Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Evolutionary Game Theory" by J. McKenzie Alexander

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  • Ackley, David and Michael Littman (1994). “Interactions Between Learning and Evolution,” in Christopher G. Langton, ed., Artificial Life III. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 487–509. (Scholar)
  • Adachi, N. and Matsuo, K. (1991). “Ecological Dynamics Under Different Selection Rules in Distributed and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games,” Parallel Problem Solving From Nature (Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Volume 496), Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 388–394. (Scholar)
  • Alexander, J. McKenzie (2000). “Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy of Science, 67: 490–516. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2007). The Structural Evolution of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Alexander, Jason and Brian Skyrms (1999). “Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?Journal of Philosophy, 96 (11): 588–598. (Scholar)
  • Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1986). “An evolutionary approach to norms,” American Political Science Review, 80(4): 1095–1111. (Scholar)
  • Axelrod, Robert M. and Dion, Douglas (1988). ‘The Further Evolution of Cooperation’, Science, 242 (4884): 1385–1390. (Scholar)
  • Axelrod, Robert M. and Hamilton, William D. (1981). ‘The Evolution of Cooperation’, Science, 211 (4489): 1390–1396. (Scholar)
  • Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Weibull, Joergen W. (1993). “Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players,” Working Paper #375, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, University of Stockholm. (Scholar)
  • Barrett, Jeffrey A. (2007). “Dynamic Partitioning and the Conventionality of Kinds,” Philosophy of Science, 74 (4): 527–546. (Scholar)
  • Bergin, J. and Lipman, B. (1996). “Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations,” Econometrica, 64: 943–956.  (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, Cristina (2006). The Grammar of Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Binmore, Ken and Samuelson, Larry (1991). “Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata,” Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 278–305. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1994). “An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150 (1): 45–63. (Scholar)
  • Björnerstedt, J. and Weibull, J. (1993). “Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation,” in Arrow, K. and Colombatto, E. (eds.), Rationality in Economics, New York: Macmillan. (Scholar)
  • Blume, L. (1993). “The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction,” Games and Economic Behaviour, 5: 387–424. (Scholar)
  • Blume, Lawrence E. (1997). “Population Games,” in W. Brian Arthur, Steven N. Durlauf, and David A. Lane (eds.), The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II (SFI Studies in the Sciences of Complexity: Volume 27), Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, , pp. 425-460. (Scholar)
  • Boehm, C. (1982). “The evolutionary development of morality as an effect of dominance behavior and conflict interference,” Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5: 413–421. (Scholar)
  • Bögers, Tilman and Sarin, R. (1996). “Naive Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics,” Working Paper, Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, University College London. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1997). “Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics,” Journal of Economic Theory, 77(1): 1–14. (Scholar)
  • Boyd, Robert and Lorberbaum, Jeffrey P. (1987). “No Pure Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Nature, 32(7) (May 7): 58–59. (Scholar)
  • Boylan, Richard T. (1991). “Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals,” Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 473–504. (Scholar)
  • Busch, Marc L. and Reinhardt, Eric R. (1993). “Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains: The Problem of Co-operation under Anarchy,” Journal-of-Conflict-Resolution, 37(3): 427-445. (Scholar)
  • Cabrales, A. and Ponti, G. (1996). “Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics,” Working Paper, Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, University College London. (Scholar)
  • Canning, David (1988). “Rationality and Game Theory When Players are Turing Machines,” ST/ICERD Discussion Paper 88/183, London: London School of Economics. (Scholar)
  • Canning, David (1990c). “Rationality, Computability and the Limits of Game Theory,” Economic Theory Discussion Paper Number 152, Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge, July. (Scholar)
  • Canning, David (1992). “Rationality, Computability and Nash Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 60(4): 877–888. (Scholar)
  • Chalub, F.A.C.C., Santos, F.C. and J.M. Pacheco (2006). “The evolution of norms,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 241: 233–240. (Scholar)
  • Cho, I.-K. and Kreps, David M. (1987). “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (1): 179–221. (Scholar)
  • Clemens, Christiane and Thomas Riechmann (2006). “Evolutionary Dynamics in Public Goods Games,” Computational Economics, 28: 399–420. (Scholar)
  • Cowan, Robin A. and Miller, John H. (1990). “Economic Life on a Lattice: Some Game Theoretic Results,” Working Paper 90-010, Economics Research Program, Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico. (Scholar)
  • D'Arms, Justin, Robert Batterman, and Krzyzstof Górny (1998). “Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice,” Philosophy of Science, 65: 76–102. (Scholar)
  • D'Arms, Justin (1996). “Sex, Fairness, and the Theory of Games,” Journal of Philosophy, 93 (12): 615–627. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2000). “When Evolutionary Game Theory Explains Morality, What Does It Explain?Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 296–299. (Scholar)
  • Danielson, P. (1992). Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1998). “Critical Notice: Evolution of the Social Contract,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28 (4): 627–652. (Scholar)
  • Dekel, Eddie and Scotchmer, Suzanne (1992). “On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior,” Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 392–406. (Scholar)
  • Eaton, B. C. and Slade, M. E. (1990). “Evolutionary Equilibrium in Market Supergames,” Discussion Paper 90-30 (November 1989), Department of Economics, University of British Columbia. (Scholar)
  • Ellingsen, Tore (1997). “The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1): 581–602. (Scholar)
  • Ellison, G. (1993). “Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination,” Econometrica, 61: 1047–1071. (Scholar)
  • Enquist, Magnus and Stefano Ghirlanda (2007). “Evolution of Social Learning Does Not Explain the Origin of Human Cumulative Culture,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 246: 129–135. (Scholar)
  • Enquist, M., Ghirlanda, S., Jarrick, A., and Wachtmeister, C. A. (2008). “Why Does Human Culture Increase Exponentially?” Theoretical Population Biology, 74: 46–55. (Scholar)
  • Epstein, Joshua A. (1998). “Zones of Cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma,” Complexity, 4 (2): 36–48. (Scholar)
  • Eshel, Ilan, Larry Samuelson, and Avner Shaked (1998). “Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model,” The American Economic Review, 88 (1): 157–179. (Scholar)
  • Fishman, Michael A. (2006). “Involuntary defection and the evolutionary origins of empathy,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 242: 873–879. (Scholar)
  • Fisher, R. A. (1930). The Genetic Theory of Natural Selection, Oxford, Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Fletcher, Jeffrey A. and Martin Zwick (2007). “The evolution of altruism: Game theory in multilevel selection and inclusive fitness,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 245: 26–36. (Scholar)
  • Fogel, David B. (1993). “Evolving Behaviours in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma,” Evolutionary Computation, 1 (1): 77–97. (Scholar)
  • Forrest, Stephanie and Mayer-Kress, G. (1991). “Genetic Algorithms, Nonlinear Dynamical Systems, and Global Stability Models,” in L. Davis, (ed.), The Handbook of Genetic Algorithms, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. (Scholar)
  • Foster, Dean and Young, H. Peyton (1990). “Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 38: 219–232. (Scholar)
  • Friedman, Daniel (1991). “Evolutionary Games in Economics,” Econometrica, 59 (3): 637–666. (Scholar)
  • Fudenberg, Drew and Maskin, Eric (1990). “Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games,” American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 80 (2): 274–279. (Scholar)
  • Gintis, Herbert (2000). “Classical Versus Evolutionary Game Theory,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (1–2): 300–304. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2007). “The evolution of private property,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 64: 1–16. (Scholar)
  • Gintis, Herbert, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr (2003). “Explaining altruistic behavior in humans,” Evolution and Human Behavior, 24: 153–172. (Scholar)
  • Guth, Werner and Kliemt, Hartmut (1994). “Competition or Co-operation — On the Evolutionary Economics of Trust, Exploitation and Moral Attitudes,” Metroeconomica, 45: 155–187. (Scholar)
  • Guth, Werner and Kliemt, Hartmut (1998). “The Indirect Evolutionary Approach: Bridging the Gap Between Rationality and Adaptation,” Rationality and Society, 10 (3): 377–399. (Scholar)
  • Hamilton, W. D. (1963). “The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior,” The American Naturalist, 97: 354–356. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1964). “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior. I,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7: 1–16. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1964). “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior. II,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7: 17–52. (Scholar)
  • Hammerstein, P. and Selten, R. (1994). “Game Theory and Evolutionary Biology,” in R. Auman and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (Volume 2), Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp. 931–962. (Scholar)
  • Hansen, R. G. and Samuelson, W. F. (1988). “Evolution in Economic Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10 (3): 315–338. (Scholar)
  • Harms, William (1997). “Evolution and Ultimatum Bargaining,” Theory and Decision, 42: 147–175. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2000). “The Evolution of Cooperation in Hostile Environments,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (1–2): 308–313. (Scholar)
  • Harms, William and Brian Skyrms (2008). “Evolution of Moral Norms,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Harsanyi, J. (1953). “Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking,” Journal of Political Economy, 61: 434–435. (Scholar)
  • Harrald, Paul G. (in press). “Evolving Behaviour in Repeated Games via Genetic Algorithms,” in P. Stampoultzsis (ed.), The Applications Handbook of Genetic Algorithms, Boca Raton, FA: CRC Publishers. (Scholar)
  • Hassell, Michael P., Hugh N. Comins, and Robert M. May (1991). “Spatial structure and chaos in insect population dynamics,” Nature, 353: 255–258. (Scholar)
  • Hauert, Christoph (2006). “Spatial Effects in Social Dilemmas,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 240: 627–636. (Scholar)
  • Hauert, Christoph, Franziska Michor, Martin A. Nowak, and Michael Doebeli (2006). “Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 239: 195–202. (Scholar)
  • Hauert, Christoph, Silvia De Monte, Josef Hofbauer and Karl Sigmund (2002). “Replicator Dynamics for Optional Public Goods Games,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 218: 187–194. (Scholar)
  • Hausken, Kjell, and Jack Hirshleifer (2008). “Truthful Signalling, the Heritability Paradox, and the Malthusian Equi-Marginal Principle,” Theoretical Population Biology, 73: 11–23. (Scholar)
  • Hegselmann, Rainer (1996). “Social Dilemmas in Lineland and Flatland,” in Liebrand and Messick (eds.), Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research, Berlin: Springer, pp. 337–361. (Scholar)
  • Hiebeler, David (1997). “Stochastic Spatial Models: From Simulations to Mean Field and Local Structure Approximations,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 187: 307–319. (Scholar)
  • Hines, W. G. (1987). “Evolutionary Stable Strategies: A Review of Basic Theory,” Theoretical Population Biology, 31: 195–272. (Scholar)
  • Hirshleifer, Jack and Martinez-Coll, Juan Carlos (1988). “What Strategies can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32 (2): 367–398. (Scholar)
  • Hirshleifer, Jack and Martinez-Coll, Juan Carlos (1992). “Selection, Mutation and the Preservation of Diversity in Evolutionary Games,” Papers on Economics and Evolution, #9202, edited by the European Study Group for Evolutionary Economics. (Scholar)
  • Howard, J. V. (1988). “Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Theory and Decision, 24: 203–213. (Scholar)
  • Huberman, Bernardo A. and Glance, Natalie S. (1993). “Evolutionary Games and Computer Simulations,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 90 (16): 7716–7718. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1995). “The Dynamics of Collective Action,” Computational Economics, 8: 27–46. (Scholar)
  • Hurd, Peter L. (1995). “Communication in Discrete Action-Response Games,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 174: 217–222. (Scholar)
  • Ikegami, Takashi (1993). “Ecology of Evolutionary Game Strategies,” in Self Organization and Life: From Simple Rules to Global Complexity (Proceedings of the Second European Conference on Artificial Life, Brussels, Belgium 24–26 May 1993), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 527–536. (Scholar)
  • Jäger, Gerhard (2008). “Evolutionary Stability Conditions for Signaling Games with Costly Signals,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 253: 131–141. (Scholar)
  • Kameda, Tatsuya and Daisuke Nakanishi (2003). “Does social/cultural learning increase human adaptability? Rogers's question revisited,” Evolution and Human Behavior, 24: 242–260. (Scholar)
  • Kandori, Michihiro, Mailath, George J. and Rob, Rafael (1993). “Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games,” Econometrica, 61: 29–56. (Scholar)
  • Kendal, Jeremy, Marcus W. Feldman, and Kenichi Aoki (2006). “Cultural coevolution of norm adoption and enforcement when punishers are rewarded or non-punishers are punished,” Theoretical Population Biology, 70: 10–25. (Scholar)
  • Kreps, David M. (1990). Game Theory and Economic Modelling, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Kreps, David M. and Fudenberg, Drew (1988). Learning, Experimentation, and Equilibrium in Games, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Iwasa, Yoh, Mayuko Nakamaru, and Simon A. Levin (1998). “Allelopathy of bacteria in a lattice population: Competition between colicin-sensitive and colicin-producing strains,” Evolutionary Ecology, 12: 785–802. (Scholar)
  • Kandori, Michihiro, George J. Mailath, and Rafael Rob (1993). “Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games,” Econometrica, 61(1): 29–56. (Scholar)
  • Kaneko, Kunihiko and Junji Suzuki (1994). “Evolution to the Edge of Chaos in an Imitation Game,” in Christopher G. Langton (ed.), Artificial Life III, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 43–53. (Scholar)
  • Kephart, Jeffrey O. (1994). “How Topology Affects Population Dynamics,” in Christopher G. Langton (ed.), Artificial Life III, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 447-463. (Scholar)
  • Kitcher, Philip (1999). “Games Social Animals Play: Commentary on Brian Skyrms' Evolution of the Social Contract,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(1): 221–228. (Scholar)
  • Krebs, Dennis (2000). “Evolutionary Games and Morality,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (1–2): 313–321. (Scholar)
  • Levin, B. R. (1988). “Frequency-dependent selection in bacterial populations,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London (Series B), 319: 469–472. (Scholar)
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  • Lindgren, Kristian (1990). “Evolution in a Population of Mutating Strategies,” Preprint 90/22 S, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute for Theoretical Physics. (Scholar)
  • Lindgren, Kristian and Nordahl, Mats G. (1993). “Evolutionary Dynamics of Spatial Games,” in Self Organization and Life: From Simple Rules to Global Complexity (Proceedings of the Second European Conference on Artificial Life, Brussels, Belgium 24–26 May 1993), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 604–616. (Scholar)
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  • Lindgren, K. (1991). “Evolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics,” in C.G. Langton, J.D. Farmer, S. Rasmussen, and C. Taylor (eds.), Artificial Life II, Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 295–312. (Scholar)
  • Lomborg, Bjorn (1992). “Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma,” Papers on Economics and Evolution, #9302, edited by the European Study Group for Evolutionary Economics. (Scholar)
  • Lomborg, Bjorn (1996). “Nucleus and Shield: The Evolution of Social Structure in the Interated Prisoner's Dilemma,” American Sociological Review, 61: 278–307. (Scholar)
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  • Mailath, George J. (1992). “Introduction: Symposium on Evolutionary Game Theory,” Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 259–277. (Scholar)
  • Mailath, George J., Samuelson, Larry and Shaked, Avner (1992). “Evolution and Endogenous Interaction,” Draft Paper, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, latest version 24 August 1995. (Scholar)
  • Matsui, Akihiko (1993). “Evolution and Rationalizability,” Working Paper: 93–19 (May 1993), Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences (CARESS), University of Pennsylvania. (Scholar)
  • Mar, Gary (2000). “Evolutionary Game Theory, Morality, and DarwinismJournal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (1–2): 322–326. (Scholar)
  • May, R. M., Bohoeffer, S. and Nowak, Martin A. (1995). “Spatial Games and the Evolution of Cooperation,” in F. Moran, A. Moreno, J.J. Merelo and P. Chacon, P. (eds.), Advances in Artificial Life: Proceedings of the Third European Conference on Artificial Life (ECAL95), Berlin: Sprnger-Verlag, pp. 749-759. (Scholar)
  • Maynard-Smith, John (1976). “Evolution and the Theory of Games,” American Scientist, 64 (1): 41–45. (Scholar)
  • Maynard-Smith, John (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Maynard Smith, John and George Price (1973). “The Logic of Animal Conflict” Nature, 146: 15–18. (Scholar)
  • Miller, John H. (1988). “The Evolution of Automata in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,” in Two Essays on the Economics of Imperfect Information, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, University of Michigan/Ann Arbor. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1996). “The Coevolution of Automata in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 29 (1): 87–112. (Scholar)
  • Miller, John H. and Shubik, Martin (1994). “Some Dynamics of a Strategic Market Game with a Large Number of Agents,” Journal of Economics, 60: 1–28. (Scholar)
  • Miller, J. H. and J. Andreoni (1991). “Can Evolutionary Dynamics Explain Free Riding in Experiments?” Economic Letters, 36: 9–15. (Scholar)
  • Nachbar, John H. (1990). “'Evolutionary’ Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties,” International Journal of Game Theory, 19: 59–89. (Scholar)
  • Nachbar, John H. (1992). “Evolution in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: A Methodological Comment and Some Simulations,” Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 19 (3): 307–326. (Scholar)
  • Nakahashi, Wataru (2007). “The Evolution of Conformist Transmission in Social Learning when the Environment Changes Periodically,” Theoretical Population Biology, 72: 52–66. (Scholar)
  • Neyman, A. (1985). “Bounded Complexity Justifies Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,” Economics Letters, 19: 227–229. (Scholar)
  • Nowak, Martin A. and May, Robert M. (1992). “Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos,” Nature, 359 (6398): 826–829. (Scholar)
  • Nowak, Martin A., Joshua B. Plotkin, and David C. Krakauer (1999). “The Evolutionary Language Game,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 200: 147–162. (Scholar)
  • Nowak, Martin A. and Sigmund, K. (1992). “Tit For Tat in Heterogenous Populations,” Nature, 359: 250–253. (Scholar)
  • Nowak, Martin A. and May, Robert M. (1993). “The Spatial Dilemmas of Evolution,” International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 3: 35–78. (Scholar)
  • Nowak, Martin A., Sebastian Bonhoeffer, and Robert M. May (1994). “More Spatial Games,” International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 4 (1): 33–56. (Scholar)
  • Ockenfels, Peter (1993). “Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma — An Evolutionary Approach,” European Journal of Political Economy, 9: 567–579. (Scholar)
  • Ostrom, Elinor (2000). “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (3): 137–158. (Scholar)
  • Page, K. M. and M. A. Nowak (2002). “Empathy leads to fairness,” Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 64: 1101–1116. (Scholar)
  • Pawlowitsch, C. (2007). “Finite populations choose an optimal language,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 249: 606–616. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2008). “Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system,” Games and Economic Behavior, 63: 203–226. (Scholar)
  • Reijnders, L. (1978). “On the Applicability of Game Theory to Evolution,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 75 (1): 245–247. (Scholar)
  • Robles, J. (1998). “Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates,” Journal of Economic Theory, 79: 207–223.  (Scholar)
  • Robson, Arthur J. (1990). “Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 144: 379–396. (Scholar)
  • Rogers, A. R. (1988). “Does biology constrain culture?” American Anthropologist, 90: 819–831. (Scholar)
  • Samuelson, Larry and J. Zhang (1992). “Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 363–391. (Scholar)
  • Samuelson, Larry (1993). “Does Evolution Eliminate Dominated Strategies?” in Kenneth G. Binmore, A. Kirman, and P. Tani (eds.), Frontiers of Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 213–235. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1997). Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. (Series: Economic Learning and Social Evolution), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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  • ––– (1988). “Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games -- Correction and Further Development,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 16 (3): 223–266. (Scholar)
  • Selten, Reinhard (ed.) (1991). Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics, New York: Springer-Verlag. (Scholar)
  • Selten, Reinhard (1993). “Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behaviour,” Games and Economic Behaviour, 3 (1): 3–24. (Scholar)
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  • Skyrms, Brian (1992). “Chaos in Game Dynamics,” Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 1: 111–130. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1994). “Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics,” in Proceedings of the 1992 PSA (Volume 2), Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 374–394. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1994a). “Darwin Meets The Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory,” Philosophy of Science, 61: 503–528. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1994b). “Sex and Justice,” Journal of Philosophy, 91: 305–320. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1997). “Game Theory, Rationality and Evolution,” in M. L. Dalla Chiara et al. (eds.), Structures and Norms in Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 73–85. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1998). “Salience and symmetry-breaking in the evolution of convention,” Law and Philosophy, 17: 411–418. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1999). “Précis of Evolution of the Social Contract,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (1): 217–220. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2000). “Game Theory, Rationality and Evolution of the Social Contract,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (1–2): 269–284. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2000). “Adaptive Dynamic Models and the Social Contract,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7 (1–2): 335–339. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • ––– (forthcoming). “Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London (Series B). (Scholar)
  • Smale, Steve (1980). “The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-cooperative Games,” Econometrica, 48: 1617–1634. (Scholar)
  • Maynard Smith, John and George Price (1973). “The Logic of Animal Conflict,” Nature, 246: 15–18. (Scholar)
  • Maynard Smith, John (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Stanley, E. Ann, Dan Ashlock, and Leigh Tesfatsion (1994). “Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners,” in Christopher G. Langton (ed.), Artificial Life III (Proceedings of the Workshop on Artificial Life, held June 1992 in Santa Fe, New Mexico), Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 131–175. (Scholar)
  • Suleiman, Ramzi and Ilan Fischer (1996). “The Evolution of Cooperation in a Simulated Inter-Group Conflict,” in Liebrand and Messick (eds.), Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research, Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
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  • ––– (1985b). “On Evolutionary Stable Sets,” Journal of Mathematical Biology, 22: 105–115. (Scholar)
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