Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Foreknowledge and Free Will" by David Hunt and Linda Zagzebski

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Adams, Marilyn, 1967, “Is the Existence of God a ‘Hard’ Fact?” Philosophical Review, 76(4): 492–503. (Scholar)
Adams, Robert Merrihew, 1991, “An Anti-Molinist Argument,” Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 5: Philosophy of Religion), James Tomberlin (ed)., Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 343–354. (Scholar)
Alston, William P., 1985, “Divine Foreknowledge and Alternative Conceptions of Human Freedom,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 18(1): 19–32. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Does God Have Beliefs?” Religious Studies, 22 (Sept/Dec): 287–306. (Scholar)
Aquinas, St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 14, art 13.
–––, Summa Contra Gentiles I, chap. 66.
Arbour, Benjamin H., 2013, “Future Freedom and the Fixity of Truth: Closing the Road to Limited Foreknowledge Open Theism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 73(3): 189–207. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 2019, Philosophical Essays Against Open Theism, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Augustine, The City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson, intro. G.R. Evans, Penguin, 2003.
–––, On Free Choice of the Will, trans., with introduction and notes, by Thomas Williams, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993.
Basinger, David, 1986, “Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought,” Religious Studies, 22(3/4): 407–22. (Scholar)
Baker, D., 2005, “Divine Foreknowledge—So What?” Heythrop Journal, 46(1): 60–65. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Simple Foreknowledge and Providential Control,” Faith and Philosophy, 10(3): 421–427. (Scholar)
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V, Prose vi.
Boyd, Gregory, 2010, “Two Ancient (and Modern) Motivations for Ascribing Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge to God: A Historic Overview and Critical Assessment,” Religious Studies, 46(1): 41–59. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “The Open Future, Free Will and Divine Assurance: Responding to Three Common Objections to the Open View,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 7(3): 207–22. (Scholar)
Boyd, Gregory A., David Hunt, William Lane Craig, and Paul Helm, 2001, Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (eds.), Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. (Scholar)
Brant, Dale Eric, 1997, “On Plantinga’s Way Out,” Faith and Philosophy, 14(3): 378–387. (Scholar)
Brown, Robert F., 1991, “Divine Omniscience, Immutability, Aseity and Human Free Will,” Religious Studies, 27(3): 285–295. (Scholar)
Brueckner, Anthony, 2000, “On an Attempt to Demonstrate the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom,” Faith and Philosophy, 17(1): 132–134. (Scholar)
Brüntrup, Godehard and Ruben Schneider, 2011, “How Molinists Can Have Their Cake and Eat It Too,” in The Ways Things Are: Studies in Ontology, Christian Kanzian, Winfried Löffler, and Josef Quitterer (eds.), Frankfurt, Paris, Lancaster, and New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag, pp. 221–40. (Scholar)
Byerly, T. Ryan, 2014, The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account, New York & London: Bloomsbury Press. (Scholar)
Climenhaga, Nevin, and Daniel Rubio, forthcoming, “Molinism: Explaining Our Freedom Away,” Mind, doi:10.1093/mind/fzab042 (Scholar)
Craig, William Lane, 1987, The Only Wise God, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 19), Leiden: E.J. Brill. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Robert Adams’s New Anti-Molinist Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54(4): 857–861. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “On Hasker’s Defense of Anti-Molinism,” Faith and Philosophy, 15(2): 236–240. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Divine Eternity and the General Theory of Relativity,” Faith and Philosophy, 22(5): 543–57. (Scholar)
Craig, William Lane, and David P. Hunt, 2013, “Perils of the Open Road,” Faith and Philosophy, 30(1): 49–71. (Scholar)
Cyr, Taylor W., 2020, “Atemporalism and Dependence,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 87(2): 149–64. (Scholar)
Cyr, Taylor W., and Andrew Law, forthcoming, “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Dialectical Intervention,” American Philosophical Quarterly. (Scholar)
Davenport, John, 2007, “Augustine on Liberty of the Higher-Order Will: Answers to Hunt and Stump,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 81: 67–89. (Scholar)
De Florio, Ciro, and Aldo Frigerio, 2015, “In Defense of the Timeless Solution to the Problem of Human Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 78(1): 5–28. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, Divine Omniscience and Human Free Will: A Logical and Metaphysical Analysis, London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
Dekker, Eef, 2000, Middle Knowledge, Leuven: Peeters. (Scholar)
Diekemper, Joseph., 2013, “Eternity, Knowledge, and Freedom,” Religious Studies, 49(1): 45–64. (Scholar)
Dummett, Michael, 1964, “Bringing About the Past,” Philosophical Review, 73: 338–359; reprinted in his Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth, 1978. (Scholar)
Edwards, Jonathan, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, Yale University Press, 2009.
Fales, E., 2010, “Is Middle Knowledge Possible? Almost,” Sophia, 50(1): 1–9. (Scholar)
Finch, Alicia, and Michael Rea, 2008, “Presentism and Ockham’s Way Out,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Volume 1), Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–17. (Scholar)
Finch, Alicia and Ted Warfield, 1999, “Fatalism: Logical and Theological,” Faith and Philosophy, 16(2): 233–238. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, 1983, “Freedom and Foreknowledge,” Philosophical Review, 92 (January): 67–79. (Scholar)
–––, 1985a, “Ockhamism,” Philosophical Review, 94 (January): 81–100. (Scholar)
–––, 1985b, “Scotism,” Mind, 94 (April): 231–43. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1989, God, Freedom, and Foreknowledge, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Snapshot Ockhamism,” Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 5: Philosophy of Religion), Atascadero: Ridgeview, 355–372. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Recent Work on God and Freedom,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 29(2): 91–109. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Molinism,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Volume 1), Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 18–43. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Book Symposium on Our Fate: Replies to My Critics,” Science, Religion, and Culture, 4: 79–101. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, “The Frankfurt-style Cases: Extinguishing the Flickers of Freedom,” Inquiry, doi:10.1080/0020174x.2021.1904640 (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, and Patrick Todd, 2011, “The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks,” Philosophical Review, 120(1): 97–115. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “The Truth about Foreknowledge,” Faith and Philosophy, 30(3): 286–301. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Introduction,” Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge, John Martin Fischer and Patrick Todd (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–38. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, and Neal A. Tognazzini, 2014, “Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2): 346–67. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, Patrick Todd, and Neal A. Tognazzini, 2009, “Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time,” Philosophical Papers, 38(2): 247–70. (Scholar)
Fitzgerald, J., 2008, “Timeless Troubles: The Challenge of Prophecy to the Eternity Solution to the Foreknowledge/Freedom Dilemma,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 82: 203–15. (Scholar)
Flint, Thomas, 1990, “Hasker’s God, Time, and Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies, 60: 103–115. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “In Defense of Theological Compatibilism,” Faith and Philosophy, 8: 237–243. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Praying for Things to Have Happened,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Volume XXI), Peter French, et al., (eds.), pp. 61–82. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Forrest, Peter, 1985, “Backwards Causation in Defence of Free Will,” Mind, 94 (April): 210–217. (Scholar)
Frankfurt, Harry, 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 46 (December): 829–839. (Scholar)
Freddoso, Alfred, 1982, “Accidental Necessity and Power Over the Past,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63: 54–68. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, “Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism,” Journal of Philosophy, 80: 257–78. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, Trans. and introduction to Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of Concordia), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Gaskin, R., 1993, “Conditionals of Freedom and Middle Knowledge,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 43(173): 412–430. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Molina on Divine Foreknowledge and the Principle of Bivalence,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 32(4): 551–571. (Scholar)
Goris, Harm J.M.J., 1996, Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will, Utrecht/Louvain: Thomas Instituut/Peeters. (Scholar)
Graham, P.A., 2008, “Warfield on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom,” Faith and Philosophy, 25(1): 75–8. (Scholar)
Griffin, David, and John B. Cobb, 1976, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition, Philadelphia: Westminster Press. (Scholar)
Grössl, Johannes, and Leigh Vicens, 2014, “Closing the Door on Limited-Risk Open Theism,” Faith and Philosophy, 31(4): 475–85. (Scholar)
Guleserian, T., 2008, “Ontological Determination and the Grounding Objection to Counterfactuals of Freedom,” Faith and Philosophy, 25(4): 394–415. (Scholar)
Haack, Susan, 1974, “On a Theological Argument for Fatalism,” Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (April): 156–59. (Scholar)
Hartshorne, Charles, 1941, Man’s Vision of God, New York: Harper and Bros. (Scholar)
–––, 1967, A Natural Theology for Our Time, Lasalle: Open Court Pub. (Scholar)
Hasker, William, 1988, “Yes, God Has Beliefs!” Religious Studies, 24(3): 385–94. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Zagzebski on Power Entailment,” Faith and Philosophy, 10(2): 250–255. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited,” Faith and Philosophy, 12(2): 223–236. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, a Reply to William Craig,” Philosophy and Phenomological Research, 57(2): 389–393. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “No Easy Way Out – A Response to Warfield,” Noûs, 32: 361–363. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!”, Faith and Philosophy, 17(1): 126–131. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Why Simple Foreknowledge Is Still Useless (In Spite of David Hunt and Alex Pruss),” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 52(3): 537–44. (Scholar)
Hawking, Stephen, 1988, A Brief History of Time, New York: Bantam Books. (Scholar)
Hess, Elijah, 2020, “Contra Tooley: Divine Foreknowledge Is Possible,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 87(2): 165–72. (Scholar)
Hoffman, Joshua and Gary Rosenkrantz, 1984, “Hard and Soft Facts,” Philosophical Review, 93 (July): 419–34. (Scholar)
Hughes, Charles T., 1997, “Belief, Foreknowledge, and Theological Fatalism,” Faith and Philosophy, 14(3): 378–87. (Scholar)
Hunt, David P., 1993, “Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge,” Faith and Philosophy, 10(3): 394–414. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Dispositional Omniscience,” Philosophical Studies, 80 (December): 243–78. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Two Problems with Knowing the Future,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 34 (April): 273–85. (Scholar)
–––, 1999a, “On Augustine’s Way Out,” Faith and Philosophy, 16(1): 3–26. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b, “Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action,” Philosophical Studies, 97(2): 195–227. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “The Compatibility of Divine Determinism and Human Freedom: A Modest Proposal,” Faith and Philosophy, 19 (October): 485–502. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt,” in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, David Widerker and Michael McKenna (eds.), Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., pp. 159–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “The Providential Advantage of Divine Foreknowledge,” in Arguing about Religion, Kevin Timpe (ed.), New York: Routledge, pp. 374–85. (Scholar)
–––, 2017a, “Theological Fatalism as an Aporetic Problem,” in Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedome in Perfect Being Theology, Hugh McCann (ed.), pp. 23–41. (Scholar)
–––, 2017b, “John Martin Fischer on the Puzzle of Theological Fatalism,” Science, Religion and Culture, 4: 15–26. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “Fatalism for Presentists,” in The Metaphysics of Time: Themes on Prior, Per Hasle, David Jakobsen, and Peter Øhrstrøm (eds.), Aalborg University Press, pp. 299–316. (Scholar)
Ishtiyaque, H., 2005, “Foreknowledge, Freedom, and Obligation,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86(3): 321–39. (Scholar)
Johnson, David Kyle, 2009, “God, Fatalism, and Temporal Ontology,” Religious Studies, 45(4): 435–54. (Scholar)
Kane, Robert, 1996, The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kapitan, Tomis, 1993, “Providence, Foreknowledge, and Decision Procedure,” Faith and Philosophy, 10(3): 415–420. (Scholar)
Kenny, Anthony, 1969, “Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom,” in Kenny, Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, The God of the Philosophers, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Kosciuk, Christopher J., 2010, Human Freedom in a World Full of Providence: An Ockhamist-Molinist Account of the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Creaturely Free Will, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Open Access Dissertations. (Scholar)
Kvanvig, Jonathan, 1986, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, New York: St. Martin’s Press. (Scholar)
Law, Andrew, 2020, “The Dependence Response and Explanatory Loops,” Faith and Philosophy, 37(3): 294–307. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “From the Fixity of the Past to the Fixity of the Independent,” Philosophical Studies, 178(4): 1301–14. (Scholar)
Leftow, Brian, 1991a, Time and Eternity, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991b, “Timelessness and Foreknowledge,” Philosophical Studies, 63: 309–325. (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1979, “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,” Noûs, 13 (November): 455–476. (Scholar)
Linville, Mark D., 1993, “Divine Foreknowledge and the Libertarian Conception of Freedom,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 33(3): 165–186. (Scholar)
Lucas, J.R., 1989, The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality, and Truth, London: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Malpass, Alex, and Jacek Wawer, 2012, “A Future for the Thin Red Line,” Synthese, 188(1): 117–42. (Scholar)
Markosian, Ned, 2004, “A Defense of Presentism,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (Volume 1), Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 47–82. (Scholar)
Massie, P., 2006, “Time and Contingency in Duns Scotus,” The Saint Anselm Journal, 3(2): 17–31. (Scholar)
Mavrodes, George, 1984, “Is the Past Preventable?” Faith and Philosophy, I (April): 131–146. (Scholar)
McCall, Storrs, 2011, “The Supervenience of Truth: Freewill and Omniscience,” Analysis, 71(3): 501–6. (Scholar)
McCann, Hugh, 1995, “Divine Sovereignty and the Freedom of the Will,” Faith and Philosophy, 12(4): 582–598. (Scholar)
McKay, Thomas J., and David Johnson, 1996, “A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism,” Philosophical Topics, 24(2): 113–22. (Scholar)
McKenna, Michael, 1997, “Alternate Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 28(3): 71–85. (Scholar)
Mele, Alfred, and David Robb, 1998, “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases,” Philosophical Review, 107(1): 97–112. (Scholar)
Merricks, Trenton., 2009, “Truth and Freedom,” Philosophical Review, 118(1): 29–57. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Foreknowledge and Freedom,” Philosophical Review, 120(4): 567–86. (Scholar)
Molina, Luis de. [See Freddoso 1988.]
Mongkin, Charles, and Menachem Kellner (eds.), 2000, Free Will and Moral Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives, College Park, MD: University of Maryland Press. (Scholar)
Mooney, Justin, 2018, “Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 10(2): 131–48. (Scholar)
Murray, Michael J., 1995, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(1): 75–108. (Scholar)
O’Connor, Timothy, 2000, Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Ockham, William, 1983, Predestination, Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, 2nd ed & trans. by Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
Otsuka, Michael, 1998, “Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame,” Ethics, 108 (July): 685–701. (Scholar)
Øhrstrøm, Peter, 2009, “In Defence of the Thin Red Line: A Case for Ockhamism,” Humana Mente, 8: 17–32. (Scholar)
Padgett, Alan, 1992, Eternity and the Nature of Time, New York: St. Martin’s Press. (Scholar)
Padgett, Alan. 2002. “Divine Foreknowledge and the Arrow of Time: On the Impossibility of Retrocausation,” in God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, Gregory E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 65–74. (Scholar)
Pendergraft, Garrett, and D. Justin Coates., 2014, “No (New) Troubles with Ockhamism,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, 5: 185–208. (Scholar)
Pawl, Timothy, 2014a, “The Freedom of Christ and Explanatory Priority,” Religious Studies, 50: (2): 157–73. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “The Freedom of Christ and the Problem of Deliberation,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 75(3): 233–47. (Scholar)
Pereboom, Derk, 2000, “Alternate Possibilities and Causal Histories,” Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 20), James Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero: Ridgeview. (Scholar)
Perszyk, Ken., 2011, Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Recent Work on Molinism,” Philosophy Compass, 8: 755–70. (Scholar)
Pike, Nelson, 1965, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,” The Philosophical Review, 74(1): 27–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1970, God and Timelessness, New York: Schocken. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge Problem,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 33 (June): 129–164. (Scholar)
Pinnock, Clark, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger, 1994, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God, Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. (Scholar)
Plantinga, Alvin, 1973, The Nature of Necessity, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1977, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “On Ockham’s Way Out,” Faith and Philosophy, 3(3): 235–269. (Scholar)
Prior, Arthur N., 1962, “The Formalities of Omniscience,” Philosophy, 37 (April): 114–29. (Scholar)
–––, 1967, Past, Present, and Future, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Purtill, Richard, 1988, “Fatalism and the Omnitemporality of Truth,” Faith and Philosophy, 5(2): 185–192. (Scholar)
Pruss, A., 2007, “Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” Faith and Philosophy, 24(4): 433–57. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “From Restricted to Full Omniscience,” Religious Studies, 47(2): 257–64. (Scholar)
Rauf, M.A., 1970, “The Qur’an and Free Will,” The Muslim World, 60(4): 289–299. (Scholar)
Rea, Michael, 2006, “Presentism and Fatalism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84(4): 511–24. (Scholar)
Reichenbach, Bruce, 1987, “Hasker on Omniscience,” Faith and Philosophy, 4 (January): 86–92. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Fatalism and Freedom,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 28 (September): 271–85. (Scholar)
Rhoda, Alan R., 2009, “Presentism, Truthmakers, and God,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90: 41–62. (Scholar)
Rhoda, A.R., G.A. Boyd, and T.G. Belt, 2006, “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future,” Faith and Philosophy, 23(4): 432–59. (Scholar)
Rice, Hugh, 2005, “Zagzebski on the Arrow of Time,” Faith and Philosophy, 22(3): 363–369. (Scholar)
Robinson, Michael D., 1995, Eternity and Freedom: A Critical Analysis of Divine Timelessness as a Solution to the Foreknowledge/Free Will Debate, Lanham, MD: University Press of America. (Scholar)
–––, 2004a, “Divine Providence, Simple Foreknowledge, and the ‘Metaphysical Principle’,” Religious Studies, 40(4): 471–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2004b, “Divine Guidance and an Accidentally Necessary Future: A Response to Hunt,” Religious Studies, 40(4): 493–98. (Scholar)
Rogers, Katherin A., 2007a, “Anselmian Eternalism,” Faith and Philosophy, 24(1): 3–27. (Scholar)
–––, 2007b, “The Necessity of the Present and Anselm’s Eternalist Response to the Problem of Theological Fatalism,” Religious Studies, 43(1): 25–47. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Anselm on Eternity as the Fifth Dimension,” The Saint Anselm Journal, 3(2): 1–8. (Scholar)
Rota, Michael, 2010, “The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2(1): 165–186. (Scholar)
Rowe, William L., 1999, “Problem of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom,” Faith and Philosophy, 16(1): 98–101. (Scholar)
Runzo, Joseph, 1981, “Omniscience and Freedom for Evil,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 12: 131–147. (Scholar)
Sanders, John, 1997, “Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control Than the Openness of God,” Faith and Philosophy, 14(1): 26–40. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence, Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. (Scholar)
Sansbury, T., 2007, “The False Promise of Quantum Mechanics,” Zygon, 42(1): 111–22. (Scholar)
Sartorio, Carolina, 2016, “PAP-Style Cases,” Journal of Philosophy, 113(11): 533–49. (Scholar)
Shabo, Seth, 2010, “Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(2): 349–83. (Scholar)
Shanley, B., 1997, “Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 71: 197–224. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 72: 99–122. (Scholar)
Shieber, Joseph., 2009, “Personal Responsibility and Middle Knowledge: A Challenge for the Molinist,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 66(2): 61–70. (Scholar)
Sider, Ted, 1999, “Presentism and Ontological Commitment,” Journal of Philosophy, 96(7): 325–47. (Scholar)
Sleigh, Robert, 1994, “Leibniz and Divine Foreknowledge,” Faith and Philosophy, 11(4): 547–571. (Scholar)
Slote, Michael, 1982, “Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem,” Journal of Philosophy, 79(1): 5–24. (Scholar)
Stump, Eleonore, 1990, “Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, Michael D. Beaty (ed.), Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 254–85. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 73–88. (Scholar)
Stump, Eleonore, and Norman Kretzmann, 1981, “Eternity,” Journal of Philosophy, 78 (August): 429–58. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Prophecy, Past Truth, and Eternity,” Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 5: Philosophy of Religion), James Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero: Ridgeview Press, pp. 395–424. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Eternity, Awareness, and Action,” Faith and Philosophy, 9: 463–82. (Scholar)
Swenson, Philip, 2016, “Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(4): 658–71. (Scholar)
Swinburne, Richard, 1977, The Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, Providence and the Problem of Evil, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Talbott, Thomas, 1986, “On Divine Foreknowledge and Bringing About the Past,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46: 455–469. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Theological Fatalism and Modal Confusion,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 33 (April): 65–88. (Scholar)
Talsma, Tina., 2013, “Source Incompatibilism and the Foreknowledge Dilemma,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 73(3): 209–19. (Scholar)
Tanis, J., 2004, “Free Will and Foreknowledge,” Dialogue, 46(2–3): 95–103. (Scholar)
Timpe, Kevin, 2005. “Prayers for the Past,” Religious Studies, 41(3): 305–322. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. “Truth-making and Divine Eternity,” Religious Studies, 43(3): 299–315. (Scholar)
Todd, Patrick, 2011, “Geachianism,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, 3: 222–51. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence,” Philosophical Studies, 164(3): 829–44. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Prepunishment and Explanatory Dependence: A New Argument for Incompatibilism about Foreknowledge and Freedom,” Philosophical Review, 122(4): 619–39. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Against Limited Foreknowledge,” Philosophia, 42(2): 523–38. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Fatalism,” Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy, Duncan Pritchard (ed.), available online. (Scholar)
–––, 2016a, “Future Contingents Are All False! On Behalf of a Russellian Open Future,” Mind, 125(499): 775–98. (Scholar)
–––, 2016b, “On Behalf of a Mutable Future,” Synthese, 193(7): 2077–95. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, The Open Future: Why Future Contingents Are All False, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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