Primary Sources: Works by Hume

• A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition, David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (eds.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007. (References to this work start with T and are followed by Book, Part, Section and paragraph number, in parentheses in the text.)
• A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford Philosophical Texts), David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (eds.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000.
• A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
• An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.) (The Claredon Edition of the Works of David Hume), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998. (References to this work start with EPM and are followed by Part, Section (if any), and paragraph number, in parentheses within the text.)
• Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975
• Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, Eugene Miller (ed.), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985.

Secondary Sources

• Abramson, Kate, 2001, “Sympathy and the Project of Hume’s Second Enquiry,” Archiv für Geschichte der Phiosophie, 83(1): 45–80. (Scholar)
• Ainslie, Donald C. and Butler, Annemarie, 2015, The Cambridge Companion to Hume’s Treatise, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Árdal, Páll, 1966, Passion and Value in Hume’s Treatise, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; 2^nd edition, revised, 1989. (Scholar)
• –––, 1977a, “Another Look at Hume’s Account of Moral Evaluation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 15: 405–421. (Scholar)
• –––, 1977b, “Convention and Value,” in David Hume: Bicentenary Papers, G.P. Morice (ed.), Austin: University of Texas Press, pp. 51–68. (Scholar)
• Baier, Annette C., 1988, “Hume’s Account of Social Artifice — Its Origins and Originality,” Ethics, 98: 757–778. (Scholar)
• –––, 1991, A Progress of Sentiments, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, The Cautious Jealous Virtue: Hume on Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Baron, Marcia, 1982, “Hume’s Noble Lie: An Account of His Artificial Virtues,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12: 539–55. (Scholar)
• Blackburn, Simon, 1993, “Hume on the Mezzanine Level,” Hume Studies, 19 (2): 273–288. (Scholar)
• Botros, Sophie, 2006, Hume, Reason and Morality: A legacy of contradiction, London and New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Bricke, John, 1996, Mind and Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Brown, Charlotte, 1988, “Is Hume an Internalist?” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26: 69–87. (Scholar)
• Capaldi, Nicholas, 1975, David Hume: The Newtonian Philosopher, Boston: Twayne Publishing. (Scholar)
• –––, 1989, Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy, New York: Peter Lang. (Scholar)
• Chappell, V.C. (ed.), 1996, Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City, NY: Doubleday. (Scholar)
• Cohon, Rachel, 1997a, “The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57 (4): 827–850. (Scholar)
• –––, 1997b, “Hume’s Difficulty with the Virtue of Honesty,” Hume Studies, 23 (1): 91–112. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001a, “The Shackles of Virtue: Hume on Allegiance to Government,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 18 (4): 393–413. (Scholar)
• ––– (ed.), 2001b, Hume: Moral and Political Philosophy, Aldershot, England and Burlington, Vermont: Dartmouth/Ashgate. (Scholar)
• –––, 2008, Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Coventry, Angela and Sager, Alexander, 2019, The Humean Mind, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Darwall, Stephen, 1995, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Dees, Richard H., 1997, “Hume on the Characters of Virtue,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 35 (1): 45–65. (Scholar)
• Falk, W.D., 1976, “Hume on Is and Ought,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 6: 359–378. (Scholar)
• Flew, Antony, 1963, “On the Interpretation of Hume,”Philosophy, 38: 178–181. (Scholar)
• Foot, Philippa, 1963, “Hume on Moral Judgment,” in D. Pears (ed.), David Hume: A Symposium, London: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 74–80. (Scholar)
• Forbes, Duncan, 1975, Hume’s Philosophical Politics, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1977, “Hume’s Science of Politics” in David Hume: Bicentenary Papers, G.P. Morice (ed.), Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, pp. 39–50. (Scholar)
• Garrett, Don, 1997, Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2007, “The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared,” Hume Studies, 33 (2): 257–288. (Scholar)
• Gauthier, David, 1979, “David Hume, Contractarian,” The Philosophical Review, 88: 3–38. (Scholar)
• –––, 1992, “Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave,” Hume Studies, 18 (2): 401–427. (Scholar)
• Gill, Michael, 2000, “Hume’s Progressive View of Human Nature,” Hume Studies, 26 (1): 87–108. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Haakonssen, Knud, 1981, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Hampton, Jean, 1995, “Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason?”, Hume Studies, 21 (1): 57–74. (Scholar)
• Harris, James A., 2015, Hume: An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Harrison, Jonathan, 1981, Hume’s Theory of Justice, Oxford, Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1976, Hume’s Moral Epistemology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Hudson, W.D., 1964, “Hume on Is and Ought,” The Philosophical Quaterly, 14: 246–252. (Scholar)
• Hunter Geoffrey, 1962, “Hume on Is and Ought,” Philosophy, 37: 148–152. (Scholar)
• –––, 1963, “Reply to Professor Flew,” Philosophy, 38: 182–184. (Scholar)
• Hutcheson, Francis, 1742, Illustrations on the Moral Sense, Bernard Peach (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Jensen, Henning, 1977, “Hume on Moral Agreement,” Mind, 86: 497–513. (Scholar)
• Kail, P. J. E., 2007, Projection and Realism in Hume’s Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Korsgaard, Christine M., 1999, “The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume’s Ethics,” Hume Studies, 25 (1/2): 3–41. (Scholar)
• Livingston, Donald W., 1984, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
• Loeb, Louis, 1977, “Hume’s Moral Sentiments and the Structure of the Treatise,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 15: 395–403. (Scholar)
• MacIntyre, A.C., 1959, “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’,” Philosophical Review, 68: 451–468. (Scholar)
• Mackie, J.L., 1980, Hume’s Moral Theory, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Magri, Tito, 1996, “Natural Obligation and Normative Motivation in Hume’s Treatise,” Hume Studies, 22 (2): 231–253. (Scholar)
• McIntyre, Jane, 1990, “Character: A Humean Account,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 7: 193–206. (Scholar)
• Miller, David, 1981, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Millgram, Elijah, 1995, “Was Hume a Humean?,” Hume Studies, 21 (1): 75–93. (Scholar)
• Morice, G. P. (ed.), 1977, David Hume: Bicentenary Papers, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. (Scholar)
• Norton, David Fate, 1982, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985, “Hume’s Moral Ontology,” Hume Studies, 11 (Supplement): 189–214. (Scholar)
• ––– (ed.), 1993, The Cambridge Companion to Hume, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993a, “Hume, Human Nature, and the Foundations of Morality,” in Fate 1993, pp. 148–182. (Scholar)
• Norton, David Fate, and Jacqueline Taylor (eds.), 2008, The Cambridge Companion to Hume, second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Persson, Ingmar, 1997, “Hume — Not a ‘Humean’ about Motivation,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 14 (2): 189–206. (Scholar)
• Radcliffe, Elizabeth S., 1996, “How Does the Humean Sense of Duty Motivate?,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 34 (3): 383–407. (Scholar)
• –––, 1997, “Kantian Tunes on a Humean Instrument: Why Hume is not Really a Skeptic about Practical Reasoning,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 27 (2): 247–270. (Scholar)
• ––– (ed.), 2008, A Companion to Hume, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
• Raphael, D.D. (ed.), 1991, British Moralsits 1650 — 1800, Volume I, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
• Schneewind, J. B., 1998, The Invention of Autonomy, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. (Scholar)
• Setiya, Kieran, 2016, “Hume on Practical Reason,” reprinted in Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Smith, Norman Kemp, 1941, The Philosophy of David Hume, London: Macmillian. (Scholar)
• Snare, Francis, 1991, Morals, Motivation and Convention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Stewart, John B., 1992, Opinion and Reform in Hume’s Political Philosophy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Stroud, Barry, 1977, Hume, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, “Gliding or ‘Staining’ The World with ‘Sentiments’ and ‘Phantasms,’” Hume Studies, 19 (2): 253–272. (Scholar)
• Sturgeon, Nicholas, 2001, “Moral Skepticism and Moral Naturalism in Hume’s Treatise,” Hume Studies, 21 (1): 3–83. (Scholar)
• Swain, Corliss, 1992, “Passionate Objectivity,” Noûs, 26 (4): 465–490. (Scholar)
• Taylor, Jacqueline, 1998, “Justice and the Foundations of Social Morality in Hume’s Treatise,” Hume Studies, 24 (1): 5–30. (Scholar)
• –––, 2002, “Hume on the Standard of Virtue,” Journal of Ethics, 6: 43–62. (Scholar)
• –––, 2015, Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy and Society in Hume’s Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Traiger, Saul (ed.), 2006, The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
• Whelan, Frederick, 1981, Order and Artifice in Hume’s Political Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Wiggins, David, 1998, “A Sensible Subjectivism?” in Needs, Values, Truth, 3^rd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 185–210. (Scholar)