Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability" by Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Alexander, S., 2013. “An Axiomatic Version of Fitch’s Paradox,” Synthese, 190: 2015–2020. (Scholar)
Beall, J.C., 2000. “Fitch’s Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox,” Australasian Journal of Philosopohy, 78: 241–247. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 105–125. (Scholar)
van Benthem, J., 2004. “What One May Come to Know,” Analysis, 64(2): 95–105. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Actions that Make us Know,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 129–146. (Scholar)
Brogaard, B., 2009. “On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay: a Case Study on Fitch’s Paradox,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 241–251. (Scholar)
Brogaard, B. and Salerno, J., 2002. “Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant,” Analysis, 62: 143–150. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. “Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 43: 261–270. (Scholar)
–––, 2008. “Knowability, Possibility and Paradox,” in V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
Bermüdez, J., 2009. “Truth, Indefinite Extensibility, and Fitch’s Paradox, ” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 76–90. (Scholar)
Berto, F. and Hawke, P., forthcoming. “Knowability Relative to Information,” Mind, first online 25 October 2018. doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy045 (Scholar)
Bueno, O., 2009. “Fitch’s Paradox and the Philosophy of Mathematics,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 252–280. (Scholar)
Burgess, J., 2009. “Can Truth Out?,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 147–162. (Scholar)
Carrara, M. and Fassio, D., 2011. “Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument Against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox,” Theoria, 77: 180–193. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D.J., 2002. “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?,” in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012. Constructing the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chase, J. and Rush, P., 2018. “Factivity, Consistency and Knowability,” Synthese, 195: 899–918. (Scholar)
Church, A., 2009. “Referee Reports on Fitch’s ‘A Definition of Value’,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 13–20. (Scholar)
Costa-Leite, A. 2006. “Fusions of Modal Logics and Fitch’s Paradox,” Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 6: 281–90. (Scholar)
Cozzo, C., 1994. “What We Can Learn from the Paradox of Knowability,” Topoi, 13: 71–78. (Scholar)
Cresto, E., 2017. “Lost in Translation: Unknowable Propositions in Probabilistic Frameworks,” Synthese, 194: 3955–3977. (Scholar)
Dean W. and Kurokawa H., 2010. “From the Knowability Paradox to the Existence of Proofs,” Synthese, 176: 177–225. (Scholar)
DeVidi, D. and Kenyon, T., 2003. “Analogues of Knowability,” Australasian Journal of Philosopohy, 81(4): 481–495. (Scholar)
DeVidi, D. and Solomon, G., 2001. “Knowability and Intuitionistic Logic,” Philosophia, 28: 319–334. (Scholar)
van Ditmarsch, H., van der Hoek, W. and Iliev, P., 2012. “Everything is Knowable—How to Get to Know Whether a Proposition is True,” Theoria, 78: 93–114. (Scholar)
Dummett, M., 1959. “Truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59: 141–162. (Scholar)
–––, 1975. “The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logi,c” in H. Rose and J. Shepherdson (eds.), Logic Colloquium ’73, Amsterdam: North-Holland. (Scholar)
–––, 1976. “What is a Theory of Meaning? (II),” in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Chapter 4. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. “Victor’s Error,” Analysis, 61: 1–2. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 51–52. (Scholar)
Edgington, D., 1985. “The Paradox of Knowability,” Mind, 94: 557–568. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth,” Synthese, 173: 41–52. (Scholar)
Fara, M., 2010. “Knowability and the Capacity to Know,” Synthese, 173: 53–73. (Scholar)
Fischer, M., 2013. “Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle,” Synthese, 190: 63–88. (Scholar)
Fitch, F., 1963. “A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28: 135–142; reprinted in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 21–28. (Scholar)
Hand, M. 2003. “Knowability and Epistemic Truth,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(2): 216–228. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Performance and Paradox,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 283–301. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Antirealism and Universal Knowability,” Synthese, 173: 25–39. (Scholar)
Hand, M. and Kvanvig, J., 1999. “Tennant on Knowability,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 422–428. (Scholar)
Hart, W. D., 1979. “The Epistemology of Abstract Objects: Access and Inference,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 53 (Supplementary): 153–165. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Invincible Ignorance,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 320–323. (Scholar)
Hart, W. D. and McGinn, C., 1976. “Knowledge and Necessity,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 5: 205–208. (Scholar)
Heylen, J., forthcoming. “Factive Knowability and the Problem of Possible Omniscience,” Philosophical Studies. (Scholar)
Holliday, W., 2018. “Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic,” in H. van Ditmarsch and G. Sandu (eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game-Theoretical Semantics, Berlin: Springer, 363–394. (Scholar)
Hudson, R., 2009. “Faint-Hearted Anti-realism and Knowability,” Philosophia, 37: 511–523. (Scholar)
Jago, M., 2010. “Closure on Knowability,” Analysis, 70: 648–659. (Scholar)
Jenkins, C., 2005. “Realism and Independence,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 42: 199–209. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond,” in Salerno (ed.)302–319. (Scholar)
Kelp, C. and Pritchard, D., 2009. “Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 324–338. (Scholar)
Kennedy, N., 2014. “Defending the Possibility of Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43: 579–601. (Scholar)
Kvanvig, J., 1995. “The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism,” Noûs, 29: 481–499. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Some Lessons in False Hope,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 205–222. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “The Incarnation and the Knowability Paradox,” Synthese, 173: 89–105. (Scholar)
Lindström, S., 1997. “Situations, Truth and Knowability: A Situation-Theoretic Analysis of a Paradox of Fitch,” in E. Ejerthed and S. Lindström (eds.), Logic, Action and Cognition: Essays in Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 183–210. (Scholar)
Linsky, B., 2009. “Logical Types in Arguments about Knowability and Belief,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 163–179. (Scholar)
Mackie, J. L., 1980. “Truth and Knowability,” Analysis, 40: 90–92. (Scholar)
Maffezioli, P., Naibo, A. and Negri, S., 2013. “The Church-Fitch Knowability Paradox in the Light of Structural Proof Theory,” Synthese, 190: 2677–2716. (Scholar)
Melia, J., 1991. “Anti-Realism Untouched,” Mind, 100: 341–342. (Scholar)
Murzi, J., 2012. “Manifestability and Epistemic Truth,” Topoi, 31: 17–26. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Knowability and Bivalence: Intuitionistic Solutions to the Paradox of Knowability,” Philosophical Studies, 149: 269–281. (Scholar)
Murzi, J. and Florio, S., 2009. “The Paradox of Idealization,” Analysis, 69: 461–469. (Scholar)
Nozick, R., 1981. Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Chapter 3. (Scholar)
Palczewski, R., 2007. “Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox,” Studia Logica, 86: 455–478. (Scholar)
Paseau, A., 2008. “Fitch’s Argument and Typing Knowledge,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 49: 153–176. (Scholar)
Percival, P., 1990. “Fitch and Intuitionistic Knowability,” Analysis, 50: 182–187. (Scholar)
–––, 1991. “Knowability, Actuality and the Metaphysics of Context-Dependence,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69: 82–97. (Scholar)
Priest, G., 2009. “Beyond the Limits of Knowledge,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 93–104. (Scholar)
Proietti, C., 2016. “The Fitch-Church Paradox and First Order Modal Logic,” Erkenntnis, 81: 87–104. (Scholar)
Proietti, C. and Sandu, G., 2010. “Fitch’s Paradox and Ceteris Paribus Modalities,” Synthese, 173: 75–87. (Scholar)
Rabinowicz, W. and Segerberg, K., 1994. “Actual Truth, Possible Knowledge,” Topoi, 13: 101–115. (Scholar)
Rasmussen, S., 2009. “The Paradox of Knowability and the Mapping Objection,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 53–75. (Scholar)
Rasmussen, S. A. and Ravnkilde, J., 1982. “Realism and Logic,” Synthese, 52: 379–437. (Scholar)
Restall, G., 2009. “Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all at once),” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 339–354. (Scholar)
Rosenblatt, L., 2014. “The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach,” Theoria, 80: 201–221. (Scholar)
Rosenkranz, S., 2004. “Fitch Back in Action Again?,” Analysis, 64(1): 67–71. (Scholar)
Routley, R., 1981. “Necessary Limits to Knowledge: Unknowable Truths,” in M. Edgar, N. Otto, and Z. Gerhard (eds.), Essays in Scientific Philosophy. Dedicated to Paul Weingartner/Philosophie als Wissenschaft. Paul Weingartner gewidmet, Bad Reichenhall: Comes Verlag, 93–115. (Scholar)
Rückert, H., 2003. “A Solution to Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability,” in Gabbay, Rahman, Symons, Van Bendegem (eds.), Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. (Scholar)
Salerno, J., 2000. “Revising the Logic of Logical Revision,” Philosophical Studies, 99: 211–227. (Scholar)
–––, (ed.) 2009. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b. “Knowability Noir: 1945–1963,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 29–48. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. “Knowability and a New Paradox of Happiness,” in H. van Ditmarsch and G. Sandu (eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game-Theoretical Semantics, Berlin: Springer, 457–474. (Scholar)
Schlöder, J., forthcoming. “Counterfactual Knowability Revisited,” Synthese. (Scholar)
Stephenson, A., 2015. “Kant, the Paradox of Knowability, and the Meaning of ‘Experience’,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 15(27), available online. (Scholar)
Tennant, N., 1997. The Taming of the True, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 8. (Scholar)
–––, 2001a. “Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Williamson,” Ratio, XIV: 263–280. (Scholar)
–––, 2001b. “Is Every Truth knowable? Reply to Hand and Kvanvig,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 107–113. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Victor Vanquished,” Analysis 62, 135–142. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Revamping the Restriction Strategy,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 223–238. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Williamson’s Woes,” Synthese, 173: 9–23. (Scholar)
Wansing, H., 2002. “Diamonds are a philosopher’s best Friend: The Knowability Paradox and Modal Epistemic Relevance Logic,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 31(6): 591–612. (Scholar)
Williamson, T., 1982. “Intuitionism Disproved?,” Analysis, 42: 203–207. (Scholar)
–––, 1987a. “On the Paradox of Knowability,” Mind, 96: 256–61. (Scholar)
–––, 1987b. “On Knowledge of the Unknowable,” Analysis, 47: 154–8. (Scholar)
–––, 1988. “Knowability and Constructivism,” Philosophical Quarterly, 38: 422–432. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. “On Intuitionistic Modal Epistemic Logic,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 21: 63–89. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. “Verificationism and Non-Distributive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71: 78–86. (Scholar)
–––, 2000a. “Tennant on Knowable Truth,” Ratio, XIII: 99–114. (Scholar)
–––, 2000b. Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 12. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Tennant’s Troubles,” in Salerno (ed.) 2009, 183–204. (Scholar)
Wright, C., 1987. Realism, Meaning and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Chapter 2. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. “Truth as Sort of Epistemic: Putnam’s Peregrinations,” Journal of Philosophy, 97: 335–364. (Scholar)
Zardini, E., 2015. “Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. A Classical Solution to the Paradox of Knowability,” Theoria, 30: 365–392. (Scholar)

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