Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Formal Epistemology" by Jonathan Weisberg

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Akiba, Ken, 2000, “Shogenji’s Probabilistic Measure of Coherence Is Incoherent”, Analysis, 60(4): 356–59. (Scholar)
Alchourrón, Carlos E., Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson, 1985, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50(2): 510–30. (Scholar)
Bertrand, Joseph L.F., 2007 [1888], Calcul Des Probabilités, Oxford University Press.
Bonjour, Laurence, 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Bovens, Luc and Stephan Hartmann, 2003, Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bradley, Richard, 2000, “A Preservation Condition for Conditionals”, Analysis, 60(3): 219–22. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Learning From Others: Conditioning Versus Averaging”, Theory and Decision, 85(1): 5–20. (Scholar)
Buchak, Lara, 2013, Risk and Rationality, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Risk and Tradeoffs”, Erkenntnis, 79(6): 1091–1117. (Scholar)
Carnap, Rudolph, 1950, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Carr, Jennifer, 2013, “Justifying Bayesianism”, PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(3): 511–34. (Scholar)
Carter, Brandon, 1974, “Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology”, in Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Observational Data, edited by Malcolm S. Longair, 291–98, Boston: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
Castell, Paul, 1998, “A Consistent Restriction of the Principle of Indifference”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49(3): 387–95. (Scholar)
Christensen, David, 1992, “Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology”, Philosophy of Science, 59(4): 540–557. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Dutch Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers”, The Journal of Philosophy, 93(9): 450–79. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism”, Philosophy of Science, 68(3):356–376. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Putting Logic in Its Place, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Cohen, Stewart, 2002, “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 309–29. (Scholar)
Collins, Robin, 2009, “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe”, in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, edited by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, 202–81. Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
Colyvan, Mark, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest, 2005, “Problems with the Argument from Fine Tuning”, Synthese, 145(3): 325–38. (Scholar)
Cresto, Eleonora, 2012, “A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41(6): 923–55. (Scholar)
Crupi, Vincenzo, and Katya Tentori, 2010, “Irrelevant Conjunction: Statement and Solution of a New Paradox”, Philosophy of Science, 77(1): 1–13. (Scholar)
Douven, Igor, and Richard Dietz, 2011, “A Puzzle About Stalnaker’s Hypothesis”, Topoi, 30(1): 31–37. (Scholar)
Douven, Igor, and Wouter Meijs, 2006, “Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative”, Synthese, 149(1): 97–132. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Measuring Coherence”, Synthese, 156(3): 405–25. (Scholar)
Douven, Igor and Sylvia Wenmackers, 2017, “Inference to the Best Explanation versus Bayes’s Rule in a Social Setting”, British Journal for the Philosophy of science, 68(2): 535–570. (Scholar)
Easwaran, Kenny, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock, and Joel D. Velasco, 2016, “Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 16(11): 1–39. (Scholar)
Edgington, Dorothy, 1995, “On Conditionals”, Mind, 104: 235–329. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “General Conditional Statements: A Reply to Kölbel”, Mind, 109: 109–16. (Scholar)
Etlin, David, 2009, “The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals”, Philosophy of Science, 76(5): 676–88. (Scholar)
Field, Hartry, 1978, “A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization”, Philosophy of Science, 45(3): 361–367. (Scholar)
Fisher, Ronald A., 1925, Statistical Methods for Research Workers, Edinburgh: Oliver; Boyd. (Scholar)
Fitch, Frederic B., 1963, “A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28(2): 135–42. (Scholar)
Fitelson, Branden, 2003, “A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence”, Analysis, 63(3): 194–99. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “The Paradox of Confirmation”, Philosophy Compass, 1(1): 95. (Scholar)
Fitelson, Branden, and James Hawthorne, 2010, “How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens”, in The Place of Probability in Science, 284:247–75, New York: Springer. (Scholar)
Gärdenfors, Peter, 1986, “Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals”, The Philosophical Review, 95(1): 81–93. (Scholar)
Genest, Christian and James V. Zidek, 1986, “Combining Probability Distributions: A Critique and an Annotated Bibliography”, Statistical Science, 1(1): 114–135. (Scholar)
Gibbard, Allan, and William Harper, 1978, “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility”, in Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, edited by A. Hooker, J.J. Leach, and E.F. McClennen, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
Gigerenzer, Gerd, Peter M. Todd, and The ABC Research Group, 1999, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Glass, David H., 2002, “Coherence, Explanation, and Bayesian Networks”, Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, 2464: 177–82. (Scholar)
Glymour, Clark, 1980, Theory and Evidence, Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Good, I.J., 1967, “The White Shoe Is a Red Herring”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17(4): 322. (Scholar)
Goodman, Nelson, 1954, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Greaves, Hilary, and David Wallace, 2006, “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility”, Mind, 115: 607–32. (Scholar)
Greco, Daniel, 2014, “Could KK Be OK?” The Journal of Philosophy, 111(4): 169–197. (Scholar)
Grice, Paul, 1989, Studies in the Ways of Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Haack, Susan, 1976, “The Justification of Deduction”, Mind, 85(337): 112–19. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
Hacking, Ian, 1987, “The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy: The Argument from Design. the Anthropic Principle Applied to Wheeler Universes”, Mind, 96(383): 331–40. (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert, 1986, Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2005, “Knowledge and Evidence”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(2): 452–58. (Scholar)
Hájek, Alan, 1989, “Probabilities of Conditionals: Revisited”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 18(4): 423–28. (Scholar)
Hempel, Carl G., 1937, “Le Problème de La Vérité”, Theoria, 3(2): 206–44. (Scholar)
–––, 1945, “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation I”, Mind, 54: 1–26. (Scholar)
Hintikka, Jaakko, 1962, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Horty, John F., 2012, Reasons as Defaults, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, Janina, 1940, “On Confirmation”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 5(4): 133–48. (Scholar)
Howson, Colin, and Peter Urbach, 1993, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, Chicago: Open Court. (Scholar)
Huemer, Michael, 1997, “Probability and Coherence Justification”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 35(4): 463–72. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Does Probability Theory Refute Coherentism?” The Journal of Philosophy, 108(1): 35–54. (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank, 1987, Conditionals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Jeffrey, Richard C., 1965, The Logic of Decision, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Joyce, James, 1998, “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Philosophy of Science, 65(4): 575–603. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief”, in Degrees of Belief, edited by Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, 342:263–97. Synthese Library, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, 1979, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk”, Econometrica, 47(2): 263–292. (Scholar)
Keynes, John Maynard, 1921, A Treatise on Probability, New York: MacMillan. (Scholar)
Klein, Peter, and Ted A. Warfield, 1994, “What Price Coherence?” Analysis, 54(3): 129–32. (Scholar)
Leitgeb, Hannes, and Richard Pettigrew, 2010a, “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy”, Philosophy of Science, 77(2): 201–35. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy”, Philosophy of Science, 77(2): 236–272. (Scholar)
Leslie, John, 1989, Universes, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1976, “Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities”, The Philosophical Review, LXXXV(3): 297–315. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “Causal Decision Theory”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59(1): 5–30. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Why Conditionalize?” in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 403–7, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
List, Christian and Philip Pettit, 2002, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result”, Economics and Philosophy, 18(1): 89–110. (Scholar)
Maher, Patrick, 1996, “Subjective and Objective Confirmation”, Philosophy of Science, 63(2): 149–174. (Scholar)
Mahtani, Anna, 2008, “Williamson on Inexact Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, 139(2): 171–80. (Scholar)
Mayo, Deborah G., 1996, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Mayo, Deborah G., and Aris Spanos, 2011, “Error Statistics”, in Philosophy of Statistics, edited by Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm R. Forster, Vol. 7. Handbook of Philosophy of Science, Elsevier. (Scholar)
Mayo-Wilson, Conor, Kevin J.S. Zollman, and David Danks, 2011, “The Independence Thesis: When Individual and Social Epistemology Diverge”, Philosophy of Science, 78(4): 653–77. (Scholar)
McGrew, Timothy, Lydia McGrew, and Eric Vestrup, 2001, “Probabilities and the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Skeptical View”, Mind, 110(440): 1027–37. (Scholar)
McMullin, Ernan, 1993, “Indifference Principle and Anthropic Principle in Cosmology”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 24: 359–89. (Scholar)
Merricks, Trenton, 1995, “On Behalf of the Coherentist”, Analysis, 55(4): 306–9. (Scholar)
Monton, Bradley, 2006, “God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57(2): 405–24. (Scholar)
Neyman, Jerzy, and Karl Pearson, 1928a, “On the Use and Interpretation of Certain Test Criteria for Purposes of Statistical Inference, Part I”, Biometrika, 20A(1/2): 175–240. (Scholar)
–––, 1928b, “On the Use and Interpretation of Certain Test Criteria for Purposes of Statistical Inference, Part I”, Biometrika, 20A(3/4): 263–94. (Scholar)
Nicod, Jean, 1930, Foundations of Geometry and Induction, New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co. (Scholar)
Nozick, Robert, 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
O’Connor, Cailin, and James Owen Weatherall, 2018, “Scientific Polarization”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 8(3): 855–875. (Scholar)
Olsson, Erik J., 2002, “What Is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?” The Journal of Philosophy, 99(5): 246–72. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Payne, John W., James R. Bettman, and Eric J. Johnson, 1993, The Adaptive Decision Maker, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Pettigrew, Richard, 2016, “Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1): 35–59. (Scholar)
Pollock, John L., 1995, Cognitive Carpentry, Philosophy of Science, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Defeasible Reasoning”, in Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations, edited by Jonathan E. Adler and Lance J. Rips, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Pryor, James, 2013, “Problems for Credulism”, in Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, edited by Chris Tucker, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Ramachandran, Murali, 2009, “Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87(4): 659–673. (Scholar)
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton, 1964 [1926], “Truth and Probability”, in Studies in Subjective Probability, edited by Henry E. Kyburg and Howard E. Smokler, 61–92, New York: Wiley. (Scholar)
–––, 1990 [1929], “General Propositions and Causality”, in Philosophical Papers, 145–63, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Rees, Martin, 1999, Just Six Numbers, Basic Books. (Scholar)
Rinard, Susanna, 2014, “A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens”, Philosophy of Science, 81(1): 81–100. (Scholar)
Rosenstock, Sarita, Justin Bruner, and Cailin O’Connor, 2017, “In Epistemic Networks, Is Less Really More?”, Philosophy of Science, 84(2): 234–252. (Scholar)
Roush, Sherrilyn, 2005, Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Prècis of Tracking Truth”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(1): 213–22. (Scholar)
Royall, Richard, 1997, Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm, London: Chapman & Hall. (Scholar)
Russell, Gillian, and Greg Restall, 2010, “Barriers to Implication”, in Hume on Is and Ought, edited by Charles Pigden, Palgrave MacMillan. (Scholar)
Russell, Jeffrey Sanford, John Hawthorne, and Lara Buchak, 2015, “Groupthink”, Philosophical studies, 172(5): 1287–1309. (Scholar)
Salerno, Joe, 2009, “Knowability Noir”, in New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, edited by Joe Salerno, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Savage, Leonard J., 1954, The Foundations of Statistics, New York: Wiley Publications in Statistics. (Scholar)
Sellars, Wilfrid, 1956, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume I: The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, edited by Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Shafer, Glenn, 1976, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence, Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Shogenji, Tomoji, 1999, “Is Coherence Truth Conducive?” Analysis, 59(4): 338–45. (Scholar)
Skyrms, Brian, 1980, “The Role of Causal Factors in Rational Decision”, in Causal Necessity, Brian Skyrms, pp. 128–139, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
Sober, Elliott, 2005, “The Design Argument”, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, edited by William E. Mann, 117–47, Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence”, Philosophical Studies, 143(1): 63–90. (Scholar)
Spohn, Wolfgang, 1988, “Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States”, in Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics II, edited by William Leonard Harper and Brian Skyrms, Kluwer. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Stalnaker, Robert, 1970, “Probability and Conditionals”, Philosophy of Science, 37(1): 64–80. (Scholar)
Steele, Katie, 2007, “Distinguishing Indeterminate Belief from ‘Risk-Averse’ Preferences”, Synthese, 158(2): 189–205. (Scholar)
Stroud, Barry, 1984, The Philosophical Significance of Skepticism, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Teller, Paul, 1973, “Conditionalisation and Observation”, Synthese, 26: 218–58. (Scholar)
Turri, John, and Peter D. Klein (eds), 2014, Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
van Fraassen, Bas, 1989, Laws and Symmetry, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Vineberg, Susan, 1997, “Dutch Books, Dutch Strategies, and What They Show About Rationality”, Philosophical Studies, 86(2): 185–201. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “The Notion of Consistency for Partial Belief”, Philosophical Studies, 102(3): 281–96. (Scholar)
von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern, 1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Vranas, Peter B.M., 2004, “Hempel’s Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Account”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55: 545–60. (Scholar)
Weatherall, James Owen, and Cailin O’Connor, forthcoming, “Endogenous Epistemic Factionalization”, Synthese, first online 04 June 2020. doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02675-3 (Scholar)
Weintraub, Ruth, 1995, “What Was Hume’s Contribution to the Problem of Induction”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 45(181): 460–70. (Scholar)
Weirich, Paul, 2004, Realistic Decision Theory: Rules for Nonideal Agents in Nonideal Circumstances, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wheeler, John Archibald, 1973, “From Relativity to Mutability”, in The Physicist’s Conception of Nature, edited by Jagdesh Mehra. Springer. (Scholar)
White, Roger, 2000, “Fine-Tuning and Multiple Universes”, Noûs, 34(2): 260–76. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Problems for Dogmatism”, Philosophical Studies, 131(3): 525–57. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence”, in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Williams, P.M., 1980, “Bayesian Conditionalisation and the Principle of Minimum Information”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 32(2): 131–44. (Scholar)
Williamson, Jon, 2007, “Inductive Influence”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58(4): 689–708. (Scholar)
Williamson, Timothy, 2000, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Zollman, Kevin J. S., 2007, “The Communication Structure of Epistemic Communities”, Philosophy of Science, 74(5): 574–587. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Network Epistemology: Communication in Epistemic Communities”, Philosophy Compass, 8(1): 15–27. (Scholar)

Generated Sun Mar 19 10:01:29 2023

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...