Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Free Will" by Timothy O’Connor and Christopher Franklin

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Adams, Robert, 1987. “Must God Create the Best?” in his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology, New York: Oxford University Press, 51–64. (Scholar)
Al-Ghazali, 2000. [IP] The Incoherence of the Philosophers, Michael E. Marmura (ed.), Provo: Brigham Young University Press. (Scholar)
Almeida, Michael, 2008. The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Anscombe, G. E. M., 1971. Causality and Determination, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Aquinas, Thomas, 1945. [BW] Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2 volumes, New York: Random House. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. [SPW] Selected Philosophical Writings, T. McDermott (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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Aristotle, 1985. [NE] Nicomachean Ethics, tr. Terence Irwin, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. (Scholar)
Augustine, 1993. [FCW] On the Free Choice of the Will, tr. Thomas Williams, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. (Scholar)
Austin, J. L., 1961. “Ifs and Cans,” in Philosophical Papers, J. O. Urmson and G. Warnock (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 153–80. (Scholar)
Ayer, A. J., 1954. “Freedom and Necessity,” in his Philosophical Essays, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 3–20. (Scholar)
Baker, Lynne Rudder, 2003. “Why Christians Should Not Be Libertarians: An Augustinian Challenge,” Faith and Philosophy, 20 (4): 460–478. (Scholar)
Balaguer, Mark, 2009. “Why There Are No Good Arguments for any Interesting Version of Determinism,” Synthese, 168: 1–21. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. “Replies to McKenna, Pereboom, and Kane,” Philosophical Studies, 169: 71–92 (Scholar)
Bayne, Tim, 2017. “Free Will and the Phenomenology of Agency,” in The Routledge Companion to Free Will, Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith, and Neil Levy, (eds.), Abingdon: Routledge, 633–44. (Scholar)
Bishop, John, 1989. Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Bobzien, Suzanne, 1998. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. “Did Epicurus Discover the Free-Will Problem?” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 19: 287–337. (Scholar)
Bramhall, John, [1655] 1999. “Bramhall’s Discourse of Liberty and Necessity,” in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, Vere Chappell (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–14.
Brand, Myles, 1979. “The Fundamental Question in Action Theory,” Noûs, 13: 131–51. (Scholar)
Bratman, Michael, 2000. “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency,” Philosophical Review, 109: 35–61. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. “Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency,” in Personal Autonomy, James Stacey Taylor (ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Broad, C. D., 1952. “Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism,” in his Ethics and the History of Philosophy: Selected Essays, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD. (Scholar)
Campbell, C. A., 1951. “Is ‘Freewill’ a Pseudo-Problem?” Mind, 60: 441–65. (Scholar)
Capes, Justin A., 2016. “Blameworthiness and Buffered Alternatives,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 53: 269–80. (Scholar)
Capes, Justin A. and Philip Swenson, 2017. “Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-grained Response Revisited,” Philosophical Studies, 174: 967–81. (Scholar)
Caruso, Gregg, 2012. Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will, Plymouth: Lexington Books. (Scholar)
Chakrabarti, Arindam, 2017. “Free Will and Freedom in Indian Philosophies,” in The Routledge Companion to Free Will, Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith, and Neil Levy (eds.), New York: Routledge, 389–404. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick, 1966. “Freedom and Action,” in Freedom and Determinism, Keith Lehrer (ed.), New York: Random House, 11–40. (Scholar)
–––, 1976. Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, La Salle, IL: Open Court, (Scholar)
Clarke, Randolph, 1993. “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will,” Noûs, 27: 191–203. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. “Indeterminism and Control,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 125–38. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action,” Philosophical Topics, 24: 19–48. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. “Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86: 408–21. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism,” Mind, 118: 323–51. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Are We Free to Obey the Laws?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 389–401. (Scholar)
–––, 2011. “Alternatives for Libertarians,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert Kane (ed.), 2nd edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 329–48. (Scholar)
–––, 2019. “Free Will, Agent Causation, and ‘Disappearing Agents’,” Noûs, 53 (1): 76–96. (Scholar)
Clarke, Randolph and Thomas Reed, 2015. “Free Will and Agential Powers,” Oxford Studies in Agency and Moral Responsibility, 3: 6–33. (Scholar)
Coffman, E. J., 2015. Luck: Its Nature and Significance for Human Knowledge and Agency, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
Cohen, Yishai, 2017. “Fischer’s Deterministic Frankfurt-style Argument,” Erkenntnis, 82: 121–40. (Scholar)
Couenhoven, Jesse, 2007. “Augustine’s Rejection of the Free-will Defence: An Overview of the Late Augustine’s Theodicy,” Religious Studies, 43 (3): 279–298. (Scholar)
Cyr, Taylor W., 2017.“Semicompatibilism: No Ability to Do Otherwise Required,” Philosophical Explorations, 20 (3): 308–21. (Scholar)
Cyr, Taylor W. and Philip Swenson, 2019. “Moral Responsibility without General Ability,” Philosophical Quarterly, 69 (274): 22–40. (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1963. “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” Journal of Philosophy, 60: 685–700. (Scholar)
–––, 1973. “Freedom to Act,” in Essays on Freedom of Action, Ted Honderich (ed.), New York: Routledge and Kagan Press, 63–81. (Scholar)
Deery, Oisin, Matthew Bedke, and Shaun Nichols, 2013. “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 1: 126–50. (Scholar)
Dennett, Daniel, 1984. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Descartes, René, 1641 [1988]. Meditations on First Philosophy, in Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (eds. and trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 73–121.
–––, 1644 [1988]. Principles of Philosophy, in Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (eds. and trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 160–212.
Donagan, Alan, 1985. Human Ends and Human Actions: An Exploration in St. Thomas’s Treatment, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. (Scholar)
Dihle, Albrecht, 1982. The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
Dilman, Ilham, 1999. Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Double, Richard, 1991. The Non-Reality of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Duns Scotus, John, 1986. “Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX, Q.15” [QAM] in Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. (ed. and trans.), Washington: Catholic University of America Press. (Scholar)
–––, [1297–99] [1994]. Contingency and Freedom: Lectura I 39, tr. Vos Jaczn et al., Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Edwards, Jonathan, 1754 [1957]. Freedom of Will, Paul Ramsey (ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press.
Ekstrom, Laura Waddell, 1993. “A Coherence Theory of Autonomy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 599–616. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. Free Will: A Philosophical Study, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2019. “Toward a Plausible Event-Causal Indeterminist Account of Free Will,” Synthese, 196 (1): 127–144. (Scholar)
Ellis, George, 2016. How Can Physics Underlie the Mind?, Berlin: Springer-Verlag. (Scholar)
Elzein, Nadine, 2017. “Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities,” Acta Analytica, 32: 169–91. (Scholar)
Fara, Michael, 2008. “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism,” Mind, 117: 844–65. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, 1982. “Responsibility and Control,” Journal of Philosophy, 79: 24–40. (Scholar)
–––, 1987. “Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility,” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays on Moral Psychology, Ferdinand Schoeman (ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 81–106; reprinted in Fischer 2006 63–83. (Citations refer to reprinted edition.) (Scholar)
–––, 1989. God, Freedom, and Foreknowledge, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility,” Ethics, 110: 93–139. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories,” Philosophical Review, 119: 315–36. (Scholar)
–––, 2011. “The Zygote Argument Remixed,” Analysis, 71: 267–72. (Scholar)
–––, 2012. Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. “The Deterministic Horn of the Dilemma Defense: A Reply to Widerker and Goetz,” Analysis, 73: 489–96. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. “The Freedom Required for Moral Responsibility,” in Virtue, Happiness, and Knowledge: Themes from the Work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin, David Brink, Susan Meyer, and Christopher Shields (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 216–233. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza, 1998. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin and Neal Tognazzini, 2011. “The Physiognomy of Responsibility,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82: 381–417. (Scholar)
Frankfurt, Harry, 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 66: 829–39. (Scholar)
–––, 1971. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 5–20. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. “On the Necessity of Ideals,” in The Moral Self, G.C. Noam and T. Wren (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 16–27. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. “Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,” in Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne: Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1993, H.F. Fulda and R.P. Horstmann (eds.), Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 433–47. (Scholar)
Franklin, Christopher Evan, 2011a. “Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument,” Philosophical Studies, 156: 199–230. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b. “Masks, Abilities, and Opportunities: Why the New Dispositionalism Cannot Succeed,” The Modern Schoolman, 88: 89–103. (Scholar)
–––, 2011c. “Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” Philosophical Studies, 152: 189–207. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. “Event-Causal Libertarianism, Functional Reduction, and the Disappearing Agent Argument,” Philosophical Studies, 170: 413–32. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. “Everyone Thinks that an Ability to Do Otherwise Is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies, 172: 2091–107. (Scholar)
–––, 2016. “If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist,” Mind, 125: 1101–31. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Freddoso, Alfred, 1988. “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature,” in Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 74–118. (Scholar)
Frede, Michael, 2011. A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
Ginet, Carl, 1966. “Might We Have No Choice?” in Freedom and Determinism, Keith Lehrer (ed.), New York: Random House, 87–104. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing,” Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 403–17. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Review of Living without Free Will,” Journal of Ethics, 6: 305–309. (Scholar)
–––, 2008. “In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations,” The Journal of Ethics, 12: 229–37. (Scholar)
Goetz, Stewart C., 2005. “Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 83–105. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. Freedom, Teleology, and Evil, London: T&T Clark. (Scholar)
Grant, W. Matthews, 2016. “Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian Freedom,” in Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns, Kevin Timpe and Daniel Speak (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 214–33. (Scholar)
–––, 2019. Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account, London: Bloomsbury Academic. (Scholar)
Griffith, Meghan, 2010. “Why Agent-Caused Actions Are Not Lucky,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 43–56. (Scholar)
Guillon, Jean-Baptiste, 2014. “Van Inwagen on Introspected Freedom,” Philosophical Studies, 168: 645–63. (Scholar)
Haji, Ishtiyaque, 1998. Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. “Control Conundrums: Modest Libertarianism, Responsibility, and Explanation,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 82: 178–200. (Scholar)
Haji, Ishtiyaque and Michael McKenna, 2004. “Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities,” Journal of Philosophy, 101: 299–314. (Scholar)
Hecht, Jonathan, 2014. “Freedom of the Will in Plato and Augustine,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 22: 196–216. (Scholar)
Hobart, R. E., 1934. “Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It,” Mind, 43: 1–27. (Scholar)
Hobbes, Thomas, 1654 [1999]. Of Liberty and Necessity, in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, Vere Chappell (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 15–42.
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Hoffman, Tobias and Cyrille Michon, 2017. “Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism,” Philosopher’s Imprint, 17 (10), 1–36. (Scholar)
Hofmann, Frank, 2022. “Explaining Free Will by Rational Abilities,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 25 (2): 283–93. (Scholar)
Holton, Richard, 2009. Willing, Wanting, Waiting, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Horgan, Terrence, 1979. “‘Could’, Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 17: 345–58. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. “Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate,” Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 3: 34–61. (Scholar)
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Irwin, Terence, 1992. “Who Discovered the Will?” Philosophical Perspectives, 6: 453–73. (Scholar)
Israel, Jonathan, 2001. Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jacobs, Jonathan D. and Timothy O’Connor, 2013. “Agent Causation in a Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics,” in Mental Causation and Ontology, Sophie C. Gibb, E.J. Lowe, and Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 173–92. (Scholar)
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Judisch, Neal, 2016. “Divine conservation and creaturely freedom,” in Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns, Kevin Timpe and Daniel Speak (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 234–58. (Scholar)
Kane, Robert, 1996. The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 1997. “Finkish Dispositions,” Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 143–58. (Scholar)
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Maoz, Uri and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), 2022. Free Will: Philosophers and Neuroscientists in Conversation, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2006. Free Will and Luck, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 1954. “Determinists and Libertarians,” Mind, 63: 317–37. (Scholar)
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