Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Functionalism" by Janet Levin

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Adams, F. and K. Aizawa, 2008, The Bounds of Cognition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
Aizawa, K., 2008, “Neuroscience and Multiple realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale”, Synthese, 167: 495–510. (Scholar)
Aizawa, K. and Gillett, C., 2007, “Multiple realization and Methodology in Neuroscience and Psychology”, British Journal of the Philosophy of Science. (Scholar)
Aizawa, K. and Gillett, C., 2009, “The Multiple realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences”, Mind and Language, 24(2): 181–208. (Scholar)
Alter, T., 2007, “Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?”, in Alter and Walter (2007), 65–76. (Scholar)
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Alter, T. and S. Walter, 2007, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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Balog, K., 2012, “In Defense of the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1): 1–23. (Scholar)
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Bechtel, W., 2012, “Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: perspectives from circadian rhythm research”, in Gozzano and Hill 2012, 88–110. (Scholar)
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Block, N. and R. Stalnaker, 1999, “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”, Philosophical Review, 108(1): 1–46. (Scholar)
Braddon-Mitchell, D. and F. Jackson, 1996/2007, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
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–––, 1995, “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice”, in Heil and Mele 1995, 97–120. (Scholar)
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Byrne, A. and Manzotti, R., 2022, “Hallucination and its Objects”, Philosophical Review, 131(3): 327–359. (Scholar)
Byrne, A. and Prior, J., 2006, “Bad Intensions”, in Garcia-Carpintiero, M. and Macia, J. (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 38 (Scholar)
Cao, R., 2022, “Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism”, Synthese, 200(6): 1–31. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1996a, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996b, “Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?”, Synthese, 108: 309–333. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(2): 473–496. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?”, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002, 145–200. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “The Foundation of Two-Dimensional Semantics”, in M. Garcia-Carpintiero, M. and J. Macia (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55–140. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, The Character of Consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chisholm, R., 1957, Perceiving, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Chomsky, N., 1959, “Review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior”, Language, 35: 26–58; reprinted in Block 1980, 48–63. (Scholar)
Churchland, P., 1981, “Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes”, Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective”, Journal of Philosophy, 102: 33–50. (Scholar)
Clark, A., 2008, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Clark, A. and Chalmers, D., 2002, “The Extended Mind”, in Chalmers (2002). Philosophy of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, 643–651. (Scholar)
Crane, T., 1995, “The Mental Causation Debate”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 69 (Supplement): 211–236. (Scholar)
Damasio, A., 1999, The Feeling of What Happens. New York: Harcourt. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 1980a, Essays on Actions and Events, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1980b, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, in Davidson 1980a. (Scholar)
–––, 1980c, “Mental Events”, in Davidson 1980a. (Scholar)
deHooge, I., Zeelenberg, M., and Breugelmans, S., 2011, “A Functionalist Account of Shame-Induced Behavior”, Cognition and Emotion, 25(5): 939–46. (Scholar)
De Joong, H.L. and M. Shouten (eds.), 2012, Rethinking Reduction, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
Dennett, D., 1978a. “Intentional Systems”, in Dennett 1978c, 3–22. (Scholar)
–––, 1978b. “Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness”, in Dennett 1978c, 149–173. (Scholar)
–––, 1978c. Brainstorms, Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science, New York: Oxford University Press, 43–77. (Scholar)
Deroy, O. (ed.), 2017, Sensory Blending: On Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Diaz-Leon, E., 2010, “Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain the Epistemic Gap?”, Mind, 119(476): 533:51. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Do A Posteriori Physicalists Get our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?”, Ratio, 27(1): 1–16. (Scholar)
Ebert, P., and Smith, M., 2012, “Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief”, Dialectica, 66(3): 305–308. (Scholar)
Endicott, R., 2016, “Functionalism, Superduperfunctionalism, and Physicalism: Lessons From Supervenience”, Synthese, 193(7): 2205–2235. (Scholar)
Feigl, H., 1958, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’”, in Feigl, H., Scriven, M. and Maxwell, G., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 370–409. (Scholar)
Field, H., 1980, “Mental Representation”, in Block 1980, 78–114. (Scholar)
Fodor, J., 1968, Psychological Explanation, New York: Random House. (Scholar)
–––, 1975, The Language of Thought, New York: Crowell. (Scholar)
–––, 1990a. “Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation”, in J. Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 3–29. (Scholar)
–––, 1990b. “Making Mind Matter More”, in J. Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 137–159. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, The Elm and the Expert, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Frankish, K., 2004, Mind and Supermind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11–12): 11–39. (Scholar)
Frege, G., 1892/1952, “On Sense and Reference”, in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), Translations from the Work of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Funkhouser, E., 2007, “Multiple Realizability”, Philosophy Compass, 2(2): 303–315. (Scholar)
Geach, P., 1957, Mental Acts, London: RKP. (Scholar)
Gendler, T., 2008, “Belief and Alief”, Journal of Philosophy, 105(10): 634–663. (Scholar)
Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J (eds.), 2002, Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gertler, B., 2007, “Overextending the Mind”, in B. Gertler and L. Shapiro (eds.), Arguing About the Mind, London: Routledge, 192–206. (Scholar)
Gilbert, M., 2013, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gillet, C., 2002, “The dimensions of realization. A critique of the Standard view”, Analysis, 62(4): 316–323. (Scholar)
Glüer, K. and Wikforss, Å., 2009, “Against Content Normativity”, Mind, 118: 31–70. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Against Belief Normativity”, in T. Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 121–146. (Scholar)
Goldman, A., 1993, “The psychology of folk psychology”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16(1): 15–28. (Scholar)
Gozzano, S. and C. Hill, 2012, New Perspectives on Type Identity, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Gray, J.A., and S. Chopping, J. Nunn, D. Parslow, L. Gregory, S. Williams, M.J. Brammer, and S. Baron-Cohen, 2002, “Implications of Synaesthesia for Functionalism”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(12): 5–31. (Scholar)
Hardin, C.L., 1988, Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1973, Thought, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Hart, W., 1988, The Engines of the Soul, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Hill, C., 1991, Sensations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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Holman, E. L., 2013, “Phenomenal concepts as bare recognitional concepts: harder to debunk than you thought…but still possible”, Philosophical Studies, 164: 807–827. (Scholar)
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–––, 1993, “From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world”, Mind, 102(408): 555–86. (Scholar)
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Horgan, T. and J. Woodward, 1985, “Folk Psychology is Here to Stay”, Philosophical Review, 94: 197–226. (Scholar)
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–––, 1996, “Mental Causation”, Mind, 105(419): 377–413. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Postscript on Qualia”, in F. Jackson, Mind, Method, and Conditionals: Selected Essays, London: Routledge, 76–79. (Scholar)
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Kahneman, D., 2011, Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. (Scholar)
Kim, J., 1989, “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion”, in J. Kim, Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge, MA: Bradford. (Scholar)
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Levin, J., 1985, “Functionalism and the Argument from Conceivability”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 11 (Supplement): 85–104. (Scholar)
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