Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Evidence" by Thomas Kelly
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Achinstein, Peter, 1983. ‘Concepts of Evidence,’ in Achinstein (ed.) The Concept of Evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 145–174. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992. ‘The Evidence Against Kronz,’ Philosophical Studies, 67: 169–175. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001. The Book of Evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Austin, J.L., 1962. Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ayer, A.J., 1936. Language, Truth, and Logic, New York: Dover. (Scholar)
- –––, 1946. Language, Truth, and Logic, Second edition. New York: Dover. (Scholar)
- –––, ed., 1959. Logical Positivism, MacMillan: New York. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982. Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, New York: Random House. (Scholar)
- –––, 1972. Probability and Evidence, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- Ballantyne, Nathan and Coffman, E.J., 2011. ‘Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality,’ Philosophers' Imprint, 11 (18). (Scholar)
- Bell, Swenson-Wright, and Tybjerg, eds., 2008. Evidence,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Blanshard, Brand, 1974. Reason and Belief, London: Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
- BonJour, Laurence, 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Bovens, Luc and Hartmann, Stephan, 2003. Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Carnap, Rudolf, 1928. Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Berlin: Schlachtensee. (Scholar)
- –––, 1932/33. ‘Psychology in Physical Language,’ Originally published in Erkenntnis, vol. III. Reprinted in Ayer (1959): 165–198. (Scholar)
- –––, 1937. The Logical Syntax of Language (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.). (Scholar)
- –––, 1950. Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). (Scholar)
- –––, 1952. The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1963. The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap (Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 11), Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), Open Court: IL. (Scholar)
- –––, 1966. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Edited by Martin Gardner. New York: Dover. (Scholar)
- Chihara, Charles, 1987. ‘Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 38: 551–560. (Scholar)
- Christensen, David, 1997. ‘What is Relative Confirmation?’ Nous, 31(3): 370–384. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010. “Higher-Order Evidence”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(1): 185–215. (Scholar)
- Churchland, Paul, 1979. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988. ‘Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality,’ Philosophy of Science, 55:2: 167–187. (Scholar)
- Cohen, Stewart, 1984. ‘Justification and Truth,’ Philosophical Studies, 46: 279–295. (Scholar)
- Collingwood, R.G., 1956. The Idea of History, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Conee, Earl, 2013. ‘Seeming Evidence,’ in Tucker (ed.) Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 52–70. (Scholar)
- Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard, 2004. Evidentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dougherty, Trent, 2011. Evidentialism and Its Discontents, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Earman, John, 1992. Bayes or Bust?, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Feigl, Herbert, 1953. ‘The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism
and Humanism’ in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds.) Readings in
the Philosophy of Science, New York: Appleton-Century-Croft. (Scholar)
- Feldman, Richard, 1988. ‘Having Evidence’ in David Austin (ed.) Philosophical Analysis, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 83–104. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004). (Scholar)
- –––, 2005. ‘Respecting the Evidence’ in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 19, Oxford: Blackwell: 95–119. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014. ‘Evidence of Evidence is
Evidence,’ in Matheson and Vitz (eds.) The Ethics of
Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fisher, R.A., 1930. ‘Inverse Probability,’
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 26(4):
528–535. (Scholar)
- Fitelson, Branden, 2012. ‘Evidence of Evidence is not (necessarily) evidence,’ Analysis, 72(1): 85–88. (Scholar)
- Fodor, Jerry, 1984. ‘Observation Reconsidered’ in Philosophy of Science, 51: 23–43. Reprinted in Fodor (1992); page numbers are to the reprint. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988. ‘A Reply to Churchland's Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality,’ in Philosophy of Science, 55: 188–198. Reprinted in Fodor (1992). (Scholar)
- –––, 1992. A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Glymour, Clark, 1980. Theory and Evidence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, Alvin, 1979. ‘What Is Justified Belief?’ in George Pappas (ed.). Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company: 1–23. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986. Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997. ‘Science, Publicity and Consciousness,’ Philosophy of Science, 64: 525–545. Reprinted in Goldman (2002). References are to the reprinted version. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002. Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011. ‘Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism,’ in Dougherty (ed.), 123–150. (Scholar)
- Goodman, Nelson, 1955. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Hacking, Ian, 1975. The Emergence of Probability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hanson, Norwood Russell, 1961. Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hempel, Carl, 1945. ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,’ Mind, 54: 1–26, 97–121. Reprinted in Hempel (1965). (Scholar)
- –––, 1952. Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1960. ‘Inductive Inconsistencies,’ Synthese, 12: 439–469. Reprinted in Hempel (1965): 53–79. (Scholar)
- –––, 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: The Free Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
- Horwich, Paul, 1982. Probability and Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter, 1993. Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, 2nd edition. Chicago: Open Court. (Scholar)
- Jeffrey, Richard, 1965. The Logic of Decision, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992. Probability and the Art of Judgement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. Subjective Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (Scholar)
- Joyce, James, 1999. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005. ‘How Probabilities Reflect
Evidence,’ Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 19,
Oxford: Blackwell: 153–178. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, Mark, 1996. Decision Theory as Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kelly, Thomas, 2005. ‘The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,’ Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1: 167–196. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008. ‘Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception,’ Philosophy Compass, 3(5): 933–955. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010. ‘Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence,’ in Feldman and Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 111–174. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014. ‘Evidence Can Be Permissive,’ in Steup, Turri, and Sosa (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 298–313. (Scholar)
- Kim, Jaegwon, 1988. ‘What is Naturalized Epistemology?’ in James Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 2, Epistemology, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co: 381–405. (Scholar)
- Kronz, Frederick, 1992. ‘Carnap and Achinstein on Evidence,’ Philosophical Studies, 67: 151–167. (Scholar)
- Kuhn, Thomas, 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1977. The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria, 2014. ‘Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2): 314–345. (Scholar)
- Levi, Isaac, 1980. The Enterprise of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (Scholar)
- –––, 1991. The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Lipton, Peter, ed., 1995. Theory, Evidence, and Explanation, Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Group. (Scholar)
- Maher, Patrick, 1993. Betting on Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996. ‘Subjective and Objective Confirmation,’ Philosophy of Science, 63: 149–174. (Scholar)
- Matheson, Jonathan, 2009.‘Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,’ Episteme, 6(3): 269–279. (Scholar)
- Neta, Ram, 2008. ‘What Evidence Do You Have?’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(1): 89–119. (Scholar)
- Neyman, J., 1952. Lectures and Conferences on Mathematical
Statistics and Probability, 2nd edition. Washington, DC: US
Department of Agriculture. (Scholar)
- Pollock, John, 1986. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Towota, NJ: Rowman And Littlefield Publishers. 1st edition. (Scholar)
- Pollock, John and Cruz, Joseph, 1999. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Towota, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 2nd edition. (Scholar)
- Popper, Karl, 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary, 1975. Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Pryor, James, 2001. ‘Highlights of Recent Epistemology’ in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52: 95–124. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V., 1951. ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism,’ in the Philosophical Review, 60: 20–43. (Scholar)
- –––, 1968. ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press: 69–90. (Scholar)
- Railton, Peter, 1985. ‘Marx and the Objectivity of Science,’ in P. Asquith and P. Kitcher, (eds.) PSA 1984, vol. II. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association. Reprinted in Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J.D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991: 763–773. References are to the reprinted version. (Scholar)
- Rosenkrantz, R., 1981. Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing. (Scholar)
- Rysiew, Patrick, 2011. ‘Making It Evident: Evidence and Evidentness, Justification, and Belief,’ in Dougherty (ed.) Evidentialism and Its Discontents, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 207–225. (Scholar)
- Shafer, G., 1976. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence (Princeton: Princeton University Press). (Scholar)
- Shapin, Steven, 1994. A Social History of Truth, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Silins, Nico, 2005. ‘Deception and Evidence,’ in
Philosophical Perspective (Volume 19: Epistemology), Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
- Skyrms, Brian, 1990. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Swinburne, Richard, 2011. “Evidence”. In Trent Dougherty (ed.) Evidentialism and Its Discontents, Oxford University Press: 195–206. (Scholar)
- Talbott, William, 2001. ‘Bayesian epistemology,’ The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2001 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/epistemology-bayesian/>. (Scholar)
- White, Roger, 2005. ‘Epistemic Permissiveness,’ Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1): 445–459. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014. ‘Evidence Cannot Be Permissive,’ in Steup, Turri, and Sosa (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 312–323. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)