C. Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, Oxford: Routledge. (Scholar)
  • Goldman, A., 1999, Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2002, “Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence”, Jurimetrics, 42: 237–260. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2005, “Legal Evidence” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, M. Goldring and W. Edmundson (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 163–175. (Scholar)
  • Griffin, L., 2013, “Narrative, Truth, and Trial”, Georgetown Law Journal, 101: 281–335. (Scholar)
  • Haack, S., 1993,Evidence and Inquiry, Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2003, “Clues to the Puzzle of Scientific Evidence: a More-So Story” in S. Haack, Defending Science: Within Reasons, New York: Prometheus, pp. 57–91. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2004, “Epistemology Legalized: or, Truth, Justice and the American Way”, American Journal of Jurisprudence, 49: 43–61. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2008a, “Proving Causation: The Holism of Warrant and the Atomism of Daubert”, Journal of Health and Biomedical Law, 4: 253–289. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2008b, “Warrant, Causation, and the Atomism of Evidence Law”, Episteme, 5: 253–266. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2009, Evidence and Inquiry: A Pragmatist Reconstruction of Epistemology, New York: Prometheus (expanded edition of Haack 1993). (Scholar)
  • –––, 2012, “The Embedded Epistemologist: Dispatches from the Legal Front”, Ratio Juris, 25: 206–235. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2014, “Legal Probabilism: An Epistemological Dissent” in S. Haack, Evidence Matters: Science, Proof, and Truth in the Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 47–77. (Scholar)
  • Ho, H.L., 2003–2004, “The Legitimacy of Medieval Proof”, Journal of Law and Religion, 19: 259–298. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2008, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Jackson, J. and S. Doran, 2010, “Evidence” in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 2nd edition, D. Patterson (ed.), Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 177–187. (Scholar)
  • James, G., 1941, “Relevancy, Probability and the Law”, California Law Review, 29: 689–705. (Scholar)
  • Josephson, J., 2001, “On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation”, Cardozo Law Review 22: 1621–1643. (Scholar)
  • Kaplan, J., 1968, “Decision Theory and the Fact-finding Process”, Stanford Law Review, 20: 1065–1092. (Scholar)
  • Kaplow, L., 2012, “Burden of Proof”, Yale Law Journal, 121: 738–859. (Scholar)
  • Kaye, D., 1986a, “Quantifying Probative Value”, Boston University Law Review, 66: 761–766. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1986b, “Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt?”, Boston University Law Review, 66: 657–672. (Scholar)
  • Kaye, D. and J. Koehler, 2003, “The Misquantification of Probative Value”, Law and Human Behavior, 27: 645–659. (Scholar)
  • Keynes, J., 1921, A Treatise on Probability, London: MacMillan. (Scholar)
  • Laudan, L., 2006, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2007, “Strange Bedfellows: Inference to the Best Explanation and the Criminal Standard of Proof”, International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 11: 292–306. (Scholar)
  • Laudan, L. and H. Saunders, 2009, “Re-Thinking the Criminal Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus about the Utilities of Trial Outcomes”, International Commentary on Evidence, 7(2), article 1 (online journal). (Scholar)
  • Lawson, G., 2017, Evidence of the Law: Proving Legal Claims, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
  • Leiter, B., 1997, “Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 803–819. (Scholar)
  • Lempert, R., 1977, “Modeling Relevance”, Michigan Law Review, 75: 1021–1057. (Scholar)
  • Lillquist, E., 2002, “Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability”, University of California Davies Law Review, 36: 85–197. (Scholar)
  • Littlejohn, C., 2020, “Truth, Knowledge, and the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law”, Synthese, 197: 5253–5286. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2021, “Justified Belief and Just Conviction” in The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials, Z. Hoskins and J. Robson (eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 106–123. (Scholar)
  • MacCrimmon, M., 2001–2002, “What is ‘Common’ about Common Sense?: Cautionary Tales for Travelers Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries”, Cardozo Law Review, 22: 1433–1460. (Scholar)
  • McCormick, C., 2013, McCormick on Evidence, K. Broun et al. (eds.), St. Paul, Minnesota: Thomson Reuters/WestLaw, 7th edition. (Scholar)
  • McNamara, P., 1986, “The Canons of Evidence: Rules of Exclusion or Rules of Use?”, Adelaide Law Review, 10: 341–364. (Scholar)
  • Mnookin, J., 2006, “Bifurcation and the Law of Evidence”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra, 155: 134–145. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2013, “Atomism, Holism, and the Judicial Assessment of Evidence”, University of California at Los Angeles Law Review, 60: 1524–1585. (Scholar)
  • Montrose, J., 1954, “Basic Concepts of the Law of Evidence”, Law Quarterly Review, 70: 527–555. (Scholar)
  • Morgan, E., 1929, “Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact”, Harvard Law Review, 43: 165–191. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1936–37, “The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence”, University of Chicago Law Review, 4: 247–258. (Scholar)
  • Moss, S., 2018, Probabilistic Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, forthcoming, “Knowledge and Legal Proof” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Volume 7), T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Nance, D., 1988, “The Best Evidence Principle”, Iowa Law Review, 73: 227–297. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1990, “Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted”, Boston University Law Review, 70: 447–507. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2001, “Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory”, Virginia Law Review, 87: 1551–1618. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2007a, “Allocating the Risk of Error”, Legal Theory, 13: 129–164. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2007b, “The Reference Class Problem and Mathematical Models of Inference”, International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 11: 259–273. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2008, “The Weights of Evidence”, Episteme, 5: 267–281. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2010, “Adverse Inferences About Adverse Inferences: Restructuring Juridical Roles for Responding to Evidence Tampering by Parties to Litigation”, Boston University Law Review, 90: 1089–1146. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2016, The Burdens of Proof – Discriminatory Power, Weight of Evidence and Tenacity of Belief, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Nance, D. and S. Morris, 2002, “An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability”, Jurimetrics, 42: 403–447. (Scholar)
  • Nelkin, D., 2021, “Rational Belief and Statistical Evidence — Blame, Bias and the Law” in Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief, I. Douven (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 6–27. (Scholar)
  • Nesson, C., 1979, “Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: the Value of Complexity”, Harvard Law Review, 92: 1187–1225. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1985, “The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts”, Harvard Law Review, 98: 1357–1392. (Scholar)
  • Pardo, M., 2000, “Juridical Proof, Evidence, and Pragmatic Meaning: Toward Evidentiary Holism”, Northwestern University Law Review, 95: 399–442. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2005, “The Field of Evidence and the Field of Knowledge”, Law and Philosophy, 24: 321–392. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2007, “The Political Morality of Evidence Law”, International Commentary on Evidence, 5(2), essay 1 (online journal). (Scholar)
  • –––, 2010, “The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof”, Legal Theory, 16: 37–57. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2013, “The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory”, Vanderbilt Law Review, 66: 547–613. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2018, “Safety vs. Sensitivity: Possible Worlds and the Law of Evidence”, Legal Theory, 24: 50–75. (Scholar)
  • Pardo, M.S. and R.J. Allen, 2008, “Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation”, Law and Philosophy, 27: 223–268. (Scholar)
  • Park, R., 1986, “The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson”, Minnesota Law Review, 70: 1057–1072. (Scholar)
  • Park, R. et al., 2010, “Bayes Wars Redivivus: An Exchange”, International Commentary on Evidence, 8(1), article 1 (online journal). (Scholar)
  • Pattenden, R., 1996–7, “The Discretionary Exclusion of Relevant Evidence in English Civil Proceedings”, International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 1: 361–385. (Scholar)
  • Pennington, N. and R. Hastie, 1991, “A Cognitive Model of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model”, Cardozo Law Review, 13: 519–557. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1993, “The Story Model for Juror Decision-making” in Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Juror Decision Making, R. Hastie (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 192–221. (Scholar)
  • Picinali, F., 2013, “Two Meanings of ‘Reasonableness’: Dispelling the ‘Floating’ Reasonable Doubt”, Modern Law Review, 76: 845–875. (Scholar)
  • Pollock, F., 1876, “Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence”, The Forthnightly Review, 20: 383–394. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1899, “Review of A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law by James Bradley Thayer, Law Quarterly Review”, 15: 86–87. (Scholar)
  • Posner, R., 1999, “An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence”, Stanford Law Review, 51: 1477–1546. (Scholar)
  • Pritchard, D., 2015, “Risk”, Metaphilosophy, 46: 436–461. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2018, “Legal Risk, Legal Evidence and the Arithmetic of Criminal Justice”, Jurisprudence, 9: 108–119. (Scholar)
  • Rescher, N. and C. Joynt, 1959, “Evidence in History and in the Law”, Journal of Philosophy, 56: 561–578. (Scholar)
  • Redmayne, M., 1996, “Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation”, Modern Law Review, 62: 167–195. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2006, “The Structure of Evidence Law”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 26: 805–822. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2008, “Exploring the Proof Paradoxes”, Legal Theory, 14: 281–309. (Scholar)
  • Ribeiro, G., 2019, “The Case for Varying Standards of Proof”, San Diego Law Review, 56: 161–219. (Scholar)
  • Roberts, P. and C. Aitken, 2014, The Logic of Forensic Proof: Inferential Reasoning in Criminal Evidence and Forensic Science, London: Royal Statistical Society. [Roberts and Aitken 2014 available online] (Scholar)
  • Roberts, P. and A. Zuckerman, 2010, Criminal Evidence , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
  • Robertson, B. and G. Vignaux, 1995, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom, Chichester: John Wiley. (Scholar)
  • Schauer, F., 2006, “On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155: 165–202. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2008, “In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law: And Epistemology Too”, Episteme 5: 295–305. (Scholar)
  • Schum, D., 1979, “A Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and His Heirs”, Michigan Law Review, 77:446–483. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1994, The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning, New York: John Wiley & Sons. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1998, “Legal Evidence and Inference” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (ed.), London: Routledge, pp. 500–506. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2001, “Species of Abductive Reasoning in Fact Investigation in Law”, Cardozo Law Review, 22:1645–1681. (Scholar)
  • Simon, D., 2004, “A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making”, University of Chicago Law Review, 71: 511–586. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2011, “Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials”, Vanderbilt Law Review, 64: 143–223. (Scholar)
  • Smith, M., 2018, “When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?”, Mind, 127: 1193–1218. (Scholar)
  • Stein, A., 2005, Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Stephen, J., 1872, The Indian Evidence Act, with an Introduction on the Principles of Judicial Evidence, Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1886, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, London: William Clowes & Sons, 5th edition. (Scholar)
  • Sullivan, S., 2019, “A Likelihood Story: The Theory of Legal Fact-finding”, University of Colorado Law Review, 90: 1–66. (Scholar)
  • Thayer, J., 1898, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. (Scholar)
  • Thomson, J., 1986, “Liability and Individualized Evidence”, Law and Contemporary Problems, 49(3): 199–219. (Scholar)
  • Tillers, P., 2005, “If Wishes were Horses: Discursive Comments on Attempts to Prevent Individuals from Being Unfairly Burdened by their Reference Classes”, Law, Probability and Risk, 4: 33–39. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2008, “Are there Universal Principles or Forms of Evidential Inference? Of Inference Networks and Onto-Epistemology” in Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context, J. Jackson, M. Langer, and P. Tillers (eds.), Oxford: Hart, pp. 179–198. (Scholar)
  • Tillers, P. and E. Green (eds.), 1988, Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence: The Limits and Uses of Bayesianism, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
  • Trautman, H., 1952, “Logical or Legal Relevancy: A Conflict in Theory”, Vanderbilt Law Review, 5: 385–413. (Scholar)
  • Tribe, L., 1971, “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process”, Harvard Law Review, 84: 1329–1393 (Scholar)
  • Twining, W., 1985, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2006, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
  • Twining, W. and I. Hampsher-Monk, 2003, Evidence and Inference in History and Law: Interdisciplinary Dialogues, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. (Scholar)
  • Whitworth, G., 1881, The Theory of Relevancy for the Purpose of Judicial Evidence, Bombay: Thacker & Co. (Scholar)
  • Wigmore, J., 1913, “Review of A Treatise on Facts, or the Weight and Value of Evidence by Charles C. Moore”, Illinois Law Review, 3: 477–478. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1935, A Students’ Textbook of the Law of Evidence, Brooklyn: Foundation Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1937, Science of Judicial Proof, as Given by Logic, Psychology, and General Experience and Illustrated in Judicial Trials, Boston: Little, Brown and Co. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1983a, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 1, P. Tillers (ed.), Boston: Little, Brown and Co. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1983b, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 1A, P. Tillers (ed.), Boston: Little, Brown and Co. (Scholar)
  • Wills, W., 1852, An Essay on the Principles of Circumstantial Evidence, Philadelphia: T & J W Johnson, reprint from the third London edition. (Scholar)

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