Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Evolutionary Game Theory" by J. McKenzie Alexander

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

  • Akin, Ethan (1980). “Domination or equilibrium,” Mathematical Biosciences, vol. 50(3-4): 239–250. (Scholar)
  • Alexander, J. McKenzie (2000). “Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy of Science, 67: 490–516. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2007). The Structural Evolution of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Alexander, Jason and Brian Skyrms (1999). “Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?Journal of Philosophy, 96 (11): 588–598. (Scholar)
  • Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1986). “An evolutionary approach to norms,” American Political Science Review, 80(4): 1095–1111. (Scholar)
  • Barrett, Jeffrey A. (2007). “Dynamic Partitioning and the Conventionality of Kinds,” Philosophy of Science, 74 (4): 527–546. (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, Cristina (1999). “Local Fairness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(1): 229–236. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2006). The Grammar of Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (1994). “An Economist’s Perspective on the Evolution of Norms,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150 (1): 45–63. (Scholar)
  • Boehm, C. (1982). “The evolutionary development of morality as an effect of dominance behavior and conflict interference,” Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5: 413–421. (Scholar)
  • Bögers, Tilman and Sarin, R. (1996). “Naive Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics,” Working Paper, Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, University College London. (Scholar)
  • Brown, George W. and John von Neumann (1950). “Solutions of Games by Differential Equations,” in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Chalub, F.A.C.C., Santos, F.C. and J.M. Pacheco (2006). “The evolution of norms,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 241: 233–240. (Scholar)
  • Clemens, Christiane and Thomas Riechmann (2006). “Evolutionary Dynamics in Public Goods Games,” Computational Economics, 28: 399–420. (Scholar)
  • D’Arms, Justin (1996). “Sex, Fairness, and the Theory of Games,” Journal of Philosophy, 93 (12): 615–627. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2000). “When Evolutionary Game Theory Explains Morality, What Does It Explain?Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 296–299. (Scholar)
  • D’Arms, Justin, Robert Batterman, and Krzyzstof Górny (1998). “Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice,” Philosophy of Science, 65: 76–102. (Scholar)
  • Danielson, P. (1998). “Critical Notice: Evolution of the Social Contract,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28 (4): 627–652. (Scholar)
  • Enquist, Magnus and Stefano Ghirlanda (2007). “Evolution of Social Learning Does Not Explain the Origin of Human Cumulative Culture,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 246: 129–135. (Scholar)
  • Enquist, M., Ghirlanda, S., Jarrick, A., and Wachtmeister, C. A. (2008). “Why Does Human Culture Increase Exponentially?” Theoretical Population Biology, 74: 46–55. (Scholar)
  • Fishman, Michael A. (2006). “Involuntary defection and the evolutionary origins of empathy,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 242: 873–879. (Scholar)
  • Fisher, R. A. (1930). The Genetic Theory of Natural Selection, Oxford, Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Fletcher, Jeffrey A. and Martin Zwick (2007). “The evolution of altruism: Game theory in multilevel selection and inclusive fitness,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 245: 26–36. (Scholar)
  • Gintis, Herbert (2000). “Classical Versus Evolutionary Game Theory,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (1–2): 300–304. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2007). “The evolution of private property,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 64: 1–16. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2009). Game Theory Evolving, Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Gintis, Herbert, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr (2003). “Explaining altruistic behavior in humans,” Evolution and Human Behavior, 24: 153–172. (Scholar)
  • Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P. and Varoufakis, Yanis (2004). Game Theory: A Critical Text, Routledge. (Scholar)
  • Harms, William (2000). “The Evolution of Cooperation in Hostile Environments,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (1–2): 308–313. (Scholar)
  • Harms, William and Brian Skyrms (2008). “Evolution of Moral Norms,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Harsanyi, J. (1953). “Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking,” Journal of Political Economy, 61: 434–435. (Scholar)
  • Hauert, Christoph (2006). “Spatial Effects in Social Dilemmas,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 240: 627–636. (Scholar)
  • Hauert, Christoph, Franziska Michor, Martin A. Nowak, and Michael Doebeli (2006). “Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 239: 195–202. (Scholar)
  • Hauert, Christoph, Silvia De Monte, Josef Hofbauer and Karl Sigmund (2002). “Replicator Dynamics for Optional Public Goods Games,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 218: 187–194. (Scholar)
  • Hausken, Kjell, and Jack Hirshleifer (2008). “Truthful Signalling, the Heritability Paradox, and the Malthusian Equi-Marginal Principle,” Theoretical Population Biology, 73: 11–23. (Scholar)
  • Hofbauer, Josef and Simon Huttegger (2008). “Feasibility of Communication in Binary Signaling Games,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 254: 843–849. (Scholar)
  • Hofbauer, Josef, P. Schuster and K. Sigmund (1979). “A note on evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics”. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 81:609–12.
  • Hofbauer, Josef P. and William H. Sandholm (2011). “Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics”. Theoretical Economics, 6:341–377. (Scholar)
  • Huberman, Bernardo A. and Glance, Natalie S. (1993). “Evolutionary Games and Computer Simulations,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 90 (16): 7716–7718. (Scholar)
  • Hurd, Peter L. (1995). “Communication in Discrete Action-Response Games,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 174: 217–222. (Scholar)
  • Jäger, Gerhard (2008). “Evolutionary Stability Conditions for Signaling Games with Costly Signals,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 253: 131–141. (Scholar)
  • Kameda, Tatsuya and Daisuke Nakanishi (2003). “Does social/cultural learning increase human adaptability? Rogers’s question revisited,” Evolution and Human Behavior, 24: 242–260. (Scholar)
  • Kendal, Jeremy, Marcus W. Feldman, and Kenichi Aoki (2006). “Cultural coevolution of norm adoption and enforcement when punishers are rewarded or non-punishers are punished,” Theoretical Population Biology, 70: 10–25. (Scholar)
  • Kitcher, Philip (1999). “Games Social Animals Play: Commentary on Brian Skyrms’ Evolution of the Social Contract,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(1): 221–228. (Scholar)
  • Krebs, Dennis (2000). “Evolutionary Games and Morality,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (1–2): 313–321. (Scholar)
  • Lewis, David (1969). Convention, Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
  • Lewontin, R. C. (1961). “Evolution and the Theory of Games” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1: 382–403. (Scholar)
  • Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa (1957). Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, New York: John Wiley and Sons. (Scholar)
  • Maynard Smith, John (1972). “Game Theory and the Evolution of Fighting,” in On Evolution, Edinburgh University Press. (Scholar)
  • Maynard Smith, John (1976). “Evolution and the Theory of Games,” American Scientist, 64 (1): 41–45. (Scholar)
  • Maynard Smith, John (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Maynard Smith, John and George Price (1973). “The Logic of Animal Conflict” Nature, 146: 15–18. (Scholar)
  • Nakahashi, Wataru (2007). “The Evolution of Conformist Transmission in Social Learning when the Environment Changes Periodically,” Theoretical Population Biology, 72: 52–66. (Scholar)
  • Nash, John F. (1950). “Equilibrium points in n-person games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1):48–49. (Scholar)
  • Nowak, Martin A. and May, Robert M. (1992). “Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos,” Nature, 359 (6398): 826–829. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1993). “The Spatial Dilemmas of Evolution,” International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 3: 35–78. (Scholar)
  • Nowak, Martin A., Joshua B. Plotkin, and David C. Krakauer (1999). “The Evolutionary Language Game,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 200: 147–162. (Scholar)
  • Ostrom, Elinor (2000). “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (3): 137–158. (Scholar)
  • Page, K. M. and M. A. Nowak (2002). “Empathy leads to fairness,” Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 64: 1101–1116. (Scholar)
  • Pawlowitsch, C. (2007). “Finite populations choose an optimal language,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 249: 606–616. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2008). “Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system,” Games and Economic Behavior, 63: 203–226. (Scholar)
  • Rogers, A. R. (1988). “Does biology constrain culture?” American Anthropologist, 90: 819–831. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1997). Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. (Series: Economic Learning and Social Evolution), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Sánchez, Angel and José A. Cuesta (2005). “Altruism may arise from individual selection,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 235: 233–240. (Scholar)
  • Sandholm, William (2010). Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics, MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Schlag, Karl H. (1998). “Why Imitate, and If So, How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits,” Journal of Economic Theory, 78: 130–156. (Scholar)
  • Skyrms, Brian (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning, & Information, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Smith, M. J. (1984). “The stability of a dynamic model of traffic assignment: An application of a method of Lyapunov,” Transportation Science 18:245–252. (Scholar)
  • Swinkels, J. (1992). “Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants,” Journal of Economic Theory, 57:306–332. (Scholar)
  • Taylor, Peter D. and Leo B. Jonker (1978). “Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics,” Mathematical Biosciences, 40: 145–156. (Scholar)
  • Thomas, B. (1984). “Evolutionary Stability: States and Strategies,” Theoretical Population Biology, 26: 49–67. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1985a). “Evolutionary Stable Sets in Mixed-Strategist Models,” Theoretical Population Biology, 28: 332–341. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1985b). “On Evolutionary Stable Sets,” Journal of Mathematical Biology, 22: 105–115. (Scholar)
  • Trivers, Robert L. (1971). “The evolution of reciprocal altruism,” The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46: 35–57. (Scholar)
  • von Neumann, John and Oskar Morgenstern (1953). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (3rd ed.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Wakano, Joe Yuichiro, Kenichi Aoki and Marcus W. Feldman (2004). “Evolution of social learning: a mathematical analysis,” Theoretical Population Biology, 66: 249–258. (Scholar)
  • Wakano, Joe Yuichiro and Kenichi Aoki (2006). “A mixed strategy model for the emergence and intensification of social learning in a periodically changing natural environment,” Theoretical Population Biology, 70: 486–497.
  • Weibull, Juergen W. (1995). Evolutionary Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Zeeman, E.C. (1979). “Population dynamics from game theory,” in Proc. Int. Conf. Global Theory of Dynamical Systems, Northwestern: Evanston. (Scholar)
  • Zollman, Kevin (2005). “Talking to Neighbors: The Evolution of Regional Meaning,” Philosophy of Science, 72: 69–85. (Scholar)

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