Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Fitting Attitude Theories of Value" by Christopher Howard

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Anderson, Elizabeth, 1993, Value in Ethics and Economics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Berker, Selim, 2018, “The Unity of Grounding”, Mind, 127: 729–777. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting”, in C. Howard and R.A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23–57. (Scholar)
Brandt, Richard, 1946, “Moral Valuation”, Ethics, 56: 106–21. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Brentano, Franz, 1889/2009, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Broad, C.D., 1930, Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Bykvist, Krister, 2009, “No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails”, Mind, 118: 1–30. (Scholar)
Chappell, Richard, 2012, “Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive”, Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 684–704. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick, 1986, Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Crisp, Roger, 2000, “Value … And What Follows by Joel Kupperman”, Philosophy, 75: 452–462. (Scholar)
Dancy, Jonathan, 2000, “Should We Pass the Buck?”, Royal Institute of Philosophy (Supplement), 47: 159–73. (Scholar)
Danielsson, Sven, and Jonas Olson, 2007, “Brentano and the Buck-Passers”, Mind, 116: 511–22. (Scholar)
D’Arms, Justin, 2022, “Fitting Emotions”, in C. Howard and R.A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 105-129. (Scholar)
D’Arms, Justin, and Daniel Jacobson, 2000a, “Sentiment and Value”, Ethics, 110: 722–48. (Scholar)
–––, 2000b, “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 65–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 1: 99–126. (Scholar)
Dreier, James, 1993, “Structures of Normative Theories”, The Monist, 76: 22–40. (Scholar)
Ewing, A.C., 1939, “A Suggested Non-Naturalistic Analysis of Good”, Mind, 48: 1–22. (Scholar)
–––, 1947, The Definition of Good, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
–––, 1959, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Aaron, Elliott, 2017, “Reasons, Dispositions, and Value”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 17. (Scholar)
Fine, Kit, 1994, “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16. (Scholar)
Fogal, Daniel, and Alex Worsnip, 2021, “Which Reasons? Which Rationality?”, Ergo, 8(11), published online. doi:10.3998/ergo.1148 (Scholar)
Foot, Philippa, 1985, “Utilitarianism and the Virtues”, Mind, 94: 196–204. (Scholar)
Geach, Peter, 1965, “Good and Evil”, Analysis, 17: 33–42. (Scholar)
Gibbard, Alan, 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Howard, Christopher, 2018, “Fittingness”, Philosophy Compass, 13: e12542. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “The Fundamentality of Fit”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 14: 216–36. (Scholar)
Hurka, Tom, 2001, Virtue, Vice, and Value, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Moore in the Middle”, Ethics, 113: 599–628. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hurley, Paul, 2017, “Why Consequentialism’s ‘Compelling Idea’ is Not”, Social Theory and Practice, 43: 29–54. (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jacobson, Daniel, “Fitting Attitudes Theories of Value”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/fitting-attitude-theories/>. (Scholar)
Johnson King, Zoe, 2019, “We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It, Too”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 14: 167–89. (Scholar)
Kant, Immanuel, 1785 [1996], Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. by Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Kelly, Tom, 2002, “The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes”, Philosophical Studies, 110: 163–96. (Scholar)
Kjellmer, Göran, 1986, “Legible but Not Readable: On the Semantics of English Adjectives in –ble”, Studia Neophilologica, 58: 11–38. (Scholar)
Leary, Stephanie, 2020, “Grounding the Domain of Reasons”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98: 137–52. (Scholar)
Lemos, Noah M., 1994, Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Lemos, Noah, 2011, “Intrinsic Value and the Partiality Problem”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82: 697–716. (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1989, “Dispositional Theories of Value”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 63: 113–37. (Scholar)
Louise, Jennie, 2004, “Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella”, Philosophical Quarterly, 54: 518–36. (Scholar)
Maguire, Barry, 2016, “The Value-Based Theory of Reasons”, Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 3: 1–30. (Scholar)
McDowell, John, 1998, Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
McHugh, Conor, and Jonathan Way 2016, “Fittingness First”, Ethics, 126: 575–606. (Scholar)
–––, 2022a, Getting Things Right: Reasons, Value, and Fittingness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2022b, “Value and Idiosyncratic Fitting Attitudes”, in C. Howard and R.A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 245-266. (Scholar)
Moore, G.E., 1903, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Naar, Hichem, 2021, “The Fittingness of Emotions”, Synthese, 199: 13601-13619. (Scholar)
Nye, Howard, David Plunkett, and John Ku, 2015, “Non-Consequentialism Demystified”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 15: 1–28. (Scholar)
Olson, Jonas, 2009, “Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12: 365–378. (Scholar)
Orsi, Francesco, 2013a, “Fitting Attitudes and Solitary Goods”, Mind, 122: 687–98. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “What’s Wrong with Moorean Buck-Passing?”, Philosophical Studies, 164: 727–46. (Scholar)
Parfit, Derek, 2011, On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Piller, Christian, 2006, “Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences”, Royal Institute of Philosophy (Supplement), 59: 155–82. (Scholar)
Portmore, Douglas, 2005, “Combining Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86: 95–113. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004, “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value”, Ethics, 114: 391–423. (Scholar)
Reisner, Andrew, 2009, “The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem”, Philosophical Studies, 145: 257–272. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Fittingness, Value, and Trans-World Attitudes”, Philosophical Quarterly, 65: 464–85. (Scholar)
Rosen, Gideon, 2015a, “The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility”, in R. Clarke, M. McKenna, and A. Smith (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 65–88. (Scholar)
–––, 2015b, “Real Definition”, Analytic Philosophy, 56: 189–209. (Scholar)
Ross, W.D., 1939, Foundations of Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Rowland, R.A., 2016, “In Defence of Good Simpliciter”, Philosophical Studies, 173: 1371–91. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “Value-First Accounts of Normativity”, in C. Howard and R.A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 176-199. (Scholar)
Scanlon, T.M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Schroeder, Mark, 2009, “Buck-passers’ Negative Thesis”, Philosophical Explorations, 12: 341–7. (Scholar)
–––, 2007a, Slaves of the Passions, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007b, “Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and ‘Good’”, Ethics, 117: 265–95. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Value and the Right Kind of Reason”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 5: 25–55. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons”, Ethics, 122: 457–88. (Scholar)
Shah, Nishi, 2006, “A New Argument for Evidentialism”, Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 481–498. (Scholar)
Sharadin, Nathaniel, 2013, “Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 7: 1–8. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Reasons: Wrong and Right”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97: 371–99. (Scholar)
Sidgwick, Henry, 1874/2011, The Methods of Ethics, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Skorupski, John, 2010, The Domain of Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Smith, Michael, 1994, The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Neutral and Relative Value after Moore”, Ethics, 113: 576–98. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Two Kinds of Consequentialism”, Philosophical Issues, 19: 257–72. (Scholar)
Stratton-Lake, Philip, 2005, “How to Deal with Evil Demons: comment on Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen”, Ethics, 115: 788–98. (Scholar)
Stratton-Lake, Philip and Brad Hooker, 2006, “Scanlon versus Moore on Goodness”, in T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Metaethics after Moore, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149–68. (Scholar)
Suikkanen, Jussi, 2009, “Buck-Passing Accounts of Value”, Philosophy Compass, 4: 769–779. (Scholar)
Svavarsdóttir, Sigrun, 2014, “Having Value and Being Worth Valuing”, Journal of Philosophy, 111: 84–109. (Scholar)
Tappolet, Christine, 2011, “Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism’s Prospects”, in C. Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 117–134. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, Emotions, Values, and Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1993, “Goodness and Utilitarianism”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 67: 145–59. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “The Right and the Good”, Journal of Philosophy, 94: 273–98. (Scholar)
Way, Jonathan, 2012, “Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason”, Ethics, 122: 489–515. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Value and Reasons to Favour”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 8: 27–49. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “A Puzzle about Enkratic Reasoning”, Philosophical Studies, 178: 3177–3196. (Scholar)
Wiggins, David, 1987, “A Sensible Subjectivism?”, in Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Zimmerman, Michael J., 2001, The Nature of Intrinsic Value, Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Partiality and Intrinsic Value”, Mind, 120: 447–483. (Scholar)

Generated Mon Jun 5 07:25:57 2023

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