Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Haecceitism" by Sam Cowling
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Adams, R. M., 1979, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”, Journal of Philosophy, 76: 5–26. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, “Actualism and Thisness”, Synthese, 49: 3–41. (Scholar)
- Almotohari, Mahrad and Rochford, Damien, 2011, “Is Direct Reference Theory Incompatible with Physicalism?” Journal of Philosophy, 108(5): 255–268. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D. M., 1986, “The Nature of Possibility”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16(4): 575–594. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Bacon, Andrew, 2018, “Is Reality Fundamentally Qualitative?”, Philosophical Studies, 176: 259–295. (Scholar)
- Baltimore, Joseph, 2014, “Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities”, Metaphysica, 15: 209–217. (Scholar)
- Bassford, Andrew, 2020, “A Response to Chisholm’s
Paradox”, Philosophical Studies, 177:
1137–1155. (Scholar)
- Bird, Alexander, 2007, Nature’s Metaphysics,
Clarendon Press: Oxford. (Scholar)
- Black, Max, 1952, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”, Mind, 61: 153–164. (Scholar)
- Black, Robert, 2000, “Against Quidditism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78(1): 87–104. (Scholar)
- Bowers, Justin and Wallace, Meg, 2018, “The Haecceitic
Euthyphro Problem”, Analysis, 78: 13–22. (Scholar)
- Bricker, Phillip, 1988, “Review of Forbes’ The
Metaphysics of Modality”, Philosophical Review,
47: 127–131. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Concrete Possible Worlds” in Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Blackwell: Oxford, 111–134 (Scholar)
- Brighouse, Carolyn, 1994, “Spacetime and Holes”, Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 117–125. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Determinism and Modality”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48: 465–481. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, Richard, 1968, “Some Remarks on Essentialism”, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 615–626. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, Roderick, 1967, “Identity through Possible Worlds”, Noûs, 1: 1–8. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, Person and Object, La Salle: Open Court. (Scholar)
- Cover, Jan, and O’Leary-Hawthorne, John, 1997.
“Framing the Thisness Issue”, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 75: 102–108. (Scholar)
- Cowling, Sam. 2012, “Haecceitism for Modal Realists”, Erkenntnis, 77: 399–417. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “Non-Qualitative Properties”, Erkenntnis, 80: 275–301. (Scholar)
- Daly, Chris and Liggins, David, 2010, “Do Object-Dependent Properties Threaten Physicalism?” Journal of Philosophy, 107: 610–614. (Scholar)
- Dasgupta, Shamik, 2009, “Individuals: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, 145: 35–67. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Bare Necessities”,
Philosophical Perspectives, 25: 115–159. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Can We Do Without Fundamental
Individuals? Yes” in Elizabeth Barnes (ed.), Current
Controversies in Metaphysics, London: Routledge, 7–23. (Scholar)
- Della Rocca, Michael, 2005, “Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres, and the Identity of Indiscernibles”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86: 480–492. (Scholar)
- Diehl, Catharine, 2022, “Haecceitism without Individuals”, Inquiry, published online 03 July 2022. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2022.2075919 (Scholar)
- Diekemper, Joseph, 2009, “Thisness and Events”, Journal of Philosophy, 106: 255–276. (Scholar)
- Divers, John, 2002, Possible Worlds, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Dorr, Cian, and Hawthorne, John with Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani, 2021, The Bounds of Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Earman, John and Norton, John, 1987, “What Price Spacetime Substantivalism? The Hole Story”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 38: 515–525. (Scholar)
- Eddon, Maya, 2011, “Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82: 314–336. (Scholar)
- Fara, Delia Graff, 2009, “Dear Haecceitism”, Erkenntnis, 70: 285–297. (Scholar)
- Fine, Kit, 1994, “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16. (Scholar)
- Forbes, Graeme, 1985, The Metaphysics of Possibility,
Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Two Solutions to
Chisholm’s Paradox”, Philosophical Studies, 46:
171–187. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Melia on Modalism”, Philosophical Studies, 68: 57–63. (Scholar)
- Hawley, Katherine, 2009, “Identity and Indiscernibility”, Mind, 118: 101–119. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, John, 2002a, “Advice for Physicalists”, Philosophical Studies, 109(1): 17–52. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002b, “Causal Structuralism”, Noûs, 35: 361–378. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Identity”, in Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 99–130. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, John, and David Manley, 2012, The Reference Book, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hazen, Allen P., 1979, “Counterpart Theoretic Semantics for Modal Logic” Journal of Philosophy, 76: 319–338. (Scholar)
- Heller, Mark, 1998, “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds”, Journal of Philosophy, 95: 293–316. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Anti-Essentialism and Counterpart Theory”, The Monist, 88: 600–618. (Scholar)
- Hoffmann-Kolss, Vera, 2019, “Defining Qualitative Properties”, Erkenntnis, 84: 995–1010. (Scholar)
- Hofweber, Thomas, 2005, “Supervenience and Object-Dependent Properties”, Journal of Philosophy, 102: 5–32. (Scholar)
- Jubien, Michael, 1993, Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, David, 1975, “How to Russell a Frege-Church”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 716–729. (Scholar)
- Kment, Boris, 2012, “Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals”, Philosophical Review, 121: 573–609. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1983, “New Work for a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983b, “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”, Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Ramseyan Humility”, in Robert Nola and David Braddon-Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 203–222. (Scholar)
- Locke, Dustin, 2009, “A Partial Defense of Ramseyan Humility”, in Robert Nola and David Braddon-Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 223–241. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Quidditism without Quiddities”, Philosophical Studies, 160(3): 345–363. (Scholar)
- Losonsky, Michael, 1987, “Individual Essences”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 24: 253–260. (Scholar)
- Mackie, Penelope, 2007, How Things Might Have Been, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Markosian, Ned, 2004, “In Defense of Presentism”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 1: 47–82. (Scholar)
- Maudlin, Tim, 1988, “The Essence of Space-Time”, Philosophy of Science (PSA Proceedings), 2: 82–91 (Scholar)
- McDaniel, Kris, 2004, “Modal Realism with Overlap”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 137–152. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, The Fragmentation of Being, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- McMichael, Alan, 1983, “A Problem for Actualism about Possible Worlds”, Philosophical Review, 92: 49–66. (Scholar)
- McKay, Thomas, 1986, “Against Constitutional Sufficiency Principles”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 295–304. (Scholar)
- Melia, Joseph, 1999, “Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions of Determinism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50: 639–664. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, Modality, McGill-Queen’s University Press: Montreal. (Scholar)
- Menzel, Christopher, 2018, “Haecceities and Mathematical Structuralism”, Philosophia Mathematica, 26: 84–111. (Scholar)
- Nelson, Michael, 2007, “Ways an Actualist Might Be”,
Philosophical Studies, 133: 455–471. (Scholar)
- Nichols, Shaun, 2008, “Imagination and the I”, Mind and Language, 23(5): 518–535. (Scholar)
- Ninan, Dilip, 2009, “Persistence and the First-Person Perspective”, Philosophical Review, 118: 425–464. (Scholar)
- Nolan, Daniel, 2001, Topics in the Philosophy of Possible Worlds, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Olson , Eric, 2012, “In Search of the Simple View”, in Georg Gasser and Matthias Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Simple or Complex?, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 44–62. (Scholar)
- Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Paul, L. A., 2004, “The Context of Essence”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 170–184. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, Christopher, 1999, Being Known, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, “Imagination, Experience, and Possibility”, in John Foster and Howard Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, Alvin, 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, “The Boethian Compromise”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 129–138. (Scholar)
- Plate, Jan, 2022. “Qualitative Properties and Relations”, Philosophical Studies, 176: 1297–1322. (Scholar)
- Pooley, Oliver, 2006, “Points, Particles, and Structural Realism”, in Dean Rickles et al. (eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 83–120. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Substantivalist and Relationalist Approaches to Spacetime”, in Robert Batterman (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Robertson, Teresa, 1998, “Possibilities and the Arguments for Origin Essentialism”, Mind, 107: 729–749. (Scholar)
- Robinson, Denis, 1989, “Matter, Motion, and Humean Supervenience”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67(4): 394–409. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Identities, Distinctnesses, Truthmakers, and Indiscernibility Principles”, Logique et Analyse, 43: 145–183. (Scholar)
- Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo, 2006, “How not to trivialise the identity of indiscernibles”, in P. F. Strawson and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Concepts, Properties and Qualities: London: Ashgate, 205–223. (Scholar)
- –––, 2022, Two Arguments for the
Identity of Indiscernibles, Oxford: Oxford. (Scholar)
- Rosenkrantz, Gary, 1979, “The Pure and the Impure”, Logique et Analyse, 88: 515–523. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, Haecceity, Kluwer: Dordrecht. (Scholar)
- Russell, Jeffrey, 2013a, “Possible Worlds and the Objective World”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013b, “Actuality for Counterpart Theorists”, Mind, 122: 85–134. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “On Where Things Could Be”, Philosophy of Science, 81: 60–80. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Quality and Quantifiers“, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96: 562–577. (Scholar)
- Salmon, Nathan, 1986, “Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 75–120. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “The Logic of What Might Have Been”, Philosophical Review, 98: 3–34. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “This Side of Paradox”, Philosophical Topics, 21: 187–197. (Scholar)
- Scarpati, Maria, 2021, “Anti-haecceitism and Fundamentality”, Erkenntnis, published online 08 December 2021. doi: 10.1007/s10670-021-00499-2 (Scholar)
- Schaffer, Jonathan, 2005, “Quiddistic Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, 123(1): 1–32. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, Sydney, 1980, “Causality and Properties”, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel, 109–35. (Scholar)
- Shumener, Erica, 2020, “Explaining Identity and Distinctness”, Philosophical Studies, 177: 2073–2096. (Scholar)
- Sider, Theodore, 2002, “The Ersatz Pluriverse”, Journal of Philosophy, 99: 279–315. (Scholar)
- Simmons, Byron, 2020, “Impure Concepts and Non-qualitative Properties”, Synthese, 197: 3065–3086. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021. “Fundamental Non-qualitative Properties”, Synthese, 198: 6183–6206. (Scholar)
- Skiles, Alexander, 2019. “There is no Haecceitic Euthyphro Problem”, Analysis, 79: 477–484. (Scholar)
- Skow, Bradford, 2008, “Haecceitism, Anti-Haecceitism, and
Possible Worlds”, Philosophical Quarterly, 58:
98–107. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘More on Haecceitism and Possible Worlds”, Analytic Philosophy, 52: 267–269. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert, 1979, “Anti-Essentialism”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 343–355. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, Mere Possibilities, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Swinburne, Richard, 1995, “Thisness”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73: 389–400. (Scholar)
- Turner, Jason, 2017, “Can We Do Without Fundamental
Individuals? No” in Elizabeth Barnes (ed.), Current
Controversies in Metaphysics, London: Routledge, 24–34. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, Peter, 2004, “A Theory of Properties”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 1: 107–138. (Scholar)
- Velleman, David, 1996, “Self to Self”, Philosophical Review, 105: 39–76. (Scholar)
- Wang, Jennifer, 2016, “The Nature of Properties: Causal Essentialism and Quidditism”, Philosophy Compass, 11: 168–176. (Scholar)
- Whittle, Ann, 2006, “On An Argument for Humility”, Philosophical Studies, 130: 461–497. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen, 1988, “Review of Forbes’ The
Metaphysics of Modality”, Journal of Philosophy,
85: 329–337. (Scholar)